Public participation : principles and practice : the legal regulation of water pollution by Burton, Timothy Paul
THE UIlVERSITY OF HULL 
Mpublic Participation: Principles and Practice 
- The Legal Regulation of Water Pollution" 
being a Thesis submitted for the Degree of Ph D 
in the University of Hull 
by 
Timothy Paul Burton LLB (eNAA) 
October 1990 
PRE F ACE 
"Power may justly be compared to a great river; while kept within its 
bounds it is both beautiful and useful, but when it overflows its banks, 
it is then too impetuous to be stemmed; it bears down on all before it, 
and brings destruction and desolation wherever it comes" <Andrew 
Hamilton, from Quotations for our Time, 1977, p. 397). 
For Lorraine 
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I • T ROD U C T I a • 
In Britain opportunities to 
but this is in relation 
participate in policy-making are provided 
to many different types of decisions and 
very different degrees. It can. therefore. decision-makers. and to 
plausibly be argued that participation as a principle has been accepted 
by successive administrations at all levels of government. The central 
problem. it will be argued, relates to the way in which this principle 
has been translated into practice. In 
when and how to provide participation 
particular, that the decision of 
has never been subjected to 
rational analysis across the whole spectrum of administration. Two 
consequences have flowed from this. First, that opportunities have been 
provided in relation to some but not all decision-makers and decisions. 
Second. when opportunities have been provided. they have not been 
provided to the public 
groupings have been 
per se 
provided 
sufficiently often - either particular 
access to the decision-maker, 
with "privileged" and hence "unequal" 
or opportunities have been provided in 
easily be utilised without significant such a way that they cannot 
constraints being imposed on the participation process. The effect of 
the latter has been that the opportunities are either very difficult to 
utilise or they do not provide a real possibility of influencing the 
outcome of the decision and actions of the decision-makers. Hence, it is 
suspected that opportunities for participation are often provided 
without real comDdtment on the part af the administration. so that the 
principle is partly disregarded as the result of bargaining, and thus as 
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a concession to "powerful" interest groupings. Participation is then 
little more than "legitimation" or "tokenism" - the appearance but not 
the reality. 
It is the intention of this thesis to contend that a "principled 
approach" to public participation in the practice of British government 
is needed. In particular it is submitted that both the decision of when 
to provide opportunities, and the 
opportunities, should be subjected to 
extent 
the kind 
and nature of such 
of rational analysis 
which it has been suggested is presently absent. There are two aspects 
to this "principled approach" which will be put forward here. First, the 
comprehensive provision of opportunities, in relation to all types of 
decision and decision-maker, with equal access for all who wish to 
participate. In particular participation must be directed to the actual 
locus of decision-making - in other words, there is no value in seeking 
to influence a local councillor where the decision is to be made by 
central government. Second, the provision of opportunities which can 
actually be utilised in practice to the benefit both of those wishing to 
take part and of the decision-maker in question. Thus, public 
participation should not bring the administration to a standstill, but 
neither should the opportunities be such that they are merely "paper 
rights" which cannot be translated into practice. 
The basis of the thesis will, therefore, 
way in which this "principled approach" 
introducing the concept of "meaningful 
be to propose, tentatively, a 
can be achieved in practice, by 
participation". 1 It will be 
suggested that there are three elements which 
participation "meaningful" - the "ability" to 
opportunity, in the form of "channels for 
must be present to make 
participate, the actual 
communication", and the 
willingness on the part of the decision-maker to treat the process as a 
"genuine" exercise, and not impose constraints preventing the practical 
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utilisation of the opportunities. In seeking to develop an approach 
concerned with public participation it is necessary to analyse the 
concept to reveal what it denotes at both the theoretical and practical 
levels, including recognising the interrelationship between the familiar 
public law concepts of "access to information", "consultation", 
"representation", "reason giving", and so on. In particular, it is 
essential to realise that participation does not just relate to 
involvement before a decision is made, but also applies after a decision 
has been made, including during its sUbsequent implementation and 
review. Xeaningful participation, therefore, provides a "standard" 
through which it can be sought to test whether any decision process does 
enable "genuine" public participation, and also a set of principles 
which can be considered in the process of creating new decision 
structures. 
The contention for a principled 
a 
approach, being 
context. Both will requires a justification and 
fully in chapter one, the former based on both 
a normative claim, 
be explained more 
the constitutional 
"expectations" created by concepts of the "rule of law" and delJDcracy, 
and the "substantive" benefits that participation can yield to 
individuals, the policy-maker. and society as a whole, in the form of 
more "accurate" and "acceptable" decisions. In terms of a context, an 
argument for public participation indicates a preference for a move 
towards a more participatory form of democracy. It will be contended 
that the present model of British democracy is too heavily reliant on a 
representative approach which is unsuited to the decision-making needs 
of a complex society. In particular, an approach which places Parliament 
at the heart of the process, in accordance with Diceyean thinking, 
cannot provide adequate public law control over government, nor the 
requisite degree of informed public consent and legitimacy. The views of 
many present-day writers, that British public law is "impoverished", and 
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that there is a need for a -new approach" (witness Prosser [1982]) will, 
therefore, be supported, and the principled approach, based on 
"meaningful participation", put forward as a move towards this. 
I. THE APPROACH OF THE TBHSIS 
An interesting example of an area in which extensive opportunities for 
public participation have apparently been provided, is in relation to 
the regulation of water pollution under the Control of Pollution Act 
1974, Part II (COPA II), re-enacted in the Water Act 1989. The former 
was heralded as an important development for openness in decision-
making, at least in relation to the environment, such that COPA II was 
propounded by the Royal ComDdssion on Environmental Pollution (Tenth 
Report, Cmnd. 9149, 1984) as a model for provisions to be applied 
elsewhere, and may form the basis for the British response to the 
proposed European Community Directive on Freedom of Access to 
Environmental Information. Such a "model" provides an ideal basis for a 
study of the realities of "public participation", and hence, to 
illustrate the way that the concept of meaningful participation can be 
applied to practical examples of decision-making to test whether the 
reality of the opportunities accords with the standard being propounded. 
In turn this provides a basis for practical suggestions as to reforms 
that are required. The main body of the thesis is thus a detailed study 
of the practice of the legal regulation of water pollution, primarily 
between the period of 1 October 1983 and 31 August 1989, although 
reference is made to events preceding that period where necessary to 
provide a full assessment. It is appropriate, here, to explain the 
approach of the thesis in relation to this example of deciSion-making. 
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In chapter one a more detailed 
participation will be provided. 
explanation of the concept of meaningful 
along with the justifications for the 
claim. and the analytical framework used to carry out the comparison 
between the principles of meaningful participation and the practice of 
water pollution control. Given the embryonic nature of the approach 
being put forward. an evaluation of meaningful participation will also 
be included. taking account of potential problems that have been 
identified in relation to applying it to all types of decision-making 
and decision-maker. and the criticisms that have often been levelled 
against public participation. The remainder of the thesis concentrates 
on the chosen example of water pollution control as carried out by the 
former water authorities in England and Wales. 
The chosen example is also significant in relation to the above argument 
that when opportunities are granted it is not always as the result of a 
genuine desire to give wider public involvement and scope for influence 
in policy-making. It has been contended. and this argument will be 
supported as far as it can be tested. that the opportunities that were 
provided in relation to the WAs as a whole. were provided by like-minded 
Governments as concessions to powerful interest groups, rather than 
being designed to provide for the involvement of the public in policy-
making. Further, that this was even more the case in relation to the 
provisions regarding pollution control 
legislation providing for the WAs and 
the framework within which they 
(already mentioned). Because the 
their operative powers. provided 
would operate in practice. the 
intentions of the Executive, at each appropriate point in time, are 
important indicators of the real reasons behind the provisions and the 
way in which they were intended to be used in practice. Thus, in chapter 
two the background and development of the water industry leading to the 
creation of the water authorities in 1974, and their re-constitution in 
1983. will be analysed, along with their arming with extended pollution 
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control powers in 1974. The chapter will then concentrate on the 
opportunities for public participation in relation to, first, the WAs as 
what can be termed "corporate entities", and, second, the pollution 
control function. 
Having set aut the contention that it 
participation should be created in WA 
was nat intended that meaningful 
decision-making, Parts II and III 
are concerned with comparing this expectation with practice. First, the 
operation of the water authorities as corporate entities will be 
considered. This will be achieved by a detailed study of one WA -
Yorkshire Water (chosen for its locality). Chapter three will 
concentrate on outlining the internal structure of Yorkshire Water, its 
relationships with central government, its "closedN comDdttee system, 
and its relations with the Press. Chapter four will concentrate an what 
will be termed the "open" comDdttees, viz. those through which public 
participation of same kind, was intended to be achieved. Although the 
thesis is primarily concerned with the legal regulation of water 
pollution, it is believed that it is vital to be aware of the 
environment within which that regulation took place, and to understand 
the totality of mechanisms which were available for public involvement. 
Part III of the thesis will concentrate, specifically, on the pollution 
control function by outlining the regime through which water pollution 
was regulated, including reference to its historical development, and 
analysis of the provisions for public involvement under COPA II. Chapter 
five will, therefore, look at the British concept of "Water Quality 
Objectives" (WQOs) and "Water Quality Standards· (VQSs) which was 
developed in the mid to late 1970s in response to pressures from the 
European Community (mainly in the farm of a series of Directives 
relating to water). Chapter six will be concerned with the process of 
regulating individual discharges to rivers, whether "systematic" (as 
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from a sewage treatment works or industrial plant via an outfall) or 
"irregular" (such as a spillage or leak from a storage tanker). In the 
former category the scope for public involvement was far greater and 
hence, forms the basis of the chapter. but account will be taken of the 
latter because of its potential importance in water pollution control 
terms. The "consents" (licences) which were required for each discharge 
to river were set with reference to the quality objectives and standards 
laid down for the river in question. Chapter seven is then concerned 
with the process through which the conditions of such consents were 
monitored for compliance and enforced where compliance was not achieved. 
In each case it will be sought to identify the opportunities which were 
provided for participation and to compare them with the requirements of 
meaningful participation. Part III includes reference to the practice of 
WAs other than Yorkshire Water, although the main emphasis will continue 
to be on the latter. 
The final section of the thesis (Part IV chapter eight) will be 
concerned to draw together the conclusions from the case study. and to 
re-evaluate the concept of meaningful participation and the analytical 
approach. However. given the major changes that took place on 1 
September 1989, under the Water Act. it is necessary to identify whether 
the changes are likely to lead to more meaningful participation in the 
legal regulation of water pollution. As far as can be assessed at this 
early stage, therefore. the implications of the changes in the industry, 
in respect of the issues raised in Parts II and III of the thesis, will 
be outlined. 
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I I • YHY STUDY THE VAs? 
Although the work is primarily concerned with water pollution control 
(within the context of the VAs as a whale) as an example of decision-
making, there are a number of factors, including constitutional 
implications, which make the VAs (as constituted before September 1989) 
of particular interest to public lawyers. 
First, the actual status of the WAs has been a matter of some confusion. 
They were located within the area of government often referred to as 
"quasi-government .. (Birkinshaw, 1985b) or the "extended state", while 
Saunders (1983, p. 71) has suggested that they formed part of a "third 
... level of the state apparatus" which he called the "Regional State", 
their history having been very clearly rooted in local government. While 
they have also been described as "independent public corporations" 
(Purdue, 1979, p. 121) they were treated by government as akin to 
nationalised industries, both in their internal constitution (especially 
from 1983) and their subjecting to the same financial controls as other 
nationalised industries. 2 Paradoxically, the first step towards the 
privatisation of the 
nationalisation (termed 
utility functions in 1989, 
"vesting") under the Water Act 
was their 
1989, which 
marked the completion of the enforced move away from local government 
control towards the centre. 3 It may also be argued that the process of 
privatisation led to a major "politicisation" of the WAs and water 
services, in a way un-precedented in this country. The 1980s also saw 
another external "actor" have a major effect on the work of the WAs. By 
then a number of Be Directives on the aquatic environment were reaching 
the end of their periods for implementation, with the WAs deSignated as 
the "competent authorities" charged with securing that implementation. 
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Second. the very nature of the functions of the VAs makes them 
interesting. They were specifically created as multi-functional bodies 
to provide for more "co-ordinatedM management of the water cycle. with 
attendant benefits in economies of scale. One feature of this was that 
they were responsible for the essential functions of water supply and 
sewage disposal while simultaneously being charged with regulating 
inputs to the water environment commonly termed the " poacher-
gamekeeper" conflict. To compound this conflict, the function of 
regulation was significant by itself, in giving the VAs extensive policy 
discretion, not only in enforcing the law (common to many regulators) 
but also to define the limits of the law through the setting of 
standards in individual discharge consents - or what is usually known as 
"rule-making". 4 Furthermore, until the implementation of the provisions 
for public involvement in COPA II (in the mid-1980s), the VAs were used 
to close relationships with those they regulated, with limited external 
scrutiny of decision-making; the 
the possibility of cutting across 
introduction of the public presented 
this 
extra "dimension". The late 1980s have 
relationship 
thus been 
and providing an 
an ideal time to 
consider issues of law. government, the environment and the public. 
1989 ODNards. While the thesis is an historical study of the WAs, it 
may be suggested that the water industry after 1989 is equally worthy of 
analysis, because of the complex nature of the institutions and the 
mechanisms for regulation - both economic, of the privatised companies 
by a non-ministerial government department - and of the environment, by 
the National Rivers Authority, retained in the public sector. With the 
publication of the Environmental Protection Bill in December 1989. it is 
expected that HXIP will take on an increasing role in relation to water 
pollution. especially with regard to the mast dangerous substances. A 
US-style Environmental Protection Agency is now nearer than it has ever 
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been, in stark contrast to the fragmented structure of pollution control 
before 1974. The post 1989 water industry also highlights the increasing 
importance of the public/private divide and the way this is becoming 
increasingly obscured 
III. THE SIGIIFICAICH OF THE THESIS 
It is suggested that the significance of the thesis lies, first, in 
putting forward a concept of participation which can be applied to the 
practice of decision-makers and decision-making, and which will help to 
promote thinking about the notion of "participation" both what it 
involves, and the problems of making it "effective" in practice. Second, 
an assessment of the water pollution control regime is timely (given the 
issues noted above). It will be contended that it is vital that the 
regime operates in the way intended so that, where agreement, based on 
informed public consent, is reached as to the way in which the aquatic 
environment is to be protected, this is not negated by a failure to 
achieve what has been agreed. It will be one of the themes of the work 
that, while on paper the pollution control system had a great deal of 
merit, it was never given the opportunity to work in practice, with the 
effect that any public agreement had limited meaning and impact. 
I V . XlITHOOOLOGY 
Reference can be made to the scope of the work and the way in which data 
was obtained and applied. The initial interest in public participation 
in the regulation of water pollution control was inspired by a pilot 
study, carried out with DAC Freestone, funded by a University of Hull 
"seedcornM grant, which sought to identify possible implications of COPA 
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II at the time when implementation had just commenced. s Having then 
decided to focus on the provisions concerned with the involvement of the 
public, it became clear that a more holistic approach was needed, with 
account being taken of all available opportunities for public 
partiCipation in relation to the WAs, not just those provided under COPA 
II. Account also needed to be taken of the environment within which 
pollution control decision-making took place, both the interrelationship 
with other WA functions - and hence the priorities of the WAs - and also 
the external influences and controls to which the WAs were subject -
notably central government and the EC. 
Awareness of these needs suggested a preference for studying one example 
VA in greater depth. Yorkshire Water was chosen for its locality, given 
resource limitations, rather than any notion of typicality, and only 
limited comparison with other WAs was possible. Such comparison has, 
however, been made where practical, and two particular events shaped the 
nature of the examples considered, viz. two public local inquiries in 
the Anglian Water region and a number of private prosecutions of WAs. 
These were studied because of their significance, albeit they did not 
involve Yorkshire Water. Two exclusions, in the case of Yorkshire Water, 
must also be noted. First, in and around the city of York, water was 
supplied by the York Waterworks Company (a privately owned "statutoryM 
water company) acting as the 
to the company were only 
participation by the public 
agent of Yorkshire Water. Issues relating 
considered to the extent that there was 
through facilities provided by Yorkshire 
Water, namely in the form of the Yorkshire Water Consumer Consultative 
Committee for the North and East Division, of which the York WiC was a 
statutory member. Second, land drainage has historically been subject to 
unique arrangements which largely survived the 1974 re-organisation, 
with the effect that the WAs were granted no more than superVisory roles 
over the function, executive decisions being made by a combination of a 
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committee of the WAs - the Regional Land Drainage Comndttee - and the 
Internal Drainage Boards (under the Land Drainage Acts). It was 
perceived that, despite the need for an holistic approach, this function 
could be excluded from detailed consideration because of these 
arrangements. s 
In relation to the pollution control function, the emphasis of the work 
is on those discharges which were made direct to waterways (hence termed 
"direct" discharges), as opposed to those made to sewers first (commonly 
known as Mtrade effluentM or MindirectM discharges). This was because 
there were 
respect of 
virtually no 
the latter; 
opportunities 
almost all of 
for public participation in 
COPA II dealt with direct 
discharges. As already indicated, most of the work is concerned with the 
period 1 October 1983 to 31 August 1989. This provided a convenient time 
period for a number of reasons. From 1 October 1983 the newly 
constituted WAs began operation with significant Changes to their 
internal structures, but coupled with very different arrangements for 
public participation. The end of the period marks the date (at midnight) 
at which the WAs ceased to exist and were formally split into (wholly 
government owned) utility companies (ready for privatisation three 
months later) and the National Rivers Authority.7 This time period, 
therefore, provided an opportunity to study the (then) existing 
structure, and to make comparisons with pre-existing arrangements. 
Data was collected in a variety of ways (as far as permitted by resource 
constraints) including written requests to Menvironmental" groups and 
the VAs, and informal interviews with VA staff and Board members,s and 
members of "environmental" groups (including attendance at some of their 
meetings). In relation to the various facilities for participation, the 
opportunity was taken to attend these wherever possible, including the 
Yorkshire Water committees, the local inquiries, and use of the public 
- 12 -
registers (relating to discharge consents). Full details of this process 
of data collection are provided in Appendix A. Information and 
developments are included up to, and including, 1 January 1990. 
V. THEORETICAL APPROACH 
The theoretical basis for the thesis was developed half-way through the 
period of research, adopting the Minductive" method. 9 The concept of 
meaningful participation, and the analytical framework coupled with 
this, were then subjected to external assessment, and modification as 
deemed appropriate. 10 The opportunity was also taken to publish as much 
of the findings as possible, appropriate reference to which will be made 
throughout the course of the thesis. 
Having developed the concept of meaningful 
limitations (given its embryonic nature) must be 
suggested that the key to public participation 
raison d'etre) is the opportunity to influence 
participation, its 
recorded. It will be 
(although not its sole 
the outcome of the 
decision. It has not been attempted to test whether in practice the WAs, 
and in particular Yorkshire Water, were influenced in their decision-
making <although there were exceptional cases where they clearly had, or 
had not, been) because of the difficulties of reliably identifying this. 
The approach, therefore, has been to highlight the importance of this 
factor as a pre-requisite for participation, and thus included as part 
of the definition of "meaningful participation" in the form of the need 
for the decision-maker to be "open to influenceM and deal equally with 
all members of the public (thereby denying "privileged" access). Such an 
approach could, however, be used as the basis for future research which 
could seek to test whether a decision-maker was "open to influence" in 
any given decision process. 
- 13 -
IOTRS: 
1 Based on the term used by Fagence (1977). 
2 But see the Eighteenth Report of the Public Accounts Committee, Cmnd. 
249, 1984/5, para. 32. Purdue (1979, p. 124) has also pointed out the 
way that, before 1979, they were subject to the Select Committee on 
the Nationalised Industries as well as the jurisdiction of the 
Commissioners for Local Administration. 
3 For a critique of this trend, see KcAuslan and KcEldowney (1985). 
A Ironically it was feared that they would not be adequate regulators, 
both before 1983, because they were dominated by local authority 
interests (where it was argued local authorities had failed in the 
past to minimise pollution), and after 1983, when they were then 
dominated by members with business backgrounds and interests. (See 
for instance the Parliamentary Debates during the enactment of COPA 
IU. 
6 Published as Burton and Freestone, "The Control of Pollution Act 1974 
and Tidal Waters: Problems of the Implementation of Part II", (1986) 
1 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal Law 241. 
~ In practical terms, the only consequence of this exclusion was that 
the Regional Land Drainage Committee was not included as one of the 
Authority committees to which the Press and public were admdtted. 
7 Care should be taken with the period from 1 April 1989, as, from this 
date, the WAs began operating in their "shadow units", separate in 
practical terms, but still under the control of the VA as a whole. 
S This process was established, during the course of the pilot study, 
referred to above, to be very informative, and helped to establish a 
range of "contacts". 
9 For instance, used by Xilbrath (1965). 
10 Different stages of the the development of the theoretical approach 
were presented to a University of Hull Law School Seminar (January 
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1989) and to a session at the Socia-Legal Studies Conference <April 
1989). In the light of the latter, the term -The Exchange of 
Information" was replaced by the broader concept of MMeaningful 
Participation". 
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CHAPTER aIE 
Public Participation: The Principles 
In this chapter it is intended to develop the justifications for, and 
rationale of, the concept of meaningful participation, and then to 
explain and evaluate the concept. Finally, the analytical approach, 
which will be applied to the case study in the main body of the thesis, 
will be outlined. 
I. JUSTIFICATIOIfS FOR THE CLAII FOR -JmAIIIGFUL PARTICIPATlor 
The essence of the argument, to support the claim for an approach based 
on meaningful partiCipation, is that the "pr1ncipleM of public 
participation in the policy-making of government has been accepted by 
successive administrations, especially in central government, and that 
this acceptance cannot, therefore, be retracted. The key problem is, 
however, that the principle has not been translated into practice on a 
systematic and comprehensive basis for all decisions and all 
decision-makers - offering equal access for all who wish to participate. 
The effect of this has been to deny real opportunities to influence 
policy-making and policy-makers. 
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In developing such an argument an important distinction needs to be 
drawn between acceptance in principle and acceptance in practice. In 
particular, it is suggested that there is a difference between what may 
be stated "officially" and what a person/body really means or does. This 
is in part a reflection of the difference between the "law in the books" 
and the "law in action". In making this distinction reference can be 
made to the notion of "legitimation" which involves "an ideological 
dimension in which the exercise of power is mediated and given 
justification" (Prosser, 1986, p. 6). In other words, that it presents 
law as a neutral process which can achieve the aimed for goals, but this 
is no more than a facade behind which lies the real rationale for the 
actions in question. Thus, it may be 
of the opportunities for public 
"legitimation". 1 
suggested that the reality of many 
participation are a process of 
A. The Acceptance of the Principle 
Although there is no general common law duty to consult (Bates v Lord 
Hailsham [1972] 1 WLR 1373), and an absence of the kind of statutory 
procedures for participation in rule-making provided by the 
Administrative Procedure Act 1946 in the USA, it is submitted that the 
principle of public participation is clearly established in the British 
state. Two significant examples can be used to illustrate this. First 
the use of Green and White 
documents prior to the enacting 
for participation in relation to 
papers, and other consultation/policy 
of legislation. Second, the procedures 
town and country planning <whether in 
relation to planning permission for a home extension or for the siting 
of a nuclear reactor) and the process of structure and local plans. 
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Xore recently, in relation to the environment, opportunities for public 
participation have become more widespread, although it was as early as 
1970 that the then Conservative Administration appeared to accept that 
the public had an important role to play in decision-making about the 
environment, especially in the "value judgment" of how much the public 
would be prepared to pay to protect the environment. 2 The Control of 
Pollution Act 1974 introduced important rights in relation to a number 
of areas of the environment, mast notably water <under Part II), which 
was further strengthened by the Water Act 1983. 3 In a wider context, an 
example - albeit less immediately obvious is that of the involvement 
of the public in the service of juries, a process seen as a fundamental 
feature of the administration of justice. 
B. Public Participation in Practice 
The crux of the argument being presented here is that this acceptance in 
principle has not been translated into acceptance in practice; the 
commdtment to achieve the kind of "principled" approach argued for here, 
has thus been absent. Although few areas of decision-making are now 
closed to public participation (and indeed some such as national 
security - must necessarily remain closed), it can be argued that in 
many cases where opportunities are apparently provided they do not 
genuinely offer a means through which the public can influence the 
outcome of the decision, either because the key issues are not open to 
the public participation process,· or because the outcome has been pre-
determined. s 
The most significant problem, it is contended, is that of the 
"privileged access" to information and the decision-maker which is 
offered to certain "favoured" groups. While the actual extent of this is 
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difficult to establish (primarily because so much remains hidden), 
reference to it, in analyses 
instance, Gunningham (1974), 
of decision-making, are plentiful. For 
in his case-study of law-making and 
implementation in air pollution control, argues that his study verifies 
the Mconflict theoryM (that law-making is nat a neutral process but the 
result of bargaining with powerful groups). XcAuslan (1980) has 
contended that idealogies of "private propertyM and "public interest" 
operate to exclude "public participation" in planning. 6 This notion of 
"privileged access" reached its peak in the development of 
"corporatism"7 during the 1970s. A related problem, it is suggested, is 
that of the lack of "competenceM of the public to participate, either 
because of a lack of knowledge of the decision process, or of how to 
participate. It can be argued that there has been no concerted attempt 
to assist the public to overcome these limitations, with the effect that 
the majority of the public do not enter the decision-making process an 
an equal footing with the small number of organised groups with the 
necessary "expertise", or they do not enter it at all. 
C. The Rationale for a Principled Approach 
Given the above claims, it is contended that there is a clear need to 
eliminate the dissonance between the acceptance of public participation 
as a principle and the position in 
participation is put forward as a 
achieved - provided that the three 
to. The kind of approach being 
practice. The concept of meaningful 
means through which this can be 
elements of the concept are adhered 
propounded here, deriving from 
"participation", and its counter-part "accountability", has previously 
been put forward by a number of theorists who have variously described 
their perceptions of the inadequacy of existing public law arrangements 
in Britain. Prosser, who, in 1982 (pp. 1-2), noted the absence of any 
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-new governing theory" t d th d f bl owar s e stu y 0 pu ic law, and the need for 
such a theory, can be cited as a leading example. Following Prosser's 
approach,S account can be taken of the two prime roles for public law: 
(1) to enable government to achieve its policy ends - a "facilitative" 
role, and (2) a "controlling" role limiting and checking the actions 
of government. 9 If the latter role is adopted, mechanisms are needed to 
achieve such control. If the former, it can be argued that there is a 
need for agreement as to the manner in which government will seek to 
achieve its ends. In this case the concept of legitimacy (noted above) 
can be called upon as a way to indicate such agreement. Once more 
mechanisms are required to give this legitimacy "concrete" form. In both 
cases, it is suggested that a concept based on participation and 
accountability can enable both roles to be effected. 
A preference will be indicated for a model somewhere between the two 
extremes, which allows government to achieve its policy goals, thereby 
recognising the need for a positive and extensive role for government 
(c/f Dicey)lO, but seeks, through both political and legal mechanisms, 
the control of the exercise of power in particular, the idea that 
decision-making should be responsive, and rational, as well as lawful. 11 
Reference can also be made to the work of Jurgen Habermas (primarily 
Communication and the Evolution of Society, (1979», and his now 
celebrated theory of communication, as a means for support for such an 
approach, following the precedents of (in particular) Birkinshaw <albeit 
in relation to freedom of information), and Prosser. Babermas put 
forward the idea of the "ideal speech situation", whereby all parties 
seeking communication would achieve what he termed "communicative 
competence-; in effect that they would be able to assert and 
substantiate their claims or views by reasoning, and because no external 
pressures would operate to benefit specific parties at the expense of 
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others, only the "better argument", irrespective of its source, would be 
accepted. While in reality such an "ideal speech situation" cannot be 
achieved 12 the similarities of this theory with the kind of argument 
being presented here are clear. In particular the idea that there should 
• 
be opportunities for those who wish to participate to do so on an equal , 
basis, and that the validity of their opinion or information 
·communication" to use the Habermasian term which they would have to 
justify, would be weighed against all other views, irrespective of from 
whom the information came. 
The ideas of Habermas can be further extended to apply to the design of 
mechanisms to achieve legitimacy (as demonstrated by Birkinshaw (1988», 
based on the idea that, at the level of the state and its institutions, 
legitimacy can only be developed if the processes for deCiSion-making 
are designed as the result of the "unforced consensus"; in other words 
by the sanction of all members of SOCiety "if they had been allowed to 
participate as free and equal in policy-making" (1988, p. 18; original 
emphasis). This recognises that 
in every decision, but that, 
not everyone can literally participate 
on everyone's behalf, deciSion-taking 
should be such that it is a neutral process not, to quote Birkinshaw 
(ibid., p. 19), "perverted by ideology, or distorted by influence and 
domination". 13 Hence, an idea of "rational, reasoned and value free" 
deciSion-making of the kind sought through the concept of meaningful 
participation. 14 
the concept of meaningful participation is, The overriding purpose of 
therefore, a process of participation fully implemented in practice, 
can do so on an equal through which all who wish to participate 1 & 
footing, with adequate information about the proposed decision and 
knowing how to participate thus the central problem of privileged 
access can be addressed, if not eliminated. Such participation will, 
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therefore, not only (1) legitimate governmental power, but (2) ensure 
that it is restrained within "agreed bounds" that it is rational 
(being founded on full and accurate information) - and (3) responsive to 
the wishes of the public. A similar idea has been put forward by 
Sainsbury (1988) in his critique of Mashaw's "Administrative Justice". 
Sainsbury states: 
-Administrative justice is achieved if an accurate decision 
is produced promptly by a process in which the client has 
participated to ensure that all relevant information has 
been collected, and the decision-maker has applied the 
relevant decision criteria in an impartial manner, and that, 
at the end of the process, the decision-maker demonstrates 
his or her accountability by issuing a full explanation of 
the relation between the evidence, the decision criteria and 
the decision" (p. 74, original emphasis). 
A Preference far ·Pluralis~. As Craig (1989, chapter 1) has pointed 
out, any claim for the use and development of a particular mechanism of 
control and operation of the state, 
conception of the way in which 
must have a basis in a particular 
the state should operate, and the 
purposes of any system of public law within the state. Craig's review of 
the "unitary state· <which he terms the "traditional model-) and the 
"pluralist model·, illustrates the way that the pluralist model, 16 in 
its "descriptive· sense, provides support for the above arguments, viz. 
that participation does exist, but not always on an equal basis. Thus 
pluralism, in its "prescriptive" sense, demands more participation to 
overcome these inequalities <and the threat of "corporatism"). The 
thesis can, therefore, be placed in the wider context of the 
inadequacies of both the "traditional" model of representative 
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government, and existing public law arrangements based on this, and a 
preference for pluralism <participatory democracy) as the favoured 
conception of democracy. 
The crux of the failings of the traditional model lies in the "extreme 
centrality accorded to Parliament" <Prosser, 1985, p. 176), whereby 
Parliament alone provides for the legitimation and oversight of 
governmental power, being the embodiment of the "public's will". This, 
by definition, precludes mechanisms for participation outside Parliament 
(Craig, 1989, p. 4).17 A range of deficiencies of the traditional model 
have been identified, primarily concerned with the development of the 
state, and especially the "extended state", whereby Parliament can no 
longer provide the necessary scrutiny of rule-making and hence the 
transmission of the public's will. Furthermore, the Executive controls 
the Legislature, and not vice versa (reviewed by Craig, 1989, pp. 12-
17). An indication of the extent of the criticism of representative 
democracy is demonstrated by a snapshot of recent sources. For instance, 
according to Ranson and Stewart (1989, p. 16): 
"The election and direct involvement of a small number of 
representatives does not give 
participation and expression 
strengthen democracy during a 
citizenship is to be taken 
adequate opportunity for the 
of public views which can 
period of social change. If 
seriously then more appropriate 
constitutive conditions will have to be developed to ensure 
it can be achieved." 
In similar vein, Hirst states that representative democracy "serves to 
legitimate modern big government and to restrain it hardly at all". He 
therefore offers his work as a 
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" criticism of [representative democracy's] capacity to 
do the job it is supposed to do: supervise, restrain and 
control government" <1988, p. 190). 
Finally, as pointed out by Sir Douglas Wass, "the choice of 
representative is no substitute for the choice of policy" <quoted by 
Harlow, 1985, p. 79). Pluralism is thus concerned with the construction 
of mechanisms outside Parliament to achieve the legitimation and 
control of rule making and public power. 
It follows that a rejection of representative democracy will lead to a 
perception that existing public law arrangements are equally inadequate. 
There is a wealth of material to support such a view. Apart from the 
arrangements for participation already considered, two themes have been 
prevalent - the "frail barque" <Harlow and Rawlings, 1984, p. 42) of 
ministerial responsibility, and the overbearing secrecy of the British 
state. These are linked by fears that the present Administration has 
increasingly used its power to achieve "partisan ends", leading HcAuslan 
and XcEldowney (1985, p. 2) to argue there exists an "incipient crisis" 
regarding the legitimacy of governmental power. ~e 
D. Arguments for the Practical Application of the Principled Approach 
Having indicated the purposes of the concept, and its similarity with 
existing approaches, the arguments for putting the principled approach 
into practice can be developed by reference to the "substantive 
benefits· it is . suggested participation can provide, and the 
"expectations" raised by present constitutional arrangements in Britain. 
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1. Substantive Benefits 
It is contended that participation can yield benefits to the decision-
maker, the participant and society as a whole. 
a. The Quality of the Decision 
It can be argued that the true purpose of any decision-making process is 
to produce the "best possible" decision, an approach which the courts 
have sought to infuse through Substantive and Procedural Review. 19 Hence 
there are two basic ideas that have been put forward. First, that 
government does not possess all the information necessary to meet such 
decision criteria and second, that it will be more likely to produce 
such a decision if it is forced to account and explain the basis of the 
decision. 
The first point assumes that the public have information, especially 
resulting from localised expertise/knowledge, which should be made 
available to the decision-maker to avoid the making of "erroneous 
decisions and ... unwise policies" (Austin, 1985, p. 340), This view was 
supported by the two leading reports on planning. According to the Dobry 
report: 
"The public has more detailed, first-hand knowledge and can 
be of vital importance in reaching sound decisions the 
public can now offer information and points of view not 
otherwise available" (DoE, 1975, para. 10.3, original 
emphasis; a view re-iterated by the Skeffington report, 
XHLG, 1969, para. 2). 
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The second idea encompasses the potential relationship between "process 
and autcomes~ - in other words that the kind of decision procedures 
adopted can shape the final decision. This is accepted, to some extent. 
for instance, in the rights of the defendant at (criminal) trial. while 
common law has developed a "right to be 
justiceM • 20 The Franks Report (Cmnd. 
heard" as a matter of "natural 
218, 195'7) (cited as a 
"landmark[ ... l in accountable and responsible decision-making" 
[Birkinshaw, 1985a. p. 156]) propounded the principles of "openness, 
fairness and impartiality" and the belief that decision-makers would be 
more diligent knowing that they would have to account through written 
reasons for their decisions. 21 The idea is summarised in the forthright 
views of James Kichael: 
"10 one who exercises authority is particularly keen to 
explain the true reasons for his decisions, or to submit to 
critical questioning about them. Such an inquiry is all too 
likely to expose the extent to which guesswork, prejudice. 
and the simple imitation of precedents can influence 
important decisions. And an informed observer might conclude 
that mistakes are being made by those in charge of things" 
(quoted by Delbridge, 1982, p. 2). 
b. Acceptability 
Following on from the above argument, it has been suggested that where a 
party has been given the opportunity to participate, it is more likely 
that he (she) will accept the outcome even where it is not the one which 
was sought. In other words, that participation may lead to an increase 
in the acceptance of decisions that people disagree with. If true, this 
would appear to provide a benefit for the administration, notably. that 
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the decision is less likely to be 
whether through the courts, or 
operation. 22 
subject to ex post facto challenge, 
in the form of protest or non co-
c. A Stronger lIandate 
There have been a number of contexts in which regulatory agencies have 
been reluctant to enforce strict liability criminal laws. One of the key 
reasons for this has been the absence of a clear Mmandate" from the 
public for stricter enforcement (see chapter seven). Public involvement 
can provide a clear indication to the agency of the wishes and concerns 
of the public. To quote Frankel: 
"To some authorities, an informed and involved public is a 
valuable asset. They show industry 
policies have public support: not 
the press and the public can be 
that pollution control 
only the authority, but 
seen to 
improvements. Such involvement 
demand the political backing 
also helps 
be expecting 
the authority 
and financial resources it 
needs for its work" (1982, p. 98). 
d. Social and Personal ·Utility· 
Finally, it is also submitted that a significant benefit arising from 
public participation falls to both individuals per se and society as a 
whole. Crudely, those allowed to participate are more likely to be the 
kind of "active citizen" envisaged by Douglas Hurd (infra.) However, an 
equally important, and related, point is the need for individuals to be 
educated in the process of participation and decision-making. It is as 
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necessary for a representative, as a participatory, democracy, to be 
able to participate "effectively-. Initially, those unsure how to 
participate can be a "drawback" - delay and cast being two of the common 
criticisms of participation but education can be gained through 
participating; in effect a form of "self-learning process". According to 
Skeffington (in the context of development plans), the process of 
educating people is: 
-
part of the wider problem of educating them to 
participate in local government affairs as a whole. It is a 
point of entry to civic matters as a whole- (XHLG, 1969, 
para. 54). 
It is suggested that this demonstrates that participation can also be 
seen as a means in itself - to educate - thereby enabling individuals to 
make "more useful" contributions, making mare likely the informational 
benefits argued for above. 
2. -Constitutional- Claims 
Apart from the substantive benefits, it is also argued that our present 
constitutional arrangements raise certain "expectations" (to use the 
discourse of Harden and Lewis) about the way in which public power will 
be exercised. Reference has already been made to the different models of 
democracy, and a preference expressed for the participatory version, but 
of equal, if not greater, importance is the "Rule of Law", which, it is 
submitted, can be called in aid of a claim for public participation. It 
can be argued that there is a need for a modern formulation of the Rule 
of Law - the "guiding principles·, which Dicey developed for the benefit 
of his students, no longer carry the meaning they may once have done. 
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The "Noble Lie· (Harden and Lewis) cannot be solely about government 
according to law (Wade and Bradley, 1987, p. 99), and if it is more than 
a "principle of institutional morality· (Jowell, p. 1985, p. 3) it needs 
to be given "concrete form". Thus the mechanisms for the control of 
discretionary power through rules, adjudicatory techniques and due 
process, suggested by Jowell as such a means, can be extended to include 
the notion of interest group participation. To quote Jowell, althoug 
this 
·speaks more to democratic theory than legal or 
constitutional theory ... [tlhe issue is, however, not 
unrelated to the arguments behind the Rule of Law and shares 
the common objective of responsive decisions. If the Rule of 
Law is concerned to protect an individual from being 
deprived of his rights without an opportunity to defend 
himself, the concern is 
group-interests from 
opportunity to express 
decided (1985, p. 17). 
only 
being 
their 
narrowly stretched to protect 
overridden without the 
views on the matter to be 
To reinforce these arguments, it is submitted that there are precedents 
from other jurisdictions, as well as in the "rhetoric" of the present 
Administration, which provide additional support. 
a. Precedents 
Possibly the most significant precedent is the system of rule-making 
promised by s. 4 of the US Federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA) , 
ironically adopted in the very year that the Statutory Instruments Act 
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1946 repealed similar provisions, relating to secondary legislation, 
which had existed in England since 1893. Section 4 enshrines the process 
of "notice and comment" (as it is commonly known) whereby proposed rules 
must be published in the Federal Register, and the general public given 
an opportunity to send written representations to the decision-maker. 
Equally, it may be suggested that the US Constitution encompasses a more 
detailed notion of "due process" than that available on this side of the 
Atlantic. 23 It is accepted that the APA system is itself subject to 
important exceptions,24 and may not actually yield the kind of 
meaningful participation being sought through this thesis, but it is a 
model that cannot be ignored. Developments within the EC are also worthy 
of note.~5 Again taking the example of the environment, the EC has been 
at the forefront of the promotion of participation. 26 
The issue of "consumerism" must also be addressed as an important 
precedent founded ,in part, on the ideology of the present Government, 
especially in the notions of consumer choice. 27 It is argued that the 
same kind of opportunities must be available to the public (free) in 
relation to government, as through the "free market w (when coupled with 
the ability to pay).2S This is supported by Delbridge (1982, p. 1) who 
states that the "basic tenets of the consumer movement" apply equally to 
the public sector as the private - viz. choice, representation, means of 
redress and information. 
b. Government Rhetoric 
The rhetoric of the Thatcher Government is also worthy of note, 
especially in relation to a little publicised idea of the former Home 
Secretary, Douglas Hurd, of the "active citizen". It would seem that the 
original idea was concerned to encourage "neighbourlinessw for instance, 
- 31 -
in the form of neighbourhood watch and victim support groups, rather 
than promoting active participation in policy-making. However, it is 
contended that this is the necessary corollary of such a proposal, a 
point which may have been recognised by the all-party ·Commdssion on 
Ci tizenship" set up (under the patronage of the Speaker) by Hurd in 
1989. It has been indicated that the Commission has sought to include in 
its definition of "citizenship" the ideas of "constructive criticism" -
that citizenship also confers "rights" (The Independent, 1 August 1989). 
Xr Hurd's statement seems to reinforce this idea: 
"Across the broad range of social policy, the Government is 
now energetically seeking to thrust power outwards - away 
from the corporatist battalions to the little platoons. 
Greater opportunities for active citizenship are being 
offered and taken up" <quoted in The Independent, 13 
September 1989).29 
II. "IEAIIIGFUL PARTICIPATIOI· 
Having set out the justifications for the claim for a more participatory 
form of democracy, the next stage is to provide the detail behind the 
concept of meaningful participation. There are two aspects to this. 
First, explanation of the basic term "participation", given that it is 
hoped to provide an impetus to analysis of what this term actually means 
and its interrelationship with other "established" public law concepts. 
Second, it has already been stated that the key to the principled 
approach to participation relies on a clear concept which will enable a 
comparison between the set of principles and practice. Therefore, the 
idea of participation being "meaningful" will be explained. It is one of 
the main aims of the wark, that meaningful participation should be put 
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forward as a concept which can be developed, refined and applied across 
the broad spectrum of decision-making, but with water pollution control 
used here for illustrative purposes. 
A. Defining Participation 
The definition of participation being used in this thesis is intended as 
an "umbrella" term, indicating that it involves, and incorporates, the 
well known notions of "access to information", "consultation", 
"representation", "reason giving/accountability" and so on. The key 
point, however, is to recognise that each is dependant on the others -
that there is no point in being consulted prior to a decision being 
made, for reasons for the decision, once made, to be kept secret. It is 
submitted that the goals of control, and ultimately legitimacy based on 
equal access, cannot be achieved without all these notions operating 
together. As will be explained below, it has been sought to develop an 
all embracing concept which seeks to break down any theoretical barriers 
between these notions, and to emphasise that elements of all of them are 
vital to enable the involvement of the public at each stage (ex ante and 
ex post facto) of the decision-making process. 
In seeking to develop such a concept, there is also a need to actually 
define a standard of what participation is - to map the outer limits of 
the activities which can be said to be participatory. In addressing this 
issue, the work of Fagence has been inspirational. He contends that 
"Of crucial significance is the determination of whether any 
act or series of actions has been participatory" (1977, p. 
127). 
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In other words, the need to identify the" lowest common denominator" 
below which an activity cannot be deemed "meaningful". Fagence adopts as 
his "lowest common denominator" that the activity can, at least 
potentially, influence the decision-maker. This is an approach which has 
seen support, albeit sometimes through a different discourse, from a 
variety of practical and theoretical works. This includes, once again 
the Skeffington (MHLG. 1969) and Dobry (DoE, 1975) reports. but more 
significantly the works of Arnstein (1969) and Xilbrath (1965), both of 
whom adopted "hierarchical" approaches in seeking to identify whether 
activities had been "worthwhile" in participation terms. 30 However. a 
subtle difference of approach will be adopted here, in that, rather than 
seeking to identify whether or not an act or event has been 
participatory, the aim will be to seek to identify the factors which 
must be present to enable meaningful 
that it is possible. ultimately, 
participation to take place - such 
to influence the outcome of the 
decision. Three pre-conditions (or "elements") will be identified. and 
hence, where they are present 
"meaningful-. sol 
the 
B. Elements of Meaningful Participation 
participation can be termed 
These are outlined in Appendix B, Figure 1.1, but will be detailed 
below. 
1. A ·Competent" Public - The Ieed for Education 
The first step towards participation, is the ability to participate -
having the awareness of the decisions being made (and by whom), of the 
opportunities to participate, and sufficient understanding of the issues 
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involved. It is contended that existing opportunities are often under 
utilised for the simple reason that the public are unaware of them or 
how to use them. 32 Support for this pre-condition can be found in a 
number of sources. First, it has been argued that even in the context of 
a representative democracy, such education - and hence an "informed 
public· - is necessary33 In the context of planning, Godschalk has 
stated: 
·Participation is a two-edged sword; planners must be open 
to working with citizens, and citizens must be active and 
competent in planning" (quoted in Fagence (1977, p. 4; 
emphasis added). 
A key criticism of participation has been the delay and cost it 
involves. One of the root causes of this, it is suggested, is that the 
public do not understand the issues, and especially, are not aware of 
the practical constraints underlying the decision, or which are imposed 
on the decision-maker. Arguably education can reduce the number of 
"frivolous" exchanges with the public and thereby increase the value of 
the information received. According to Wurster: 
·Conscious consumer wants are limited by experience and 
knowledge ... by and large you can only want what you know 
... what we ... really want to know, therefore, is what 
people would want if they understood the full range of 
possibilities on the one hand, and all the practical 
limitations on the other" (in Fagence, 1977, p. 51). 
Equally, it is argued that such education can also help to answer the 
problem of the "inarticulate" and the domination by the" middle classes" 
(see Harlow and Rawlings, 1984, chapter 14).34 Thus, to seek to develop 
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a public Mable M to participate, three main kinds of education are 
suggested (as indicated in Figure 1.1 [Appendix BJ). 
2. Opportunities to Participate - the ·Channels for CODDUnication-
The second key element for meaningful participation in practice is the 
actual opportunity to participate, and, as indicated above, it is 
intended that the approach taken here should break down the barriers 
presented by existing notions of Maccess to informationM and 
Mconsultation" and so on, by replacing them with the different stages of 
the decision-process as, indicated in Figure 1.1. Hence, the second 
aspect of the principled approach is that comprehensive opportunities 
(whether "formal M or "informaIM)36 should be made available in respect 
of all decisions and decision-makers, and that all the stages described 
under this heading should be made available. 3G 
The main aim of this element of the concept is to demonstrate the need 
for a fluid process of "two-way communication" between the decision-
maker and the public (an idea influenced by the Skeffington Report 
(IHLG, 1969». In other words, it is intended to demonstrate that 
meaningful participation should not just be about responding to 
proposals developed by the decision-maker, it should also be possible 
for the public to put their own suggestions for policies and action on 
their own initiative, and at any time. Equally, it is not just about ex 
ante activity, but also ex post facto. Finally, decisions should always 
be subject to review through a continuing process of meaningful 
partiCipation, including, at the implementation stage. 
Following the discussion of Fagence, above, the "lowest common 
denominator" needs to be identified. The idea that this should equate 
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with the opportunity to influence the outcome would seem to exclude 
access to information (stage I). However, because of the argument 
presented here, that every stage is vital and interconnected, it will be 
argued that the bottom line includes all the different stage~ This is 
also on the basis that obtaining information from a decision-maker can, 
potentially, have an indirect influence on the decision-maker, similar 
to the idea that having to provide reasoned accounts of decisions is 
argued to - in effect the idea of always being open to scrutiny from an 
·activeM public. 
The key to making opportunities to participate available is by the 
provision of (what will be termed) ·channels for communication" between 
decision-maker and the public. In other words, a mechanism through which 
each of the different stages indicated in Figure 1.1, can be achieved. 
The similarities with the US APA 1946 (ibid.) (and dissimilarities with 
British practice) are clear, although it has been sought to extend 
beyond this. Before explaining the different stages, the idea of 
Minformation" needs amplification. This is intended to cover anything 
that parties may wish to communicate including facts, ideas and 
opinions. 37 stage I will be concerned with information relating to 
decisions and policies, as opposed to that covered by education. 
St~ lA. The aim of stage I is for information to be available on a 
continuing basis - it may be that the reqUirement is best fulfilled 
through the actual provision of the information, but it may also be 
satisfied by informing the public that such information is available on 
request. The crux of this stage is that people will need to know, not 
just that a policy decision is being considered (see under education), 
but on what basis and with what implications. This will also include 
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knowledge of the available options, the facts supporting those options, 
and which options are favoured by the decision-maker, and why.38 
stase lB. This aspect is important to establish the freedom of the 
public to show an interest in subjects other than those on which the 
decision-maker is specifically seeking to provide information as the 
basis for beginning the decision process. Thus it must be possible to 
obtain information other than that which the decision-maker is prepared 
to offer, otherwise the prerogative rests, as at present, with the 
"state". 
Both aspects of stage I would fall under the traditional concept of 
"access to information", the need for 
irresistible. 39 
which, it is argued, is 
stase II. This is intended to complete 
communication prior to decisions being 
the initial two-way process of 
made, by making available 
channels through which information can be given to the decision-maker 
either in response to information obtained under lA, requested under IB, 
or irrespective of stage I. Thus, the public are free to give 
information, including ideas, at any time 
agenda, rather than being restricted to the 
maker. This is clearly important, but is 
explicit, and may not even be implicit, 
"consultation". 40 
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to have matters put on the 
"agenda" of the decision-
not, it is suggested, made 
in the existing notion of 
stage III. This covers the key idea that whenever information is given 
to the decision-maker under stage II it should be fully considered and 
its merit determined. 41 
stage I~ This involves the right to receive a response from the 
decision-maker of the value of the communication and the use to which it 
has been put. or is likely to be put, preceded initially by notification 
that it has been received, and how soon it will be considered. This 
stage is particularly important in respect of the educative aspect of 
participation, as argued earlier in the chapter. Where the "merit" of a 
contribution is explained to the contributor. this will enable the kind 
of "self-learning process" suggested earlier. It can also be argued that 
greater benefits. in terms of acceptability rather than frustration, 
will accrue through this process. 42 
stage V. To show the need for a fluid two-way process, the option has 
been included of the above stages being repeated before a decision is 
finally reached; this may be required especially where a decision is 
"complex" and needs to be "right" first time. It is quite common for 
more than one round of "consultation" to take place, notably in the case 
of legislation through the issuing of White and then Green papers. 
Alternatively. it may be considered that the channels for the above 
stages may be best achieved by a very formalised process such as a 
public inquiry, following on from the above stages. 
stage VI. Once the decision has been made, it is crucial that a 
reasoned decision (in writing) is provided to achieve 
"accountability".43 This involves both the actual decision and the 
- 39 -
reasons behind it, including why the particular options were chosen and 
others rejected. The provision of such information may thus enable the 
public to participate in a form of "hard look"44 or detailed scrutiny of 
the decision. It can also be noted that accountability does have a 
forward-looking aspect, which Turpin has termed Mamendatory" 
accountability (1985, p. 52), in the sense that there is an expectation 
that changes will be made to the original decision. 
Stase VII. The final stage is the opportunity to keep decisions that 
have been made under review through a renewed process of the above 
stages. It is important to recognise that decisions may later be shown 
to be "wrong", "inappropriateR , or in need of amendment because of 
subsequent developments. It can also be suggested that the idea of a 
(single) decision is perhaps artificial. decisions are rarely taken in 
isolation, but are generally part of a process or series of decisions on 
related matters - one overall decision involving a series of smaller 
decisions within it. It is also for this reason that it has been sought 
to reduce the emphasis on the difference between ex ante and ex post 
facto control. 
3. ·Political ViII-
The third aspect of the concept 
requirement of "political will M. 
of meaningful 
Because the 
participation is the 
central purpose of 
participation is to influence the outcome of the decision, it 1s a sine 
qua non that the decision-maker must, at the outset, and throughout the 
decision process, have an open mind and be amenable to influence. 
Second, he must be willing to assess any information received, based on 
its merit and unaffected by any prejudice because of from whom it was 
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received - hence a move towards a kind of Habermasian Mideal speech 
situation" is sought. It is important that this equality of treatment, 
and absence of bias, applies in all dealings with the public at all the 
different decision stages so that, literally, the sought after aim of 
equal access to policy-making can be achieved. 
This willingness to be open to the idea of participation also deals with 
the problem relating to the sense of priorities that a decision-maker 
often possesses, or is subject to. Reference can be made to the problems 
posed by concepts of "expertise" ("technocracyM) or "we know bestM46 
whereby the view of the public is disregarded. The approach is to 
emphasise the value of the "information" irrespective of its source. 
Thus decision processes where, from the outset, there is only one 
possible outcome, must be rejected. 
Again support for the importance of this element can be found in a range 
of sources, but it may be perceived that the main barrier is that of 
attitudes and hence a need for their change. Birkinshaw, arguing for a 
British Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), concludes thus: 
"10 one should expect that an FOIA will change the nature of 
government or the behaviour of the governed overnight. 
Progress and democratic development will take time ... 
Unless, however, there is a change in attitude and ethos in 
our public administration, FOIA by itself will be something 
of a confidence trick... [Aln FOIA must be accompanied by 
more widespread changes in attitude if we are to be better 
informed and more open. Those are the necessary conditions 
to help reduce the abuse of power."46 
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The term Mpolitical" warrants definition. This is intended to refer to 
the decision-maker - Npolitical M with a small .p •. 
-PUbl1c V111-. Given the latter pOint, it is equally important that the 
public possess a sense of willingness to Nco-operate- a form of 
political or "public will". However, clearly the extent to which the 
public should not be seeking to obstruct and prevent the system 
MworkingM is a vexed issue. The argument clearly hinges on the idea that 
if meaningful participation is available then, theoretically at least, 
the public should have confidence in the decision processes, decision-
makers and, ultimately, the decisions resulting therefrom. A7 
C. Evaluation of the Concept of Jeaningful Participation 
As stated earlier, the concept of meaningful participation is being 
presented, tentatively, to seek to stimulate thought about participation 
and the problems of making it "effective" in practice. Thus an initial 
evaluation is appropriate, including an identification of some of the 
likely problems and possible solutions. 
1. The Role of the Decision-laking Body 
Two issues need to be considered here, relating to the MprerogativeM of 
the decision-maker to make the final decision, and the extent to which 
participation should occur. The wider implications of the concept for 
representative democracy must also be noted. 
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As a general principle it is not intended to argue that participation 
should challenge the role of the decision-maker; thus the appointed 
decision-making body should make the final decision. 48 Equally, to 
ensure the process of communication, the role of the decision-maker can 
be seen as the "pivot" or "centre for communications". However, a second 
option is that there may be occasions when it is appropriate to break 
down the barrier between the public and the decision-maker, to introduce 
co-option or actual power sharing. 49 Neither option, however, should be 
seen as a threat to the role of representatives, but as a wider, and it 
is submitted, improved version of democracy. 
Heap, it is contended, misses the paint, in arguing that 
"citizen participation ... seems to me to strike at the very 
roots of elective democracy ... elected representatives ... 
should, in my view, be allowed to get on with the job. 
Citizen participation substitutes, or tends to substitute, 
for the decision of the elected representative the decision 
of the man in the street - the woman on the Clapham omnibus 
and all this leads not to government by elected 
representatives but to government by plebiscite too much 
citizen participation will strike fatally at the whole 
concept of government by elected representatives "(1973, 
p. 210; original emphasis). 
In particular Heap seemed to assume that decision-making by elected 
representatives actually did take place in an idealised world of 
NHabermasian" impartiality. GO Furthermore, it must be noted that most 
decision-making, especially in the "extended state", is not carried out 
by elected representatives. 
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The approach being propounded here does not seek to negate the role of 
elected representatives, but seeks to argue that such a process is 
inadequate by itself, and needs to be developed so that decisions are 
taken only after a process of meaningful participation. Indeed it will 
be vital that the appointed decision-maker does take the final decision 
because, after a full process of meaningful participation, it is likely 
that he will have received conflicting viewpoints and information which 
will need to be balanced. It can be further argued that the biggest 
threat to any form of democracy lies in providing privileged 
access/corporatism and the domination of party political dogma. 
2. Xeaningful PartiCipation - A Flexible Concept 
A number of practicalities also need to be addressed. The prime answer 
at this stage to all the problems which are indicated below is that 
meaningful participation is intended to be a "flexible concept- tailored 
to the individual nature of the decision and decision-maker in question. 
Thus the same degree of participation is not going to be appropriate for 
the granting of planning permission for a house extension compared to 
the Channel Tunnel. However, the essential principle remains that the 
three elements, including the different channels for communication. must 
be present to some degree. In the case of education. it may even be 
argued that it should be a continuing process irrespective of the making 
of individual decisions. 
Thus, in respect of the most common criticism of participation - delay 
and cost - it is not intended that meaningful participation should bring 
the administration to a halt, but that only through the necessary 
commitment to the process can the argued for benefits of participation 
be achieved. It is thus a question of balance, and the decision as to 
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the appropriate extent of meaningful participation should itself be 
subjected to processes of meaningful participation. 
a. Who Should Participate? 
This is a particularly difficult question which can only be noted here, 
being a matter worthy of a thesis itself. The danger of Mtoo many 
participantsM must be addressed, although it might be argued that if a 
significant number of people are interested/concerned this shows that 
extensive participation is appropriate. The issue is thus one of 
determining the kind of channels for communication which will enable a 
balance to be struck.sl It is submitted that any approach to this issue 
must be guided both by the above point regarding balance, and the 
overriding principle that any access granted to policy-making must be on 
an "equal basis". 
b. Public CoDDdtment 
A further answer to the above problem may lie in the extent of public 
commitment expected by the decision-maker. In other words, that it may 
be appropriate to expect a higher degree of action or inconvenience on 
the part of those members of the public who want to participate where 
this would otherwise significantly increase the burden facing the 
administration. s2 As a general principle, it is submitted that 
information to be classed as part of the education process should 
involve the minimum commitment on the part of the public. 
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c. Public Apathy 
The opposite problem of the scenario above, is the more common 
experience of public apathy the widespread lack of interest in 
participating. It is subDdtted that this is partly the result of years 
of a secretive and non-participatory State, and the lack of education 
related to participation in decision-making; hence, the problem is a 
long-term one of getting people used to participating, and, just as it 
has been argued that attitudes on the side of the administration are 
important, so too are those of the public. 53 
d. Limits of the Application of the Concept 
Two related issues pose further important problems for the development 
of such a concept, viz. the situations when it is appropriate that 
meaningful participation should be excluded or Ddnimised, and the range 
of decision-makers to which it should apply. 
Regarding the first issue, there will always be areas (national security 
being the most common) where the public cannot be involved, but 
arrangements for the accountability of the decision-makers are still 
required in some form. 54 Further, it can be argued that if a decision is 
not to be subject to meaningful participation, that decision itself must 
be so subject. The second issue is concerned, in particular, with 
whether bodies in the private sector should be subject to the concept. 
Given the obfuscation of the public/private divide,GG and the increase 
in public regulation of private organisations (especially following 
privatisation) there is a strong 
exercises power affecting people 
principles. 
argument for any organisation which 
fundamentally to be subject to such 
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e. Putting the Concept into Practice 
The manner in which the principled approach can be put into practice 
also needs to be considered. This involves the issues of who should 
provide education, by what means, and the kind of mechanisms that should 
be provided for the channels of communication. Again, given the need for 
a flexible approach. it is suggested that these are matters which can 
only be determined in the context of the individual decision processes. 
balancing the above issues. 
A particularly difficult issue facing proposals, which in Britain in 
1990 might be deemed "radical·. is the question of their likely 
acceptance. Given the fate that befell the Skeffington proposals in 
respect of town and country planning. it might be suggested that 
participation is a ready victim, especially when budgets are tight. 
Thus, it must be argued that the Administration must recognise the 
potential benefits, but equality of access must be the key criteria. The 
extent of the problem of acceptability is indicated. in particular. by 
the works of KcAuslan and Gunningham. already noted. The former's 
Mrevelationsw that planning is not the Mgolden metwandM it has often 
been perceived to be - participation being seen as "anti-establishment". 
and is thus ·squeezed aut" by the combined ideologies of ·private 
property· and Mpublic interest".56 The crucial statement of McAuslan is 
thus: 
·public participation eo noRtine will continue to feature in 
both the administration of and official descriptions and 
discussions about planning and other governmental programmes 
but it will exist only on the terms acceptable to the 
governing elite. ie that its function is to aid and assist 
- 47 -
the operation and management of government and not to 
challenge or disrupt itR (1980, p. 269).67 
Finally, Craig's warning suggests a significant barrier: 
"What is not possible is the suggestion that participatory 
democracy can somehow exist and legitimate public power, 
within a society which adopts a differing vision of 
democracy. It is clear that the Conservative philosophy is 
not based upon anything like participatory democracy in its 
'technical' sense" (1989, p. 33; original emphasis). 
A clear change in outlook 
government. 
is therefore required within central 
The above review suggests that seeking acceptance of the proposed 
concept is an uphill task, but, it is submitted that this is not a 
reason for not trying. In particular, while the real changes can only 
come from a " top-down" approach, they must also be clearly demanded 
" bottom-up" essentially such a concept must be seen as a 
"constitutional rightH,se 
f. EnforceJEnt 
The final problem to address is the related question of enforcement in 
practice. Again this is difficult, given the importance of ·political 
will", and attitudes, and hence, is clearly going to take time. A theme 
of the thesis is that statutory rights to participation do not guarantee 
that they will be translated into meaningful participation, but at least 
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they represent a step forward compared with discretionary processes of 
participation.6~ 
I I I. UAL TTl CAL FRAlIHVORK 
To complete the chapter, it is intended to outline the analytical 
framework to show the way in which it will be applied to the empirical 
study to effect a comparison between the principles of meaningful 
participation and the practice of the legal regulation of water 
pollution. The basis of the approach will be to seek to identify the 
opportunities which were made available for public participation and to 
assess the way in which they were used in practice. Thus, in each case 
it will be attempted to identify whether the different channels for 
communication were provided for, and whether this was coupled with 
education. As indicated in the Introduction, the question of political 
will is far more difficult to test for, and especially, in respect of 
whether the decision-maker was "open to influence". However, it will be 
sought to identify any factors which would appear to suggest its 
presence or absence. 
To aid this process two particular factors will be taken into account. 
First, whether the channels were "formal" or "informal" - in other words 
whether a specific "facility" was made available as a channel for 
communication. Thus the provision of such "formal" facilities, and the 
rationale behind their provision, will be identified 
this may provide an indication of the presence of 
- in particular 
pol i t i ca 1 wi 11 , 
especially where offered voluntarily. Second, whether the opportunity 
provided was for, what will be termed, "direct" or "indirect" 
participation - in other words, whether any person was allowed to 
participate with the decision-maker, or only through another party such 
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as a chosen, or imposed, representative. The indirect aspect is 
particularly important in terms of the comparison with the concept of 
"representation", and should highlight the potential problems of the 
role that the representor is expected to play, and the need for his 
relationship, and channels for communication with both the decision-
maker and the wider public, to be "effective". However, the provision of 
a "representor" may be vital in assisting those who are otherwise unable 
to participate. 
This approach of identifying the opportunities and their nature, will be 
further buttressed by taking account of any constraints which may appear 
to have been imposed, either "externally· (by statute or a superior 
body> or "internally· (by the decision-maker), which may thus prevent 
participation from being meaningful (for instance by making it 
impossible in practice to influence the decision-maker). This emphasises 
the need for there to be no gap between rights provided by statute and 
the ability to benefit from such rights in practice. The decision-making 
and operational "environment" of the decision-maker will, therefore, be 
mapped out, including any relationships with other bodies. The 
identification of any "external" constraints also helps in the analysis 
of the locus of the decision-making. Participation will always need to 
be directed at the "real" decision-maker. 
Two approaches will be taken in applying the above framework to the 
practice of water pollution control. First, an "institutional" approach, 
looking at one sample water authority Yorkshire Water as a 
"corporate entity", the opportunities for meaningful participation in 
relation to it and its decision-making environment, and the influences 
and controls to which it was subject. Second, a "decisional" approach in 
the context of the regulation of water pollution - in other wards, of 
looking at particular decisions about the control of water pollution and 
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the opportunities for participation in respect thereof. As earlier 
indicated, this must be read in conjunction with the first section, not 
just because the influences to which the WAs were subject to were likely 
to affect their performance of the pollution function, but also because 
most of the opportunities for participation at corporate level, were 
also applicable to the pollution aspect. Thus, it is hoped that through 
such an approach it will be possible to assess (to some extent) whether 
meaningful participation did occur in practice, and highlight the major 
restrictions to it, if any, and the causes. This will further allow a 
re-evaluation of the concept, but also provide an illustration of the 
way in which it can be applied to a sample decision-maker. 
J 
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IorES: 
1 They can alternatively be termed -tokenistic". Prosser (ibid.) 
contrasts this with the idea of "legitimacy", which has been stated 
succinctly by Birkinshaw (1988, p. 18) as "justification for the 
exercise or non-exercise of power on the public behalf". The 
"unifying concept of 
according to Lipset, 
1 egi t i macy" 
be taken to 
(McAuslan, 
mean " 
political system to engender and maintain 
1975, p. 7) can, 
the capacity of a 
the belief that existing 
political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for 
society- <quoted ibid.). 
2 Cmnd. 4373, 1970, especially para. 5. The Royal Commission on 
Environmental Pollution (First Report, Cmnd. 4585, 1971, paras. 26 et 
seq.) indicated the "responsibilities" of the public, as well as of 
elected representatives, in protecting the environment. 
3 Government claims of the importance of public participation in 
environmental decision-making are further indicated by the statement 
in 1986 that "[plublic participation, backed by adequate access to 
information, provides a major stimulus to effective environmental 
protection" (DoE, 1986b, para. 3.9). 
4 Public inquiries are often quoted as an example, in particular 
because the main policy decision, for instance whether to build the 
nuclear plant, is reserved for the Minister only - witness Bushell v 
Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75. 
6 See Birkinshaw (1988, p. 235, and n. 68) regarding the Sizewell 
inquiry. 
6 The contentions of Saunders and Jordan et al, in the context of water 
pollution control, will be considered in the main body of the thesis. 
7 The process through which government specifically sought to achieve 
pOlicy goals through bargaining with specific interest groups. See 
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for instance, Winkler, J T. "Law, State and Economy: The Industry Act 
1975 in Context-, (1975), 2 British Journal of Law and Society 103. 
a This time in relation to the Nationalised Industries and public law 
(1986). 
9 For a comparative approach, see the "red" and "green lightM theories 
analysed by Harlow and Rawlings (1984). 
10 Dicey, A V (1885), Lawof the Constitution (10th Edition by E C S 
Wade, 1959». 
11 Such an approach accords with the -amber light" theory (Harlow and 
Rawlings (1984). 
12 See for instance, Prosser (1986, p. 11) re the effects of ·power". 
13 Further Prosser (1982, 1986), 
14 A similar theme can also be seen in the comments of Hirst (1988, p. 
196): ·So what is democracy for? It can only be, once we have cleared 
away the myths of rule by the people, a set of political mechanisms 
for ensuring the benefits of competition, scrutiny and influence. 
These benefits are that governmental decisions be responsive to the 
needs of citizens, efficient because based on adequate information 
and subject to criticism, and not systematically oppressive of 
individuals". See further the approach of Harden and Lewis (1986) who 
propounded a re-working of the "Rule of Law' - the MNoble Lie", 
lS Subject to the limits discussed post. 
16 It should be noted that Craig suggests there are two distinct models, 
the second <excluded here, but referred to below) relates to 
participation through the "free market·, 
17 The nature of the distinction between pluralism and representative 
democracy has been stated succinctly thus: "Whereas under the theory 
of representative democracy the consent of the electorate confers 
general authority to govern upon those elected, participatory 
democracy requires the consent, agreement, or reconciliation of those 
affected by specific decisions" (Austin, 1985, p. 339; emphasis 
- 53 -
added). Austin further states that the "main goal and raison d'etre" 
ot pI ural ism is "eel t-government by the people" (p. 340). 
18 Further important sources are: Austin (1985); Baldwin and McCrudden 
(1987); Birkinshaw (1985b, 1988); Harden and Lewis (1986); Harden, I, 
.. A Consti tution for QUAlfGOs?" (1987) Public Law 27; Kramer, L, liThe 
Open Society, Its Lawyers and Its Environment", (1989) 1 Journal of 
Environmental Law 1; and Lewis, N, (1985) and "If You See Dicey Will 
You Tell Him? Regulatory Problems in British Constitutional La~·, 
(1988) 59 Political Quarterly 6. Austin has summarised the effect of 
the interrelationship between ministerial responsibility and secrecy 
as follows: "British government is excessively secretive. Its 
monopoly over official information makes the doctrine of ministerial 
responsibility difficult to operate, and undermines the effectiveness 
of public participation in decision-making (1985, p. 332). 
19 lotably the consideration of "relevant factors", the exclusion of 
"irrelevant factors", rationality, the absence of bias and bad faith 
and so on, developed in cases such as Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, Padfield v Minister 
of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997, Congreve v Home 
Office [1976] QB 629, Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for 
the Civil Service [1985] AC 374 et al. 
20 Influenced by Ridge v Baldwin (1964) AC 40. 
21 The limited application of the report is noted (see ibid. p. 157 et 
seq.). Consideration is also warranted of the doctrine of the "hard 
look" well developed in the US courts, and strongly favoured by 
Harden and Lewis (1986) in particular. 
22 Indeed in cases where the implementation of a decision depends on 
those people affected by it, then participation becomes 
i mperati ve. 
23 See the 5th and 14th Amendments. 
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an 
24 Especially following Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v 
Natural Resources Defense Council 435 US 519 55 L Ed 2d 
, ... 460, 
analysed by Stewart, R, "Vermont Yankee and the Evolution of 
Administrative Procedure Reformation", (1918) 91 Harvard Law Review 
1805. 
26 Although its own arrangements for legislating are not beyond question 
- the so-called "democratic deficit-. 
26 Kost recently in the form of the proposed Access to Environmental 
Information Directive. 
27 For instance, in relation to local government, see Grant, X, 
"Central-Local Relations: The Balance of Power" , (1989) in The 
Changing Constitution, (Jowell, J and Oliver, D, eds.). 
28 Craig's warning (noted post) of different concepts of democracy, is, 
however, respected. 
29 A "we know best attitude" is equally difficult to reconcile with 
those occasions where government invites the public to co-operate in 
achieving policy ends - most notably the saving of resources, such as 
water during a drought. 
30 Although the latter two approaches have been subject to criticism by 
Fagence for failing to be "explicit- (p. 127). 
Ranson and Stewart (1989), Hill, and Geddes 
Fagence, ibid.), would seem to be closer to 
The approaches of 
(both discussed by 
the approach being 
proposed here. Each of these ideas had some influence on the present 
work. 
31 However, as was noted in the Introduction, the ambitious task of 
seeking to identify whether or not influence did actually occur has 
not been attempted. 
32 For an illustration of this view, previously argued, see Burton, 
1989a. 
33 Harden and Lewis (1986), including the importance of knowing a 
candidate's past record. 
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34 Both the above ideas have been 
critics of participation, Sir 
reference to "Prejudiced 
Conservationists". 
36 An idea explained post. 
endorsed by one of the sharpest 
Desmond Heap (1973, p. 212) in his 
Pressure Groups and Cranky 
36 The limits of this claim will be discussed in more detail below. 
37 The latter being particularly important in respect of the democratic 
ethic. 
38 Skeffington's central theme also needs to be taken on board, that 
such "consultation" must take place early enough in the decision 
process. 
39 Indeed Prosser (1982, p. 14) states that any concept linked to the 
Habermasian idea of "communication" is dependant on as "free a flow 
of information as possible", and that participation and 
accountability both depend on it. Further, according to Austin (1985, 
p. 339): "[aJt all levels of participation the value of the 
participant's role as measured by his ability to affect the outcome 
of the decision-making process is dependant upon his degree of access 
to official information. Rarely do participants have the resources to 
produce the information-base necessary for decision-making in public 
administration". See further p. 366 and Birkinshaw (1988). 
40 Clearly certain decisions will not be amenable to this approach; for 
instance, it is only possible to respond to a planning application, 
but for more general policy decisions it is possible - for example to 
suggest that no planning permissions should be granted for satellite 
dishes. 
41 Reference can be made to the English cases where the term 
"consultation", and the requirements involved therein, have been 
enunciated - Rollo v Minister of Town and Country Planning [1948] 1 
ALL ER 13j Agricultural, Horticultural and Forestry Industrial 
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Training Board v Aylesbury Xushrooms Limited [1972] 1 ALL ER 280 et 
al. 
42 Importantly Dobry (DoE, 1975, para. 10.5(3» identified the absence 
of such explanations as a major complaint of representors in the 
planning process. 
43 According to Ranson and Stewart (1989, p. 18) "to be accountable is 
to be asked to say why something has been accomplished or not and 
thus to make intelligible the reasons for conduct and the values 
which informed them". Further see Coyle, C, "Public Administration 
and the Theory of Accountability", 35 Adndnistration 107. 
44 See Harden and Lewis (1986, chapter 9), and note that they have 
suggested that the "testing and debate" of Government policies and 
decisions is one of the central roles of Parliament today (p. 89). 
46 Lucidly illustrated by Heap - the "bore" for planners (1973, p. 210). 
46 1988, p. 238; emphasis added. This is echoed by Delbridge (1982, p. 
3) and XcAuslan (1980). 
47 Both the Skeffington and Dobry Reports were keen that the public 
should be positive and not sectional, although the criticisms of 
Damer and Hague, and Long <cited by Harlow and Rawlings <1984, p. 445 
et seq.» are noted. Further, see the interesting comment of Eden (in 
Eastwood and Ord, 1986, p. 246) regarding the meaning of ·public". 
48 Again a strong theme of the Skeffington and Dobry reports. 
49 I am grateful to those members of the Socio-Legal Group (now the 
Socio-Legal Studies Association) who attended the discussion at the 
conference in Edinburgh <April 1989), for drawing my attention to 
this possibility. This idea can be compared with the top two "rungs" 
of the Arnstein "ladder"; Arnstein arguing that only through such 
"power-sharing" can participants succeed in influencing the outcome 
of decisions (1969, p. 216). 
so And note the apparent contradictions between this and his later 
statement at p. 211. 
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61 The issue is perhaps more vexed in the case of "local- decisions _ 
Craig (1989, p. 22) uses the example of licensing taxis in Liverpool, 
and the question of whether drivers outside Liverpool should be 
allowed to participate. The potential implications of Burnheim's 
approach can also be noted. "It is desirable that each person or 
group should have an opportunity for influencing decisions of any 
matter in direct proportion to their legitimate material interest in 
the outcome. It is not often noticed that this principle is 
ineffectual unless its converse is also satisfied. Iobody should have 
any input into decision-making where they have no legitimate material 
interest" (1989, p. 5; original emphasis). An alternative solution 
has been suggested by Birkinshaw, viz. "If individual access to 
information is too costly, or too sensitive, or not worth the effort 
because of public apathy, or because there is little public feedback 
of views or ideas to inform specialists or decision-makers, is this 
an argument against freedom of information? Or is it an argument in 
favour of the provision of essential and unadulterated information to 
bodies whom we trust, so that they may check the policy-making 
process, render that process 
findings?" (1988, p. 1). 
accountable, and report on the 
&2 Again reference can be made to Xilbrath (1965), who was particularly 
concerned with the notion of public commitment, a point excluded by 
Arnstein. For example, the sending 
less commitment on the part of 
of information to people involves 
the public, than placing it on a 
register which the public may have to travel 50 miles to view. 
63 It has never been suggested that, because there is significant public 
apathy at elections, these should not be held. Kilbrath (1965, pp. 
17, 22) has noted the way that participation is often "cumulative", 
and that the degree of "political stimuli" people receive, will 
influence the extent to which they participate. 
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54 The criticisms of the oversight 
Security Services Act 1989 
of the security services under the 
can be noted as an example, and 
Birkinshaw's comment (noted supra.) is again apposite. 
55 Birkinshaw (1988, pp. 17-18), and Barrie, Sir Gordon, MThe Regulation 
of Public and Private Power", (1989), Public Law 552. 
56 1980, pp. 1-5; and note further his explanation of the 
"socialisation" of new recruits into the profession. 
57 It should also be noted that the term" ideology" was del i berately 
chosen by KcAuslan, which he defined to include - "values, attitudes 
and assumptions, 'hidden articulate premises', that may not be well 
thought out and are usually disguised rather than spoken out loud." 
(1980, p. xii). Further Gunningham (1974). It may also be suggested 
that the position has deteriorated since 1979; see for example, 
Lustgarten, L, Book Review, (1989), Public Law, 363, at 364. 
58 Charter 88 is noted. 
59 It has been further suggested (by members of the Socia-Legal Group, 
ibid.) that the real danger lies in a "bureaucratic nightmare" 
regarding any arrangements for enforcement. However, it may also be 
argued that a review of constitutional arrangements for ensuring 
"better" administration is apposite, and that a form of all embracing 
"ombudsman", freed from the present constraints of the Parliamentary 
Commissioner, might be appropriate. See further the proposals of Sir 
Douglas Vass for a permanent Royal Commdssion (noted in Birkinshaw, 
1985a, p. 168) and the use of an agency for the enforcement of the US 
FOIA. 
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CHAPTER TVO 
The Vater Authorities and Pollution Control: 
"Political ViII- and the Executive 
Having argued in chapter one that public 
in this 
participation as a principle 
has been accepted 
approach" based on 
by government country, 
meaningful partiCipation, has 
but a "principled 
not been put into 
practice, reference can now be made to one specific area of public 
administration to further develop this thesis. As earlier indicated, the 
practice of the WAs (between 1983 and 1989) provides an ideal subject 
for study because more comprehensive opportunities for the public to 
participate were made available than has been the case in many areas of 
deciSion-making. Furthermore, in chapter one it was argued that a key 
problem was that, often, where opportunities were actually provided on a 
comprehensive basis, the intentions behind them were not to create 
"meaningful participation"; in other words that they were provided for 
legitimation purposes, or as the result of bargaining with powerful 
interest groups as concessions, or that once in operation a dominant 
ideology would render obsolete the necessary political will. 
At this stage an important distinction needs to be drawn between what 
can be termed the "political will- of the legislator (in practice the 
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Executive, given its practical domination over Parliament) in making the 
provisions available (where this is achieved by statute), and the 
intentions or Wpolitical will- of the decision-maker in operating those 
provisions. The former is the concern of this chapter, because the type 
of provisions enacted provide the whole framework within which the 
decision-maker and the process of meaningful participation must operate. 
The former is, therefore, fundamental. Account must also be taken of the 
relationship between government and the decision-maker where the latter 
is a state agency (an emanation of the state), and a fortiori where the 
former has the ability to influence, if not actually control, such an 
agency. It may be argued, therefore, that the views and desires of 
government could shape agency thinking, including, in respect of the way 
in which the agency operates the public participation provisions - such 
an idea being encompassed in the concept of the "mandate- of the agency. 
For instance, government could indicate, or actually impose, priorities 
which inevitably force, or suggest, that less attention needs to be paid 
to public participation than to matters such as finance. For these two 
reasons account of the perceived intention of the Executive, in relation 
to the WAs and pollution control, is vital. 
In this chapter emphasis will be placed on the opportunities which were 
provided by statute (which will be discussed in more detail in later 
chapters) and the reasons underlying their provision - did the Executive 
intend that meaningful participation, or something similar to it, should 
be established in practice? It will be argued, by reference to a number 
of theoretical assessments, that in creating the WAs, providing them 
with extended pollution control powers, and making available in both 
cases apparently extensive opportunities for public participation, 
successive Governments did not have such an intention. Furthermore, it 
will be argued that the rationale for the creation of the WAs was to 
deal with a predicted crisis in the supply of water (both in terms of 
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quantity and then quality) and, thus, specialist agencies were created 
for their "expertise" - an idea, which it will be argued does not 
readily embrace meaningful participation. It will be suggested that 
there was also an "ideology· within the WAs themselves, that public 
participation was not to be regarded as anything more than legitimation 
- a process of public relations - "informing" but not "involving". This 
idea can be reinforced first, by suggesting that the opportunities for 
public participation were provided as concessions to specific interest 
groups, rather than for the benefit of the public, and that after 1974 
the key issue for the WAs, in the context of the emerging national 
economic crisis, was that of finance. Government thus imposed a priority 
which was to override any ideas of meaningful participation. Second, 
that COPA II was not implemented until this became necessary to meet Be 
obligations. 
Two further points, by way of introduction, also need to be made. First, 
this chapter will further illustrate the importance of assessing the 
pollution control function in the context of the VAs as a whole - as 
"corporate entities" - including their external relationships (notably 
central government and the Ee).l Second, the difficulties of actually 
trying to establish a "mandate" for an agency, and Executive (or 
Legislative) intention in that 
noted that the Executive may 
mandate for the agency2 or it 
respect. In particular, it should be 
not actually seek to provide a clear 
may allow the agency to develop its own 
mandate. Because of Executive dominance over Parliament, this chapter 
concentrates on the perceived intentions of the former, although 
reference will be made to statements in Parliament. In the case of the 
enactment of COPA, the debates are particularly interesting because both 
major Parties were involved in promoting very similar Bills - according 
to the present Prime Kinister, COPA had "two parents" (Hansard, He, vol. 
875, col. 106; 17 June 1974). 
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I. RHASOIS FOR THE CREATIOI OF THE VAs 
In this section it is intended to review the reasons for the creation of 
the WAs (under the Water Act 1973) and their empowering with wider 
pollution control provisions <under COP A II). It should, however, be 
noted that while the following may suggest that this was a smooth 
evolution, it has been stated that 
WIn fact, the 1973 Act implied a sudden rejection of two of 
the principal characteristics of the previous system. It 
removed water from the control (in the main) of local 
government and it also meant that all functions were 
administered within integrated organisations rather than 
through separate authorities. Whereas previously water had 
been handled by a variety of bodies, after 1974 the various 
functions were administered by different operating arms of 
the regional water authorities· (Jordan, Richardson and 
Kimber [hereafter Jordan et all, 1977, p. 318; original 
emphasis). 
A. The Ieed For The WAs 
It will be explained below that the central reason underlying the 
identification of the need for a new structure, which culminated in the 
creation of the WAs in 1973/4, was a perceived "crisis· in the 
management of water services. Two types of problem producing this crisis 
can be suggested, the first relating to the quantity of water for supply 
and the quality of river water, and the second, the administrative 
agencies responsible for water services. This will be considered in 
respect of the situation bath before, and then after, 1963. 
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1. The Position Before 1963 
The central problem facing water management before 1963 was that of the 
increasing demand for water, initially recognised during the Second 
Vorld Var, 3 As a result of this, the first attempt to deal with the 
problem was the Water Act 1945, which had adopted the recommendations of 
the Central Advisory Water Committee (CAVC) in 1943, A further report of 
the same commdttee in 1958/9 coincided with the severe drought of 1959, 
but the most significant report was that of the Sub-Committee of CAVC 
(chaired by Proudman), published in 1962, and based (inter alia) on the 
following terms of reference: 
Ma. to consider the extent to which the demand for water for 
domestic, industrial, agricultural and other purposes is 
increasing and is likely to increase; to consider the 
problems in meeting these demands .. (CAVC, 1962, para, 
1) , 
The mainstay of the report was the need for short-term action, in 
particular, a "comprehensive system for controlling surface water 
abstractions. ,A. 
The report also recognised that a major obstacle to meeting the 
increased demand for water was the "multiplicity of agencies" 
responsible for the various aspects of the water cycle (especially water 
supply) which were seen as inadequate to overcome the problem,S In 
consequence, the report identified the absence of a single authority 
responsible 
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-locally for co-ordinating the use and development of the 
water resources of a river basin as a whole, ,,- <para, 11i 
emphasis added) 
as the key omission, and recommended the creation of ·comprehensive new 
authorities ... charged with a positive duty of water conservation" 
<para. 8). As a result, the Vater Resources Act 1963 followed the 
publication of a White Paper the preceding year, and created 32 River 
Authorities, based on river basins, responsible (inter alia) for 
pollution control, and water abstraction licensing. 
2. 1963-13 
The Act was initially perceived as having dealt with the water supply 
problem, but in 1968 the revelation by the Water Resources Board that 
demand for water was expected to double by the end of the century, at a 
time when cheap sources of supply were running out, led to an awareness 
that further action would be needed (Jordan et al, 1977, pp. 319-20). 
The problem relating to the quantity 
amplified by a growing awareness of 
of water available for supply was 
the importance of river water 
quality <and effluent disposal as affecting that quality) for water 
supply, in particular in terms of the ability to re-use such water. The 
CAVC report in 1970 (see below) identified, as a key failing of the 1963 
Act, the lack of emphasis on river quality.s Demand on the sewage 
disposal system was also rising, as the Jeger Committee made clear. 
Referring to sewage disposal as the ·Cinderella of the public services·, 
the Committee stated that it was a "matter of urgent concern whose 
solution could not be taken for granted," The committee feared the 
"destruction" of rivers and coastal waters (XHLG, 1970, para. 2). 
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In relation to the administration of water services, two other factors 
were instrumental in identifying the need for further change. First, the 
replacement of J H Street, by Jack Beddoe, as Under-Secretary of State 
at the Kinistry of Housing and Local Government (at the time the 
sponsoring department for water services), was seen as bringing about a 
change in emphasis within the Xinistry.7 Second, following the report of 
the (Redcliff-Maud) Royal Commission on Local Government,s the CAVe was 
reconvened (in 1970) to consider the implications of Redcliff-Maud for 
water services. CAVC identified three obstacles to comprehensive water 
management, notably the inadequacy of 
paras. 125-30) and the structural 
the "operating units" (DoE, 1971, 
defects in the way that water 
functions were organised and co-ordinated. 9 
However, assessments of the 1963 Act have not been wholly negative: 
"Perhaps the mast significant contribution of the short-
lived river authorities was their operating experience as 
true multifunctional agencies ... in a country where sharp 
distinctions had always been made between the 'clean' and 
'dirty' water fields, the river authorities developed 
leadership with an understanding of both, a resource sorely 
needed in the reorganised water industry" (Okun, 1977, p. 
31). 
3. Proposed Remedies 
All of the reports cited above were in broad agreement regarding the 
changes that were needed to meet the defects they had identified. 
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WThe necessity for the reuse of large quantities of water 
demands that there must be a single, comprehensive water 
management plan for every river basin, which includes water 
reclamation" (DoE, 1971, para. 119). 
which could only be achieved through "strong bodies· (ibid., para. 
300).10 However, these bodies were more divided on how to implement this 
approach. Members of the CAWe, for example, could not agree between the 
choice of multi-purpose, or single purpose authorities, and the 
distribution of functions between central and local government (DoE, 
1971, paras. 171, 268, 276 and 292). 
4. The Government's Response 
The next step towards the implementation of change was in the form of a 
series of 17 consultation papers detailing various aspects of water 
management,ll a major circular (in 1971), and finally, the publication 
of the Bill in 1973, with an accompanying explanatory document which 
incorporated the responses to the consultation papers. 
The crux of the proposals was the creation of 10 multi-purpose 
(regional) water authorities to commence operations on 1 April 1974 (to 
coincide with the changes in the local government and health services), 
which would be based "on natural watersheds and in most instances on 
boundaries of the existing river authorities" (DoE, Circular 92171, 
paras. 4-5). The Government clearly shared the views of CAVC: 
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"The Government are convinced that the change now 
proposed is essential if water supplies are to be 
safeguarded and if the quality of water in rivers and 
estuaries is to be improved, or even maintained." 12 
To deal with the conflict between abstractions and discharges the 
Government concluded that the time had come to: 
• bring together, under all-purpose management 
structures, all aspects of the hydrological cycle, literally 
from the source to the tap" (DoE, Circular 92/71, 
Memorandum, para. 18). 
The proposals would thus be seen as developing the principles of the 
1963 Act and applying them to the whole of the water cycle, replacing 
the existing wide range of authorities (ibid., paras. 18-19).13 The main 
role of the new bodies was to be the supply of water and the reclamation 
or disposal of waste water, so that statutory obligations to provide 
water to meet "legitimate needs" would be "preserved and consolidated" 
(i bid., para. 25). 
B. The Ieed For Extended Pollution Control Powers 
The above has given a brief impression of the developments that led 
first, to an understanding of the problems facing water management after 
the Second World War, and second, the proposals for the WAs as multi-
purpose agencies based on geographical, rather than political, 
boundaries. The awareness of the importance 
the control of pollution, is significant, 
of water quality, and hence 
and is reflected in the 
original intention that the new VAs would be equipped with wider powers 
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to control pollution. However, because of the desire to ensure that the 
VAs began operations on the same day as the new arrangements for health 
and local government (1 April 1974), the pollution control proposals 
were deferred with the intention of enacting them in subsequent 
legislation (DoE, Circular 92/71, para. 56). 
1. The History of Pollution Control AdDdnistration 
By way of introduction to pollution control administration, it is useful 
to be aware of the background to it prior to the 1970s. Although 
legislation on water pollution actually dates back to 1876 (Rivers 
Pollution Prevention Act), the 1948 River Boards Act has been described 
as a "landmarkA for providing, for the first time, unified control 
throughout England and Vales for the functions of land drainage, 
fisheries and river pollution control (Sayers, 1982, p. 65), and by 
introducing boundaries based on river -catchments" (but not -basins"). 
The introduction of powers to control pollution was achieved on a phased 
basis, with the Rivers <Prevention of Pollution) Act 1951 (which largely 
repealed the 1876 Act) giving the river boards their main powers 
(Sayers, 1982, pp. 65-6). This was followed by the Clean Rivers 
(Estuaries and Tidal Waters) Act 1960, and the Rivers <Prevention of 
Pollution) Act 1961. The combined effect of these three Acts (which, 
collectively, were known as the Rivers <Prevention of Pollution) Acts 
1951-61) was that virtually all discharges to inland waters required a 
Mconsent M from the river boards, but only those to tidal waters begun 
after 1961 (unless there had been a Ministerial HTidal Vaters OrderM). 
These acts provided the basis for water pollution regulation until the 
implementation of COPA II in the mid 1980s. 
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2. Identifying the Ieed for Action 
In a similar way to the 1973 Act, a number of independent reports, 
including again Jeger (XHLG, 1970), were influential. 14 The crucial 
issue was indicated to be the need for control over all discharges to 
all types of water, especially tidal waters (KHLG, 1970, paras. 202, 
264).16 The main responses of the Heath Government to these reports were 
provided in (DoE) circulars 118/72 (containing the response to the Royal 
Comndssion Third Report) and 10/72, where the Government stated that it 
"agree[dl widely" with the Jeger Working Party on its specific proposals 
and had the same objectives (Appendix to 10/72). In particular, the 
relevant Xinisters recognised that the maintenance of water quality 
"should be an essential component in the national strategy for the 
management of water resourcesA , and they further agreed with the need 
for the extension of control to tidal waters and for greater protection 
of the seas (i bid. ). 
ParliaJDentary Progress. Following the 
1973/4, the Conservative Government 
above circulars, in Session 
presented to Parliament the 
Protection of the Environment Bill which contained a series of detailed 
provisions to extend water pollution control powers for the VAs (which 
by then were already operating in "shadow"·form). 16 Having completed 
Comndttee Stage in the Lords, the Bill was lost with the defeat of the 
Heath Government, but a substantially similar Bill, under the title 
"Control of Pollution", was introduced by the new Administration, and 
because of the detailed scrutiny which the original Bill had received, 
its successor was enacted in less than six months, achieving Royal 
Assent in July 1974. 
There are two aspects of the final legislation which can be noted. 
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First, unlike the Environmental Protection Bill presented to Parliament 
in December 1989, the Act did not provide for an "integrated- approach 
to pollution control - each of the four parts provided very different 
regimes relating to the different environmental media. Second, one of 
the most contentious issues in Parliament proved to be the actual scope 
of the legislation - with Labour, when in Opposition, arguing that the 
Bill did not seek to protect the whole environment, merely limited parts 
of it. 17 This was the rationale behind the change of name of the Bill 
(for instance, Lord Shepherd, Hansard, vol. 351, col. 373; 7 May 1974). 
The two Parties were, however, largely in agreement over the substance 
of the would-be Act, which was described (for example) by Denis Howell 
as a 
Bill of absolute necessity if we are to demonstrate to 
the country that the whole House takes as seriously as the 
country increasingly wishes the control and protection of 
the environment" (Hansard, HC, vol. 875, col. 167; 17 June 
1974). 
Hembers were also clear on the importance of the provisions in relation 
to water. 19 While the details of the legislation will be analysed in 
Part III of the thesis, as will be seen below the key issue, following 
Royal Assent, became the implementation of the provisions relating to 
water, a process subject to Xinisterial edict despite the warnings of 
the Royal Commission (Cmnd. 5054, 1972, para. 27), 
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I!. THE COISTI TUTI 01 OF THE VAs 
Having established the events which influenced the developments in water 
management from 1945, the next stage is to consider the opportunities 
for public participation which were provided in relation to the WAs as 
"corporate entities", and the reasons behind the provision of such 
opportunities. Discussion of this revolves around the central issue of 
the constitution of the WAs, and in particular, the extent to which they 
were to reflect or include local government interests, given the 
historical role of local government, indicated above. It will be 
suggested that the real reason behind the provisions is that they were 
concessions to local government, and that the choice of structure of the 
VAs was to satisfy operational criteria primacy was given to the 
"water professionals" (the engineers), and thus, the WAs were instilled, 
by the Government, with an ideology of "expertise", potentially the 
converse of meaningful public participation. Account must also be taken 
of developments since 1974, in particular in the form of changes to the 
VAs' constitution in 1983, which, it will be suggested, transformed the 
ideology towards one which has been termed that of "business principles" 
or the ethos of the "balance sheet" (Saunders, 1984, p. 7)19 
Support for this analysis has been provided, notably by Jordan et a1, 
and to some extent by Saunders (the modified version of his theory will 
be discussed further below). They have argued that the VAs, as created 
d 73 A t I Ie of "managerialist" or un er the 19 c, were a c ear examp 
"technocratic" organisations. The strength of their argument is 
illustrated by the view that 
"The 1973 Act implies a belief in planning, a preference for 
efficiency rather than participation: it presents a system 
designed to meet technical rather than political criteria 
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and which attempts to solve conflict by intra-organisational 
methods" (Jordan et al, p. 318, and see Saunders, 1983, p. 
33>' 
The implications for public participation of this argument, if the YAs 
were truly managerialist, are made clear by Saunders, who has identified 
the "conflict" that thereby arises between the "experts· and those who 
wish to participate, most notably the local government members of the 
WAs. Such an ideology is 
" 
antithetical to participation in policy-making by 
outsiders ... The professionals, in short, know best and 
they view with distaste any attempt to cloud purely 
technical issues with unwarranted political opinions" 
(Saunders, 1983, pp. 34-5). 
Further, Parker and Penning-Rowsell have stated that "management by 
experts necessarily implies limited scope for local participation and 
democracy" (in Saunders, 1983, p. 35). 
However, it can be noted that the adoption of the managerialist approach 
for the WAs had not been inevitable the choice had been between that 
and a system of (solely) local government representation, but two key 
influences shaped the final choice. First, Jack Beddoe, referred to 
earlier, whose acceptance of the managerialist approach was "as sudden 
as it was total" (Jordan et al, p. 319).20 According to Saunders (1983, 
p. 29) this acceptance was merely part of the managerialist -fashion" of 
the time. The second influence was the model adopted for the river 
authorities under the 1963 Act, because they demonstrated the preference 
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for some degree of multi-functionalism and managerial ism, rather than 
local government control.21 
Saunders (1983), in his initial working paper relating to the "regional 
state", supported the above analysis. However, in a later work, relating 
specifically to the WAs post 1983, for which he carried out detailed 
empirical research, he modified his arguments to suggest that it was nat 
so much the "water professionals" who were the key players in providing 
the managerialist ethos, but the chairmen of the authorities, because 
there was a new emphasis an financial control of the WAs, and the idea 
of "economic and efficient businesses". This was again to the potential, 
if not actual, detriment of public participation (1984, pp. 0-7). Given 
these important ideas, it is intended to review the arrangements for the 
constitution of the WAs, initially under the Water Act 1973, and then 
under the Water Act 1983. 
A. Under The Yater Act 1913 
1. The Decision-Making Process Leading to the Act 
Following Beddoe's symposium paper (in 1969, supra.), the review by the 
Xinistry was undertaken by a working party, which concluded in favour of 
unified, rather than single purpose, bodies, and more significantly, 
preferred a "strong technological" element instead of local government, 
on the basis that water treatment and supply were matters for 
technology, with little room for "local democracy" (Jordan et a1, p. 
325). Following presentation of this report to the Xinister, Lord 
Greenwood, in June 1969, the CAVe was re-called, but Jordan et a1 have 
argued <pp. 326-7) that this was no more than a process of legitimation, 
and that the Ministry sought to ensure the "right result", The latter 
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was assisted by Xinistry officials offering a detailed report, which 
favoured the technological approach, as the basis for the Committee's 
deliberations. While the Committee split 14-13 in favour of this 
approach, ultimately it did no more than to present the options to the 
(by then) new Xinister, Peter Walker, who, according to Jordan et al 
(pp. 328-9), had by that time already gained Cabinet approval for the 
managerial approach. 
a. The Granting of Concessions to Local Government Interests 
The above discussion would appear to suggest that progress towards 
publication, and then enactment of a Bill designed to reduce local 
government involvement in water management almost to nil, had been an 
easy process. This was not, however, the case. During the three years 
prior to the Parliamentary stages, there had been considerable 
bargaining with local government interests - the result of which was a 
number of concessions relating to the extent of local government 
representation on the WAs' Boards, and the role of the local authorities 
in the provision of sewerage services. 
Okun (1977) has detailed the way this process of bargaining developed, 
including a -boycott-, and a deputation to the Minister (in May 1972). 
It is important here to note the type of proposals being offered by the 
Government and sought by the 
relating to WA membership 
local authorities. The consultation paper 
proposed the idea of "consultative 
committees-, which would seem to suggest something more akin to direct 
public participation (albeit on a limited scale) than a system based 
purely on the role of local authority representatives on the VAs' Boards 
- participatory rather than representative democracy. However, the local 
authority groupings made it clear that they did not want such committees 
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(Okun, p. 76), demanding their own representation. Ultimately, the 
Government conceded, granting the local authorities the majority of 
seats on the VA Boards, and allowing them to continue their 
responsibilities for sewerage services, at least as agents of the VAs 
(Saunders, 1983, p. 31). It can be argued, therefore, that for their own 
benefit, both sides were willing to sacrifice a system offering, 
potentially, a more participatory approach, for one based solely on an 
(in)-directly elected base of local government representation. 22 Support 
for this view can also be found from the comments of Jordan et al, 
noting the reluctance of the local authority members to lose their 
previously key roles in water management - a reluctance sharpened by the 
earlier losses of the gas, electricity, and health functions - water was 
effectively the "final straw' (Jordan et al, p. 324). 
The reasons for the Government's willingness to concede are also worthy 
of note. Significant among these were the pressures of Parliamentary 
time if water was to be re-organised simultaneously with health and 
local government, and it would seem that 
backbench "revolt" (Saunders, 1983, p. 31). 
set of proposals was, therefore, at the 
the Government also feared a 
The protection of the whole 
heart of the Government's 
"generosity". A further reason may simply be that the concessions did 
little to dent the managerial ethos to cite Jordan et al, after the 
concessions the structure 
" remain[edJ essentially managerial and a dramatic re-
organisation of the water industry" (p. 332). 
Further the concessions had 
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• all weakened the overall strategic control enjoyed by 
the RWAs and the water professionals within them. Yet 
despite these concessions, the new water authorities still 
had extensive powers and responsibility, most of which had 
been won at the expense of local government· (Saunders, 
1983, p. 32; emphasis added). 
b. The Government's Intended Role for Local Authority Iembers 
Given that the concessions were granted, it would seem important to 
consider the actual role that the Government intended the local 
authority members to play on the VA Boards. It is submitted that they 
were seen primarily as being able to generate a ·smooth" working 
relationship between the two sets of bodies (especially in respect of 
the sewerage function), rather than as a genuine mechanism for providing 
any public input into policy-making. 23 
c. Public Consultation 
Given the extensive interest group dealing which preceded the Act, which 
seems to bear out Gunningham's thesis (1974), it is important to seek to 
identify to what extent the public were able to contribute to the 
shaping of these new and significant organisations. As part of the 
"principled approach", it is argued that meaningful participation is as 
necessary at the stage of creating organisations, such as the VAs, as at 
any other. However, despite the 17 consultation papers already referred 
to, it would seem that they too offered little more than legitimation. 
Saunders has alleged that even before they were published, the choice of 
managerialist VAs had virtually been decided, and the importance of the 
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views of the public, especially in 
issue, were insignificant (1983, p. 
75>, the outlook of the Government, 
"seemed to have hardened". 
2. The Enactment of the Bill 
relation to the local government 
30). According to Okun (1977, p. 
following the consultation papers, 
Interestingly, Jordan et al excluded consideration of the Parliamentary 
stages of the 1973 Bill on the basis that the 
"important discussion, negotiations, concessions were made 
directly between groups and the DoE. Indeed in the case of 
the local government aspects, the Members of Parliament 
presenting the local government case were kept out of the 
negotiations between the Government and the associations -
and were left in ignorance to put down amendments which were 
completely undermined by agreements already privately 
arranged between the associations and the Government." 
(Jordan et al, p. 332). 
However, notice will be taken here, if only because of the argument that 
the feared backbench "revolt" was a factor in the process. 24 Inevitably, 
in Parliament the key issues were the WAs' constitution, and the 
consultative committees. In the case of the former, the local 
authorities sought the right (rather than the SoS) to appoint the 
chairman. Interestingly, having agreed to delete the provision for the 
consultative committees, the Government then agreed to give the WAs the 
power to create advisory committees consisting of anyone that the WA 
deemed appropriate, but it was anticipated that elected members would, 
again, play a significant role (DoE, Circular 100/73, para. 50). 
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Importantly, it was also agreed that the Press and the public would have 
access to the meetings of the VAs. 
To conclude with regard to the Bill, the assessment of Okun, from a US 
standpoint, is interesting. Okun is particularly critical of the lack of 
scrutiny which the Bill, in fact, received,26 especially the way that 
the Government treated its promise, in relation to local authority 
representatives, as a "blanket defence" to any other more significant 
changes <pp. 80-2, 99). It could, therefore, be argued that there was a 
"conspiracy" to allow such an approach without the realisation that, if 
the arguments of Jordan, Saunders and others are valid, the WAs would 
still be managerialist-based, and hence, a true role for the public, 
leading to responsive decision-making, would not be ensured. 
B. Under The Yater Act 1983 
The change of Government in February 1974 from Conservative to Labour, 
was potentially significant for the VAs, as it provided an early 
opportunity to make drastic changes to a structure only in its infancy. 
However, Labour did not fundamentally oppose the objectives of the re-
organisation, and so proposed a review, only after allowing the WAs two 
years to settle in. 26 The review resulted in a "Green" Paper in 1976, 
and a White Paper a year later,27 but the only change which was actually 
introduced (by statutory order) was a minor increase in local government 
representation. Notably, there was a change of heart on the appointment 
of the WAs' chairmen - Labour now decided that this should remain the 
prerogative of the SOS.29 Kore wide reaching proposals, including the 
creation of a -national water authority", were last on the fall of the 
Labour Government in May 1979. 
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As is well known, the period of the Wilson/Callaghan Government from 
1974-79, was dogged by a severe financial crisis, and hence, the new WAs 
were subjected to major expenditure cuts virtually from day one. This 
crisis overshadowed, if not replaced, the one which the WAs had been 
created to deal with (supra), especially as it was soon realised that 
pre 1973 predictions for water demand had been pessimistlc. 29 With the 
Thatcher Administration came a sharper emphasis on the control of public 
expenditure - "economy and efficiency" became the key words - and this 
was to be reflected in the case of the WAs through a series of measures 
imposing tight financial control (discussed in the next chapter), and 
more significantly, a re-structuring of the constitution of the WAs to 
replace the local government representatives with (solely) ministerial 
appointees. The latter was 
rationale behind it will 
achieved through the Water Act 1983. The 
be briefly reviewed here, and it will be 
suggested, supporting Saunders, that the Act introduced a more 
"explicit· version of the managerial ethos - one which put finance first 
- what will be termed the "business principles ethos· with the 
chairmen becoming the most important people in the organisations. 
The main changes that the Act effected were to remove the right of the 
local authorities to appoint members to the WAs, and the Press and 
public were no longer to be admitted to the Board meetings as of right. 
But "compensation" for these changes was provided in the requirements 
for the WAs to create committees for the representation of consumers 
interests (see chapter four). It will be seen from the following, that 
in the build-up to the Act, there were two key issues - the role of the 
local authority representatives on the VA Boards, and the need for the 
WAs to become more "efficient". 
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1. The Background to the Act 
There were essentially three events which influenced the new Government 
in its decision to re-constitute the WAs. On taking Office it had 
already indicated that it would adopt the same approach to the WAs' 
finances as for the nationalised industries an approach espoused by 
the predecessor Government in a Vhite Paper in 1978. 30 The three events 
were - a report by the KMC into Severn Trent WA (and its two associated 
water supply companies),31 the changes in the structure of the Welsh 
Authority made by the SoS for Wales in 1982, and the Department of Trade 
consultation paper relating to consumer representation in the 
nationalised industries. 32 Combined, these three events led to the 
more general but quite fundamental question of the 
extent to which, seven years after reorganisation, local 
authorities need to have a continuing and close involvement 
in the management of water services ... [tJaken together the 
Government believe that these factors produce a momentum for 
change in the membership arrangements of RWAs" (DoE, 1982a, 
para. 2). 
As a result of this belief a number of options for restructuring were 
outlined (DoE, 1982a). 
Changes to the structure 
secondary legislation on 
process of consultation 
of the Welsh 
1 April 1982 
inspired by 
Authority were implemented by 
(SI 1981/1883), following a 
public concern over the 
"accountability" of the Authority, given "dramatic" rises in water 
charges.33 The importance of the changes was in providing a model which 
included a Board of 13 members (all ministerial appointees), and five 
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"local consumer advisory committees", membership of which included 
members of the general public (DoE, 1982a, para. 17). 
The importance of the XKC report, published in June 1981, was that it 
supported a reduction in the size of the Severn Trent VA Board, and 
indicated that "widespread dissatisfaction" had been expressed as to the 
effectiveness of the role of local authority representatives. The Report 
concluded that membership of 48: 
M ••• impose[s] considerable costs on the Authority - both 
directly, because of the expenditure arising from the 
provision of staff to support the comDdttee structure, and 
more important, indirectly because of the diversion of 
senior management effort required to operate the systemM (HC 
339, 1980/1, paras. 11.154-5). 
The Commdssion therefore recommended a nationalised industry-style Board 
of about 12 members, not based on local authority representation (DoE 
82, paras. 15-6). 
The Department of Trade paper followed a six year debate on consumer 
representation in the nationalised industries, which had also included 
the National Consumer Council pointing out that, unlike the nationalised 
industries, the WAs had no provision for consumer councils. The 
Department of Trade, in response, proposed to strengthen the role of the 
consultative commJttees, including the right to discuss proposals and 
policies, and greater rights of access to information. 
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2. The Government Response 
By 1982 the level of water charges was once more a central public issue. 
The response of the Government was to emphasise the importance of 
"efficiency", for which it considered the local authority members of the 
WAs to be anachronistic. This is illustrated by the following comment: 
-It was in the public interest that the knowledge and 
experience of their predecessors should be available to the 
RWAs by providing that there should be a dual system for 
appointing members ... Arguably the RWAs' transitional period 
is now at an end and the present arrangements governing the 
size and composition of their membership are no longer 
suitable for the effective, efficient and economic 
management of these major public utilities" (DoE, 1982a, 
para. 11; emphasis added). 
At the same time, questions were being raised about the actual "success" 
of the local authority members in representing the interests of the 
public on the VAs (see para. 13) a role, it has already been argued, 
they were never genuinely intended to have had.34 
Finally, the Government concluded that the pre 1983 WAs were 
- much bigger than is needed for the management of 
essentially executive organisatiOns" (DoE, 1982a, para. 14; 
emphasis added). 
Of the five options set out in the consultation paper,3S the Government 
preferred a structure of Boards of 9-15 -executive" members, but coupled 
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with divisional advisory comDdttees (statement of Tom King, Session 
1981/2, vol. 27, cols. 293-4; 7 July 1982).36 
3. Enactment of the Bill 
In arguing that the Bill was designed to make explicit the Mbusiness 
principles ethosM, the parliamentary deliberations of the Bill are 
illuminating; there was no attempt to hide the fact that Nbusiness 
principlesM were to be the ruling criteria of the new WAs. For instance, 
according to Lord Bellwin 
MThe overall purpose of this Bill is to improve efficiency 
and cost-effectiveness. That is the hallmark of the present 
Administration. We believe this is the area which can bring 
the most benefit to the public· (Hansard, HL, vol. 438, col. 
998; 7 February 1983). 
While Tom King stated that improved accountability would be achieved 
through 
M better management of resources and better performance 
by authorities ... N (Hansard, HC, vol. 32, col 153; 16 
November 1982).37 
Support for the argument that local authority members had not originally 
been intended to provide a participatory role, but had been appointed as 
a concession, can also be found in the Debates. For instance, Eldon 
Griffiths indicated that it had been felt Minappropriate- to sever the 
local authority link in one go, but now local authority members had 
·worn out their welcome" (Hansard, HC, vol. 32, col. 173; 16 November 
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1982). It should be noted that a potentially key aspect of the Act was 
to be in the form of the divisional CCCs (which would include moving the 
local authority members "downwards" from the WA Boards). It will be 
contended that, while these appear to offer a more participatory 
approach, albeit in an advisory capacity, they were clearly to be 
required to operate within the business principles ethos - WAs' first 
priorities were clearly to be finance and not public participation 
(further Saunders, 1983, p. 36). 
I I I. POLLUTIOI COITROL: THE IECESSARY - POLITICAL YILL-? 
In considering the pollution control function of the WAs, it 1s clearly 
vital to do so in the context of the WAs as a whole. Thus, it has been 
argued that the WAs, when created in 1973, were primarily structured on 
the basis of the "managerialist ethos", and that in 1983 this was 
modified so that the business principles of "economy and efficiency" 
became the overriding directive. Thus, it could be argued that public 
participation would not be allowed to be a key priority for the WAs, and 
hence, they would not be able to possess the necessary political will 
for meaningful participation. In the case of pollution control, as has 
already been noted, important provisions laying down opportunities for 
public participation were provided in COP A II, enacted in July 1974. 
However, support for the above argument can be found in the way that the 
WAs sought, and Government (both Labour and then Conservative) willingly 
acceded to, a delaying of the implementation of the provisions, 
primarily because of the cost implications for the WAs. Neither 
government nor the WAs were, therefore, concerned that participation was 
being placed, at least, a clear second to financial requirements. 
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In this section it is intended to review these arguments, setting out 
the perceived reasons why the implementation of COPA II was delayed for, 
effectively, 11 years, and why it was finally implemented. Before this, 
however, it is important to take account of the original reasons for 
including the rights within the legislation, especially as it has been 
argued that the legislation was primarily designed to meet the expected 
crisis relating to the demand for water, whereby river water quality 
would be a key factor in overcoming that crisis. 
Throughout the following section it is also crucial to note the time 
factors which were involved, and the nature of the VAs in relation to 
the provisions. When enacted, it was expected that the new provisions 
would be available at a time when the WAs were, at least symbolically,39 
dominated by local authority appointees, and meeting in public. However, 
by the time that the provisions were brought into force, the re-
structuring, under the 1983 Act, had taken place, and the WAs were 
comprised of ministerial appointees, and meeting behind closed doors 
(with the exception of the Welsh Authority).39 This is an incongruity 
which does not seem to have perplexed successive Governments. 
A final point with regard to the pollution control function, and the 
likely presence of political will, is that the idea of "expertise" or 
"technocracy· could be expected to be more clearly present in an arm of 
the organisation where "expertise" was an important factor. 
A. The Rationale of the Provisions for Public Participation 
In discussing the background to the extended pollution control 
provisions (supra.>, a number of reports were referred to as the key 
Sources for inspiring the changes. These reports were also influential 
- 86 -
in persuading government to legislate in respect of public 
participation. The most significant influences would appear to have been 
the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution and the Jeger report on 
sewage disposal. 
Bearing in mind that the Royal Commission had been appointed by the 
Conservative (Heath) Government. it can be expected that the latter 
would give due regard to the conclusions of the former. One of the 
notable themes of the early reports was the need for "open government" 
in pollution control. however. the latter was perceived to be dominated 
by "commercial confidentiality". This issue was identified in the First 
Report (Cmnd. 4585. 1971). and then formed the basis of the Second 
Report, which was termed, by the Commission, a "consultative document" 
(Cmnd. 4894, 1972, para. 2), and addressed the question of whether: 
"information about industrial effluents and wastes (should] 
remain (as it is at present) secret?" (ibid.) 
The Second Report noted the extent of secrecy, and "doubted", following 
significant evidence from many industries, that the reasons for it were 
justified in the majority of cases (paras. 3-6), The Commission also 
rejected the existing position on the basis that 
"The waters into which the pollutants are discharged are 
public property: interest in the nature and quantity of 
these pollutants is entirely justified. Moreover, since many 
industries are going to great trouble and expense to abate 
pollution, they do themselves a disservice by needless 
secrecy. We believe that public confidence in the concern 
these industries have for the environment would be 
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strengthened if this needless 
wi thdrawn" (para. 7). 
cloak of secrecy were 
The COmmission, therefore, recommended legislation to bring about 
greater "openness" (para. 8). The main theme of the Jeger report was the 
need for all applications for discharge consents to be advertised, 
reversing the position at that time, so that all users of rivers would 
be informed. (XHLG, 1970. para. 164, and see the Government's response 
in (DoE) Circular 10/72), 
The main consultation process for COPA was carried out as part of the 
process for the provisions that became the Water Act 1973. when the COPA 
provisions were severed because of time pressures (supra.), The last of 
the 17 consultation papers took the form of a series of six papers 
dealing with pollution control, one of which set out the proposals in 
relation to public participation, largely taking on board the above 
recommendations. 40 
1. Reasons Given in ParliaDent 
Given that COPA had "two parents" <ibid.), the statements in Parliament, 
regarding the intentions behind the provisions, can be expected to be 
informative. A sample of these will be noted. It would seem that despite 
the "managerialist ethos" and the 
theme throughout was the desire for 
quote Anthony Crossland, SoS for 
comments set out below, the general 
an informed and involved public. To 
the Environment, introducing the 
<second) Bill for Second Reading in the Commons in June 1974 
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·the public has the right to know and be made fully aware of 
the state of the environment and the sources of pollution. 
Obviously we must live with some degree of pollution. A 
perfectly clean world would be a dead world. But the public 
must participate fully and actively in decisions about how 
much pollution should or should not be tolerated. These are 
not matters to be settled behind closed doors" (Hansard, HC, 
vol. 675, cols. 95-6; 17 June 1974; emphasis added). 
and with reference to the views of the Royal CODrnUssion, he stated: 
"Our overriding objective surely must be a freer and fuller 
flow of information to the public, and the requirements of 
the Bill will go a long way to achieve this" {ibid., col. 
96).41 
While the above statements appear to portray an image of dedication to 
public participation, this must be tempered by the conflicting 
impressions given at different stages of the enactment of COPA. In 
particular, both Governments sought to suggest that the WAs could be 
"trusted" by the public, and, therefore, only limited safeguards on 
decision-making were required; an approach, it is suggested, which 
conflicts with the above rhetoric. Two themes which clearly indicate 
this conflict are that the SoS would be a major "ally" for the public, 
and that the WAs themselves would both act "reasonably" and had the 
"expertise" to protect river quality. It was pointed out that the SoS 
was under a duty (under the Water Act 1973, s. 1) to "maintain and 
improve" river quality, and this was used to reject calls for the public 
to have a right of appeal against the granting of a consent (given that 
dischargers would have an appeal against refusal), According to Lord 
Aberdare, the granting of a consent was automatically in conflict with 
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the above duty, and hence, the public had" an assured ally and a 
minimum safeguardM (Hansard, HL, vol. 348, col. 1687; 24 January 1974). 
In relation to the payment of expenses to the public at local inquiries, 
such expenses would not be granted because the: 
Mwater authority are there to consider and put the case for 
maintaining and restoring the wholesomeness of the water for 
which they are responsible. That is their statutory duty, 
and they have the technical expertise necessary to help in 
such casesM (Lord Aberdare, Hansard, HL, vol. 349, col. 121; 
28 January 1974). 
A common theme of the speeches of Viscount Dilhorne was that the 
(Conservative) Government was asking the Opposition to accept that 
M[The] WA will always know best, far better than anyone else 
concerned with the riverM (Hansard, HL, vol. 349, col. 142; 
28 January 1974). 
Finally, the role of the local authority members, who by then formed the 
majority of each VA's membership, raised an interesting issue. All 
Parties seemed to regard the members' role as negative, again suggesting 
that they had been granted their place as a "concession", and not to 
provide a means for public involvement in VA decision-making. In 
particular, members of both Houses were concerned that local 
authorities' past records in relation to both sewage disposal, and 
through the river authorities, pollution control, suggested that little 
would change now. 42 The Conservative Government (for instance) was keen 
to dispel these fears by drawing distinctions between the past 
arrangements and the new VAs, notably suggesting that the local 
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authority members of the WAs would only make a limited impact, and 
hence. there was no reason to believe that the WAs would not act 
"responsibly".43 
Thus, it is contended that, despite the superficial rhetoric about the 
importance of public participation, there was enough in the 
Parliamentary Debates to suggest that both Governments did not believe 
that the public needed a significantly active role, because the WAs 
could be "trusted", and hence, this presented little challenge to the 
managerial 1st claims. 
2. The Provisions for Public Participation as a Concession 
On top of the influences noted above, it can be suggested that the 
provisions were also given by government as a concession to industry, 
because of the latter's concern that the WAs would be both polluters and 
regulators, a position unacceptable if it was to be carried out in 
private. Frankel has stated that this dual role "presented a serious 
problem of accountability" which was 
" unacceptable, not only 
industry which suspected that 
be unfairly subjected to much 
to the public, but also to 
industrial dischargers might 
stricter enforcement than the 
authorities' own, possibly more polluting, sewage works. The 
dilemma was solved by introducing two safeguards" (Frankel, 
1982, pp. 110-1).44 
Such an argument again indicates support for the "conflict theory" 
(Gunningham, 1974), in a similar way to the power of appointment of 
local authority members to the VA Boards before 1983, discus:;ed above. 
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B. Reasons for the Initial Ion-Implementation of COP! II 
Having argued that the provisions for public participation were provided 
to the already managerialist WAs, as much as a concession to industry as 
in a belief of the importance of anything akin to meaningful 
participation, it will be further argued that events following Royal 
Assent in July 1974, give the clearest indication that public 
participation was not the highest priority on the government agenda, nor 
did government intend that it should be such for the VAs. Again this 
issue must be seen in the context of the wider circumstances of 1974 
onwards, when the original fears over a crisis relating to the demand 
for water were overshadowed, if not replaced, by the "oil crisis" and 
the consequences of that for the national economy. The control of public 
expenditure became the one significant guide for all government policy. 
In this final section, it is intended to explain the way in which both 
Labour and then the Conservative Governments, refused to implement all 
but two sections of COPA 11,45 and the articulated and hidden reasons 
for this. Finally, account will be taken of the reasons why 
implementation finally did take place. 46 Only one reason was actually 
articulated by 
discernible. 47 
government, however, a 
1. Public Expenditure 
Following enactment, there seemed to be a 
new provisions would involve expenditure 
administering the new provisions49 and in 
of private 
number of others are 
sudden realisation that the 
for the VAs, both in 
bringing their sewage works 
prosecutions under the Act into compliance, given the fear 
(further, post). Perhaps the clearest indicator of this reason is 
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provided by the National Water Council (which, significantly, included 
the ten WA chairmen) . 
• formal implementation 
prospect) involve additional 
would (and has already in 
cost and staff to meet the 
requirements and would create a 
increased capital expenditure in 
on the grounds of these 
climate of expectation of 
pollution control. It was 
extra 
implementation was originally deferred 
The policies of the present Government 
have led the Council to suggest 
commitments that 
by the Government. 
on public spending 
to Ministers that 
implementation could with advantage be further postponed" 
(IWe, 1979, p. 20; emphasis added). 
In 1979 the "serious" attempts then being made to implement COPA II 
(discussed in chapters five and six) were lost with the fall of the 
Callaghan Government, and the change in Administration put the process 
back further, although the new Government announced that it was 
"examining the issues involved" (XL Fox, Parliamentary Under-Secretary 
of State (Environment), Hansard, He, vol. 975, col. 683, 12 December 
1979). The arguments about public expenditure can, however, be put into 
context by the later comments of former senior DoE officers, who have 
argued that because COP A II was no more than a "framework Act", 
implementation per se did not involve public expenditure; only the 
setting of standards by the WAs could do that.49 
2. The Administrative Workload 
A partially articulated reason seems to have been based on three 
elements. First, those involved were not adequately prepared for 
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legislation claimed to have been the most researched;50 a problem which 
did not ease over time. 
"we have explained that no timetable can be decided 
until we have better information about the expenditure 
implications. These are being examined 
" (Written 
Answer, Hansard, He, vol. 981, col. 209; 19 larch 1980). 
Related to this is the suggestion that "too many" DoE staff were devoted 
to housing, rather than water functions (Cmnd. 9149, 1984, pp. 61-2), 
and that implementation was expected to lead to a significant increase 
in "paper-work" for the VAs, relating both to the new controls and the 
participation provisions. In the mid 1970s, VA staff had actually been 
increased in readiness for COPA, but this position was reversed because 
of public expenditure cuts. Thus David Walker of the NWC, is quoted as 
saying that "we have to proceed so as not to create 10 years work for 
staff that doesn't exist" <cited by Caulfield, 1982, p. 211).51 
3. The Industry "Lobby" 
Industry clearly recognised that the new pollution controls could 
involve extra expenditure and, therefore, sought to resist the new 
provisions (as a complete package), as did the WAs. According to Pearce 
" thanks to pressure from industrialists, [COPA] has 
still not come into force. And, when it does, its teeth will 
have been drawn entirely. Firms such as Unilever, leI and 
Rio Tinto Zinc all have cause to cheer Whitehall's 
generosity in setting aside the will of Parliament" (Pearce, 
1984 I P' 1 0) . 52 
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4. The MFear- of Private Prosecutions 
One case where the public participation provisions (specifically) were 
blatantly resisted was the power which COP A II would provide for any 
member of the public to bring a prosecution for breach of a discharge 
consent. The significance of this can be seen in the context of the 
number of sewage works which failed their discharge consents in 1970 -
3000 out of 5000 (XHLG, 1970, para. 50) and this was a key concern, 
both to the WAs and industry. For instance, John Buckenham, when 
Secretary of the IWC, is quoted as saying that the water industry had 
requested an initial three year delay to "put its house in order" 
(Anon., 1975, p. 1315). Concerns regarding the effects of prosecutions 
on the WAs' planning were also expressed (Oldfield, 1984, p. 11), but it 
seems to have been assumed that the public were anxiously waiting, with 
"bottomless purses·, to prosecute every infringement, however minor (c/f 
Price, 1981, p. 13).63 
In conclusion, therefore, it is submitted that a combination of the 
above reasons conspired to achieve the initial non-implementation of 
COPA II, both in respect of the new 
relating to public involvement. It can 
control provisions, and those 
be argued that the Executive did 
not possess the requisite political will, and clearly required the WAs 
to put financial considerations first. What is equally disconcerting is 
the complicity of the WAs (despite, between 1974-83, being comprised of 
a majority of (in)-directly elected members), suggesting the presence of 
the "business principles ethos· and thereby threatening meaningful 
participation. Whether this was borne out in practice will be one of the 
issues for the remainder of the thesis. 
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C. Reasons for the Implementation of COP! II 
When implementation finally took place, commencing in 1982, 
significantly, it was achieved in phases thus suggesting, first, a 
desire to "soften the blo~', and, second, that there was no sudden 
change in the governing ethos. This is further re-inforced by the 
reasons for implementation which, it will be argued, were based on the 
force of "external pressures", rather than the free choice of government 
and industry. 
The pervading reason for implementation was the need for Britain to meet 
its legal obligations under a series of EC directives, the combined 
effects of which were that discharges, and especially those to estuarine 
and coastal waters, needed to be consented by the "competent authority" 
(the WAs). In many cases, however, the WAs did not have the power to 
require consent under pre-COP! legislation. Two directives were of 
particular concern, viz. Directive 76/160/EC Concerning the Quality of 
Bathing Water (OJ L31, 5 February 1976) and Directive 78/176/EC on Waste 
from the Titanium Dioxide Industry (OJ L54, 25 February 1978).64 The 
clearest statement of the effects of EC requirements, was expressed by 
the Royal Commission in its Tenth report 
"(this] is only one example of 'optional' legislation where 
ministers' unfettered discretion over commencement dates can 
effectively frustrate Parliament's intentions. the 
handling of this Act reflects little credit on successive 
administrations, and it is only pressure from the 
finally led to a partial 
Act" (Cmnd. 9149, 1984, p. 
european community that has 
implementation of Part II of the 
6lj emphasis added).66 
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This argument is reinforced by the way in which implementation was 
achieved (see Burton, 1987a) in particular, that control was only 
immediately introduced (on 31 January 1985) for those discharges which 
required consent to meet EC requirements (with the special exception of 
the Xersey, explained ibid,), Those discharges exempted (by the Control 
of Pollution (Exemption of Certain Discharges from Control) Order 1983, 
SI 1983/1182) were only being brought into (actual) control over a 
period of five years starting from 15 October 1987 (Control of Pollution 
(Exemption of Certain Discharges from Control) (Variation) Order 1986, 
SI 1986/1623),56 
While it can be argued that the above only explains the implementation 
of the control provisions, given the earlier arguments about the 
concessions to industry in respect of control not being tolerated in 
secret, it was inevitable that all the provisions would be implemented 
together, However, as previously detailed (Burton, 1987a), the process 
of implementation was such that the public involvement provisions were 
further by-passed, increasing support for the argument that there was no 
commitment on the part of the Executive to public participation, an 
argument developed further in chapter six. 
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IOTES: 
1 This is also necessary because the provisions under COPA were 
originally intended to form part of the legislation through which the 
WAs were created (post). 
2 See Lewis (1985, p. 217), and Baldwin and McCrudden (1987, p. 327 et 
seq.) . 
3 Especially in relation to water for fire-fighting (Okun, 1977, p. 
18), 
4 Para. 60. Irrigation was a particular problem because the water was 
not returned to the river after use (para. 21). 
6 (Para. 10). According to Okun (p. 19), in 1945 there had been 1186 
water undertakers. For a clear indication of the deficiencies, see 
the comments of the XHLG, cited at para. 13 of the (1962) CAVC 
report. 
s Para. 123, and see further paras. 115-6. This was further recognised 
by the Vater Resources Board (set up under the 1963 Act) which 
described water supply and sewage disposal as "interrelated and 
inseparable- (7th Annual Report, 1970, in Okun, p. 25). 
7 According to Jordan et al (p. 322) this was indicated by the paper 
presented by Beddoe at the IPHE/lWES/IWPC joint-sYEposium in March 
1969, just one month after the Xinistry had announced a review of the 
1963 Act. It will be seen below that, in fact, the question of 
personalities had a far greater effect on the type of structures 
introduced, than the need for change itself. 
a Royal Commission on Local Government in England and Wales 1966-1969, 
Cmnd. 4039, 1969. 
9 While there were still some 1300 bodies responsible for sewage 
disposal, which the report termed "excessive fragmentation- <para. 
130), the main conflict of interest was deemed to be abstractions 
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from, and discharges to, rivers (para. 145). Further problems were 
also apparent; for instance, Jordan et al (p. 318) noted the absence 
of any specific responsibility for water reclamation, and hence, the 
absence of co-ordination between water supply and sewage disposal 
bodies. Similarly, there was an absence of a national authority 
"charged with planning and co-ordinating the work of 1400 sewage 
treatment authorities" (WRB, 7th Annual Report, 1970, in Okun p. 25). 
For the XHLG's acceptance of these problems, see Jordan et al, p. 
322. 
10 Further MHLG, 1970, paras. 415, 417. This was also an approach 
supported by the Royal ComDdssion on Environmental Pollution, in its 
First Report (Cmnd. 4585, 1971, para. 94). 
11 These are summarised in Okun (p. 51), an important work on the Water 
Act 1973. 
12 DoE, Circular 92/71, para. 10, and see the comments of Beddoe in an 
interview with Okun, 1977, p. 41. 
13 Subject to the comment of Jordan, supra. 
14 The Conservative Government also published a general White Paper on 
the Environment in 1970 (Cmnd. 4373), which identified perceived 
weaknesses of the pollution control framework. 
16 Following a special investigation by the Royal Comrnnssion (1971, 
First Report, Cmnd. 4585, paras. 86, 93-4, and then the Third Report, 
Cmnd. 4894, 1972) regarding the pollution of industrialised 
estuaries, the Commdssion concluded (inter alia) "Because of the 
general but unjustified belief that estuaries disperse all that is 
put into them, they have received too little protection by Parliament 
against the wastes from industries attracted to estuaries by the 
double lure of a cheap sink and easy access to and from the seau 
(Cmnd. 4894, 1972, para. 11i emphasis added). Note that the report 
explained that the main reason for control historically being 
concentrated on non-tidal waters was because of the ability to (re)-
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use such waters for water supply (para. 103). The Commission also 
identified the inadequacy of pollution law enforcement (Cmnd. 4585, 
1971, para. 4, supported by CAWe (DoE, 1971, paras. 123-4), and MHLG, 
1970, para. 147 et seq.). 
16 The Bill also contained proposals in relation to waste on land and 
the control of air and noise pollution. 
17 See for instance the comments of Baroness White in relation to a 
general duty to avoid pollution (Hansard, RL, vol. 347, col. 21; 27 
November 1973) and the "charges· of Lord Chorley (ibid. col. 77). 
18 See for instance Lord Chorley who thought that the provisions in 
relation to tidal waters were the most significant (Hansard, RL, vol. 
347, col. 79; 27 November 1973). 
19 With regard to such ideologies, the importance of the perceptions of 
agencies to the existence of procedural requirements has been noted. 
For instance, that agencies will see them as Ma waste of time, 
inefficient and irrelevant" (Hawkins and Thomas, 1984, p. 11). Note 
can also be taken of a range of theories which have been developed to 
explain why public agencies are created outside the government 
department structure. As Baldwin and McCrudden (1987, p. 7) have 
indicated, there has rarely been only one reason, but in the case of 
the WAs, of central importance is the idea of the "expertise- of the 
staff who were to be recruited to the new bodies. Apart from this, 
the main reasons, it is suggested, relate to the perceived efficiency 
gains through "rationalisation", coupled with the ability for long-
term planning in a (potentially) politically stable structure. For a 
more detailed account of the theories, see Lewis (1985, p. 205 et 
seq.), Baldwin and McCrudden (1987), Birkinshaw (1985, chapter 4), 
including as to "regulation", Richardson et al (1982, chapter 1) and 
Hawkins and Thomas (1984, chapter 1). 
20 Further, p. 322 et seq., including the failings of local government 
management of water in the past. Beddoe was seen by many as the 
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architect of the final VA structure - in relation to the "House that 
Jack Built", see Kinnersley, 1988, p. 94 et seq. 
21 In fact, similar issues had already been rehearsed by the Proudman 
Commdttee (CAVC, 1962) prior to the 1963 Act, when, significantly, 
the majority had favoured the -nationalised industry model- of small 
authorities of no more than 15 members, thus attaching "less 
importance to representation as such than to efficient and 
expeditious discharge of the wide range of functions involved" 
(paras. 107-8, emphasis added>. For the (then) rejection of this, see 
the White Paper (Cmnd. 1693, 1962, para. 16). A third influence was 
the existing models of gas and electricity (Jordan et al, p. 324). 
22 DoE, Circular 92/71 (para. 43) indicates that the committees would 
have included membership from amenity and recreation groups, although 
this would have been purely in an advisory capacity, whereas the 
local authority representatives were to have (notional) control of 
the VA Boards. The local authority groups, however, considered that 
their presence on the Boards would obviate the need for such 
committees - they did not seem to want them as well (Okun, pp. 61-2). 
23 See DoE Circular 100173, and further, Baroness White, who saw the 
position of the local authority members as a "gimmick" or a piece of 
"bogus democracy", for the reasons already given (in Okun p. 97). 
Ironically, it was in relation to the representative role, that the 
Conservative Government of 1983 implied that the local authority 
members had "failed" - see post. 
24 On the role of the first 
ensuring that the Bill 
Okun, pp. 77-8. 
Chairman of the Royal Commission, in 
was actually presented to Parliament, see 
26 Regarding the dissatisfaction of the 
was only 13 days between publication 
Second Reading, see Okun p. 84. 
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Opposition, and the fact there 
of the Bill and the Commons 
26 Regarding the "blue orphans left on a red door-step", see Klnnersley, 
1988, p. 106 et seq. 
27 Respectively, Review of the Vater Industry in England and Wales - A 
Consultative Document, and The Vater Industry in England and Wales: 
The Next Steps, Cmnd. 6876. 
28 See further Okun, p. 333 et seq., Purdue, 1979, pp. 123-4, and 
Kinnersley, 1988, pp. 111-2. 
29 See Kinnersley, 1988, p. 109, including re the effects of the 1976 
drought. 
30 The Nationalised Industries, Cmnd. 7131, and DoE, 1982a, para. 9. 
31 Severn Trent Vater Authority, East Worcestershire Vaterworks Company 
and South Staffordshire Vaterworks Company a Report on Water 
Services SUpplied by the Authority and the Companies, HC 339, 1981. 
32 Consumers' Interests and the Nationalised Industries - A Consultative 
Document, 1981; (followed by The Nationalised Industry Consumer 
Councils: A Strategy for Reform, 1982); these were in response to 
papers by Justice (The Citizen and the Public Agencies; Remedying 
Grievances, 1976) and the National Consumer Council (Consumers and 
the Nationalised Industries, 1976). For discussion of these papers 
see Lewis (1985), and Birkinshaw (1985b). 
33 See the Welsh Grand Committee Report of the Price Commission, Welsh 
Vater Authority - Water, Sewerage and Environmental Services, HC 
Standing Committee Vol. XIV, 1979/80, 18 July 1979, and the 
Consultation Paper issued by the SoS for Wales, 27 July 1981. 
34 Interestingly, Saunders and others, have indicated that the local 
authority members had little chance of being successful. To quote 
Saunders: "In practice, the authorities operate[d] ... as laws unto 
themselves, and in this, the water professionals in general, and the 
engineers in particular, achieved considerable control" (1983, p. 
34); further pp. 34-6, Purdue, 1979, pp. 124-5, and see the debate 
during the Water Authorities <Public Accountability> Bill 1982, 
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(Session 1981/2, vol. 25, cols. 922-30; 15 June 1982). It should be 
noted that no attempt is being made to evaluate the Government's 
arguments. 
36 For details of the responses to this paper, see the Oral Answer given 
by Tom King, Minister for Local Government and Environmental Services 
(Session 1981/2, vol. 22, cols. 260-1, 21 April 1982). 
36 The key distinction between this and the similar option (no. 4) is 
crucial. The latter would have continued the local authorities' right 
to appoint members to the Boards, rather than merely to noDdnate 
(DoE, 1982a, para. 27). 
37 Rather than through any concept of meaningful participation. 
38 Given earlier arguments. 
39 But by that time the CCCs were operational. 
40 For the main responses, including the CBI, see Okun, 1977, pp. 73-4. 
41 Lord Ashby pointed out the incongruities of the law, at that time, 
whereby the penalties for disclosing what was put into rivers were 
greater than for actually polluting (Hansard, HL, vol. 347, col. 36; 
27 November 1973). 
42 For instance, see Lord Molson, Hansard, HL, vol. 348, cols. 1688-9; 
24 January 1974, and vol. 349, col. 139. 
43 See Lord Aberdare, Hansard, HL, vol. 349, col. 142; 28 January 1974. 
Again note that by the time COPA was implemented the WAs were based 
only on ministerial appointees. In respect of the WAs and public 
participation, note also the cases where the respective Governments 
asserted that the WAs could be relied upon, and, therefore, did not 
require duties written into the Act; for instance, Hansard, HL, vol. 
349, col. 136 et seq. 
44 Which were the right of private prosecution and the public registers. 
Further Purdue, 1979, p. 132. 
4S SS. 43-4 relating to discharges to sewer were implemented in 1976. 81 
1976/958. 
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46 In discussing the non-implementation, the wider implications of the 
role of Parliament should be noted the ability of Ministers to 
override the "will of Parliament" at their own discretion (see 
further Pearce, 1984, p. 10 et seq.). Further, in terms of a 
"principled approach" to public participation, it can be noted that 
the general public had even less say in this decision. 
47 It should be noted that there were some early indications of delay, 
but not of the kind that actually took place. See for instance, 
clause 24 (which became s. 32) which allowed for "transitional" 
control, and the comments of Lord Aberdare, Hansard, HL, vol. 348, 
cols. 1651-2; 24 January 1974; but clf col. 1654. 
48 Care needs to be taken in identifying whether the reasons related to 
the "control" of pollution provisions, or the public participation 
proviSions, or both. In some cases the two were clearly 
interconnected, and it is noticeable that there was no consideration 
of bringing in the 
provisions. 
public participation without the control 
49 See Garnett, 1981, p. 176, Renshaw, (in Lester, 1980, p. 173), and 
further the comments of the Royal Commission, Tenth report, Cmnd. 
9149, 1984, pp. 77 and 84. 
60 According to Mrs Thatcher: "I cannot 
seen introduced in the House which 
think of any Bill which I have 
has been preceded by more 
investigation, research, discussion and consultation, than this Bill" 
(Hansard, HC, vol. 875, col. 106; 17 June 1974). 
61 Further, see Tetlow, 1979, p. 183, Garnett, 1981, p. 175; Oldfield, 
1984, p. 11, Matthews, 1985, p. 82, and Burton and Freestone, 1986, 
p. 253. A further problem, which came to light once implementation 
did take place, was that the WAs lacked full information about all 
the discharges in their area, and therefore needed to undertake 
potentially lengthy field work (Burton, 1987a, pp. 12-13 and Sayers, 
1980, p. 151) 
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52 Further, Garnett, 1981, p. 175, Matthews, 1987, p. 140, Oldfield, 
1984, p. 10; Royal CODmUssion, Cmnd. 9149, 1984, p. 65, but clf James 
1984, p. 581. 
53 The process of affording dischargers "protection", by reviewing 
consents prior to implementation, will be discussed in chapter five. 
54 Garnett has explained that these were negotiated by the British 
Government on the basis that COP! would be in force (1981, p. 175). 
55 Further pp. 29-30. 
66 See further, chapter six. 
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PAR T I I 
THB YATER AUTBORITIBS: A STUDY OF YORKSHIRE YA.TER 
In chapter two it was suggested that the WAs were created. and then re-
structured, in accordance with an ethos where managerial ism. and 
ultimately Mbusiness principles· were the overriding priority. so that. 
apparently, the Government did not possess. nor did it intend the WAs to 
possess, the necessary political will for meaningful participation. The 
next stage is to begin to assess to what extent meaningful participation 
could be seen to occur in practice, based on the expectations that, at 
the very least, the necessary political will may not have been present. 1 
This will be attempted by reference, first, to the practice of the WAs 
as a whole, by concentrating on one particular water authority-
Yorkshire Water - and then by looking at the pollution control function 
as carried out by the WAs more generally. Part II of the thesis thus 
presents a detailed study of the practice of Yorkshire Water between 1 
October 1983 and 31 August 1989. 2 
The importance of looking at the WA as a corporate entity, is that it 
provides the context or framework within which pollution control was 
exercised. The function would thus be shaped by the way in which the WA 
operated, its priorities, and the influences and controls to which it 
was subject thus its relationships with bodies such as central 
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government will be seen to be a key factor. 
equally important to analyse the extent 
Because of this, it is 
to which meaningful 
participation was possible in relation to the WA as a whole, on the 
basis that if the framework for pollution control was to be determined 
by policy-making at Board level, then the public needed to be able to 
influence this level of decision-making the ·principled approach-
demands this. Furthermore, it will be seen that, while there were 
comprehensive provisions for participation specifically in relation to 
the pollution function, there were a number of opportunities at Board 
level through which the public could seek to influence pollution control 
decision-making. An overall picture is, therefore, required. 3 
- 107 -
CHAPTBR T H R B B 
The Authority and the Public I 
- The Board 
The first stage in assessing the practice 
briefly outline the decision-making 
of Yorkshire Water will be to 
structure of the Authority, 
including its internal structure of executive and non-executive 
committees, and arrangements at senior management and divisional level. 
It will be noted that the key processes for decision-making actually 
remained hidden from public view. Second, the "environment" within which 
the Authority was required to operate, taking account of its statutory 
duties and any controls imposed on it by government in particular, will 
be explained. Akin to Dworkin's "doughnut",· this enables the area of 
discretion, within which the Authority was free to determine its 
priorities and exercise its functions, to be identified. The crucial 
point is that the public would have been able to influence this area of 
discretion, but not those matters which were outside the remit of the 
WA. Third, the aims and objectives, as determined by the Board of the 
Authority, will be noted because of their potential influence on the way 
in which decision-making, thereafter, would be determined& - thus a 
distinction can be drawn here between external influences and controls 
(those imposed by bodies above the WA in the hierarchy) and internal 
ones (those determined by the Authority itself). 
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Finally, the opportunities for participation will be identified and 
analysed to compare them with the requirements of meaningful 
participation. In chapter four, the system of committees which were open 
to the public, and which were non-executive comDdttees of the Authority, 
will be considered, while in this chapter, all opportunities for 
participation with the Board, with the exclusion of those comndttees, 
will be considered. 
I. THE DHCISIOI-IAKIIG STRUCTURE - THE COISTITUTIOI OF THE AUTHORITY 
Having argued that a principled approach to public participation 
requires that participation be located at the point where the decision 
is actually to made (ie the body with the jurisdiction), it is important 
to identify the decision-making structures and procedures of the 
organisation under consideration. In this section it is intended to 
outline the structure of Yorkshire Water, both to place subsequent 
discussions in context. but also, so that it is clear by whom, within 
the Authority, decisions were made; thus enabling a check between the 
decision-making and the locus of public participation. s The importance 
of the discussion is in showing that the key structures were hidden from 
public view with the effect that there was a danger that information was 
less likely to be fully transmitted to the decision-maker, and back, 
with the same degree of influence as may be the case in a closer 
relationship. 
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A. The Board7 
The effect of the Water Act 1983 was (inter alia) to amend s, 3 of the 
1973 Act, to provide that the 9 English WAs would consist of between six 
and twelve members appointed by the SoS for the Environment (plus the 
Chairman, ·post) and two members appointed by the Xinister of AFF. In the 
case of the former, such members were to be people: 
" 
. , , appearing to [the SoS] to have had experience of, and 
shown capacity in, some matter relevant to the functions of 
the water authorities· (s. 3(5) as s b tit t d b 1 , u sue y s. , 
Water Act 1983),8 
The experience and capacity of those appointed by the Minister was 
required to relate to agriculture, land drainage or fisheries (s. 
3 (4».9 
In the case of Yorkshire Water, a Board of 13 (reduced to 12 on the 
retirement of the chief executive, a year later) was appointed in place 
of the previous 28 members. This included three members appointed in 
accordance with the Government undertaking, during the enactment of the 
Water Act 1983, that between 2 and 4 members would be appointed from 
nominations made by local authorities (see DoE, Circular 16/83, para. 
6), The advent of the privatisation proposals was to lead to further 
major changes to the Board structure before the final abolition of the 
WA in its post 1983 guise; changes which, it will be argued, further 
demonstrate the stranglehold of the business principles ethos. First, 
despite shelving its initial proposals (see chapter eight), the 
Government announced in its White Paper (Cmnd. 9734, 1986, para. 102) 
that it no longer considered itself bound by the above undertaking, and 
began a process of removing the local government element. Thus the three 
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Yorkshire Vater local council members were replaced by two new members 
with industrial/business experience. Such an approach is interesting, 
given that members. whether of local government persuasion or nat, still 
had to satisfy the criteria of the Water Act, as indicated above. The 
changes, however, clearly illustrate the continuation of central 
government fashioning of the WAs in its desired image. Again the 
undertaking would seem to have been no more than a device to placate 
opposition during the enactment of the 1983 Act. The process was 
completed in October 1988 with a further three members Mretiring" to be 
replaced by the Executive Directors of (Water Services, Finance and 
Business Services). 10 
B. The Authority CoDmdttee Structure 
Following on from changes to the 
pre-privatisation period, the 
complement this. The comDdttees 
Board to meet the requirements of the 
committee structure was modified to 
of the Authority can essentially be 
classified as follows: (1) the "standing comDdtteesM - those set up at 
the discretion of the WA, which, in all but one case (the Water Quality 
Advisory Group) were closed to the public; (2) the "statutory 
committees" - which. in all but one case (the Regional Land Drainage 
Committee) were advisory. The emphasis here will be on the former; the 
latter will be considered in the next chapter. 11 Before explaining this 
structure, a comparison will be drawn with the arrangements that the 
Authority made before 1983. 
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1. Arrangements Between 19'14 and 1983 
The key influence on the arrangements made by all the YAs was the report 
of the Ogden committee - The New Water Industry KanageJDent and Structure 
(DoE, 1973) - set up by the DoE in 1972 to provide assistance to the 
WAs. The DoE believed that the WAs, being completely new organisations, 
should not be required to adopt any existing organisational structures 
(DoE, Circular 3/73).12 However, Okun (1977, p. 137) has noted the way 
that the WAs varied in the extent to which they adhered to the proposals 
of the Committee, and in particular Yorkshire Water's response attracted 
public interest for two reasons. First, while Ogden had recommended 
adoption of the existing water supply, and sewerage disposal and other 
units in the immediate term, with a longer-term move towards multi-
functional divisions, Yorkshire Yater adopted the latter at the outset. 
Second, the Authority adopted the structure Ogden suggested for smaller 
authorities, while being considered as one of the larger ones (1bid., 
pp. 167-9). 
Ogden further favoured the maximum delegation of decision-making to 
committees and sub-committees. Yorkshire Water, in accordance with its 
powers under s. 6(1) of the 1973 Act, created the following: Policy and 
Resources Committee (PRC) , Finances and Manpower Sub-comDdttee, 
Chairman's Advisory Committee, Amenities, Fisheries and Recreation 
Committee, the Water Quality Advisory Panel, and the Resources Planning 
Advisory Panel. 1~ In practice the PRe was the most important committee 
for management purposes (as suggested by the Ogden committee), which was 
chaired by the chairman of the Authority (hence a ministerial rather 
than local government appOintee); the Board appeared merely to Mrubber-
stamp· decisions of the PRC.1. 
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2. ·standl~ ComDdttees from October 1983 
Significant changes to the above structure were made following the 
appointment of the new Board. with its clear remit from the Government 
to put -economy and efficiency· first. 16 
Erecut1ve JBnase.ent Te~ This was one of the key commdttees. created 
in July 1984, consisting of the Chairman (who by then was also the Chief 
Executive). the Deputy Chairman and the Directors of Water Services and 
Finance. According to the 
Team was " regarded 
Yorkshire Water 
as an essential 
SCheme of Organ1sation. the 
and integral part of the 
strategic management of the organisation." It met on an "informal M 
basis. including having no formal agenda. and no minutes were recorded 
(YW, 1984a. [amended 1986] section F). The terms of reference indicate 
the main functions, including reviewing policy matters before they were 
put to the Board, taking appropriate action to implement Board policy, 
and keeping under review the management, organisation. senior 
appointments and administration of the Authority. as well as the 
approval of certain capital schemes. 1& 
Corporate Plann1~ Panel. Second in the hierarchy, initially as a sub-
committee of the Authority, and later as a sub-committee of the EXT, the 
main role of the CPP was to take capital expenditure decisions of a 
"high order· (according to the Chairman), and memberShip included the 
Chief Executive, the Director of Operations. and the Director of Finance 
and Support Services. 
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Operat10DS Kanage.:!Dt Tea.a This consisted of the Head Office 
Directors, the Division General Managers, and others invited by the 
Director of Water Services, such as the Chief Technical Manager and the 
Regional Personnel Manager. 17 
The above three units provided the base of the Executive side of the 
Authority, in conjunction with the Board itself. Of note is the way in 
which senior management, especially the Head Office Directors, were 
closely involved with the Executive Board members, which is reflected in 
the promotion of the former to the Board in 1988 (supra.). Importantly, 
there was no public access either to the meetings or the papers of these 
bodies; indeed it is doubtful that many knew of their existence. 
Audit Grou~ This Group was designed to provide for ·internal auditsM 
both in relation to the Authority accounts, and as to whether capital 
expenditure was used Nwisely· (in the sense of projects being completed 
within budget and achieving what had been intended) (Chairman, pers. 
comm.). Only non-executive Board members were included in the Group, 
which was created, in part, as a response to criticism by the KKC (Cmnd. 
9392, 1984, pp. 33-4; and for the response of the Authority - YV, 1985a, 
para. 2). 
rater Qual1ty Adv1sory Grou~ Al though this will be considered in more 
detail in chapter four, because, unlike any of the above commdttees, it 
was open to the publiC, it is mentioned here because it was a standing 
committee of the Authority, although non-executive. 19 One of the key 
issues of the 1973 re-organisation had been that the WAs would be both 
"poacherM and NgamekeeperM in respect of sewage disposal and the 
regulation of pollution. To promote the accountability of the WAs in 
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this respect, the Ogden commdttee had recommended an advisory comndttee 
deriving its powers direct from the Authority, which would be 
responsible for providing water quality reports on the performance of, 
both the Authority, and other organisations. It was, thus, to be Man 
internal check" on the Authority (Okun, 19nn • p 115 d f th "., ,an ur er 
Dangerfield, 1979, p. 23 et seq.). Members were, therefore, chosen from 
the non-executive members of the Board to provide "independent" 
monitoring of the executive members and WA officers, in relation to 
pollution control - a "watchdog" role according to the Chairman. 19 
HuJJber Bstuary Comn ttee. Following the re-organisation, Yorkshire 
Water, Anglian Water and Severn Trent had shared responSibility for the 
regulation of the Humber. Before then a similar position had existed 
with the three river authorities, who had thus formed a joint comDdttee, 
known as the "Humber Consultative ComDdttee", in 1973. This was replaced 
by a modified commdttee - the REG - which included one Board member from 
each of the three WAs, and provided a forum for the co-ordination of 
policies in relation to the estuary.20 
3. Senior Kanagement and Divisional Organisation 
The basis of the senior management arrangements are indicated above. 
Initially, there had been three key posts - the Director of Operations, 
the Director of Finance and Support Services, and the Director of 
Strategic Services (Annual Report, 1983/4, p. 41) to which was added the 
Director of Water Services in July 1984, who was to be responsible for 
operational matters and to whom the Division General Managers would 
report. Responsibility for service of the committees was transferred to 
the Solicitor.21 By 1987, this had been reduced to three posts, vlz. the 
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Director of Water Services, the Director of Finance and the Secretary 
and Solicitor. 
Interestingly, in the case of the divisional structure, the main changes 
were introduced by the pre 1983 Board, just prior to the implementation 
of the 1983 Act, and were not influenced by the latter. Yorkshire Water 
had initially operated with seven multifunctional divisions and one 
rivers division (solely for land drainage). Having considered this, the 
appropriate structure since 1974, it was only in 1981 that a full 
review, including a financial consultant's report, led to the adoption 
of four multifunctional divisions (north and east, southern, western and 
central) and a rivers division (to include fisheries and pollution 
control as well as land drainage). Within each division Marea" offices 
were also created, although any services deemed not to affect the public 
directly were centralised (Annual Report 1982, Foreword and p. 5; and 
see the approval of the XlC, Cmnd. 9392, 1984, at paras. 2.13, 5.43, 
5.48).22 
I I. THB DKCISIOI-IAKIIG HIVIiOHRIT - EITERIAL COITROLS AID IIFLUBICBS 
Having explained the structures of the 
outline the decision-making environment 
required to operate. This is crucial, 
Authority. the next stage is to 
within which the Authority was 
given the arguments that the 
Government sought to impose, through the Water Act 1983, an "explicitM 
version of the managerialist ethos whereby "business principles" were to 
be the overriding priority. Two main controls need to be considered -
the statutory duties of the WAs (hence the need for meaningful 
participation at the stage of enacting such legislation), and the 
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relationship of the WAs with central government - notably financial 
control. 
A. statutory Duties 
It is not intended to provide a comprehensive statement of all the 
duties to which the WAs, and hence Yorkshire Water, were subject,23 but 
to indicate their significance in terms of creating a framework for 
decision-making. In particular, it will be clear that the WAs could not 
consider pollution control in isolation. Equally, public participation 
which sought to persuade the WA to act in contravention of such duties 
would be otiose, but the opposite problem can be noted, of seeking to 
enforce such duties. The view has been expressed that it is doubtful 
that such duties would have been amenable to court enforcement at the 
behest of individuals.2~ 
The key duties of the WAs related to their main functions, as defined by 
the Vater Act 1973 (as amended), including the supply of water (s. 11), 
the provision of sewers and sewage disposal works (s. 14(1», duties in 
relation to salmon, trout and eel fisheries (s. 18), recreation (s. 
20(1», and conservation (s. 22), pollution control (in accordance with 
the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts 1951-61), and the supervisory 
role over land drainage (s. 19). Two important "planning· duties were 
provided under s. 24. First, relating to the preparation and regular 
review of a "water development plan" regarding the water resources in 
the WA area, expected future water demand, and an action plan to achieve 
this. Second, capital plans of a general nature for the carrying out of 
the WAs' functions (s. 24(6)(7».26 Finally, it can be noted that the 
WAs were designated as "competent 
compliance with Ee Directives relating 
authorities· for purposes of 
to the environment, although the 
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question of such compliance (and attempts by the public to force it) has 
been one of the vexed questions of the 1980s. 
B. Central Govern:ment Controls Over the VAs 
The Water Act 1973 also placed statutory duties on Ministers - namely 
the SoS for the Environment <and 80S for Wales in respect of the 
province), and the Minister for Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. In 
particular, these Ministers were charged with a duty to jointly "promote 
a national policy for waterM, as defined in s. 1(2)(3), which included 
"(c) the restoration and maintenance of the wholesomeness of rivers and 
other inland water". The importance of the fact that such duties were 
placed on the Ministers, and not the WAs, especially as to pollution,26 
can be noted in encouraging a very close liaison, if not control, from 
central government. The problem with such control is especially where it 
is informal and "hiddenM, (Mdiscreet rather than overtM - Lewis, 1985, 
p. 218), a process which can be considered as indicative of a move away 
from Mgovernment by law" (Birkinshaw, 1985b, p. 96) and, thus, not 
subject to public scrutiny. 
Under the 1973 Act, the SoS was given formal powers of Mgeneral M 
direction over the WAs, relating to the national policy for water or the 
"national interest" (s. 5), and also a power to act in "default", 
However, significantly, the power of direction was never used, but it 
has been publicly admitted that ministerial "interference- was extensive 
- indeed this was used by the present Government as a justification for 
privatisation - the freeing of -managers to manage-. 27 According to the 
Secretary of the (then) Water Authorities Association (which promoted 
the interests of the would-be plcs in the privatisation), in declaring 
the Mnationalised industry model bankruptM 
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" . , . for 15 years Governments have interfered in day to day 
operational matters, and for 15 years decisions vital to the 
industry have been determined by political considerations" 
(Water Bulletin, 23 Karch 1989, p. 3).28 
Such an analysis is a cause for great concern in that it suggests a 
great danger that unless meaningful participation could be directed to 
the Xinisters, it was possible that the WAs would have been acting under 
the dictation of the Government, thereby obviating much meaningful 
participation directed at the WAs. It clearly indicates that there was 
scope for the government to reinforce its priorities. 29 
A further problem, which probably caused further -interference" in the 
running of the WAs, was the effect of EC requirements, especially 
because of the twa-tier structure by which the WAs were the "competent 
authorities· for EC Directives and, therefore, responsible for the 
practical implementation, but with the Sas being directly answerable to 
Brussels. Haigh has argued that the DoE had to become involved in 
"matters nat previously its business·, despite questions regarding 
successful compliance with Community Directives (1986, pp. 201, 204), 
The DoE was also the wgatekeeperw (Earnshaw, 1988) of communications 
between the EC and the water industry (illustrated by DoE, Circular 
7/89), 
1. Financial Controls 
It will also be suggested that the combination of financial controls 
imposed by the Government, was such that the WAs had no choice but to 
put economics first, thereby again reflecting the suggested ethos to the 
potential detriment of meaningful participation. This is supported by 
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the following statement of the Government in its consultation paper 
which preceded the 1983 Act. 
"The accountability of RVAs lies primarily to Xinisters, to 
whom they must report annually, and through Ministers to 
Parliament '" The Government, as part of their strategy 
towards the public sector as a whole, have been particularly 
concerned to ensure that RWAs carry out their functions 
effectively, efficiently and economically. The nationalised 
industries white paper of 1918, forms the basis of the 
Government's policy for the nationalised industries, is 
generally applicable to the RWAs, which are subject to 
financial and performance diSCiplines similar to those laid 
down for the nationalised industries. These are the most 
important controls on the main parts of the RVAs 
activities ... iBprove.ent in the industry's efficiency will 
continue to be a .ajar objective" (DoE, 1982a, Para. 9; 
emphasis added). 
In considering the controls that the WAs were subjected to, it should be 
noted that the basis of VA financing was slightly different from the 
nationalised industries, as the VAs were less dependant on government 
for subsidies, being required, by the 1973 Act, to levy charges 
sufficient to meet their expected revenue expenditure. Theoretically, 
within this they were free to determine their own level of charges 
(Telling, 1914, p. 18), but as the following makes clear the realities 
of the 1980s were very different. 30 Each of the controls noted were set 
on an annual basis by the SoS Environment following negotiations with 
each VA. 
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F1nanc1al T~ts. These were defined as a Ilprofit calculated as a 
percentage rate of return", in other words that the VA was expected to 
achieve a sufficient income from charges to achieve a rate of return on 
the current cost value of assets. 
RXternal F1DaDc1~ L1.uts. EFLs provided a limit on the amount that the 
WAs were allowed to raise externally - primarily through borrowing (but 
also leasing and government grants). The effect of this was to limit the 
annual level of capital expenditure to this level, plus whatever the VA 
chose to raise through charges. 
PerforDBnce A1.s. These were designed to ensure that ·operating costs" 
were reduced in real terms, and were introduced in 1981 after the DoE 
had admitted to the Public Accounts Commdttee that financial targets by 
themselves would not provide an incentive to greater efficiency (Cmnd. 
249, 1984/5, para. 17).31 
cap1tal ce1l1~. In 1989/90 a new control was introduced, as a maximum 
limit on the capital expenditure of each WA, thereby reducing the 
discretion of the WA to the internal allocation of resources only.32 
2. other Controls 
The VAs were also required to produce annual reports and accounts (Water 
Act 1973, Schedule 3) and annual corporate plans. 33 A further 
d th 1980 was in the form of "levels of service" evelopment in e s, 
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indicators which provided a means for assessing standards of service 
other than in monetary terms.3~ 
3. DoR Objectives 
Finally, reference can also be made to the stated objectives of the DoE 
as influencing their likely approach to the WAs. For instance, according 
to the objectives published at the time of the reconstitution of the VA 
Boards, it is clear that public expenditure controls and the promoting 
of the efficiency of the WAs were to be the key aspects (reproduced in 
the Royal ComDdssion Tenth Report, Cmnd. 9149, 1984, p. 62).36 
I I I. TIIK OBJECTIVES AID PRIORITIES OF THB BOARD 
Having outlined the framework within which the WAs, and Yorkshire Water 
specifically, were required to operate, the next stage is to begin to 
consider the area of discretion available to the Authority and the kind 
of framework it adopted as a guide to future decision-making. Thus, any 
objectives and priorities that it specified must be considered. The key 
question here is the extent to which these objectives were for 
Mguidance-, and hence could be departed from as appropriate - if they 
were more definite (nearer to rules) then this would make later 
meaningful participation more difficult as some decisions would have 
been pre-determined. Hence, it will be argued that meaningful 
participation is vital at the stage of setting such obj ect i ves. 
Following the business principles ethos, and the dictates provided by 
central government, it can be expected that the VA would give clear 
priority to finance - economy and efficiency and hence, this would 
threaten to override meaningful participation in practice. 
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In reviewing the objectives set by the Board, it is worth noting that, 
potentially, other influences, apart from central government, were 
likely to affect the decision-making processes of the YA, apart from the 
public per se through participation. In particular, Saunders (1983, p. 
37 et seq.) has argued that two key influences, in the case of the YAs, 
were the local authorities and private sector interests. Importantly, as 
the result of both pieces of work, Saunders concluded that the most 
significant influence on WA policy formulation and implementation was, 
what he termed "producer interests· in other words those, such as 
agriculture and industry, who used water as part of their production 
process. 36 Thus, he suggests there was a strong scent of ·corporatismM37 
involved - almost a "partnership· with some groups (1984, p. 28) - but 
that the VA dealt with different groups in different ways (which he 
termed a -bifurcation of politics- [1984, p. 26]). While there may have 
been something of a partnership with organisations such as the CBI, 
participation with the public was actually seen as no more than a 
process for explaining to the public the WAs' policies and plans (1984, 
p. 26), and that "expertise· was seen as a qualification for 
participation (1984, p. 49).aG Such an approach suggests that the WAs 
were prepared to attach more weight to the responses and views of 
certain groups in preference to the public per se - a process which, by 
definition, denies the necessary political will for meaningful 
participation. 
While two sets of objectives need to be considered (published in 1984 
and 1988) this can be prefaced by statements of the new Chairman in the 
1984 Annual Report, which included that the Board had been charged with 
"conducting its affairs in as business-like a way as possible-, but this 
would be sought without lowering standards of service (YV, 1983/4, p. 
4).3~ It is also clear from this report, that the Board moved very 
quickly to develop its strategies and priorities, including for capital 
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investment. It can, therefore, be questioned to what extent the public 
were able to be involved in this process, in particular because the 
consumer consultative comDdttees (discussed in the next chapter) had 
not, by this stage, met - these decisions were thus being made by the 
wholly Government appointed Board. This view is further reinforced by 
the main document setting out the Authority's objectives, produced in 
October 1984 Water Services in Yorkshire: Objectives, Aims and 
Standards of service (YV. 1984b). This detailed, first, the objectives 
which had been laid down for the Authority by the Government, the WA's 
own objectives, and then a series of supporting objectives. Finally, the 
document detailed the "priorities· which would enable the achievement of 
the objectives. 
It can be argued that the detailed nature of this document suggests that 
the objectives and priorities were likely to have an important influence 
on subsequent deCision-making. especially in the allocation of 
resources, but again there appears to have 
possible in their development. Ao The document 
at their first meetings in June/July 1984 
been no public involvement 
was presented to the CCCS 
as an explanatory exercise, 
and, therefore, an equally important question is the extent to which the 
WA was willing to keep the process under review (stage VII of meaningful 
partiCipation, and see post).A' 
Apart from specifying its objectives in terms of the functions of the 
WA, the document can also be seen as an important indicator of the WA's 
attitudes towards public involvement generally. In this context it can 
be noted that one of the supporting objectives was listed as follows: 
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"(c) to achieve effective consultation with users and others 
affected by [Yorkshire Vater's] activities about their needs 
and to deal with any problems as promptly, effectively and 
sympathetically as possible- (p, 4),42 
In 1988 the Authority produced OUr Plans for 
Customers <YV, 1988a), which 
objectives,~3 This is important, as 
effectively 
it would 
the Future - serving OUr 
re-iterated the above 
appear that there was at 
least a limited process of review, 
extent of any influence cannot be 
initial objectives, the extent to 
involving the public,44 although the 
analysed here. 46 In modifying the 
which another factor was a key 
influence, may be questioned. This was the report of the Monopolies and 
Kergers Co~ssion (Cmnd. 9392, 1984) in to the services provided by the 
Authority. The Commdssion concluded that the Authority was not acting 
against the public interest, but one of its main criticisms was the 
inadequacy of the Authority's -management information systems" <para. 
2.29), and the limitations of some of its objectives, notably that they 
did not indicate the costs of providing particular levels of service 
<para. 10.5, and further chapters 10 and 12 of the Report). It can be 
expected, therefore, that the Authority would have been particularly 
keen to be seen to be responding positively to the report,4G a view 
suggested by the Authority's response <YV, 1985a, especially p. 17).47 
IV. FDRllAL OPPORTUIITIiS FOR PARTICIPATIOI WITH TIIB BOARD 
Having outlined Yorkshire Vater's decision-making structure and 
environment, in this section it is intended to explain the forma1 48 
opportunities that were made available for the public to participate 
with the Board (other than through the comDittees being considered in 
the next chapter), The main emphasis will be placed on the arrangements 
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for the holding of Press conferences fallowing Board meetings, which 
replaced the previous system of allowing the Press - and public - to 
attend the meetings of the Board. It will be suggested that this was a 
very limited facility by itself, but is important to consider, first, 
because it caused such controversy, both during. and after the enactment 
of the Water Act 1983, and second, because a holistic approach to the 
opportunities for participation must be taken. In other wards such Press 
conferences must be seen as one of a number of facilities, all of which 
were capable of contributing towards the provision of meaningful 
participation. Hence, a complete comparison cannot be achieved until the 
end of the fallowing chapter, but the issues relating to Press 
conferences, and in particular, a comparison with the pre 1983 
arrangements, can be made. 
A. Ieaningful Participation in. the Appoin.tlEnt of VA Board Iembers 
Prior to consideration of Press conferences, however, it is important to 
outline one area where there appears to have been limited scope for 
meaningful participation, despite the importance of the decision49 , v1z. 
the appointment of the members of the Board of the WAs, including 
Yorkshire Water. As earlier indicated, this was a matter for the SoS 
Environment (with the exception of two members to be appointed by the 
Kinister of AFF) under the Water Act 1983. A wprincipled approachM 
requires meaningful participation in this fundamental decision, which 
could include giving the general public the right to both nominate, and 
comment on other nominations - this does not challenge the right of the 
SoS to make the final decision. There is, however, little evidence that 
such arrangements were offered. A related question is the extent to 
which, once appointed, Board members, and especially the chairmen, could 
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be called to "account" by the public through meaningful participation 
wi th the SoS. 
The issue of appointments, and nominations thereto, was raised during 
the enactment of the 1983 Act, where the Government staunchly refused to 
impose any duties on the SoS to consult named organisations prior to 
making appointments (for instance, Giles Shaw, Hansard, Standing 
Commi ttee B, cols. 43-4; 25 lovember 1982) • but promised that wide 
consultation would take place. Further, it defended its record. 
including asserting that it had been the first Administration to widely 
advertise appointments rather than relying on the MWhitehal1 List" (Tom 
King, Hansard, HC, vol. 32, col. 208; 16 lovember 1982). Nominations 
were sought from the local authorities (DoE, Circular 16/83, para. 6), 
but clearly there was never any possibility of a local authority member 
being appointed as chairman. Further, it might be expected that the ccCe 
would have been utilised (once they had come into operation in 1984) for 
participation in subsequent appointments, but this was never the case. 
The related issue is whether there are any circumstances under which a 
member of the Board, or the whole Board, and particularly the chairman. 
could have been expected to resign, or be dismissed, for failings on the 
part of the Authority (other than in relation to failing to achieve 
government objectives). One recent incident which highlights this issue 
is the poisoning of water supplies and rivers around Camel ford, as a 
result of the discharge of aluminium sulphate into the wrong storage 
tank at the (un-manned) Lowermoor water treatment works on 6 July 1988. 
As is well known. the incident has led to a plethora of legal actions 
both against, and by, South West Water (the organisation which existed 
before 1 September 1989), but a major issue for the local residents at 
the time was both the confused. and apparently secretive. response of 
the WA during the first few days following the incident. Although the 
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error at the plant had been discovered two days after it had happened, 
it was 14 days later that full details were made public, and then 
through a newspaper advertisement the Authority having apparently 
abandoned the idea of a Press release (Observer, 2 October 1988), It was 
not until 12 August that the Authority admitted the full seriousness of 
the events. The Authority was subjected to intense criticism for this 
from local residents, as well as an internal Board inquiry (carried out 
by John Lawrence), and a Department of Health panel, Significantly, the 
latter suggested that both the VA and the relevant health authority had 
provided 
"conflicting, inadequate, inappropriate and delayed advice" 
(quoted in the The Independent, 21 July 1989) 
and that this, rather than the aluminium sulphate, had been a major 
cause of illness,so 
The consequence was the call for the resignation of the Chairman of 
South Vest Water (who was also the Chief Execut1ve) ,&1 The incident 
brings in to question whether this 
the Chairman himself, or the SoS, 
was appropriate, and whether, either 
possessed the political will (in 
particular, in the sense of being "open to influence") to make such a 
decision. 52 Although the example cited did not relate to Yorkshire 
Yater, it raises the issue of the extent to which a "ministerial 
responsibility"-type concept should have applied to Board members, and 
the provision of mechanisms for the public to question performance. 
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B. Press Conferences After Board Xeetings 
The first formal mechanism for meaningful participation which will be 
analysed, is that of the Press conferences which were held following 
Board meetings. This was offered by the WAs in place of the pre 1983 
position whereby the public and Press were permitted to attend the 
meetings of the WA Boards and their comDdttees (by virtue of Public 
Bodies (Admission to Xeetings) Act 1960,63 
WAs, by the Water Act 1983). This again 
enactment of the 1983 Act, and it is 
(repealed, in respect of the 
was a key issue during the 
submitted that this further 
supports the business principles ethos which the Government sought to 
impose on the WAs - for this reason the rationale for the change will be 
reviewed. Following this, the practice of Press conferences will be 
analysed, including by comparison with the practice of access to 
meetings before 1983. 
1. The Rationale of the Change 
This was clearly indicated by the Government 
pOints. First, that the nature of the WAs, 
and rested on two key 
and hence their Board 
meetings, was to be significantly different 
second, that the presence of the Press 
following the 1983 Act, and 
and public would have an 
"oppressive- effect on the members. In the case of the former, emphasis 
was placed on the severing of the local authority link, and the 
transition to small "executive M bodies, thus a model more akin to 
private companies or the nationalised industries, rather than local 
authorities. This was put most clearly by Giles Shaw 
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"The character of the new authorities is fundamentally 
different from the local authority majority structure that 
it will replace That above all else, is the most important 
reason why the review of press access resulted in the 
decision that it was not appropriate. We must bear in mind 
that the Bill will move the character of the authorities 
away from the local authority, open forum type meeting to an 
executive styleM (Hansard, HC, vol. 35, col. 236; 18 January 
1983). 
In respect of the "oppressive effectM, it is submitted that, at times, 
the arguments reached extreme proportions; they are summed-up by Lord 
Bellwin 
"It is impossible to function effectively as a member of ... 
a board if at every stage one is concerned that the odd word 
here, the odd outspoken comment there, will hit the 
headlines the next day (Hansard, HL, vol. 438, col. 995) .... 
People will not speak up as freely as they would in private 
(Hansard, HL, vol. 439, col. 911; 28 January 1983). 
He went on to explain that Min a debating c~r such as the 
meetings of the WAs at present- the interest of the Press was 
"reasonable and proper" (Hansard, HL, vol. 438, col. 995; 7 February 
1983; emphasis added) but not for the new WAs. 
A third important argument was that the new arrangements, being offered 
by the Government, were "betterM (see Giles Shaw, Hansard, Standing 
Committee B, col. 307; 16 December 1982, and HC, vol. 35, col. 239; 18 
January 1983); this will be considered further below. s • 
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2. The Response of Yorkshire Yater 
The Act actually gave each WA the discretion whether to permit public 
access, and all the WAs, with the exception of the Welsh, refused 
access. 55 In considering the question of political will, it is suggested 
that it is important to consider the reasons why Yorkshire Water decided 
not to allow access, and why it continued, throughout the period under 
study, to refuse it. If the reasons were based on -dogma·, this would 
suggest a lack of comDdtment to public participation; however, if it was 
because of a genuine belief that alternatives were better, and the WA 
was committed to these, then clearly the charge cannot be levelled. 
Similarly, if the Authority took the view that it could not operate 
"efficiently· without closed meetings, this would suggest support for 
the business principles ethos, which would thus need to be fully 
compensated by alternative arrangements. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the CCCs raised the issue 
repeatedly during the years following the change, but did not succeed in 
persuading Yorkshire Water to change its policy.56 Initially, the 
Authority stated that it would await the outcome of the KHC report 
before reviewing the policy. The KXC, noting the VA's approach, stated 
that the Authority should keep it under review, and also take account of 
the experience of the Welsh Authority in holding open meetings (Cmnd. 
9392, 1984, para. 5.46). The response of Yorkshire Vater to the XKC 
gives the clearest indications of its reasons 
... the Board is enjoined to run Yorkshire Vater as much M 
like a business as possible, and is inclined to see itself 
in much the same light as, say, the nationalised Gas and 
Electricity Board ... The Board has taken the view that it 
should, like the Gas and Electricity Boards (and other 
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nationalised corporations) conduct its Board business 
privately and thus in the absence of the Press and Public. 
In doing so, it is behaving in the same way as any private 
business, or public company <Yorkshire Water, 1985a, p. 4) • 
This would appear to be strong evidence of a willingness to act in the 
manner expected of it by the Government - a clear priority to "business 
principles".57 If meaningful participation was to be possible in 
practice, therefore, it is necessary that the alternative opportunities 
did provide for the channels for cOmDUnication, and that the Authority 
showed the requisite political hd1l in respect of them - this would 
include a willingness to review the alternatives and to make changes to 
them, if it was established that they were less -effective- than they 
could be. In this respect, as promised, the Authority undertook a review 
of the CCCs after they had been operating for one year, and concluded 
that the COGs were Meffective-, and the Board would continue its policy 
of denying access to its meetings <Yorkshire Water, 1985b). The same 
justification was repeated whenever the Authority was challenged on the 
issue. sa 
3. The Practice of Yorkshire Yater Press Conferences 
During the enactment of the 1983 Act, the Government stated that a code 
of practice would be drawn up between the 10 WAs and the British Guild 
of Newspaper Editors, to govern the process of Press conferences. 59 The 
Code stated, inter alia, 
"Generally it is iutended that a Press Conference will be 
held ... to explain important policies and decisions taken 
and will provide a forum for questions and answers in 
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relation to such matters. A list identifying items for 
discussion at the Press Conference will be circulated in 
advance. In addition Press Releases will be issued as and 
when appropriate giving information about decisions of the 
Authority and its Committees" (para. 1.2, emphasis added). 
Hence, it can be seen that there were to be three essential elements -
the list of items, the conference itself, and the Press releases. The 
three need to be seen as a whole. 
In the case of Yorkshire Vater, Press conferences were held in the 
afternoon following the monthly Board meeting in the morning, at the 
headquarters of the Authority in Leeds, generally lasting a couple of 
hours (pers. comm.). VA staff suggested that the conferences were ·well 
attended".60 Thus, as was argued in Parliament, meetings were more 
regular than had been the case under the old Authority.61 
In terms of the different stages for communication between the public 
and the Authority, it would seem that the Press conference enabled 
information to be obtained either before (stage I) or after (stage VI) 
the making of a decision. However, few of the remaining stages would 
have been possible, and importantly, the mechanism must be seen as 
indirect - in other words, that it was a process of co~nication via 
the Press. Although this would enable wider coverage to be given, there 
are clear problems in this relationship, as will be noted further, 
below. The extent to which members of the Press would have been prepared 
to engage in giving information to the 
issues not being unknown) is open 
WA (Press campaigns on specific 
to question. However, as the 
Government were keen to stress, journalists were able to question Board 
members, including on matters which had not been discussed at the 
meeting, thus giving the Press a more active role (L Boardman, Hansard, 
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HL, vol. 439, col. 908; 24 February 1983), adopting the reasoning of the 
Franks ComDdttee (Cmnd. 218, 1957>, by being subjected to such scrutiny 
the Authority might have produced more "rational" decisions. 
The presence of political will on the part of the Authority was clearly 
important, especially the willingness to answer questions, given the 
discretion of the Authority. Equally important, it is suggested, is who, 
on behalf of Yorkshire Yater, attended. The practice was initially for 
the Chairman to attend, although this ceased in 1988 when the Chairman 
became "too busy" with the run-up to privatisation and his added role as 
Chairman of the Water Authorities Association. However, other members of 
the Board also attended, along with officers as appropriate for the 
issues likely to be considered. Furthermore, the Chairman was very keen 
that questions should be answered very fully, and from evidence received 
informally (although this must be treated with care from both sides> 
from representatives of the Press, it would seem that Yorkshire Water 
did show a commdtment to the process. 
In terms of education, two main aspects need to be considered. First, 
education about the facility, to enable members of the Press to be able 
to make use of it, and second, the wider issues relating to the public. 
In the case of the former, the "list of items"62 sent out to the Press 
in advance of the meetings, was the vital element in detailing when and 
where meetings would be held, and indicating the matters that the Board 
would be discussing. G3 A related point which needs to be considered, if 
such Press conferences were to be "effective", concerns the actual 
"competence" of the Press in attendance, in relation to WA matters -
their own knowledge/experience, and hence, an ability to Mask the right 
questions", and make their own informed judgments of the answers 
given. G • 
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In the case of the public, the need for education, in terms of knowing 
when the Board was to meet, and hence, to expect a report of the meeting 
in their local paper/on local radio, needs consideration - no equivalent 
information of this kind was provided. Further, it has been noted that 
the facility was indirect and, therefore, the relationship between the 
Press and the public needs to be considered. 66 In particular, the public 
have no practical control over the Press, and the information actually 
provided to them - the communication is not "value free M , as criteria 
such as "newsworthiness" will be involved with the danger that a 
conference might not have been reported if a "major event M had occurred 
on the same day. Similarly, points of interest to members of the public 
may be very different to those that the Press consider worthy of report. 
The issue of "objective" reporting also needs to be noted. In summary, 
the question of the commitment <political will) of the Press needs to be 
considered, as well as whether sufficient channels for communication 
were enabled. It might be suggested that only limited forms of stages I 
and VI were possible. 
However, it may be suggested that Press coverage could have wider 
benefits in being able to reach larger numbers of people and could 
thereby play, at least, an educational role as an introduction to VA 
affairs. Furthermore, coverage of VA Press conferences must not be seen 
in isolation, in the sense that the Press would have been covering VA 
issues on a regular basis, and, as noted earlier, this assessment must 
also be read in conjunction with the other facilities available for 
public participation. 
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4. Press Conferences and Access to Board Xeetings: A Comparison 
To complete the picture relating to Press conferences, it is worth 
noting what, in terms of meaningful participation, would have been 
possible through access to meetings and a comparison of the two, at 
least in terms of communication. 
First, it should be noted that access did not just involve access to the 
meetings, but also included the agenda and supporting papers, which 
thus, provided more detailed information, and enabled the Press to 
determine whether they actually wished to attend. Further benefits to 
the Press in attending meetings were in being able to hear the full 
arguments, witness any presentations made by VA officers to the Board, 
and hence select the matters which they considered met their criteria 
for reporting (per a news agency representative). The key limitations 
were that the discussions would have been for the benefit of the Board 
(assuming no "playing to the gallery"), and that, potentially, there 
would have been no opportunity for the Press to question Board members 
(hence stage lA, but not IB). However, it is difficult to envisage that 
members would not have been prepared to answer questions following the 
meeting (assuming the necessary political will). 
The second key point is that access included access for the public to 
considerable benefits in Board meetings, and hence, there would 
attendance (or just receiving the papers) 
be 
rather than having to rely on 
Press reporting. However, in terms of attendance, the considerable 
commitment on the part of the public, needs to be considered. Further, 
the point does need to be made that the "success" of the process would 
have been dependant on the presence of both political will, and, 
especially for the public, education. 
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A wider problem that also needs to be considered is the issue of whether 
the meetings of the Authority would have been the actual locus of "realM 
decision-making. It should be noted that access had included access to 
all WA comDdttees - including, the Policy and Resources Commrlttee (given 
earlier comments). It can also be argued that the -fear" of secretive 
decision-making, and the presentation of a facade at public meetings, 
proves the need for political will on the part of the decision-maker. 66 
At this stage, the key conclusion that can be drawn between the two 
approaches, is that neither, by themselves, would satisfy the 
requirements of all the aspects of the communication process, and, 
therefore, more effective mechanisms, assessed as a whole, need to be 
considered. In the case of the decision by Yorkshire Water, it 1s 
however, disappointing that the Authority did not appear willing to 
consider, or "experiment" with, alternatives to access to meetings, such 
as allowing the eee chairmen to attend, or providing the public with at 
least edited agenda - the latter at least would seem not to conflict 
with the reasons given by the Authority for preferring closure. Finally, 
there appears to have been no evidence that the Authority did comply 
with the advice of the XKC (supra.) to monitor the Welsh experience of 
open meetings. 
C. The Annual Report and Accounts 
This is the second for~l mechanism which will be briefly considered. 
While a statutory requirement,67 it is important to note that their 
content was in part governed 
{empowered under sch. 3, para. 
by guidelines produced by the SoS 
40(2», the practical significance of 
which, however, is not known. The main benefit of the reports is clearly 
th P f they were a mechanism for at, in contrast to ress con erences, 
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information to be provided directly to the public, but they could only 
provide it in one direction - from 
potential significance in respect of 
it will be argued that their main 
the Authority; hence, they were of 
stages lA, and VI again. However, 
benefit was in the form of an 
educational role, relating, both to the functions of the Authority, and 
the facilities for public participation, and thus, they could provide a 
stimulus for further participation. 
In the case of the reports of Yorkshire Water, it is suggested (although 
such an assessment is necessarily subjective) that the reports produced 
after 1983 involved far less detail, and were of potentially less value, 
than those of the pre 1983 Authority. For instance, taking the 1988 
report as a sample, while the main areas relating to the work of the 
Authority, its performance over the year, and those relating to 
facilities for public participation, are included, the content is brief. 
A profile of the Board and the Executive Management Team is provided, 
but no information about the role of the latter, and there is no mention 
of the other executive comDdttees, or of the "specialist- mechanisms for 
participation (discussed in the 
Fisheries Advisory GomDdttee or 
Section 24A of the Water Act 1983 
reviewing the work of the GGes 
barely fulfils the spirit of this 
next chapter) such as the Regional 
the Water Quality Advisory Group. 
required the WAs to include a section 
it is suggested that the 1988 Report 
in its two sentences, which do not 
show the potential importance of the commdttees as mechanisms for public 
participation. 6S By comparison, the reports from 1977 onwards provide 
detail on the Authority comDdttees, including attendance, as well as 
extensive accounts of the performance of individual functions. 
In contrast to the above assessment, the Chairman of Yorkshire Water 
considered that it was the pre 1983 
believed that the public wanted to 
reports which contained little. He 
know about the efficiency of the 
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Authority, how the money was being spent, and whether the drinking water 
was safe to drink the post 1983 reports met this criteria (pers. 
comm.). The final aspect, in relation to the reports, is the extent to 
which they were made available, especially to the public. The WAs were 
required <under ech. 3, para. 40(3) Water Act 1973) to send copies to 
all local authorities within the WA's area, and copies were also to be 
available on request, on payment of a ureasonable charge- (sub-para. 
(8». The Yorkshire Water report for 1988 cost tlO, but it was 
noticeable that the Authority seemed very willing to overlook this when 
copies were requested (including at the National Water Exhibition in 
1988). Copies were also sent to libraries. 
V. lHURlIAL OPPORTUIITIKS FOR PARTICIPATIOI WITH THE BOARD 
The distinction between formal <in the sense of actual "facilities") and 
informal is, potentially, a difficult distinction to make in some cases, 
but account needs to be taken of those cases where communication between 
the public and the Authority was possible in practice, albeit there were 
no specific facilities provided for it. An assessment of such informal 
communication is, however, subject to severe limitations in terms of 
accurate research, and hence, it is intended to no more than point out 
the possibilities, and their potential significance. Again it is being 
argued that all potential channels for communication must be considered 
as a whole, in seeking to determine whether or not meaningful 
participation could occur. Two aspects can be considered. First, the 
range of direct communications with the Board and Yorkshire Water 
officers, and second, the plethora of "public relations" work of the 
Authori ty. 
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A. Direct Participation with the Board and VA Officers 
The extent to which this took place, especially with the Board, is 
particularly difficult to measure, although it is clear that it did 
occur. (For instance, the Chairman indicated that it was regular 
practice to invite "major" customers and local authority representatives 
to lunch following Board meetings, [pers comm.]). The key points are 
that the extent of such contact would depend on (1) the public knowing 
how to make such contact, and (2) the willingness of the Board to be 
open to it, and especially to treat different groups, and types of 
people, equally. In the case of contact with WA staff, this was likely 
to be more extensive. For instance, Derbyshire County Council indicated 
the way that they had dealt with Yorkshire Water extensively from the 
mid 1970s onwards, in relation to river water quality in the north east 
of the county, and had always found the Authority helpful, including a 
willingness to respond to requests for action relating to sewage 
discharges <pers. comm.). Similarly, Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace 
regularly sought information from the Authority, although, as will be 
noted in the next chapter, they did not nominate members to the consumer 
committees. 
B. Public Relations 
The work, and variety, of the public relations department of the 
Authority was extensive, and can be seen as important, especially in the 
context of the need for education, including offering the public 
information about proposed decisions and those actually decided. 69 Five 
main types of work can be reviewed. 
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First, the Authority undertook a number of exhibitions, including as 
part of the now well established process of sewage and water treatment 
works open days. The open day at the Elvington works (forth Yorkshire) 
was the largest in the country (attended by 117 000 in 1988), while, to 
coincide with the building of the new long sea outfall at Scalby Kills, 
Scarborough, the Authority built a "visitors' centre- designed to 
explain the project to the public70 , and, in terms of numbers attending 
(20 000 in 1988), was deemed a great success. In each of these cases it 
can be suggested that the Authority was very effective in providing 
information about its functions, and how it sought to fulfil these, but 
the main criticism is in relation to a noticeable lack education about 
the facilities for participation. It is arguable, therefore, given the 
above discussion, that the Authority was very willing to welcome those 
who knew how to participate (at least within the ambit of the business 
principles ethos), but did not take a positive enough role in educating 
people how to participate. 
Second, a range of publications were produced by Yorkshire Water, a 
process begun before 1983. 71 One of the most significant publications 
was the Customer InfDr~tiDn Guide, which provided for basic information 
about the Authority, which was intended as "a new initiative to improve 
communications with [Yorkshire Water's] customers" (YV, 1988b). The 
Authority intended that this would be sent to each of the 1.4 million 
households with the next round of water bills. 
Public meetings appear to have been used less extensively since 1983, 
than before, and there appears to have been no clear policy behind their 
use. The clearest available example, is in relation to the water 
metering trials at 
Authority provided 
Normanton, 
free buses 
near 
to 
Wakefield interestingly, 
enable residents to attend 
minutes, Central Division, October 1988, minute 39). 
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(CCC 
A process which the post 1983 did, apparently, initiate was the use of 
larket Research Surveys, from 1986 (and repeatedly annually), and began 
to attach increasing importance to them (indicated by the Chairman, 
pers. comm.).72 Furthermore the Deputy Chairman (pers. comm.) suggested 
that they were one of the main factors identifying the need for the 
"public awareness campaign". discussed below. There is no doubt that 
they did have an important role to play; however, the key issue here is 
the weight attached to them in comparison to other, especially formal, 
mechanisms for participation. For instance, it could be argued that if 
the Authority had attached more weight to the Surveys than the CCCS -
the designated facility for the transmission of the views of the public 
this suggests that the Authority saw the latter merely as 
legitimation. It is not intended to argue that this was the case, but it 
is a matter of concern that the Surveys were stated as one reason 
justifying the Campaign, but the CCCs were not consulted prior to it. 
Having referred to the Ca~ign, it is worth noting this as the final 
type of public relations work. This formed part of the national campaign 
mounted by the WAA on behalf of the "ten water and sewerage businesses 
of England and Wales" (rather than the ten WAs), which caused so much 
controversy in 1989. It is not intended to rehearse the issues relating 
to whether its purpose was to promote privatisation on behalf of the 
Government, and whether its cost was justified, but it does raise a 
number of important issues regarding the education of the public, and 
whether the campaign offered the right approach in these terms. The 
first point is that it is, at least unfortunate, that such a campaign 
should have been mounted at the very end of the 15 year life span of the 
WAs, having clearly been needed throughout that time, and that, only 
those aspects of the WAs functions 
advertised. It is difficult to see how 
that were to be privatised, were 
this gave the public an accurate 
and informed understanding of the provision of water services. 73 In the 
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case of Yorkshire Water, it also undertook (simultaneously) a regional 
version of the Campaign.7~ 
The conclusions about the Campaign are essentially that it may have been 
of great importance in heightening public interest in water services, 
and the issues involved, but achieved little in terms of increasing 
public understanding of their opportunities to participate, or in 
relation to the new structure of the water industry. It is noticeable 
that since the re-organisation in September 1989, and privatisation in 
November, there has been, nor do there appear to be, any plans for a new 
campaign. 
VI. COICLUSIOIS 
In conclusion, it can be argued that, in the case of Yorkshire Water, 
the Government successfully instilled in the post 1983 Authority, the 
requirement that business principles were to be the overriding priority, 
but that, within this framework, the WA appears to have shown a 
commitment towards public participation, both through fDrmal mechanisms 
and informally. The main problem, however, seems to have been in respect 
of the lack of education provided for those not aware of how to 
participate. Again it must be stressed that conclusions at this stage 
must be tentative, because of the need to include consideration of the 
range of commdttees open, either to public membership or attendance. 
These will be assessed in the next chapter. 
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.OTRS: 
1 Although again the difficulties of actually making such an assessment 
must be recorded. 
2 Comparisons with the arrangements before 1983 will also be made as 
appropriate. 
3 As indicated in the Introduction, consideration of the land drainage 
function has, however, been excluded. 
• Dworkin, R X, Taking Rights seriously, (1977). 
& If these objectives are shown to have been "written in stone", and 
hence, not to be departed from, this would deny the necessary 
political will in subsequent decision-making. 
6 Similarly, Saunders, 1984, p. 5. 
7 Strictly speaking it was the members of the Authority who actually 
made up the VA itself, the officers being employees, but not 
·members·. However, practice was to use the "shorthand" - the "Board" 
(see Yorkshire Water, 1984a, SCheme of Organisation). This approach 
will be adopted throughout. 
e This was interpreted by the DoE to mean that " ... all members must be 
able to make an effective contribution to the all-round competence of 
the water authority in carrying out its functions and attaining with 
efficiency the agreed objectives" (DoE, Circular 16/83, para. 5; 
emphasis added), Clear support for the "business principles" ethos, 
it is suggested. 
9 In both cases the Ministers were required "to have regard" to such 
members "being familiar with the requirements and circumstances of 
the authority's area." (s.3(7». 
10 By this time, the Board included just five of the original 1983 
Board, and only two of the pre 1983, both of whom were MAFF 
appointees. The way in which Board changes were mainly in preparation 
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for the creation of the company which was to be privatised can also 
be noted. All but the two XAFF appointees became members of the Board 
of the pIc. 
11 With the already stated exceptions that the WQAG will be considered 
in the next chapter, and the RLDC excluded. In identifying the two 
committees the following labels, adopted in relation to the potential 
of the committees for public participation, will be used, viz. "open" 
committees, for those to which the public had access, and "closed" 
for which they did not. 
12 The significance of the report for the development of the WAs has 
been suggested by Saunders, who has argued, in support of his 
·unmodified" thesis, that the report was crucial in putting the 
managerial ethos into effect. "The report placed its emphasis on 
managerial efficiency at the expense of participation in policy-
making by outsiders." Further, the dual effect of the report and the 
Vater Act 1973 fl ••• was to undermine both electoral and participatory 
democracy within the reorganised water industry" (1983, p. 34). For a 
fuller account of the report and VA responses to it, see Okun, 1977, 
chapters 5 and 6, and Dangerfield, 1979, p. 22 et seq. The details of 
the report are drawn from these two works. 
13 In conjunction with the Anglian and Severn Trent Authorities, the 
Humber Estuary Committee was also created, as explained post. 
14 This is clear from the minutes of the respective meetings (viewed at 
the Yorkshire Water library in Bradford) and from discussions with 
officers who served under both the pre and post 1983 Authority. The 
early meetings of the committee (first meeting, 22 November 1973) are 
interesting for showing the decisions which were taken in developing 
the Authority. The committee structure was also reviewed at the 
meeting on 16 October 1974, where the commdttee decided to continue 
the existing system, rejecting a proposal to disband the PRe. 
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16 I am grateful to the Chairman of the Authority for his lucid 
explanation of the standing commdttee structure. 
16 Ibid., amended 1988, section F. The Team was also assisted in this 
process by a computer system, termed the MEXT information system", 
developed by Yorkshire Water staff, but only available to the Board, 
which detailed everything about the Authority, and was described by 
the Chairman as an "essential toolM for running the business <pers. 
comm.). In 1988, in preparation for privatisation, the Secretary and 
Solicitor was added to the Team. 
17 YV, 1984a [amended 1986], F. It would seem that when the Chief 
Executive was added, it would then be known as the Regional 
Xanagement Team. 
18 Yorkshire Water was believed to be the only Authority which granted 
the Press and public access to its WQAG. 
19 One of the first tasks of the Panel (as it had been called before 
1983) was the preparation (in 1974) of a report on the Authority's 
-inheritance-, relating to the state of its pollution control and 
sewerage disposal assets <Annual Report, 1975). 
20 For details of the HEC, see Sayers, 1982, pp. 67-8, and the YV Annual 
Reports from 1975. Its role in relation to the setting of Water 
Quality Objectives for the Humber will be discussed in chapter five. 
21 Further, Cmnd. 9392, 1984, paras. 5.13 et seq., and AppendiX 5. 
22 Thereafter there were only two further changes. First, the 
strengthening of the "AreaM 
to the DGM, as the first 
approach, 
point of 
with area managers, reporting 
contact for the public - an 
approach particularly favoured by the Chairman. Then, from 1 April 
1989 the Authority began to operate in its pIc and IRA units. 
23 For a detailed account see Telling, 1974. 
24 For instance, in relation to Mconservation" see Xacrory, 1984, p. 5. 
2& In the case of Yorkshire Vater, the former was included as part of 
the five year (rolling) Corporate Plan. 
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26 Attempts were made during enactment to place such a duty on the YAs 
(for instance, see Lord Craigton, Hansard, RL, vol. 348, col. 1370; 
22 January 1974). 
27 Extensive control was, in fact, predicted by Telling (1974, p. 8). 
For the comments of Gray, regarding the NYC as a "vital bufferM 
between the DoE and the WAs, see Saunders, 1983, p. 42. 
28 Similar comments were made by the Chairman of the YAA, who was also 
Chairman of Yorkshire Water, at the opening of the National Vater 
Conference in 1988. 
29 This must be seen in the context of the review of the present state 
of public law in chapter one. 
30 Further details of the controls applying to the WAs are provided in 
the XKC report, Cmnd. 9392, 1984, chapter 3; further Lewis, 1985. The 
figures for each year were provided in the WA Annual Reports. 
31 lote that the CAG found that the combination of performance aims and 
financial targets would have the effect of setting the general level 
of charges for the WAs (HC 157, 1984/5, noted ibid., para. 14). 
32 It can be suggested that the achievement of the business principles 
ethos was further assured, and its importance to government further 
indicated, by the introduction of "bonus payments" for YA (executive) 
Board members, including the chairmen. These were paid for the first 
time in 1986/7, and were only to be paid when performance aims were 
achieved (see the statement of Colin Xoniyhan, Written Answer, 
Hansard, HC, vol. 124, cols. 274-5; 11 December 1987, and The 
Independent, 20 January 1988. 
scrutiny). 
Quaere Parliamentary and public 
33 According to the Public Accounts Committee these were at the heart of 
the monitoring of the WAs and the nationalised industries (Cmnd. 249, 
1984/5, para. 10). 
34 For instance, the regularity of sewer failures. See Cmnd. 9734, 1986, 
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p. 18, and Cmnd. 9392, 1984. The control through Ministerial 
appointments is considered below. 
36 lote can also be taken of subsequent publications by the Government; 
for instance, DoE, Public Access to Information Held by Pollution 
Control Authorities - A Discussion Paper, 
Access to Environmental Information, 1986, 
can be argued that these, at least 
commdtment to public participation, but 
offered would have to operate within 
August 1985; DoE, Public 
Pollution Paper 10 23. It 
superficially, suggest a 
clearly 
the stated 
any opportunities 
objectives, and 
hence, the governing ethos. 
36 Be identifies the IFU, CBI, Housebuilders Association and Country 
Landowners Association (1984, p. 16). 
~7 In the sense of providing "privilegedN , and possibly hidden, access 
to decision-making. 
38 Hence, the need for equality of access to overcome this state of 
affairs (1984, p. 57). 
39 Reference can also be made to the objectives of the pre 1983 Board 
(which appear to have been stated only in the Annual Reports), 
indicating that the Board were concerned to maintain and then seek to 
improve Mlevel s of service- provided to the community (Annual Report 
1976, para. 1.5), although, by 1980, repeated public expenditure cuts 
had resulted in an emphasis on II essential rather than desirable 
levels of serviceM <Annual Report 1980, Foreword). 
40 The danger is that they may have been subject to negotiation with 
particular interest groups, but there is no evidence to prove or 
disprove this. 
41 On the positive side, it can be noted that the document was 
potentially very valuable in terms of education, in actually 
informing the public of the objectives, and also the framework which 
government had laid down for the WA (and hence the potential for 
influence by the public). This seems to have been recognised by the 
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Authority, who, not only made it available to the GGGs, but also 
sought to make it as widely available as possible. 
42 Two further detailed sections were also headed ·communication with 
the public <which did little but explain the mechanisms that were 
available for participation, and hence, of value again for education, 
but not suggesting a great comDdtment to meaningful participation <p. 
26», and "queries and complaints procedure". 
43 One notable change was the introduction of target dates for the 
achievement of different objectives <p. 17). 
44 For instance the document was submitted in draft to the GOGs at their 
June 1988 meetings. 
46 A point which should be noted, is the complexity of much of the 
material, and hence, the particular need for education if the public 
were to be able to participate. 
46 Although this does not mean that it could not have been open to other 
views as well. 
47 For this response, and subsequent action, the Authority received a 
·pat on the back" from Environment Minister John Patten <Vater 
Bulletin, 6~ February 1987, p. 3). 
4S In the sense of specific mechanisms or facilities. 
49 In enabling government to reinforce the business principles ethos 
<hence the arguments of Saunders, already noted). On appointments by 
government generally, see Lewis, 1985. 
60 Note that the Press were not free from criticism. Interestingly, the 
findings of the Lawrence inquiry would seem to lend support for the 
business principles ethos: "there seems to be a culture in which the 
public are told as little as possible, and are expected to trust the 
Authority to look after their interests" <quoted in the Observer, 2 
July 1989). 
&1 For his reasons for refusal, see Vater Bulletin, 26 August 1988, p. 
3. He did, however, promise "amendatory" action. 
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62 In the case of Yorkshire Water, although no comparative incident ever 
occurred, there was one occasion where the office of the Chairman was 
called into question, through the mechanism of the CCCs. It was 
alleged, by a commi ttee member, that the Chairman had II misled" the 
(forth and East Division) COmmittee, because the Board had always 
stated that it was "neutral- on the question of water privatisation, 
but that this had been contradicted by the Chairman, in his role as 
Chairman of the VAA, making clear his support for privatisation. A 
vote of no confidence in the Chairman was clearly defeated (notes of 
meeting, 6 February 1989). 
63 The Act, in support of which, the present Prime Kinister made her 
maiden speech. 
&4 The main Opposition arguments included that the WAs would still be 
dealing with the same issues, it was only the size of the Boards that 
was being changed <e.g. Alan Beith, Hansard, HC, vol. 35, col. 218-
20; 18 January 1983). 
&& Unfortunately, it has not been possible to carry out, or identify, 
any research in respect of the Welsh experience. 
&6 This does not prove that the Authority was not ·open to influence", 
however. 
S7 This point also re-inforces the importance of government control 
through appointments had more local authority members been 
appointed, it is possible that the Authority would have continued to 
meet in public. 
sa The Chairman also expressed his personal view that he would have felt 
inhibited had meetings been open <pers. comm.). During the debates on 
the (defeated) Water Authorities (Access to Meetings) Bill 1984/5, 
the Minister for Housing and Construction stated that the Chairmen of 
the WAs" have concluded that the advantages to busine66 
efficiency of meeting in private 
(they] have reassured me that 
outweighs any disadvantage ... 
they wish to be as open as is 
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consistent with the proper running of their businesses· (Hansard, He, 
vol. 72, col. 584; 1 February, 1985; emphasis added). The assertion 
that "closed meetings means lower water charges· cannot of course be 
tested. 
69 The Government did not, however, include this as a requirement of the 
Act - government by "administration"? 
60 For those unable to attend, Press releases were also issued following 
the meeting. 
61 Although it has already been argued that the Policy and Resources 
Commdttee, of the old Authority, was more significant. 
62 In the case of Yorkshire Water, entitled "An Invitation to a Press 
Conference-. 
63 It should be noted that this list was in place of the agenda, which 
was also deemed confidential. 
64 It was noticeable, for instance, that many of the Press who covered 
Yorkshire Water committee meetings were very "inexperienced" in WA 
matters. VA officers were always very willing to explain, however. 
66 It is not intended to provide a detailed analysis, but see the 
·People, Plans and the Press·, Linked Research Report, in Journal of 
Planning and Environment La~ (1977) pp. 758-9. 
66 A similar point is the danger that the power to exclude the Press and 
public from meetings (by a "resolution" under the terms of the 1960 
Act) could be "abused". 
67 Under sch. 3, paras. 38 and 40 of the Water Act 1973. They were 
presented to Parliament, usually in July of each year. 
68 Similarly there is no mention of the facilities for public 
participation in relation to pollution control. 
69 The importance of this role was recognised by successive Yorkshire 
Vater Chairmen (see the Annual Reports, 1976, p. 40, and 1979, pp. 36 
et seq.). 
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70 Reviewed by Garrett, P, ·Showtime at the Scalby Centre-, (1989) Yater 
Bulletin, 27 January 1989, p. 10. 
71 See for instance, How Xuch Do You Know About Your Yater Services? 
(referred to in the Annual Report 1979, p. 38). 
72 The first Survey, undertaken by a research company on behalf of the 
Authority, involved questioning a "representative sample" of 365 
householders across the Yorkshire Water region, about their 
-awareness" of services provided by the Authority, and their 
impressions regarding the "accountability· and "efficiency" of the 
Authority, including by comparison with the regional electricity and 
gas boards, and local authorities. See YV 1986a, pp. 2-3, and 1986b. 
73 The main justifications for this were, according to the Secretary of 
the VAA, that these were the functions about which public attention 
had focused, especially in relation to EC water quality standards and 
compliance therewith, and that the proposed privatisation had 
-resulted in extraordinary and unprecedented levels of misinformation 
and confusion about the industry and its activities" (pers. comm., 23 
lay 1989). Note, that in Scotland, where privatisatian has been ruled 
out, no such campaign was undertaken (The Independent (letters), 31 
August 1989). It is difficult to imagine that the Scots are better 
informed than their English counterparts. For the other side of the 
arguments, see the letters from Sir Frederick Carfield, (The 
Independent, 10 Karch 1989 and 8 September 1989, and the response, 11 
September 1989). 
7A Costing t700 000 according to the Authority, or t4.3m, according to a 
Sheffield City Council audit (The Independent, 3 September 1989). 
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C B APT E R F OUR 
The Authority and the Public II 
- The CoDmdttees 
To complete the study of Yorkshire Vater and its relationships with the 
public, this chapter will concentrate on analysing the system of 
committees which offered public participation through a combination of 
their membership being open to the public; via the members on a 
"representative" basis, or by being open to public and Press attendance, 
in contrast to the standing committees and the Board (discussed in 
chapter three). Four comDittees will be considered, viz. the Consumer 
Consultative ComDittees (CCCs), the Regional Recreation and Conservation 
ComDdttee (RRCC), the Regional Fisheries Advisory Committee (RFAC) and 
the Water Quality Advisory Group (VQAG). In each case it is intended to 
identify what was possible in terms of communication, and what was 
actually achieved in practice, including any constraints, imposed either 
externally or internally (by the VA itself), as well as considering the 
necessary elements of education and political will. The main emphasis of 
the chapter will be on the CCCs because they were, potentially, of the 
greatest significance in providing for meaningful participation, as they 
were concerned with the interests of the public per set Comparisons will 
then be drawn with the other three comndttees. In the case of the RRCC 
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and the RFAG, consideration is relevant because they provided for the 
representation of, what can be termed ·specialist interests·, especially 
fisheries; it is critical, given the arguments relating to ·privileged 
access", that these arrangements did not provide for "better" access for 
some groups in preference to others. Significantly, in each case the 
committees were able to consider policy issues in contrast to the 
nationalised industries consumer councils (see Birkinshaw, 1985b, p. 103 
et seq.). In conclusion, the interrelationship between the four 
committees will be considered, along with an overall assessment, taking 
account of the opportunities for meaningful participation outlined in 
chapter three. 
I. THE COISUJlRR COBSUL TAT I VE CODITTKHS 
A. The Structure of the CoDDdttees 
As indicated in the previous chapter, the GGCs were one form of 
.compensation" for the changes made to the WAs under the Water Act 
1983. 1 Thus, S. 7 required that the WAs make arrangements "for the 
representation of the interests of consumers in their area", in 
accordance with guidelines, issued by the 80S, and with each scheme to 
be approved by the So8. 2 Government intentions were expressed as 
follows: 
MAs these comndttees will provide the main forum for 
representative and public comment on water authority 
policies and proposals, including charging policies, 
investment and other planning, local issues and individual 
customer complaints, this will provide significant access to 
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the water authorities' plans, policies, proposals and 
actions (DoE, Circular 16/83, para. 13; emphasis added>. 
However, clearly this must be read subject to earlier arguments 
regarding the way in which the Government sought, through the 1983 Act, 
to impose on the WAs an explicit form of the "managerialist ethosNj it 
is, therefore, inevitable that any arrangements for public participation 
would have to operate within that context. The Ntensions· behind the 
Government's proposals must, therefore, be considered. First, the 
commdttees were to provide for a more participatory approach than the 
pre 1983 arrangements by allowing for the appointment of members of the 
public per se (termed "householders·) an approach to be welcomed, 
albeit that the commdttees were only advisory. However, it can be argued 
that the basic premise of the committees was a II confused mixture" 
because members, including local councillors, acted not only on behalf 
of the public, but also on their own views, perceptions and experience. 
It will be suggested that the actual roles that the members were to 
play, and the problems this led to, were not thought out in advance. In 
particular, such an approach, by providing for indirect participation 
through the CGC members, posed the problem of how successful the link 
between the members and public per se would be. It will be suggested 
that Hsuccess" was limited. It did not, therefore, truly provide a 
participatory approach. 
A related tension is the way in which the CeGs were to be primarily 
dependant on local authority members, despite the implication by the 
Thatcher Administration that the local authority members had "failed" in 
their consumer representation role on the Boards of the WAs (chapter 
two). It is argued that awarding them a significant number of places on 
the eecs was a further process of appeasement, as central government 
continued to reduce the influence of local government over water 
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services. This further suggests that the Government did not possess the 
necessary political will that meaningful participation should be 
possible through the cces, and hence, this would be reflected in the 
structure proposed by the Government. This argument, as a reflection of 
the business principles ethos, is further borne out by the assessments 
of Kinnersley and Saunders. The former has explained why he perceives 
that the structure, propounded by the Government in its guidelines, was 
"unsatisfactory", including that the committees were to be created to 
operate at divisional level, while most of the major policy matters were 
determined by the WAs at regional level. Second, that the "guidelines 
made sure that the (COCs] could have, despite wider terms of reference, 
little independence" an argument which will be supported and 
developed, below. 3 Indeed he has stated: 
"Far from compensating for the loss of local links through 
elected councillors, these committees had little scope to 
express well-informed and independent views, neutered as 
they were by the (water] authorities and the DoE" (ibid., p. 
115). 
Further, Saunders has noted the basic problem that, not only would the 
tendency of the WAs be against (meaningful) participation with the 
public, but the "established interests" would be unwilling. The danger 
being that the OCCs might provide a facade, while the "real" policy 
"negotiation" went on elsewhere, with groups such as the CBl. Saunders, 
writing just as the CCCs were beginning operations, stated 
" it does seem that the CCCs will be mainly symbolic or 
tokenistic ... any idea that these committees will provide 
for effective consumer representation in water policy-making 
is surely naive. Those interests which already enjoy close 
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and relatively informal links with the VA regional officers 
will continue to do so; all that has happened is that a few 
other less substantial groups have been given a seat at a 
non-executive body operating at divisional level ... It may 
be true that the chairman will be speaking to both groups 
but it is unlikely that the consequences will be the same 
for eachM (1984. pp. 13, 15). 
Again the issue of public participation. at the stage of determining the 
structure of the comDdttees by the Executive. must be considered. given 
that this would provide the framework within which each WA was reqUired 
to specify its arrangements. The extent to which public participation 
took place cannot be established, but it can be noted that the two 
preliminary sets of guidelines were issued for public consultation (22 
November 1982. and 23 June 1983). 
1. Creating The Yorkshire Yater CoDDdttees 
Each VA was required to produce its Scheme by 1 February 1984 (SI 
1984/11). Yorkshire Water set up four divisional committees, one for 
each operating division (excluding rivers division) which. in the case 
of the North and East Division, also included the York Waterworks 
Company (the agent of the Authority for water supply in. and around. the 
city of York). Two points need to be noted about the timing of the 
arrangements. First, the Scheme was drawn up by the post 1983 Authority; 
in other words, the Board solely appOinted by Ministers, without the 
previous local authority majority. It could, therefore, be expected that 
any arrangements made would largely meet the pervading ethos, especially 
as ministerial approval was required. Second, a key point of concern 1s 
the delay between the appointment of the new Board and the commencement 
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of the eees. The Yorkshire Water comDdttees held their first meetings in 
June/July 1984, meaning that for the period from 1 October 1983 until 
then, there was very limited scope for public participation, despite the 
fundamental decisions adopted by the Board (chapter three). 
Again, the extent of participation in the drawing up of the Scheme is 
important - especially in the determination of who would be allotted 
places on the commdttees. Both the decision of who to award places to, 
and their actual appointment, were for each WA (DoE, 1983c, para. 10) 
with the danger that a VA could potentially favour particular groups or 
persons.· The DoE suggested that the WAs would want to consult 
Minterested parties", and following determination of the scheme, make 
copies available for public response (DoE, 1983c, para. 25). No 
information is available of the precise extent to which this was 
fulfilled in the case of Yorkshire Water, but in making the 
appointments, nominations were sought through advertisement in local 
newspapers <Yorkshire Water, 1984c) and by direct invitation with 
specified bodies. Figure 4.1 (Appendix B) suggests that the Authority 
did seek to achieve a balance between different interests, and the 
Authority did not refuse to appoint any individuals nominated by 
specific groups.s The only comment to be made, is the way that 
organisations, such as the CBI and !FU, were provided with places, 
despite (according to Saunders, 1984) already having well established 
links - if not "influence" with the WA, while also being granted 
places on the other comndttees, a point which will be developed further. 
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2. Arrangements for Consumer Representation Before 1983 
Brief comparison can be made between the GGGs and the arrangements prior 
to the 1983 changes in WA structure. At the broader level, different WAs 
made their own arrangements (see Dangerfield, 1979, p. 26 et seq.), but 
those adopted by the Wessex and Thames WAs, were particularly 
influential as models for the GGGS.6 In the case of Yorkshire Vater, its 
response to the major drought of 1976 was interesting, in that the 
Authority set up divisional "emergency water commdttees· to liaise with 
organisations such as the CBI, local authorities, fire, police and 
social services. They were deemed so "successful- that they were 
continued with "modified" membership after the drought. 7 It should be 
noted that, common to all three WAs was the exclusion of the public from 
the meetings and membership of these comDdttees. 
Yorkshire Vater also operated an extensive 
arrangements, through, either comDdttees, 
system of consultative 
or meetings, with 
organisations such as local authorities,S the CBl, fFU, the three 
national parks (Yorkshire Dales, forth Yorkshire Koors and the Peak 
District), the Humberside Economic and Planning Council, and recreation 
and environmental interests (further details, ibid.). It should be noted 
that the DoE specified that the WAs were free to continue existing 
arrangements of the above kind, and Yorkshire Water indicated that it 
would do so. 
3. The Independence and Constraints of the Yorkshire Water ComDdttees 
Given the nature of the principles of meaningful participation argued 
for, it is essential that, if the GGGs were to be effective mechanisms 
for enabling meaningful participation in practice, they had to be able 
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to operate independently of the VAs. without fundamental constraints 
imposed either externally (especially by central government) or 
internally (by the VA). Given the contentions of Kinnersley (supra.). it 
is intended to assess the structure of the Yorkshire Water commdttees. 
to seek to identify to what extent they could act free of such 
constraints. It will be shown that the main issue of concern was the 
actual provision that was made for the commdttees by Yorkshire Water, in 
terms of the regularity of meetings, their budgets. and their powers. 
a. External Constraints 
The terms of reference of the Yorkshire Vater commdttees included: 
M(a) To watch over the interests of the public in relation 
to the Authority's functions, and the ways in which the 
Authority endeavours to reconcile and serve those interests 
... including the Authority's general charging and financial 
policies, scales of charges, planning for investment and 
standards of service. 
(b) To foster mutual understanding between the public and 
the Authority. 
(c) To consider any such matter which is raised with the CCC 
by a customer or other interest or by a member of the CCC. 
(e) To make reports and recommendations on any such matters, 
to the Chairman of the Authority or of the [York Waterworks] 
Company, who will respond to the CCC" (YV, 1984a, para. 3). 
t i ifi t external constraint on It 1s contended that the mas s gn can 
meaningful th h th COIDml'ttees was the extensive participation roug e 
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control of VA policy-making by central government. 9 The extent to which 
the WAs were subject to control, especially in relation to finance, was 
indicated in the previous chapter. Especially in the case of the setting 
of water charges (which was seen as one of the main roles the COGs would 
play), the effect the CCCs could have was severely curtailed. The common 
response of the comDdttees was "indignation", and the desire that 
Yorkshire Vater be allowed to borrow more than the Government would 
permit. As a result, there was a constant flow of letters from the 
committees to the DoE, and on one occasion a threat of resignation by 
the Central Division Committee because of the belief that they were 
"wasting their time" due to the Government limitations (Central Division 
Annual Report, 1984/5, para. 5, and minutes, 15 January 1985). The 
following <paraphrased) response is typical of the view of the DoE, 
however, 
"The Xinister concludes that the comDdttee has a wide remit 
to consider any matter affecting water authority consumers 
and they can influence water authority plans, but it is for 
the Government to decide such matters as the level of 
financial target and the external financing limit" (in North 
and East Division Annual Report, 1984/5, para. 5.8).10 
b. Internal Constraints 
Yorkshire Water provided secretarial and support services for the 
committees. Although this did not appear to constrain them, it will be 
suggested that some of the arrangements made for the committees through 
their Standing Orders did, and despite a willingness to keep them under 
d d t than minor changes. Two review, the Authority never acce e 0 more 
examples will be considered. 
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The Regularity of OCC Meeti~. An interesting example was a concern of 
all the divisional comndttees (and also the RRCC, discussed below), and 
it is suggested that this indicates, clearly, the way in which the 
Authority wished to retain tight control of the committees. Yorkshire 
Vater stated that the number of meetings was for each committee to 
decide, but the comDdttees would be required to keep within their annual 
budget, which would be fixed by the Authority, and, apparently, was 
non-negotiable. 11 The Authority did, however, agree to increase the 
number of meetings from the original two, to three per year, but at no 
time was it prepared to allow four. 12 
The COnstitution of the North and Bast Division Co~ttee. Under the 
internal re-organisation of the Authority carried out in 1982-3 (chapter 
three) the North and East Division was created, covering approximately 
60 per cent of the total region, although with a population about equal 
with the other three divisions. At the early meetings of the divisional 
committee, it was repeatedly argued that more than one committee was 
required, 13 but the Authority was of the view that (1) there were major 
benefits in having a comndttee that coincided with the operating 
division, (2) there were no other natural divisions within the region, 
and (3) there would be considerable duplication of resources for running 
more than one comDdttee (see Yorkshire Vater, 1985a, p. 6).14 
The National Foru& A further example appears to strengthen the view 
that Yorkshire Water was keen to constrain the independence of the 
committees. Because the committees were created on a divisional basis 
(leading to 49 comndttees nationally), there was no provision made by 
either the Government or the VAs, for national, or cross-regional, co-
d t t a "national foru~', 16 ordination. When attempts were ma e 0 crea e 
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partly with an eye on privatisation (with assistance from the National 
Consumer Council), Yorkshire Vater, while not seeking actively to 
prevent such a development, at no pOint indicated positive support for 
it. The view was expressed that there "were no issues that could not 
adequately be dealt with at a local level" (Horth and East Division, 
minutes, 6 October 1986). This suggests a desire for the Authority to 
remain the sole provider of information to the committees. 16 
c. The Independence of the ComDdttees 
To balance the above analysis, there were a number of factors which 
contributed to giving the comDdttees some degree of independence. 
The Choice of CDnmdttee Chajr~n. First, an important concession during 
the passage of the 1983 Act, was the agreement to allow the commdttees 
themselves, rather than the VAs, to elect their chairmen. 17 In the case 
of Yorkshire Water's Western Division comDdttee, the chairman selected 
was actually a Board member, but also a local councillor, and thus the 
deputy chairman was also selected by the comndttee. 18 The importance of 
the chairman is indicated by his powers to call extra meetings in 
·special circumstances", writing the foreword to the comndttee annual 
report, and he alone had regular direct access to the Authority chairman 
(see below). 
Education of CD~ttee Xembers. While it has been argued that the 
Authority sought to exercise tight control over the committees, 
including being the sale provider of information, it can be suggested 
that within this framework it did all it could to assist the members of 
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the commdttees. In particular, it is contended that it is vital that the 
committee members were "competent" in the issues they were discussing. 
In this Yorkshire Water demonstrated a strong degree of political will 
by providing education for the members in a number of ways, including 
seminars on special subjects such as privatisation, visits to works (on 
an annual basis) and detailed presentations at meetings on particular 
topics, including, as requested by the members. 
Powers of the CDnmdttees. It can also be noted that no formal powers 
were specified for the comDdttees, (apart from the issuing of an annual 
report) but apart from actually discussing matters, and making 
"resolutions" (thus suggesting the expectation of a response from the 
Board), at different times the committees (and especially the Central 
Division Co~ttee) sought to demonstrate their "independence" through 
repeatedly raising an issue, seemingly seeking to wear down the 
Authority's resolve. 19 The approach was, however, rarely successful. 
4. Public Participation Through 
Relationship 
the ComDdttees The Indirect 
It has already been indicated that the comndttees were designed largely 
on a "representative" basis, interposing the members of the committee 
between the public and the WA. Such an approach is inevitable given the 
need for practicality, but equally, it means that account must be taken 
of this indirect relationship. It is argued that for such an approach to 
work meaningful participation must have been possible in both elements 
of the structure - in other words between the public and the committee 
members, and the committee members and the WA. It is intended to analyse 
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whether, and the way in which, the structure of the committees enabled 
this. 20 
a. CoDmUDicatiOD Between the Board and the CCCs 
The main mechanism for communication was the membership of the 
committees by Board members, as indicated above. 21 It is suggested that 
such an approach was vital in providing for information to be passed 
between the Board and the committees, including, potentially, any of the 
communication stages. However, any assessment must be tempered by the 
distinction between the executive and non-executive Board members, and 
the importance of the chairman and chief executive. In the case of the 
Yorkshire Water comrndttees, in all but one case (the North and East 
Division ComDdttee, from 1988) the Board members appointed to the 
committees were non-executive, and the Chairman of the Authority never 
had any direct contact with the comndttees. 22 It is, therefore, vital 
that there was effective communication from the committees through their 
Board members to the executive members of the Board and the Chairman, so 
that participation would ultimately be located with the actual 
decision-makers. 23 Political will is again the central issue; there is 
no evidence to suggest that Yorkshire Water failed to ensure such 
communication. 
There was, however, one specific problem which, it is suggested, did 
have an inhibiting effect on the process of communication, regarding the 
discussion of matters in committee and their determination by the Board. 
While the Board met monthly (excluding August), the CCCs met only three 
times a year (June/July, October and January/February)24 with the result 
that, unless decisions were to be taken over a fairly long time scale 
(especially with the need to give members time to consult their 
- 165 -
nominating bodies, post), proposed policies could not be put to the 
committees unless special meetings were called. There were (limited) 
occasions where such meetings were arranged, despite the expectation 
that, given the business principles ethos, "efficient" decision-making 
might require speed. A further problem was the notification of members 
of decisions taken. 26 
b. Co..unlcatloD Between the ComDdttee lembers and the Public 
While it can be argued that the link between the Board and the 
committees was basically effective, the link between the members of the 
committees and the general public is of greater concern, a problem which 
may be seen as a "typical- reflection of the limits of representative 
democracy (chapter one). The main problem lies in the types of role that 
the members were intended, and actually, played, and their 
relationships, both with those who nominated them, and the wider public. 
The key to the commdttees being successful as a mechanism for meaningful 
participation lay, it is contended, in the ability of the public to 
participate through the comndttee members - in other words for all the 
different stages of communication to have been possible. It will be 
argued that, while this appeared to work to some extent for specific 
organisations which nominated members to the comndttees, it was far less 
successful - as far as can be judged for the public per se. Three 
types of member need to be 
are slightly different: (1) 
distinguished, as the problems in each case 
local authority members, (2) members of 
other specified organisations, (3) "householdersM • 26 Furthermore, two 
different roles can be identified (1) acting on the members' own 
beliefs/experiences, (2) acting as the communicator for either the 
nominating body, or members thereof, or for the public (ie people who 
are not members a specified nominating body). 
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L1nks hdth 'oBUnatlng ~aDjsat1ons. In the case of the first two 
categories of member, it could be expected that the eee members would 
have been involved in a combination of either, acting on their own 
body. In each case it might be behalf, or for members of the nOminating 
expected that there would have been arrangements for the member to 
report-back on matters discussed at meetings (and/or provide copies of 
the minutes), and also provide for 
so that they could then have been 
responses from the nominating body, 
communicated to the next eee meeting. 
This would be especially important where the body wished to express its 
views on a proposed VA decision (including water charges). It has not 
been easy to gage the extent to which the latter did occur (for 
instance, it was rarely obvious from meetings that the member was 
speaking on behalf of his organisation, rather than expressing a 
"personal" view), and from informal discussions with committee members, 
it would seem that there were few specific arrangements for members to 
report-back. 27 A key point in all these cases may be the extent to which 
organisations had alternative means for making inputs to VA policy-
making, especially where they considered these "more effective" (again 
see Saunders, 1984). 
L1Dls hdth the PUblic per se. The question of the links with the wider 
public seems to pose a more 
points to weaknesses in the 
difficult question, which, it is suggested, 
eee system. The central question to be 
addressed is to what extent members were intended to offer a role as 
communicators between the public and the 
to 
WA, as well as providing their 
WA policy-making. The answer to own experiences/beliefs as an input 
this has never been articulated it was perhaps never addressed. 29 
meaningful participation to be achieved However, it is argued that, for 
through the eecs, such a role needed to be successfully carried out. It 
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then becomes a question of which members, if not all, were to do this, 
and how. 
The first category to consider are the "householder" members, given that 
they were members of the public per se - their introduction already 
argued as an important development compared to pre 1983 arrangements; 
such membership itself being an important form of participation (a 
higher level of comndtment in Xilbrath's terms). The question is then 
whether such members were deemed to provide sufficient Mpublic· input by 
their own presence,29 or whether they were also expected to seek to act 
on behalf of other members of the public. 30 While members of specific 
organisations could be expected to have been concerned only with the 
interests of their nominating bodies, and perhaps have only limited 
contact with the wider public, the local authority members are the group 
who could be expected to most easily have fulfilled the role as 
communicators, given that they would have been doing that (at least 
theoretically) as a matter course, in relation to their respective local 
authorities. However, again this must be prefaced with concerns about 
the perceived weaknesses of representative democracy, and the fact that 
the Conservative Government appeared to consider that local authority 
members had wfailed" in their role as representors of the consumer on 
the pre 1983 WAs (including because the public had not known that they 
had such representatives). It is difficult to assess the extent to which 
local authority members did act on behalf of members of the public in 
relation to pollcy-mak!ng,31 but a subjective (and again impressionistic 
view) is that such a practice was severely limited. 
Three further points must be considered in relation to the potential 
"success. of this structure. First, the need for education for the 
public to know about the cces, what they were for, and how to make use 
of them. Yorkshire Water produced a series of leaflets, including lists 
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of the members names and addresses, and made these widely available at 
libraries and post offices, however, the Authority's own <Market 
Research> surveys have suggested that only a small percentage knew of 
the committees. 32 Second, the need for political will on the part of the 
committee members to adopt, and be commdtted to, all necessary roles. 
Two situations arose, in the case of the Yorkshire Water committees, 
which posed a barrier to this, in the 
organisations to nominate members, 
form of the failure of specified 
having been reserved places 
(occurring twice), and the non-attendance of members at meetings 
(although provision was made for deputies to be sent).33 Third, 1s the 
question of resources for members to carry out work on behalf of members 
of the public - there was no indication that such resources were made 
available, for instance, for members to hold surgeries similar to those 
held by Xembers of Parliament. 34 
Press and Public Attendance at CCC Jfeeti1llJS. A final aspect, in 
relation to the effectiveness of the commdttees and the wider public is 
the issue of Press and public attendance (bearing in mind the discussion 
regarding Board meetings in chapter three). Public attendance at 
Yorkshire Water eee meetings was very limited (the most at anyone 
meeting being eight). It was commonly suggested, by WA officers, that 
the public "were not interested". While partially true, it is suggested 
that public attendance was nat actually important,35 primarily because, 
if a member of the public had information he wanted to give or receive, 
this could be achieved through the committee without the need to also 
attend the meeting although attendance could be considered as an 
"optional extra". 36 The limitations of actual attendance must also be 
noted, in that the public were only permitted to "observe" proceedings 
- which may have proved difficult to follow - but not to actually speak. 
A matter would, therefore, have had to be left to a member to deal with. 
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The attendance of the Press can be seen as far more important as a means 
for promoting, both public awareness of the committees, and of the 
matters considered thereby. This must be considered subject to the 
limitations outlined in the previous chapter. Press attendance at 
Yorkshire Water Gee meetings was consistent, although actual ·coverage" 
has not been analysed. It can also be noted that there appeared to be no 
occasions where members of the committees did "play to the gallery·. 
In conclusion, doubts must be expressed about the extent to which the 
eeGs did provide in practice for the cOmEUnication of information 
between the wider public and the WA, although such doubts are 
necessarily impressionistic. This must also be considered in the context 
of the limitations of participation, especially in the form of public 
apathy, and thus, it could be argued that the eGes were important 
mechanisms in providing for, at least limited, outside input and 
potential influence over the WAs. It must be argued that the issues 
raised above must be more fully considered before similar arrangements 
for public involvement, in whatever context, are adopted in the future. 
B. The Practice of the Yorkshire Yater CoDDdttees 
Having already addressed the issues of the education of, both the 
members, and the wider public, the remaining requirements of the 
channels for communication and political will will be considered, to 
complete the comparison with meaningful participation. It will be noted 
that the examples - all selected on an illustrative basis - are a 
combination of those relating to what may be termed "substantive· policy 
issues, as well as those again relating to the structure of the 
committees <which were matters of great concern to the members). The 
committees offered the potential to make available any, or all, of the 
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channels for communication (subject to the limitations regarding the 
link with the public and the regularity of meetings, supra,), thus 
making the commdttees an important mechanism to study,37 
1. Standing Reports 
The first point that can be illustrated is the way in which it was 
possible to fulfil stage I, with information actually being offered to 
the commdttee members and equally, being provided on request. The former 
was achieved primarily through a series of "standing reports·, either at 
each meeting, or on an annual basis. 38 The main examples of this are the 
report at each meeting by the Division General Manager on the work of 
the division since the last meeting (for instance water supply 
problems), and a report on "queries and complaints",39 In terms of 
political will, account can be taken of the "quality" of the information 
provided, and respective opinions thereof. In particular, it is 
noticeable that Yorkshire Water identified, almost from day one, that 
the quality of information about queries and complaints was not as they 
wished it to be, and that it did not fully assist the commdttees in 
fulfilling their role of monitoring complaints. 40 The Authority sought 
to solve this problem, although, it was not until just before the 
abolition of the comDdttees, that this was achieved, through the 
introduction of the Authority "Operations and Management System".41 A 
further addition was the introduction of a new standing report on 
prosecutions, taken by the Authority, relating to river pollution. 42 To 
complement the process of standing reports, a series of ad hoc detailed 
presentations was made, either on the Authority's initiative, or at the 
request of members. 43 Finally, in terms of the provision of information, 
it should again be noted that VA officers were always present at 
meetings, thus enabling them to be questioned by members to obtain 
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fuller details than provided in the agenda reports, including the 
standing reports. 44 
2. Capital Expenditure and Yater Charges 
It had been anticipated that one of the main roles for the eees would be 
in the consideration of water charges and the related capital 
expenditure levels of the WAs. This provides an important example, in 
particular. as a process of uconsultationU by the Authority (stages [-
III, especially) - which illustrates the way in which the comndttees 
could operate, but also a number of limitations. Any consideration of 
this decision-making process must be read in the context of the outline, 
in chapter three, of the extent of central government control over the 
WAs finances, and the possible effects of the business principles ethos, 
and hence the limits of potential influence for the committees. 4S As far 
as the actual process of setting charges was concerned, government 
controls were set in October, and the WA's proposals put to the eees in 
January/February, in time for the new financial year. 
One important example to be taken from this, is a case which suggests 
that the scope for influence was very limited, and raises the issue of 
political will. This was where members of the North and East Division 
Committee suggested that the Authority's proposed tariff structure be 
recalculated to reduce the difference in the proposed increases for the 
"measured" and "unmeasured" charges. The committee was told that such a 
Change would not be practicable for the year in question, but could be 
reviewed for future years (notes of meeting, 1 June 1987), This brings 
into question the extent to which the process of involving the 
committees really was a genuine exercise in meaningful participation -
a clear example of participation being "too late-, 
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A further example can be given where the effect of the Government 
failing to agree its financial controls for the Authority until much 
later than October, had the effect of completely disrupting and delaying 
the process for the eccs. As a result, the charges for 1989/90 had to be 
considered by all four committees over 
Board meeting to confirm the charges, 
a period of two days, with the 
on the third day. Quite clearly 
"radical" proposals would not be accepted in this situation. This 
problem is of particular concern where the issues of involving the 
nominating bodies, and the wider public (supra.), are concerned. It was 
generally the case that agenda were available a week or so before the 
meeting, thus leaving very little time for commdttee members to in turn 
"consult" others as to the actual VA proposals. It can be seen how 
difficult it is to envisage a successful link between the committees and 
the wider public relating to specific proposals. 
In terms of the ability of the committees to assess the implications of 
the proposals, it is suggested that an important change introduced in 
1988 was for the Authority budget and charges and capital programme 
(i.e. the proposed projects which would be financed from the Authority's 
revenue) to be considered together (as one item), rather than 
separately, as had previously been the case. This allowed members to 
clearly see the way that an extra 
allow an extra tx million to be 
actually see, in the context of 
this would involve. 46 
1 per cent increase in charges would 
spent on capital projects, and to 
the proposed programme, which projects 
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3. The ·Public Awareness Campaign" 
According to the SoS guidelines, the VAs were to be 
Nobliged so far as practicable to consult cces well in 
advance before deciding upon proposals with significant 
implications for their consumersN (DoE, 1983c, para. 9) 
which Yorkshire Vater translated to exclude "cases of urgencyN (YV, 
1984a, para. 5).47 There were three cases, however, where the Authority 
failed to raise a matter with the committees prior to reaching a 
decision. Of the three, the "public awareness campaign" (chapter three) 
will be outlined, because it also provides an example of information 
being refused by the Authority. First, in determining the need for the 
(regional) campaign, the annual Xarket Research surveys were cited as a 
key factor - the COGs (appointed to represent the interests of the 
customers of Yorkshire Water) were not, however, asked their views. When 
the matter was later raised by committee members, the Authority appeared 
to place commercial interests first, in refusing to give the full cost 
of the Campaign. According to a Board member, the information could not 
be provided " as to do so could jeopardise future negotiations with 
the sellers of advertising space".48 
4. Access to Yorkshire Water Board .eetings 
This issue was considered fully in chapter three in terms of the 
requirements of meaningful participation, but it also provides an 
interesting illustration of the work of the committees, in particular in 
the way that the issue was repeatedly raised, communicated to the Board, 
reported-back, but with the Authority, on each occasion, refusing to 
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change its policy or adopt any of the alternatives proffered to it.49 It 
was explained in chapter one that political will required that the 
decision-maker be "open to influence". The extent to which Yorkshire 
Vater was open to influence at all times, in relation to this matter, is 
inevitably impossible to assess, but the way the process of 
communication took place can be seen, and importantly, those who 
requested the change (to any of the alternatives) did not always have 
unanimous support - a number of motions were, in fact, defeated. Again 
it is unclear the extent to which members were speaking for "their own 
interests", There was only one occasion - the presentation of a petition 
on behalf of the York Campaign for Freedom of Information (2 June 1986), 
where members were clearly acting as communicators. 
5. InfDrm61 Participation 
To complete the analysis, it can also be noted that there were many 
occasions on which matters were dealt with between members of the 
committees and the Authority <Board or officers) outside the committee 
fora. These can be placed in two categories - first those relating to 
Mpolicy" issues, which, for instance, were raised at a meeting, but a 
member was provided with more detailed information following the 
meeting; second, those where a committee member acted on behalf of a 
member of the public in dealing with an individual problem or grievance. 
The latter were not the intended role for the committees, 60 but it was 
clear that many members did act in this way, and it can be seen as an 
important benefit, both because effective grievance remedying is 
important per se, and because it was likely to increase the public's 
awareness of the cces, and hence the likelihood that the public would 
use the committees for participation in policy-making as well. 
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II. THE REGIONAL RECREATIOI AID COISERViTIOI OOXKITTEE 
Section 7 of the Water Act 1983 also required the WAs to make 
arrangements for receiving advice as to the functions of recreation and 
conservation. This was achieved by setting up regional recreation and 
conservation committees (one per authority) again in accordance with 
guidelines drawn up by the SoS - on a very similar basis to the CCCs.Sl 
For this reason the Yorkshire Vater comDdttee will be assessed only to 
the extent that it differed from the CCCs, either in structure or 
practice. All the differences considered, arise from the terms of 
reference of, and the interests represented on, the committee - both 
being a reflection of the specific functions with which the committee 
was concerned. 
A. The Structure of the CoDmdttee 
The terms of reference were (inter alia) as follows: 
M(a) To consider any matter affecting the interests of the 
public, and the ways in which the Authority endeavours to 
reconcile and serve those interests, in relation to the 
functions of the Authority under sections 20 and 22 of the 
Vater Act 1973, as amended by the Wildlife and Countryside 
Act 1981, viz.: Water and land based sports and other 
recreations ... Conservation and amenity .... 
(b) To foster mutual understanding between the public and 
the Authority. 
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(c) To consider any such matter which is raised with the 
RRCC by an organisation or by a member of the committee, or 
of the public. 
(e) To consider and report to 
on any matter which may be 
Authority" (YW, 1984a). 
the Chairman of the Authority 
referred to the RRCC by the 
thus indicating the narrower range that the committee was concerned 
with; again, as with the cces, it would seem that in practice this did 
not pose a problem for the RRCC.62 
A more significant distinction was the interests, in the form of 
particular organisations, which were reserved the right to nominate 
members to the commdttee. This raises the 
facilities for "specialist interests· rather 
The SoS Guidelines for the committee stated 
issue of the provision of 
than the general public. 
that the interests of both 
"organised and ... casual users" would be taken into account (DoE, 
1983c, para. 13), which was reflected in the case of the Yorkshire Water 
committee in the form of granting places to both the statutory and 
voluntary organisations as well as local authorities (see Figure 4.2, 
Appendix B). Places were not, however, reserved for members of the 
public per 5e. This highlights the question of whether it was possible 
for the general public to communicate with the Authority on matters 
relating to conservation and recreation, on an equal basis to those 
members of the public who were represented through being members of 
organisations which were represented on the RRCC - a condition, it is 
contended, necessary for meaningful 
noted that the wider remit of the 
public participation. 
cces entitled them 
It can be 
to consider 
recreation and conservation matters, but it was likely that such matters 
would be considered in more detail by the RRCC, and potentially, the 
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latter would have been seen as more a th it ti u or a ve by the VA. It can be 
argued, therefore, that there was a danger that such arrangements hinted 
at granting privileged access to those represented on the RRCC, at the 
expense of the wider public. The key to avoiding such privileged access, 
therefore, lay in the members of the RRCC being prepared to act as 
communica·tors on behalf of the public in the way suggested earlier for 
members of the cces. This again raises the question of the different 
roles of the members of the committees, and the effectiveness of the 
link with the public, as well as the nominating organisations. 53 It will 
also be suggested that it was important that the different comndttees 
were kept informed of what each other was considering, so that there 
could be "interaction" - in other words, so that a decision was not 
reached by the Authority after involving the RRCC, where the CCCs might 
have legitimately made, or wanted to make, an input, had they known the 
matter was being discussed. This point is particularly important where 
specific organisations had representation on more than one committee.SA 
Again, regarding specialist interests, the nature of existing 
relationships (in 1983/4) between the VAs and different organisations 
must be addressed. In other words, where an organisation considered that 
it already had "good relations" with the WA, and existing fora through 
which to communicate on policy matters, consideration of the effect of 
the new structures, and the introduction of other -interests· to the 
decision process must be considered. Hence, t~ political will of all 
parties is important, and, that the specified arrangements such as the 
RRCC should have been the main fora for communication, so that all 
organisations had an equal opportunity to communicate. 56 The range of 
relations with specific groupings of the VA before 1983, has already 
been indicated, but equally, it is important to note that the VA, from 
1983, continued to include (two) members appointed in respect of 
specific functions of the Authority, viz.: land drainage and fisheries 
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the appointments being made by the Minister of AFF. This is 
interesting because it suggests a duplication of provision for special 
interests; in relation to both of these functions statutory comndttees 
were provided enabling further input to VA policy-making. In the case of 
fisheries, at least, this position seems difficult to justify,66 and it 
would seem that the reality behind the Government's justifications lay 
in the nbattle~ between XAFF and the DoE, and the ability of the former 
to achieve concessions during the enactment of the legislation (both in 
1973, and again in 1983).67 
The background to the RRCC is worthy of note especially as, in the 
original version of the 1983 Bill, there was no such proposal. Under 
what became the Water Act 1973, the then Conservative Government acceded 
to Opposition proposals to create the WASAC, which was argued to be 
necessary to ensure that the WAs took sufficient account of the "third 
dimension" - the use of water for recreational purposes. The main 
function of the WASAC was to advise the Xinister and the WAs in relation 
to such use, with regard to the formulation and implementation of the 
national policy for water under the 1973 Act. Membership included the 
chairmen of the ten WAs. sa Unsurprisingly, the Labour Opposition of 1983 
were unwilling to see the abolition of the WASAC and made numerous 
attempts either to save it, or require the creation of special 
committees in relation to recreation and conservation69 It was at the 
Report Stage in the Commons that the Government presented proposals for 
the creation of the RRCCs (at that stage termed "Regional Water 
Recreation Advisory Comrnrrttees" - Hansard, HC, vol. 35, col. 188; 18 
January 1983).60 
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B. The Practice of the Yorkshire Yater Comodttee 
Having indicated the nature of the RRGG, and the way that it differed in 
structure to the GGCs, the next stage is to consider the practice of the 
Yorkshire Water comrndttee to indicate what could be achieved in 
practice. First, given the similarities with the GGGs, potentially the 
RRGG could achieve all that was possible through the GCes, including 
making available all the channels for communication, subject to the 
above noted limitations in respect of membership, the matters to be 
discussed, and the link with the public. An important point to note is 
the way that members of the committee were able to provide greater 
expertise on matters under consideration than members of the cces, 
thereby, possibly leading to greater benefits through participation, as 
well as requiring less in the way of education of the members of the 
committee. 
Again the range of matters considered by the committee can be 
indicated61 including concern about the structure of the committee 
itself.62 The committee also received standing reports from the 
Authority, including from the Amenity, Fisheries and Recreation Manager, 
and its views were sought on a regular basis on such matters as the 
Authority consultative and corporate plans. Interestingly, however, the 
committee was never consulted on the Authority charges, and it was only 
in 1988 that the comrndttee requested information about the Authority's 
capital works programmes (5 February 1988, minute 10). These pOints are 
surprising given the implications of these matters for the functions of 
conservation and recreation. 63 One of the main functions of the 
committee, in practice, appeared to be to give its views as to the 
Authority's fishing permit charges; the minutes do not, however, suggest 
that the VA proposals were ever deemed Mcontraversial- by the committee 
(see February each year). 
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The main example considered here (chosen for illustrative purposes only) 
relates to a series of proposals by Yorkshire Water to build new water 
treatment works at Morehall, Inbirchworth, Bradfield and Rivelin. The 
"environmental" implications of these proposals caused concern for the 
RRCC, as well as for local amenity groups and residents. The input to 
the decision process, in the case of Korehall can be noted in 
particular, as this appears to be the one that caused the most concern. 
This example is of interest because it showed the way that communication 
could be achieved through the committee, but it also raises the question 
of the potential impact of the members on the decision of the Authority. 
The matter was first aired at the 5 June 1987 meeting, where the member 
for the CPRE presented two papers outlining that organisation's concerns 
about the environmental effects of Yorkshire Water's proposals, and also 
put forward CPRE's own proposals regarding the proposed siting of the 
works, for changes in design of the buildings and the choice of 
materials, and landscaping work. In response, the Southern DGH gave a 
presentation detailing why this, rather than an alternative, site had 
been chosen, the "consultation" that had already been undertaken, and 
the changes that had been made as a consequence of that. Interestingly, 
the committee then resolved to use its power to appoint a sub-committee, 
consisting of the chairman, deputy chairman and six other RRCC members, 
to visit the proposed site and consider the proposals further (minute 
25). It should be noted, however, that this process actually coincided 
with the application for planing permission for the preferred site, 
which, by the time of the next meeting, had been refused. Without 
Yorkshire Water, apparently, further involving the committee, the 
Authority appealed, rather than seeking an alternative site - the latter 
being the preference of some RRCC members (see 2 October 1987 meeting). 
At the meeting in June 1988, members of the committee expressed the view 
that there had been a failure of "consultation", especially as they were 
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informed that, while the original application was to be subject to a 
public inquiry, the Authority had made a revised application relating to 
the same site. The comDdttee also expressed concern that, on this 
occasion, the Southern DGM was not present to answer further questions. 
The committee resolved that a further meeting of the sub-committee be 
held so that the implications of the new proposals could be considered. 
This meeting was held on 5 July 1988, and provided the Authority with an 
opportunity to explain why there had been the apparent "failing" in the 
consultation process, as well as to provide, in the form of a slide 
presentation, further details, including technical, relating to the 
preference for the site, and the way the Authority had taken care to 
minimise the environmental impact. 
The above process indicates the way in which the committee offered the 
possibility for communication in detail regarding the proposals, but 
there appeared to be a failure on the part of the Authority to involve 
the committee in the actual decisions regarding the choice of site and 
related planning applications. 64 The matter was actually resolved 
outside the RRCC/WA forum by the DoE Inspector at the public inquiry in 
, 
September 1988, where the site was rejected and the Authority advised to 
find an alternative - the need for a new treatment works was however 
accepted. (3 February 1989, minute 4(a». 
In the case of the Bradfield and Rivelin works <where Yorkshire Water 
was seeking to replace the existing works, but on the same sites) the 
RRCC did not appear to be the main fora for participation,65 but the 
committee was used to explain the potential choice of sites, and the 
reasons why the Authority had chosen the ones it did. It is, therefore, 
open to question whether the Authority was prepared to be influenced on 
the question of the actual choice of site in each case, although it was 
clearly prepared to explain and justify its reasoning (3 February 1989. 
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minute 5). In contrast, it should be noted that, in the case of the 
Scarborough long sea outfall, it would appear that three options were 
put to the committee before the Authority had adopted one as its 
preferred (7 June 1985, minute 19). 
In conclusion to the RRCC, the way that <potentially) the different 
stages of communication could be achieved between the committee members 
and the Authority can be noted, and the link with the nominating 
organisations could be expected to be stronger. However, there are wider 
questions relating to the link with the public per set Limited evidence 
is available regarding the extent of education of the public about the 
committee, and the above examples have indicated possible question-marks 
about the existence of the necessary political will in the case of the 
Authority being open to influence. It would seem, however, that central 
government control of the Authority was less a concern here, than for 
the CCCs. 
III. THE REGIO.AL FISHERIES ADVISORY COIlITTKK 
To continue the theme of t~ provision of opportunities for 
participation on the part of "specialist interests", the next committee 
to consider is the RFAC, through which communication with the Authority 
was possible in relation, specifically, to the fisheries function of the 
VAs. Again the nature of the Yorkshire Water committee will be outlined, 
including any notable differences with the above committees, and with 
two examples of the committees 
privileged access is central. It 
in practice. Again the question of 
should be noted that the RFAC was a 
statutory requirement, first enacted in the Water Act 1973 <amended by 
the Salmon and Freshwater Fisheries Act 1975),66 and, therefore, long 
before the CCCs were established the VAs were experienced in formal 
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participation with fisheries groups.67 The perceived Mimportance" of 
such interests is, however, reflect d i 
e n the way that, alongside the 
RFAC, fisheries organisations were also i g ven representation on the RRCC 
(supra. ). 
A. The Structure of the Comaittee 
1. Terms of Reference 
These were expressed as follows: 
"To advise the Authority on the manner in which it is to 
discharge its duty to maintain, improve and develop the 
salmon, trout, freshwater and eel fisheries in its area" 
(YV, 1984a). 
2. The Objectives of the ComDdttee 
In assessing the approach of the Authority to the RFAC, it is worth 
noting what Yorkshire Water itself, as indicated by the Deputy Chairman, 
(and chairman of the RFAC) , considered to be the objectives of the 
committee. In 1983, following the re-organisation of the Yorkshire Water 
Board, the Deputy Chairman stated that the Minister of AFF, had briefed 
him to the extent that the Minister 
" 
required the Committee to be a manage.ent committee 
managing all the fisheries as a resource" (emphasis added) 
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and, therefore, it was intended that It a management plan- would be 
developed with the assistance of the committee and the nOminating 
organisations (minutes, December 1983). Thus, it would 
RFAC would be asked/allowed to play a very positive 
development, potentially more so than for the CCCs.sa 
seem that the 
role in policy 
3. Interests Represented 
The requirements for membership laid down by s. 18 of the 1973 Act (as 
amended by s. 28(1)(b) of the 1975 Act) were that the RFAC should be a 
committee of " ... persons who appear to [the WA] to be interested in 
••• 11 salmon, trout, freshwater and eel fisheries. As indicated by Figure 
4.3 <Appendix B), in the case of the Yorkshire Water committee, it was 
the main fisheries organisations who were given the right to nominate 
members to the RFAC.s9 
In the case of the RFAC, possibly even more than for the CCCs or RRCC, 
it could be expected that the link between the members and their 
nominating organisations would be stronger. Indeed, in practice, this 
was indicated by the way in which the WAs, including Yorkshire Water, 
and respective fisheries interests, sought to ensure such relationships 
through the setting up of the Fisheries Consultative Associations. In 
the case of Yorkshire Water, seven FCAs were formed in 1974, covering 
geographical areas based on the inland 
Humber, which were the responsibility of 
provided a means for bringing together 
them to the RFAC as the mechanism for 
river systems feeding the River 
Yorkshire Water. The FCAs thus 
local angling clubs and linking 
communication with the VA. As 
such, they also complemented the developed structure of angling 
interests through the Salmon and Trout Association, and the National 
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Federation of Anglers, both nationally and locally, to which many of the 
clubs also belonged. 70 
In terms of ensuring the link between the Authority and the comndttee, 
it can be noted that, not only was the chairman of the committee a Board 
member,71 but three other Yorkshire Vater Board members were also 
appointed to the RFAC, a process also coupled with the practice of the 
minutes being submitted to the Board. 
In terms of the links between the members and the nominating bodies, the 
impression gained from attendance at RFAC meetings is that this process 
was far stronger than in any of the committees already considered. For 
instance, it was often clear by the way members spoke, that they were 
putting forward the views of their organisation. This is further 
supported by attendance at meetings of the East Riding FCA, the South 
Yorkshire Salmon and Trout Association,72 and discussions with members 
of the FCAs and VA officers. However, it must be noted that such 
communication reached only a limited proportion of the total angling 
fraternity, a point which Yorkshire Vater, in particular, readily 
recognised. Many anglers and clubs were not members of the FCA system, 
nor had some of them actually heard of it.73 
The RFAC did not produce an annual report, and its relationship with the 
wider public can be questioned. The Press and public were permitted 
access, but, in respect of the former, there was no advertising of the 
meetings, although agenda and minutes were available (free) from 
Yorkshire Water, provided one knew to request them. Importantly, in the 
case of the Press, invitations to attend the meetings were sent out in a 
similar fashion to Board meetings and the cecs. It was thus, the Press 
Who were to provide the main, albeit limited, link with the wider 
public. The point must be made that it was vital that the wider public 
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were able to communicate with the WA through other mechanisms - if not 
through the RFAC - and their views given equal weight to those expressed 
through the RFAC. The real problem, in the absence of thorough education 
and interaction of the various committees, is how the public would have 
known that items were an the "agenda". 
Interestingly, in the case of the RFAC, there did not appear to be the 
concern expressed aver the structure of the comDdttee in the way that 
had been the case for the cces, except aver the extent of FCA 
representation, but the RFAC was permitted four meetings per year from 
1983 onwards - the importance of this is unclear, but it is interesting, 
in comparison with the way in which the Authority resisted such a 
development for the committees specifically created to represent 
<general) consumer interests. 
B. The Practice of the Yorkshire Yater CoDDdttee 
As indicated above, the RFAC had the potential to enable all the 
channels for communication, the main concerns being the processes of 
communication outside the members and nominating bodies. It may be 
suggested that a key difference from the CGes was that the members of 
the RFAC brought more experience and local knowledge to the comndttee, 
leading to more detailed examination of policy proposals. As with the 
committees already considered, the RFAC received a series of standing 
reports,74 presentations were made by VA officers, visits undertaken, 
and the Authority also sought to improve the information provided at the 
request of the members. There was also a range of items on which the 
views of the committee were sought on a regular basis - most notably 
fishing licence duties (on an annual basis). 
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The Fisheries -Aanage.ent Plan-, This provides an interesting example 
of the practice of the RFAC, because the process of decision taking did 
not appear to run as might be expected, and hence, it is unclear to what 
extent communication was achieved, At the second meeting of the 
committee (following the "take-over" of the new Board) the AFR Manager 
presented a series of headings to the co~ttee for consideration as the 
basis for the possible objectives, and suggestions from the Salmon and 
Trout Association were also tabled (minutes, 27 February 1984). Two 
meetings later, the comments that had been received by the Authority 
were reported to the RFAC, but the next step was the formation of a 
working party,7S consisting of the chairman and other members of the 
committee, charged to produce a set of draft objectives (minutes, 20 
August 1984). Surprisingly, this was not then submitted to the next 
meeting of the committee, but to the Board, and the Corporate Planning 
Panel, and only then to the RFAC (minutes, 26 November 1984). However, 
this did not mark the end of the decision process, with further stages 
of participation at the next two meetings of the RFAC (25 February and 
20 Kay 1985) which included the incorporation of amendments, and between 
those meetings, it would seem that further discussions were held with 
related organisations. The document was finally submitted to the CPP. 
The example again illustrates the way that communication could take 
place with the VA, based on the strong links with the nominating 
organisations, but the extent to which the wider public and other 
committees had the opportunity to make an impact can be questioned. 
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IV. THE WATER QUALITY ADVISORY GROUP 
As already indicated, the WQAG was a "standing" committee of the 
Authority, but in contrast to the other nine WAs, Yorkshire Water 
allowed the Press and public access to the papers and meetings of the 
Group. For this reason it is suggested that it formed an important 
formal mechanism for communication between the Authority and the public, 
at least in relation to the pollution control function. However, it will 
be suggested that not all the channels for communication were possible, 
but the Group provided a means through which, at least education, could 
be provided in a very detailed form, and could, therefore, act as a 
"catalyst" to participation through other mechanisms. Again an holistic 
approach is required. 
A. The Structure of the YQAG 
Because it was a commdttee of the Authority, membership was confined 
solely to members of the VA Board, and, therefore, participation by the 
public in the form of membership was not possible. This also indicates 
that members of the Group were not acting as -representatives· of 
particular organisations; in effect it could be suggested that the idea 
that the VQAG could be a mechanism for meaningful participation was 
coincidental to the concern of the members. Despite the changes in 
internal structure of the Authority and the Board in 1983, no 
significant changes were made to the VQAG. 76 In October 1983 membership 
was seven, but this was reduced to just four in 1987 <YV, 1984a [amended 
1988], Part C, and WQAG minutes, 27 February 1987).77 
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The terms of reference of the VQAG were (inter alia) as follows: 
"To consider, advise, and 
quality relevant to the 
water 
report on 
Authority's 
quality for provide reports on 
Authority both on the performance of 
all aspects of water 
functions and to 
publication by the 
outside bodies (in 
particular those making discharges to rivers ... ) and also on 
the Authority's own performance as water supplier, sewage 
treatment authority and custodian of the rivers, Humber 
Estuary and coastal waters· (YV, 1984a [amended 1988], Part 
C)' 
The main tasks of the Group were further identified as including the 
consideration of standards (discharge consents, EC directives, sampling 
programmes), any "derogations" therefrom, monitoring compliance with 
such standards, and assessing any explanations for non-compliance 
(ibid.). 
This process was fulfilled in practice by the Group receiving quarterly 
standing reports on water quality from each of the divisions on: 
prosecutions taken by the Authority, non-compliance with required 
standards, and, as from 1985, the Group began a detailed consideration 
of each of the main river catchments (one per meeting) including the 
proposed "River Quality Objectives· (chapter five) and the action 
required to meet those objectives (minutes, 2 May 1985), Ad hoc 
presentations and reports were also provided by VA officers, who, in a 
similar manner to the CCGs, attended WQAG meetings to provide fuller 
information and answer questions. Such reports included the consequences 
of the North Sea Ministerial Declaration in 1987, "raw water qualityM, 
and "Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution". The way in which, on a 
number of matters, the VQAG sought more informative reports was also 
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notable. 78 The Group also took a close interest in matters such as the 
development of aquifer and abstraction "protection policiesM developed 
by the Authority, pollution from waters from abandoned mines, and 
pollution from farm waste. 
B. The Practice of the YQAG 
It can be seen from the above discussion, therefore, that the VQAG was 
intended as a "watchdog" mechanism (to use the [YV] Chairman's phrase) 
to monitor the way in which the Authority carried out its pollution 
function, but Yorkshire Vater, unlike the other VAs, intended that this 
monitoring should also occur publicly. 79 The Group was, therefore, seen 
by the Authority as an important part of the decision-making and 
checking process - rather than as 
could be anticipated that the 
a process for legitimation. Thus, it 
Group would be provided with full 
information, and that its communication with the executive part of the 
Authority would be "effective" in terms 
policy-making. In turn this would increase 
mechanism for communication. eo 
of the potential to influence 
the value of the WQAG as a 
From the point of view of communication, the above comments are 
important, as it can be noted that the WQAG essentially offered a 
mechanism through which the public, directly. or indirectly (via the 
press) could receive information from the Authority (either stage I or 
VI). However, in contrast to the above comDdttees, the limitations 
regarding the remaining channels must be noted. There were no means 
through which the public could give information, or request more detail 
- this had to be achieved through other mechanisms, formal (such as the 
ceCs) or informal - hence the need for an holistic approach. s1 It is, 
however, suggested that the WQAG was of particular importance in terms 
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of education - in providing information about the functions of the 
Authority, and the types of decisions with which the Authority was 
involved. 82 
Given the above limitations, 
it is suggested that public 
unlike the commdttees already considered, 
attendance was far more important 
especially as a Mrepresentative" could not be relied on for the process 
of communication. 83 The difficulties of this were considerable, however. 
First, in terms of the practicalities of attendance (cost, time-off work 
for those working), including the fact that meetings were normally held 
at the Yorkshire Water headquarters in Leeds,84 but, potentially, the 
biggest problem was the lack of public awareness of the Group. The 
Authority was "required" (according to Public Relations staff) to post a 
notice in the Authority headquarters' reception in advance of each 
meeting, but no advertising was undertaken. It was thus, a case of only 
those who knew could benefit. Interestingly, there did not appear to be 
any notification to members of the other committees of the existence of 
the WQAG. 8 s Attendance at meetings was thus very limited, but not 
actually much less than for any of the other committees. 96 Press 
coverage of the Group was consistent, always in the form of a local news 
agency, but on occasions sparking greater interest, especially when 
matters such as sewage works' performance was on the agenda. 87 
In conclusion, the extent to which the Group was able to fulfil its 
potential as a "catalyst" can be questioned. It seems unfortunate that 
Yorkshire Water did not do more to promote it, especially in terms of 
public awareness, and hence, fully realise the value of the Group as a 
vital part of the whole range of opportunities for public participation. 
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V. COIeLUSIONS 
In conclusion to the chapter, it is possible to attempt an overall 
comparison between the full range of commdttees and the process of Board 
meetings, in contrast to the pre 1983 arrangements. Before doing this, 
it has already been indicated that the actual "interaction" between the 
different committees is considered to be important for ensuring that 
public participation, rather than privileged access to decision-making, 
was possible. In other words, that because particular functions or 
interests were served by specific committees, it was likely that a 
different range of matters would be 
and, potentially, they would have 
considered by them, in more detail, 
been 
Authority. There was, therefore, the need 
given more weight by the 
for the wider public to have 
known that such matters were under discussion within these fora and to 
have been able to comnrunicate about them. ae 
Conmdttee Interaction. Overall, it is suggested that the extent of 
committee interaction was very limited; such that it would seem doubtful 
that it was a matter that had been considered by Yorkshire Water or many 
members of the various committees. as It may be argued that this was a 
significant limitation towards meaningful participation being achieved 
in practice. Two types, of what would appear to have been ad hoc 
interaction, can be reviewed. First, those cases where more than one 
committee was informed of, or allowed to participate in respect of a 
matter; second, those where a committee asked to be informed about the 
discussions of other committees. 
In the case of the CCCS, the final (SoS) guidelines required that there 
be "suitable- arrangements for liaison between the CCCs and the RRCC 
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(DoE, 1983c, para. 24) but apart from the meetings between the five 
chairman and the Chairman of Yorkshire Water, and the regional seminars, 
there seems to have been only limited response to this. However, as 
previously noted, the Central Division CCC did request a standing report 
at each meeting of the matters considered by the RRCC - the same 
approach was not taken in respect of the other divisional committees, or 
in respect of the RFAC or WQAG. In the case of the RRCC, there did 
appear to be dual consideration (with the RFAC) of fishing licence 
charges, and there are also examples of ad hoc consideration of matters, 
such as the poisoning of swans by lead (7 June 1985 onwards). There was 
also a notable degree of interaction between the WQAG and the other 
committees, but again only on an ad hoc basis. For instance, the 
water quality problems" was to be presentation on "bacterialogical 
presented to the CCGs as a means of 
public (minutes, July 1988). The 
relation to River Quality Objectives 
passing on the information to the 
reports received by the WQAG in 
"for information" (chapter five), 
another comDdttee an opportunity to 
were 
and a 
make 
also passed on to the RFAC 
rare case of actually giving 
an input to policy-making was 
the proposed "abstractions" policy submitted to the RFAC, with comments 
received taken into account at the next meeting of the WQAG (minutes, 7 
February, 1985). The standing reports on prosecutions, received by the 
WQAG, were also passed onto the RFAC (February 1988). 
It is, therefore, submitted that where there are to be a range of 
committees, as in the example analysed here, their potential, as 
mechanisms for public participation, needs to be recognised along with 
the importance of each committee being aware of the other committees and 
their work, especially where some of the committees provide apparently 
"better" access for some groups at the expense of others or the wider 
public. 
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Kean1ngful Participation and tbe Board of Yorkshire Yater. It has been 
argued that the opportunities for public participation in relation to 
the WAs as corporate entities needs to be assessed as a whole - that 
provided meaningful participation was possible through a combination of 
opportunities, the individual opportunities per se, were less 
significant. For this reason no specific view was taken of the refusal 
of Yorkshire Water to admit the Press and public to its meetings after 
1983. Having completed the comparison of the individual facilities for 
communication with the Board, it is now 
overall conclusions regarding the ability 
meaningfully with the Board. 
possible to attempt to draw 
of the public to participate 
In comparison with the alternatives of access to Board meetings, it is 
suggested that the system of committees was a significant development in 
providing a forum which included members of the public per se, and 
through which detailed two-way communication with the Authority could 
take place, in a way not possible through access to Board meetings. 
However, the point must be made that the latter offered the benefit of 
the provision of "undiluted" information. so It can, therefore, plausibly 
be argued that the options did not have to be seen in an either/or 
context - a stronger system might have been developed by providing 
access concurrent with the CCCs. Certainly the arguments presented by 
the Government during the enactment of the 1983 Bill in favour of 
closure, were not convincing; closure was essentially a further 
demonstration of the Government's ruling ethos, imposed on the WAs - and 
welcomed by appropriately appointed VA chairmen. 
The question of the options available for the Press must also, it is 
argued, be seen from what will enable meaningful public participation. 
Any answer Is likely to be shaped by personal views of the role of the 
Press, and the need for political will on the part of the Press. It 
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would seem that, in the case of the Press, there is little to suggest 
that both options (access to meetings and Press conferences) could not 
have been considered more closely. However, if a choice is required 
(from the assessment in chapter three) there seems to have been little 
available to the Press through the conferences, that (given the 
necessary political will) could not have been achieved by obtaining 
agenda, and attending meetings. The latter would, therefore, have 
allowed the Press to determine for itself the matters deemed appropriate 
to report. 
The central concern revealed by this study, however, is that, 
irrespective of the different arguments relating to access to meetings 
instead (or as well as) the CCCs, the problem lies with the CCCs not 
having fulfilled their potential, primarily because of the limitations 
in communication between the committee members and the public. Clearly, 
also, far greater education about the committees was needed. The point 
must also be re-iterated, that the committees were required to operate 
within the framework laid down for the WA - the business principles 
ethos being the overriding priority - as indicated, it is submitted, by 
the way that Yorkshire Water seemed reluctant to allow the CCCs 
independence. 
It is submitted, therefore, that in devising any mechanism for public 
participation, the kind of problems identified here must be addressed, 
and solutions sought. Chapters three and four also demonstrate that no 
mechanism can successfully operate without the necessary political will 
on the part of all involved - from government to the committee members; 
and the need for greater public awareness of the opportunities and how 
to make use of them. 
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IOTES: 
1 Kinnersley (1988, p. 113) has used the phrase "token balance". 
2 Two sets of guidelines were issued before the final set on 19 October 
1983, which was laid before Parliament. For concern over their use, 
see for instance, Hansard, HL, vol. 441, col. 103 et seq.; 12 April 
1983. The Government stated that the WAs would be allowed Mmaximum 
discretion to ... take into account 
1983b, para. 7). 
local circumstances (DoE, 
3 1988, pp. 113-4, and see his comparison with experiences in the USA 
<p. 115). 
<II Note the objections of Kent County Council, reported by Saunders, 
1984, p. 13. 
S It should be noted, as indicated by Figure 4.1 (Appendix B), that for 
organisations, such as the local authorities, CBI, NFU, specific 
places were "reserved" for them. 
6 In 1974 Wessex created three divisional "local water advisory 
committees" including representation from the district councils, the 
CLA, IFU and csr (pers. comm., Wessex Water). Thames created six 
"divisional advisory panels", in 1982 (pers. comm., Thames Water). 
7 Annual Report 1976, p. 42, and see the minutes of the Authority 
meeting (21 July 1976) and PRC meeting (6 October 1976). 
e Five such committees were created, meeting initially twice, and then 
once, each year, and giving the local authorities in particular, an 
opportunity to comment on water charges before being set by the Board 
<Annual Reports 1975, section 11, and 1979, p. 35). 
9 It had been made clear in Parliament that there would be matters 
which, according to Lord Skelmersdale, would be "too sensitive" for 
the cces to consider (Hansard, HL, vol. 441, col. 239j 13 April 
1983). These were defined by Yorkshire Water to include matters 
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relating to "industrial relations negotiations·, transactions 
involving the VA and a customer, and security (YV, 1984a, para. 3). 
In practice this did not appear to be a limitation. It should also be 
noted that the committees were given only an oversight role in 
relation to complaints; this, it is submitted, was an advantage. 
10 Similarly Prosser has recorded the extent of government interference 
in relation nationalised industry price setting (1986, p. 163 et 
seq.) including that the role of the consumer councils was limited to 
"malti ng a fuss" (p. 173). 
11 See for instance, the minutes of the Southern Division Committee, 
first meeting, July 1984. 
12 Consideration of this issue must, however, be balanced by reference 
to the seminars which were provided regionally for the committee 
members (at least one per year). 
13 A matter also considered by the IXC, Cmnd. 9392, 1984, para. 5.47. 
14 As will be explained below, (as advised by the DoE) the arrangements 
provided for a member of each VA Board to serve on each divisional 
committee, either as chairman, but more usually as deputy chairman. 
Because the Board member had voting powers, this could have provided 
a further internal constraint, where his vote was crucial when as 
chairman (or acting chairman) in the form of the casting vote. The 
example of the vote of no confidence in the Chairman (chapter three) 
illustrates the way Board members could not (always) be expected to 
vote against the Authority, but in practice it did not appear that 
Board members were seeking to "impose their will" on the committees. 
There appear to have been no cases where the vote of confidence was 
decisive, but it is submitted that, as a matter of the independence 
of the commdttees, it was inappropriate that the Board members were 
entitled to vote. 
1& See the letter of Councillor Jack, The Times, 30 August 1986. 
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16 Kinnersley is more damning of the combined efforts of the ten WAs, 
thus: "The WAs set about blocking [ the national forum] in every way 
they could with allegations of empire-building against the 
promoters ... N (1988, p. 115). 
17 Hansard, RL, vol. 440, col. 202; 8 March 1983; clf the arrangements 
for the NRA commdttee discussed in chapter eight. 
18 The committee was far from pleased when the chairman was "retired" 
from the Board of Yorkshire Water, (see Western Division, Annual 
Report, 1986/7, para. 2.4>. 
19 This was the case regarding "access to meetings", noted below. 
:20 The DoE stated in its final set of guidelines that "Every effort 
should be made to ensure that the members appointed are in close 
communication with those whose interests they represent and the water 
authori ty ... at the appropriate level" (DoE, 1983c, para. 2; 
emphasis added>. 
:21 An approach influenced by the Wessex commdttees set up in 1974 (DoE, 
1983c, para. 15). Meetings were also attended by a range of WA 
officers, relating to the specific matters under consideration, thus 
enabling more detailed information to be provided on "operational" 
matters. 
:2:2 See below, regarding contact with the chairmen of the committees. 
23 It should be noted, however, that the <whole) Board received the 
minutes of the comndttee meetings, and in return, committee members 
received copies of the "list of items" of matters discussed at the 
Board meetings, and the Authority news releases. 
24 Yorkshire Vater's reluctance to increase the number having already 
been noted. 
26 In the case of water charges, this had to occur informally outside 
the meeting fora, because, having been considered by the committees 
in February, by the time of the next meetings, the new charges would 
have been operational. 
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26 I.e. members of the public per se. 
27 It would appear that they were stronger in the case of organisations, 
rather than the local authorities, but this is purely 
impressionistic. 
28 It was, however, by the Welsh Affairs ComDdttee in relation to the 
proposals for the Welsh committees in 1981/2. The Comnrlttee stated 
that it could not comment on the appropriate extent of local 
authority representation until the roles of the members had been 
defined (HC 335, 1981/2, paras. 14-17). The Government appeared, 
however, to "gloss" over this (He 499, 1981/2, para. 3(a». 
29 This would seem to be suggested by the label "to represent the 
interests of the public generally" and the way in which Yorkshire 
Water sought to create a balance between people from different social 
circumstances - such as high and low rateable value properties. The 
Authority also stated that it expected members " ... to have regard to 
the needs and wishes of the users of water services in Yorkshire 
Water as a whole" (YW, 1984a, para. 5.2). 
30 The actual nature of these members, indicates that some had been 
nominated by particular organisations - such as the Womens' Institute 
- and could be expected to fall into the above categories, to some 
extent. Others could be seen to be from backgrounds where they would 
have day to day contact with the public - such as the Hull Council 
for Voluntary Service - thus making it easier to act on behalf of the 
public. 
31 Discussions with members seemed to suggest that they did a great deal 
in relation to individual problems - thus as grievance remediers. 
32 21 per cent in 1986 (YW, 1986a, p. 3). Meetings were also advertised 
through the local Press. 
33 Figures for attendance are provided in the annual reports of the 
committees, but the reasons for non-attendance were regarded as 
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"confidential" as between the members and the VA, a process not 
promoting personal "accountability". 
34 It can be noted that the Secretary to the Commdttees, a VA officer, 
was provided with a direct telephone line, which was publicised as 
above. 
35 Although the right to attend is; clf the arrangements for the RRAC 
considered in chapter eight. 
36 The commitment on the part of members of the public must also be 
noted, in terms of time and cost; expenses were paid to members only. 
Public awareness must also be seen as a major problem. 
37 By way of introduction, an indication of the range of matters 
considered by the comndttees can be given. These included issues 
relating to methods for paying water bills, flouridation, 
arrangements in case of nuclear attack, nitrate pollution and water 
metering. 
38 It can also be noted that the agenda was always a detailed document 
which provided reports on other matters included on the agenda. 
39 Under the terms of reference, the committees were enjoined only to 
deal with individual complaints at meetings where these were deemed 
not to have been dealt with adequately by the Authority; but the 
committees were also required to monitor the" volume and content 
of complaints generally" <YV, 1984a, para. 3). 
40 The main problem was that the system for recording "contacts" with 
the public could not distinguish between a "query" and an actual 
"complaintll, nor could it distinguish between whether 100 calls 
related to the same incident <e.g. a burst main) or 100 different 
incidents. 
41 See minutes of the October 1984 meetings for initial discussions, and 
then October 1988, and June 1989 for the improvements introduced. 
Other improvements were made in the meantime at the request of 
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members, such as dividing queries received according to local 
authority areas. 
42 The Central Division Committee also requested the introduction of a 
standing report on matters discussed by the RRCC, but interestingly, 
a similar report did not appear to have been requested, or offered, 
by the other comndttees. 
43 It can be noted that in some cases, where information was requested 
by members, this was provided outside the meeting forum where only 
one or two members wanted it. 
44 Thus, the DGX would always seek to attend. The benefit of this could 
be seen in the ability to get a "straight answer", unavailable 
through other mechanisms. A (personal) request for information via a 
member of the North and East Division Committee, relating to the 
Government's proposals for "time limited consents" for sewage works 
discharges (chapter six) led to a very detailed report from the DGM 
(notes of meeting, 6 February 1989). There appear to be only two 
examples of where information was actually refused by the Authority 
having been requested by the committee the first in relation to 
"access to meetings" and the second, relating to the full cost of the 
"public awareness campaign"; both of these are discussed more fully 
below. 
45 In particular, it was not open to the committees to suggest that more 
spending should be financed by borrowing, although this was 
repeatedly attempted; in practice the CCCs could only propose 
different levels of increase above the minimum created by the 
combination of government controls. It might be suggested that in 
practice members tended to become "distracted" by their indignation 
at government controls, thus giving less thought to the extent of the 
decision they could potentially influence. 
46 Interestingly in 1988, against the background of public concern about 
the environment, and the perceived need for improvements to VA sewage 
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works, the North and East Division Co~~~ttee d  propose an increase 
higher than that proposed by Yorkshire Water (notes of meeting, 18 
January 1988) . 
• 7 For Parliamentary attempts to include a statutory duty to consult 
"early" with the committees, see (H.""ns"'rd HL 1 441 1 2 
.... ..., ,vo . ,co s. 31-
40; 13 April 1983) - Lord Hemingford's amendment being defeated by 
five votes in Commdttee. 
48 Quoted from the Central Division Committee minutes, 13 June 1989. In 
contrast, the reasons given by the Deputy Chairman (of YV) were that 
the full costs could not be calculated until the Campaign had been 
concluded (pers. comm.). In the case of the sale of customers' names 
and addresses to commercial enterprises "listbroking" the 
Authority agreed to suspend the practice until each customer had been 
given the opportunity to "opt out". However, it is unclear whether 
the concern of the committees, or that of the Data Protection 
Registrar, was more influential in 
Listbroking, News Release, 10 June 1988, 
Board to suspend). The third case was 
leaflets - especially those advertising 
this. (See YV, Review of 
giving the decision of the 
that of the inclusion of 
personal loans - with water 
bills. When raised (ex post facto) by the committees, the Authority 
agreed to halt the inclusion of advertisements for loans (North and 
East Division Committee, minutes, 1 June 1987, and 5 October 1987) . 
• 9 These included the provision of the Board's "management papers 
(Central Division Annual Report, 1984/5, para. 5), the agenda and 
minutes of the Board meetings (subject to matters outside the remit 
of the CCCs being excluded; North and East Division, 21 January 
1985), and for the chairmen of the CCCs to be able to attend Board 
meetings as observers (Central Division, 15 January 1985). The main 
arguments of the Board against the proposals were that arrangements 
through the CCCs, including having Board members on those committees, 
were adequate to ensure communic~tion between them. 
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60 And were clearly outside their jurisdiction as far as the meeting 
fora was concerned. 
61 Including the appointment of a Board member as deputy chairman of the 
committee. 
62 Although it will be noted below, that the comndttee did not discuss 
the proposed charges or capital programme of the Authority. 
63 And note that local government representation was far smaller on the 
RRCC than the CCGs. 
64 This is a point that will be developed further in the chapter 
(including in relation to fisheries). 
6& Saunders speculated on the implications of the RRCC in respect of the 
Nature Conservancy Council, given, what he termed, the "quasi-
corporatist- relationship of the latter with the WAs (1984, pp. 15-
6) . 
&6 It is possibly more justifiable in the case of land drainage, given 
the extraordinary nature of the arrangements for it, whereby the WAs 
merely had a supervisory function, and the committee in question -
the Regional Land Drainage Committee was an executive commdttee, 
which in turn filtered down to the Internal Drainage Boards. 
&7 The appointment of members related to specific functions was the spur 
to a range of attempts to follow suit in respect of, for instance, 
conservation and recreation, including, by Lord Xelchett, to have at 
least one member appointed with capacity in recreation, and one re 
landscape or wildlife conservation (Hansard, HL. vol. 439, cols. 
878-81; 24 February 1983). Such an attempt was also a reflection of 
concern over the proposed abolition of the Vater Space Amenity 
Commission (VASAC) noted post. The main response of the Government 
was, first. that members were appointed to take a broad view of the 
work of the Authority. having been appointed for their abilities to 
run multi-million pound organisations (Hansard. Standing Committee B, 
col. 94; 30 November 1982) and second, that it was difficult to 
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decide where to "draw the line", per Lord Bellwin (Hansard, HL, vol. 
439, cols. 883-4; 24 February 1983), but the latter also argued that 
there was no need for special members. b ti 
' ecause conserva on and 
recreation were statutory functions and hence, the WAs would have to 
take them into account! (ibid, col. 888). 
58 Further, Okun, 1977, pp. 177-8 and Dangerfield, 1979, p. 50. 
59 See for instance, Denis Howell (Hansard, HC, vol. 35, cols. 196 et 
seq.; 18 January 1983), Lord Kelchett (Hansard, BL, vol. 441, col. 
265; 13 April 1983). 
60 Most of the WAs followed the recommendations of the Ogden committee 
(DoE, 1973), in 1974, of creating committees relating to recreation 
and conservation; in Yorkshire Water's case the Amenity, Fisheries 
and Recreation Comndttee, which held its first meeting on 12 March 
1974. 
61 Lead poisoning of swans, disposal of Yorkshire Water land, the 
recreational use of Yorkshire Water land and reservoirs, conservation 
practices, and the European Year of the Environment. 
62 For instance, in relation to the regularity of its meetings, see the 
minutes for July 1984, and June 1987. 
63 In considering the comndttee, note must again be taken of the way the 
functions of the Authority of concern to the committee were arranged 
on a regional (through the Rivers "division"), rather than divisional 
basis. 
64 Consider further the problems caused by the irregularity of the 
meet i ngs. 
65 Public meetings and exhibitions were held in the locality of the 
works. 
66 Quaere as the result of effective bargaining by fisheries interests 
wi th government. 
67 It can be noted that Saunders (1983, 1984) does not include 
consideration of the RFAC in his work. 
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69 Five years later, the same chairman stated "As I see it, [the RFAC 
is] here to keep an eye on the Authority to try and ensure that it 
does its statutory duty of improving and developing our fisheries" 
(YV, 1988c, p. 10). The llmanagement plan" is considered further post. 
69 Again note that both the NFU and the CLA were also given places. 
70 Initially, the FCAs were granted only one place between them on the 
RFAC, but in 1979 they were permitted one place each (Yorkshire Water 
Annual Report 1979, p. 36), but with the internal re-organisation of 
Yorkshire Water in 1983 (chapter three) this was reduced to five to 
coincide with the number of operating divisions (Annual Report 1983, 
p. 18). By Hay 1988 there were the following FCAs - the Ouse, Derwent 
and Esk, East Riding, Don, and the Aire and Calder. The nature of the 
FCAs is suggested by the constitution of the Esk and Derwent 
Association (kindly provided by the Secretary) which specifies that 
memberShip is open to "angling associations, small angling clubs, and 
individual anglers, owners and managers of riparian land, salmon 
netsmen, fish farmers and representatives of the ACA, IFA, STA, 
Institute of Fisheries Management, and the CLA and NFU". The objects 
of the Association being (inter alia): 
"(a) to make suggestions and comments to, and to 
consult with, the VA on fishery matters, and 
to act as a liaison body between the YA and 
fishery interests relating to the WAs' fishery 
dut ies ... 
(c) to offer all possible advice and assistance 
on fishery interests to members or represented 
members of the Association" (emphasis added). 
This constitution WdS further re-inforced by the guidelines drawn up 
for the associations by the VA itself, which included the requirement 
of the as~ocl'ations was to provide lIan that a "maj or function" ~ 
effective representative to serve on the RFAC". A further process of 
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communication was to be ensured, on the basis that the FCA was 
actually required to appoint two members, one of whom was required to 
be prepared to become a member of the regional organisation of the 
BFA, and the other of the STA (YV, 1984a [amended 1988], RFAC 
minutes, 25 November 1985). The power of appointment actually lay 
with the chairman of the RFAC in consultation with the STA and NFA. 
71 As indicated earlier, he was appointed by MAFF partly with this 
function in mind, enabling the link with MAFF as the sponsoring 
government department for fisheries. 
72 See Appendix A. In both cases there was provision for formal 
reporting-back to the members and for discussion of issues raised at 
the RFAC. 
73 Pers. comm., Secretary of the RFAC, and see also the Angling Times 
survey, 2 December 1987, p. 2. The Yorkshire Water magazine, Catch, 
was also considered an important mechanism for reaching those outside 
the groups involved through the RFAC, which often included details of 
the work of the RFAC and thus important in educative terms. 
Distribution was primarily through inclusion in 
Press, such as the Angling Times, although 
the 
the 
main angling 
magazine did 
experience a troubled history (see RFAC minutes 25 February 1985, and 
23 February 1987). 
74 The main one being the report of the Amenity, Fisheries and 
Recreation Officer - which gave details of events relating to the 
fisheries function during the preceding three months - which always 
received detailed scrutiny by the members at the meetings attended 
personally. 
76 Again a process opposed for the CCCs. 
76 The reasons for the change in suffix - from Panel to Group - are not 
known. 
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77 Interestingly, when the chairman of the Group (was) "retired" from 
the Board in 1988, he was invited to continue to chair the Group 
because of his experience. 
78 For instance, details of the actual cost per case to the Authority of 
bringing a water pollution prosecution (5 November 1987), and in 
relation to water pollution incidents (3 February 1984, 31 July 1986 
and 3 November 1988). 
79 Ironically, it was not until 1985 that the public were provided with 
an active role in pollution control decision-making under COPA II 
(chapter two). 
80 Indeed the Chairman of Yorkshire Water indicated that he considered 
the WQAG to be a sub-committee of the Board - thus, it reported 
directly to the Board <pers. comm.). 
81 It can be noted that the members of the Group were always very 
willing to discuss matters further after meetings with those who 
attended, thus enabling some informal communication. 
82 The Group also produced a very detailed annual report. 
83 Although receiving the detailed agenda would be significant 
compensation. 
84 Although, during 1984, meetings were held around the region. 
es But see further under "interaction", below. 
86 In terms of political will on the part of the Authority, it is 
important that the power to exclude the Press and public from 
meetings was only ever used once each year, when the Group considered 
its draft annual report. 
e7 Members and officers always appeared willing to assist, and give 
interviews following the meetings. 
e8 Again it can be noted that organisations which had representation on 
more than one committee were at a possible advantage in having a more 
holistic perspective of the work of the WA. 
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89 For instance, it appears that members of the GGGs were not briefed 
about the other comndttees, unless this occurred at the regional 
seminars. 
90 It was stressed that the availability of the agenda and supporting 
papers was as important as physical attendance. 
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PAR T I I I 
TBR PaLLUTIO. aJ.TROL FUICTIOI 
In Part II the framework within which the WAs operated was outlined by 
looking in detail at one particular WA. It has been argued throughout 
the thesis that the way in which pollution was regulated would be 
affected significantly by such a framework, including the constraints to 
which the WA was subject and the priorities which it laid down, and, 
therefore, that any public participation in relation to pollution 
control specifically, would be subject to the same kind of limitations. 
Thus, it can be suggested that the fact of the WAs being subject to the 
business principles ethos, and intensive financial constraints would be 
the overriding factor within which all participation would take place. 
In this section of the thesis it is intended to look in detail at the 
pollution control function, the types of decisions which were involved 
and the opportunities that were available for public participation, and 
to seek to identify whether something akin to the argued for standard of 
meaningful participation was achieved in practice. This will be 
approached from a wider perspective than just the one WA,1 both because 
developments at a national level were of major significance, but also 
because a number of examples considered relate to other WAs, having not 
Occurred in respect of Yorkshire Water during the period in question. 
- 210 -
The regulation of water pollution was achieved in a number of ways. In 
respect of discharges of trade and sewage effluent, consents from the 
WAs were required, breach of which amounted to a criminal offence. With 
regard to pollutions occurring irregularly, these were controlled by a 
combination of preventative and remedial action, and prosecutions on a 
strict liability basis. The approach of Part III will be to outline the 
structure within which control over, primarily, trade and sewage 
effluent discharges was operated, starting with the concept of Water 
Quality Objectives and Standards, by reference to which consents were 
(notionally> set. Reference will be made to other forms of control as 
appropriate. 
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CHAPTER F I V E 
I~ing Control I 
- Yater Quality Objectives and standards 
During the period under study, discharge consents were set by reference 
to the concept of Nquality objectivesN and "quality standards· which had 
been developed, pragmatically, in Britain during the late 1970s in 
relation to inland waters, and, as will be shown below, were essentially 
a response to pressures from the European Community and a resistance to 
the approach favoured by the other Kember States. This approach involved 
the setting of an objective or target for each stretch of river 
specified in terms of quality classifications - such as -goodN, "fair" 
or "bad" - developed for use in the quinquennial river quality surveys. 
Scientific standards were then devised nationally for particular 
substances, on the basis that if the standards were not exceeded for 
each stretch of water the target (objective) would be achieved. The 
totality of these standards could then be "shared out" between the 
discharges to the stretch of river in question so that the combination 
of discharges did not lead to the quality standard being exceeded. 2 It 
can be seen from this brief introduction that these objectives and 
standards formed the whole basis of the regulatory system (in relation 
to trade and sewage effluent discharges> in shaping the way that all 
subsequent decisions were made. Therefore, in accordance with the 
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argument for a principled approach to public participation, it is 
necessary that meaningful participation was possible in relation to the 
process of setting such objectives and standards f as much as in relation 
to the individual consents - otherwise the latter process will have been 
pre-determined. 3 
This process of setting objectives and standards will therefore be 
explained in detail in this chapter f including the background to their 
development.~ It is important to take account of the way in which, and 
the reasons why. the concept of objectives and standards was developed. 
because it will be seen that its development was clearly a response to 
BC requirements f and was thus, largely a development of "convenience" 
based on technical criteria f suggesting limited scope for public 
participation. It can also be noted that it was not developed on a 
statutory basis, and was developed at a time when the public did not 
have the rights to access to information and participation promised in 
COP! II (because of its non-implementation). 
I. THB -FORIALISATIOr OF THE WATER QUALITY OBJRCTIYK APPROACH 
A. Origins of the Approach 
The origins of the approach have actually been the centre of a dispute, 
with successive British Governments claiming that it was a long-standing 
- albeit -informal M - practice. This has been subject to much criticism, 
including the suggestion that the concept was "manufactured" to suit 
British arguments, and it is unclear to what extent the BC was convinced 
by these arguments. The leading critique is that of Haigh (1984) who has 
suggested that the first hint of the WQO approach is to be found in the 
Rivers Pollution Prevention Act 1876, that it had first been understood 
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by the famous Royal ComDdssion on Sewage Di 1 (Ei hth) sposa g Report in 
1912. and existed in a very vague form since the H bd R o ay eport in 1949. 5 
However, as he indicates, it was far from being an established practice 
for a number of reasons, including that the Jeger Report in 1970 (MHLG, 
1970) proposed such an approach, and, that the approach was not put on 
statutory footing when the clearest opportunity arose (the enactment of 
COP! II in 1974). EO The final point which, it is submitted, shows 
conclusively the vagueness of the WQO practice, is the way in which it 
was actually "formalised" under the auspices of the Rational Water 
Council in the late 1970s, as explained post. 
B. Reasons for - FOrlll8.1isation-
The rationale for British claims that the WQO approach was long-
standing, and for its formalisation, was the problem posed by BC 
legislation, in the form of a series of Directives on the aquatic 
environment, which threatened to impose a different approach - termed 
either "uniform emission standards" (hereafter UES) or "limit values".7 
This was the approach whereby the scientific standard for each substance 
was applied to each discharge irrespective of the location of that 
discharge and the capabilities of the receiving water, as opposed to 
sharing out the capacity of the receiving water under the British 
approach; the effect of the latter being that different discharges could 
be subject to different standards for the same substances. This 
"conflict" came to a head during the enactment of the so-called 
"Dangerous Substances Directive" (76/464/EC)9 where the British 
Government made it clear that it could not accept the UES approach as it 
ran counter to "established" (sic.) British pollution control practice. 
The Government also argued that the UES approach would deny the benefits 
of the greater capacity of British rivers (in contrast to, for instance, 
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the Mediterranean which, being shallow, had no such capacity).9 In 
contrast, other Kember States argued that one of the aims of the 
Directive was to achieve equality of competition, and they were 
suspicious that the UK would be subject to Mlighter- controls through 
the WQO approach. 10 FarqUhar (1983, p. 1(8) has argued that one of the 
main problems in enacting the Directive was that of -nationalism- and in 
particular, it can be argued that at the heart of this -fearN, was the 
likely cost implications of a standardised form of control. 11 
The result of the British claims was the realisation that, in fact, the 
WQO approach had been used in no more than the most informal way, and 
that it needed to be formalised as quickly as possible to convince the 
EC that it was an approach which could protect the environment as 
effectively as the UES, and therefore merited adoption in Directive 
76/464/EC. To cite Haigh: 
-Certainly the dates fit the hypothesis that water 
authorities were encouraged by central government to adopt 
explicit quality objectives in order to comply with 
Community legislation and in order for there to be 
consistency with the British Government's posture in 
negotiating that legislation, and in particular in resisting 
the limit values of Directive 76/464 M (1984, p. 46).12 
The conflict between the parties took a number of years to resolve, 
although in the Directive itself, a compromise solution - termed the 
Mparallel approachM - was adopted, which allowed Kember States to choose 
to use either the UES or WQO approach, but stricter monitoring 
requirements were applied in respect of the latter. 13 
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The argument that cost was again at the heart of the British arguments 
is important from the point of view of considering possible political 
will towards meaningful participation in the process of setting and 
It may be argued that the reviewing WQOs and-WQSs, as considered below. 
same kind of business principles approach was being demonstrated. where 
the interests of the water <and other industries> was being put before 
any concepts of protecting the environment or the adoption of controls 
agreed through a process of informed public debate and consent. It can 
thus _be questioned to what extent parties involved in the decision-
making processes would be open to influence from anyone other than the 
most "powerful- interest groups. However, the theme will also be 
developed that the formalisation of the WQO process provided an 
important benefit for public participation in terms of creating a system 
that could be understood by the public. 
C. The Process of -Farll8.lisation-
Council 
The Role of the Iational Vater 
Having explained the background to the formalisation of the WQO 
approach, the next stage is to outline the way in which this was 
achieved, and the possible scope for meaningful participation that was 
provided. Given that this process took place a number of years ago, the 
extent to which it is possible to identify the full range of public 
participation is limited, but the 
will be noted. In considering this 
main opportunities that were provided 
process, it is submitted that the 
parties involved, especially the Jational Water Council. were more 
concerned with individual discharges, including the standards applying 
thereto and the lack of compliance of a high percentage of discharges. 
rather than with creating a "rational- system of WQOs. and then 
reviewing all consents based on those WQOs. It is suggested that the NYC 
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wished to review discharge consents and then set objectives to suit the 
consents - the reverse of what the VQO approach was supposed to involve. 
This was also inspired by the "fearM of private prosecutions under the 
(then) soon to be implemented COP! II. It should also be noted that the 
process was only concerned with non-tidal waters; as indicated in 
chapter two, concern with tidal waters developed only as a result of 
(later) pressures from the EC. 
The basis of the process was 
the IVC. The first, issued 
the issuing of two consultation papers by 
in 1977, recommended that the VAs specify 
Minterim- or "permanent" "river quality objectives" for surface waters, 
as the basis for the review of discharge consents (IVC, 1977, para. 2). 
Such RQOs were not, however, concerned with defining the uses to which 
each river would be put and then seeking to protect these uses; instead 
they were concerned only to specify which -river quality classification" 
would be adopted whereby Class 1, defined using chemical criteria, was 
designated as -good" quality, down to Class 4 "bad".l. This is 
important, it is submitted, from the point of view of public 
partiCipation, in that the public were not being offered a full 
opportunity to agree the uses to which each river would be put. A more 
significant criticism of the consultation paper must also be made, as it 
appears that there was limited scope for the public to influence the 
outcome of the "consultation". First, the NWC stated that, initially, 
the existing classification should be designated as, either the 
-permanent- objective, or the "interim" objective but with the option 
for improvement in the longer term <para. 10). Second, it appeared that 
the criteria which would determine the targets would be based on 
available finances, rather than the targets being publicly agreed, with 
the funds, necessary for their attainment, being made available-
business principles once again in evidence. For instance, in reviewing 
the position inherited by the WAs in 1974, the NWC stated 
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•... a number of eXisting consents are not consistent with 
what is currently practicable with eXisting treatment plant 
or with funds available to produce improvement within the 
immediately foreseeable future- (1977, para. 7; emphasis 
added). 1& 
A further criticism is that the public were involved in this process of 
·consultation" at too late a stage, the approach using iQOs, and the 
need for a review of discharge consents (post) having already been 
determined. 
1. The Review of Discharge Consents 
A year later, the NWC published a second paper in which it indicated 
paper, the main difference of that, from the responses to the first 
opinion was as to the speed at which 
(1978, paras. 1-4) - emphasising the 
made, as to which decision should 
improvements should be achieved 
importance of the point, already 
be made first. The Council also 
recognised that the WQO approach had not been used fully as the basis 
for setting consents16 and hence, a review of consents was necessary. 
The process of public participation can be considered at two levels. 
First, nationally in respect of the above consultation papers, and 
second, regionally, both in the responses of the WAs to the above 
papers, but also in the process of the setting of WQOs, and subsequent 
reviewing of discharge consents, by each VA. Each of these stages will 
be considered in turn. 17 
- 218 -
2. Iational ·Consultation- with the Iational Vater Council 
The extent to which participation took place in response to the two NWC 
papers is difficult to assess, although the first paper was distributed 
to a range of groups (including fishing and environmental) who were 
"expected" to be interested (1977, para. 1); but 
the need for the education of the wider public 
again a key issue is 
to know that such a 
process was ongoing. As indicated by the second paper (IWC, 1978) a 
range of groups did respond. In respect of that paper, criticisms can be 
levelled as to the extent to which constraints were being imposed by the 
IYC, thereby limiting the scope for influence. For instance, it appeared 
that the review of consents was . to be seen as a technical exercise in 
achieving "better value for money", while the NYC considered the desire 
for speedier environmental improvements to be a "separate issue" (1978, 
para. 25). This is interesting when compared with the belief of the 
Council that the review would 
" ... provide a sound basis for informed discussion of the 
present quality of rivers and the priorities for their 
improvement" (1978, para. 26), 
and it wished to see the WAs offer participation "subject to the need to 
avoid too much time-consuDdng and burdensome consultation" (ibid., para. 
28; emphasis added in both cases). 
3. Regional • Consul tation- with Yorkshire Vater 
In respect of the first paper, a further opportunity for participation 
was provided, regionally, by Yorkshire Waterl~ prior to submitting its 
own formal response to the NYC. Three types of participation can be 
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identified, viz. (1) the provision of copies of the NWC document to 
selected parties, and to others on request, with the promise to take 
responses into account (Yorkshire Water, Annual Report 1977, p. 43); (2) 
participation through the Authority's "consultative comDdttees- (as 
discussed in chapter three), involving bodies such as the CBl, NFU and 
the local authorities, and fisheries interests through the RFAC; 19 (3) 
participation via the WA's Board meetings and comDdttees through public 
attendance and Press coverage. 20 It should also be noted that, at the 
time, the WA was comprised of a majority of local authority members who 
were thus (theoretically) "consumer representatives".21 
The final decision regarding the Yorkshire Water response, appears to 
have been taken at the meeting of 
6 April 1977. 22 Two cOmDents can 
the Policy and Resources Commdttee on 
be made about the Yorkshire Water 
process. First, it would seem that the Authority adopted a similar 
outlook to the lYe, that improvements in river quality could be achieved 
only Nas and when finance allows· (WQAP, 10 Karch 1977).23 Second, the 
responses received by the Authority mirrored 
"spli tN received nationally, regarding the 
improvements. The only change from 
replacement of the terms "interim" and 
significantly those 
over the timing of 
the paper proposed was the 
"permanent" with "short" and 
"long" term, a change which, again was mirrored nationally, and agreed 
to by the IWC. 
Public participation did, therefore, clearly, take place, but questions 
must be asked regarding the extent to which the decision-makers were 
willing to be influenced, especially over the central issue of whether 
WQOs were to determine finances or vice versa. It would seem that the 
latter was clearly the case. 
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I I • THE SBTT I IG OF YQOs BY YORKSHI RE VATER 
Having explained the background to, and rationale of, the process of 
formalisation of WQOs, and outlined the potential extent of 
participation in that process, the next stage is concerned with the 
actual setting of the WQOs at regional level - again for purposes of 
detail, Yorkshire Water has been chosen as the basis for this study. 
Initially, the setting of WQOs for non-tidal waters will be outlined, a 
process undertaken in the late 1970s, and then the setting of WQOs for 
tidal waters - it will be seen that there was a considerable time delay 
between the two. The first step, in each case, will be to briefly 
explain the -technical- constraints which had to be taken into account 
in the decision process, before outlining the decision-making process 
and the extent, as far as it can be judged, of participation. 
A. YQOs for Ion-Tidal Vaters 
1. Constrai uts - The Technical Process 
These can be divided into those which were outside (external), and those 
within, Yorkshire Water's control (lnternal). 
8. EXternal Constraints 
Clearly the two main constraints are as outlined in respect of the WA as 
a whole (chapter three). First, the statutory duties of the WA, 
involving balancing the requirements relating to sewage disposal and 
water supply, and taking account of the duty <placed on the SoS for the 
Environment by the Water Act 1973) to maintain and restore the quality 
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of rivers. 24 Second. Government financial controls were likely to have 
been particularly important given the needs for public expenditure cuts. 
thereby limiting the extent of investment possible by each WA. It can 
clearly be seen that any development of WQOs would. as a matter of fact, 
be determined within the framework of what finance the Government would 
allow. 26 
A further significant problem for the WAs, especially when seen in the 
context of the above constraints. relates to the actual condition of the 
rivers and sewage disposal/pollution control assets at the time the WAs 
were created. A WA with assets in poor condition would require far 
greater finances to achieve significant improvements. Unfortunately, the 
position "inherited" by all ten WAs, and some more so than others. was 
extremely severe. Okun (1977, pp. 214-5) has indicated that "each WA had 
its own list of 'horrors'", and it would seem that Yorkshire Water was 
one of the worst affected. 26 
b. Internal Constraints 
Reference has already been made to the priorities developed by Yorkshire 
Water within the constraints imposed externally, including those of the 
pre 1983 Authority. The overriding priority of the latter was the 
protection of the quality of drinking water, but by 1978. the Authority 
was also developing what it called "service objectives" in relation to 
all its functions. The aim here was to identify the defects in each 
area, and the effects of this on the public and the environment, and 
determine the costs of improvements, so that a regional strategy and 
individual priorities could be developed. The significance of this can 
be seen in that. by 1978, the Authority had identified some 300 capital 
projects as being necessary to achieve Minterim objectives· at a cost of 
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t200m, of which about 30 per cent was to be allocated to river quality 
improvements (Annual Report 1978, paras. 3.1.4-9).27 The concept of WQOs 
would clearly have to fit within the already determined priorities of 
the Authority, therefore. 
2. Yorkshire Yater's Proposals 
These were set out by the Authority in a document published in the first 
half of 1978, River Quality Objective~ and included what the document 
termed "general objectives" as well as more detailed objectives for each 
stretch of water.2B Essentially, the former were that the initial aims 
should be to achieve river quality in accordance with Class 2 of the .wc 
classification, so that Yorkshire Water's rivers would be capable of 
supporting a ·viable coarse fish population", but a number of ·minor 
watercourses· <classified by the Authority as Class ·XM) would be 
improved only to a level that would avoid a public nuisance. Those which 
were already Class 1, and used for water supply or as "good amenity and 
fishing rivers·, would be maintained at that level.29 It should be noted 
that the detailed objectives were thus written only in terms of the 
target "Class·, and not in terms of defined uses for each stretch of 
river, unlike the approach developed for tidal waters, post. 30 
Develop.ant of the Proposals. The way in which the proposals were 
developed can be explained with reference to the river classification 
system created by the NWC. The original classification system had been 
developed by the ImLG for the first (national) River Quality Survey in 
1958,31 and then adopted, in modified form, by the fiC. <It was also 
influenced by the (then) recently agreed BC Directive 75/440/BC 
Concerning the Quality Required of Surface Water Intended for the 
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Abstraction of Drinking Water in the Member States. 32 The NVe also 
included chemical criteria based on biochemical oxygen demand, dissolved 
oxygen, ammonia and toxicity, but apart from the presence of absence of 
fish, no biological criteria were included (Lester, 1980, p. 429).33 
Again with regard to a principled approach to public participation, it 
can be pointed out that there seems to have been no scope for public 
involvement in the process of developing the river classification 
criteria. 
In developing their proposals, the WAs were also assisted by the 
information they were required to obtain under s. 24 Water Act 1973, 
essentially to undertake "surveys· of the water resources in their area 
with regard to all their functions, including the state of their rivers, 
and to update this information at least every seven years. 34 In the case 
of Yorkshire Water (at least) the surveys were carried out in the 
context of the annual corporate plans and provided the basis for the 
projections for the next five years. 36 
3. The Decision-Iak1ng Process 
It would appear that responsibility for the production of the Yorkshire 
Water proposals rested initially with the divisions, who then submitted 
to Head Office, for the production of the single document. This in turn 
was submitted to the WQAP, followed by the PRe (Board minutes, 15 March 
19"8 I be th f that in a similar way to the ,). t can seen, ere ore, , 
Authority's response to the lie (supra.), the main mechanisms for public 
participation were through the Authority comDdttee structure (open to 
well as by ki the document available for Press and public), as ma ng 
public response. These will be considered respectively. 
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a. Consideration by the Yorkshire Yater CoDmdttees 
The starting paint for this was in the form of the submission of the 
initial document (produced primarily by the Director of Operations) to 
the WQAP on 15 June 1978. This was explained to, and considered by, the 
Panel. Interestingly, this included the view that it was ·sensible and 
reasonable- to aim for a general 
maintain the existing levels of 
with the -national aim" of a 
target of Class 2, but a proposal to 
quality was rejected as inconsistent 
steady improvement in water quality 
(minutes). The fact that the WQAP was, in this case, the main forum for 
detailed scrutiny of the proposals is indicated by the way in which the 
PRC, and in turn, the Board, "merely- recommended adoption of the 
document as the basis for public participation (5 July 1978 and 19 July 
1978 respectively>, 
One committee which was specifically allowed to participate was the RFAC 
at its meeting in September 1978, where the document was considered at 
length and the proposed policy generally supported. 36 
b. Participation by the ·Public· 
The extent and nature of the participation was also discussed by the 
WQAP at the above meeting, following an from the promise by the PRC that 
the Authority would allow "proper public participation" (6 April 197'1). 
This included agreeing the range of bodies to which copies would be sent 
and responses sought; meetings would be held with any organisations that 
requested it; the report would be sent to any other bodies or 
individuals who asked for it; and comments welcomed from any -interested 
parties" (VQAP, 15 June 1978),37 In arguing for a "principled approach" 
the implications of such a policy are noteworthy. It is contended that 
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it was vital that adequate education was available to those who were to 
receive copies on request so that they would have been able to know that 
the decision process was being undertaken, and that such action on their 
part was necessary to join the process. Otherwise a de facto form of 
privileged access would have resulted. as 
c. Consideration by the Consultative ComDdttees 
The document was also submitted to the Autumn round of meetings of the 
consultative committees involving the local authorities, CBI, Chambers 
of Commerce, and the National Parks, with the intention of determining 
whether 
-the Authority's proposals struck a reasonable balance 
between the views of those who would like to bring all 
Yorkshire's rivers up to the highest quality regardless of 
cost and those who set a greater value on limiting the 
financial burden on ratepayers and industryM <Yorkshire 
Water, Annual Report 1979, p. 35). 
d. Responses and Completion of the Decision Process 
While a comprehensive analysis of the actual extent of public 
participation cannot be attempted because of the absence of sufficient 
empirical information, the nature of the responses received, and the 
existence of any potentially important constraints (re political will) 
can be noted. While an initial indication of responses received was 
given at the WQAP meeting an 15 March 1979, a fuller report was given an 
28 June 1979. 26 responses were recorded, which included concern over 
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individual stretches of water, as well as a promise (by Yorkshire Water) 
to include a section dealing with nature conservation following the 
comments of the Nature Conservancy Council. 39 
In terms of constraints, three important points can be noted. First, in 
response to the concern of North East Derbyshire County Council, in 
relation to the river Whitting, it was explained that the pollution 
problems were the result of waters from abandoned mines which the WAs 
had no legal powers to control (and such powers were repeatedly refused 
by central government). Hence, this can be seen as having important 
implications for the planning process (especially as it applied to more 
than just the one river), but was a matter outside the jurisdiction of 
the WA and hence, the influence of the public (at this level). Second, 
again the issue of available-finance-versus-choice was raised, and again 
shown to be dominant, in that, at the Board meeting on 19 September 1979 
it was stated that the originally planned seven year definition of 
·short term" had had to be revised because of the most recent round of 
public expenditure cuts. This can be seen as an ex post facto (external) 
constraint on the process of public decision-making - the question of 
time-scales being as important as the actual targets. Finally, the 
effect of the later process of reviewing consent conditions in agreeing 
the RQOs can also be questioned. It has already been suggested that 
perhaps greater attention was to be paid to the former (as discussed in 
the next chapter also), and support for this can be found in the 
statements that the discharge consents were to be reviewed and set at 
levels at which they were currently (sic.) achieving because of the need 
for "major capital expenditure" before improvements could be achieved 
(YV, Annual Report 1978, p. 21). This suggests a clear constraint, at 
least, regarding time-scales. 
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Following the receipt of the responses, 
revised document considered by the VQAP 
the Authority on 19 September 1979. 
B. YQOs for Tidal Vaters 
they were incorporated in a 
(28 June 1979) and adopted by 
The above process in relation to VQOs, and the later discharge consent 
review, had no application in respect of tidal waters, partly because of 
the absence of control over such waters, although ironically, the 
process was in part in preparation for the implementation of COPA II 
which was to introduce such control (chapter two). The point can also be 
made that if VQOs had been established British practice in the way 
argued in 1975, this should have enveloped tidal waters as well. As it 
was, the process of setting WQOs for tidal waters was very clearly a 
response to further EC pressures in the form of a number of Council 
Directives which required discharges to tidal waters to be "authorised" 
(consented) by the "competent authority". This was especially presient 
in the case of the Humber Estuary, on the south bank of which, were two 
plants discharging titanium dioxide waste. From 1978 onwards such waste 
became the subject of a series of directives~O which were aimed at its 
eventual elimination. The three VAs responsible for the Humber, and 
especially Anglian Water (responsible for most of the south bank), were 
thus spurred into action to develop WQOs well in advance of the 
remaining VAs.41 A similar approach will be adopted in this section as 
for the setting of WQOs for non-tidal waters, above. 
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1. The Technical Process 
This was largely as for inland 
differences can be noted. First, the 
waters, although two potential 
likelihood was that the inherited 
position of each WA was less severe by the early 1980s, and although 
tidal waters had been subject to limited control (with the exception of 
the Jersey), they were generally in a reasonable condition.42 Second, it 
could be argued tha~ estuaries were likely to be of far greater amenity 
value, and therefore, potentially could pose more constraints, in the 
form of baseline requirements, for the planning process,43 The NWC 
(1977) had recognised the interrelationship between the two sets of 
VQOs, including that for some WAs the volume of discharges was greater 
to tidal waters than to non-tidal, and that priorities for non-tidal 
waters could therefore be affected by those for tidal, which would only 
be worked out in the future. 
2. The Development of the YQOs 
An important contribution towards the concept 
been made in 1972 by the Royal Commdssion, 
of WQOs for estuaries had 
the Third Report of which 
also goes some way to indicating the rather different nature of the 
objectives which were developed, In discussing the extent of 
improvements necessary, the Report suggested there were two criteria 
which needed to be adhered to: 
• (a) the ability to support on the mud bottom the fauna 
essential for sustaining sea fisheries; 
(b) the ability to allow the passage of migratory fish at 
all states of the tide~,44 
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The Comndssion also indicated that monitoring and research were required 
for three main reasons (inter alia) to Mfind practical and economic ways 
of reducing the amount of pollutionM , so that a national and local 
policy could be developed through which it could be ensured that 
·(a) no irreversible damage is being done to life support 
systems, 
(b) marine food is unquestionably safe for human 
consumption, 
(c) waters and beaches are aesthetically acceptable and fit 
for recreational use- (ibid" para. 161). 
The management process at the national level initially involved a joint 
sub-group of two main working parties - the Karine Pollution Monitoring 
lanagement Group (XPXKG) and the Freshwater Xonitoring Group (FXG) - who 
were mandated to consider the appropriateness of the river 
classification system in relation to tidal waters at the same time 
(1977) as the DoE had decided that a new classification system was 
needed for inland waters. In particular the sub-group was asked, inter 
alia, to have regard to the uses to which an estuary might be put - for 
instance, the passage of migratory fish, shell fisheries, wildlife, 
amenities, such as sailing, bathing, appearance and industry (Sayers 
1980, p. 148), The idea that the protection of all Mlegitimate uses· of 
estuaries was the key reason for imposing conditions on discharges, was 
supported by a working group of the NYC which had formerly considered 
the review of consents for inland waters and was also reconvened in 
respect of tidal waters.46 The NVC Working Group did not, however, 
consider the XPKKG/FKG classification proposals workable, and indicated 
that it would be necessary to be able to "quantify· the degree of 
cleanliness needed for particular uses to be protected (ibid. p. 149). 
The approach put forward by the NYC group was first used in the 1980 
- 230 -
River Quality Survey,46 although the Survey also noted the limitations 
of the classification system. 
3. YQOs for the Humber Estuary 
At the regional level, the work of setting WQOs for the Humber was 
initially the responsibility of the Humber Estuary Commdttee (chapter 
three), a technical working party of which carried out the main work in 
association with the DoE and the Water Research Centre.·7 The REC then 
reported to each of the three member WAs, including Yorkshire Water, 
where, in the case of the latter, the proposed objectives were discussed 
and agreed by the WQAG on 20 December 1983 .• 8 A target date of 1995 was 
set for achievement of the objectives.·9 
8. Public Participation in the Humber YQOs 
The only scope for public participation in the setting of the Humber 
WQOs was in the form of the meeting of the WQAG noted above. There was 
no wider participation, in contrast 
for inland waters (above).6o The 
to the approach for the objectives 
reasons behind this were simply the 
need for "speed", given the pressures from 
latter itself being under clear pressure to 
central government, the 
meet HC requirements in 
relation to the Directives already mentioned (CSO, Yorkshire Water, 
pers. comm. ).51 Interestingly, the matter was not put to the RFAC, and 
despite the fact that, by the time of actually finalising the objectives 
the new Board (meeting in private) had taken over, the CCCs and RRCC had 
not by then been set Up.52 
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b. The Iature of the Humber Objectives 
It is worth noting the different nature of the objectives which were 
adopted for the Humber compared to those discussed above for inland 
waters. These were as follows: 
Humber Estuary - Yater Quality Objectives 
"(1) The protection of all existing defined uses of the 
estuary system; 
(2) The ability to support on the mud bottom the biota 
necessary for sustaining sea fisheries; 
(3) The ability to allow the passage of migratory fish at 
all states of the tide" (Yorkshire Water, (1986) Vater 
Quality Report, p. 72). 
It is submitted that the move, albeit a limited one, to agreeing WQOs in 
terms of actual uses is an important development in terms of creating a 
system which is easily understood and allows clearer agreement about the 
desired nature of the aquatic environment, and the benefits to be gained 
from it - all to the benefit of those wishing to participate. In 
particular, it goes some way towards resolving the "conflict of uses" 
which arises for many rivers. 53 This is reflected by the views of the 
REG, that objectives written in terms of river classifications only. 
were "unhelpful" (CSO, Yorkshire Water, pers. comm.). 
III. THH SKTTIIG OF YATER QUALITY STAIDARDS 
Raving explained the first stage of the process, the setting of WQOs, 
and the way that a different approach was taken for inland and tidal 
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waters, the next step is to consider the standards which were developed 
to accompany the objectives. WQS have been defined as follows: 
MThat concentration of a substance which must not be 
exceeded if a specified use of the aquatic environment [the 
VQOl is to be maintained- (Sayers, 1986, p. 277). 
The setting of WQSs must be considered at three levels. First, it will 
be seen that EC legislation had a significant impact on British VQSs, in 
that the limits for individual substances set in particular BC 
Directives were adopted as the individual WQS being the minimum 
required.6~ The whole question of public participation in the setting of 
those limits by the BC must, therefore, be considered, especially given 
the disquiet which has been expressed about the scientific validity of 
many of the limits. Apart from those set by the BC, the remainder of the 
British VQSs were developed nationally by the DoB and the VRC. 66 The 
potential for public input will be considered at this level, but with 
account being taken of any opportunities at the regional level in the 
case of Yorkshire Water, given the latter's likely input to the national 
process. 
The distinctions between the approach favoured by most of the Kember 
States of the Ee and Britain can be noted. In the case of the former, 
the UES for each substance would be applied directly to each individual 
consent, but in the case of the WQO approach, the WQS would provide the 
vital link between the WQO and the consent - but consent standards would 
vary, subject to the pre-condition that their total effect would not be 
such as to cause the WQS to be exceeded in the receiving water. The 
difficulties of this approach have been noted, however, including the 
need for a "matrixM of WQSs, where a range of uses are to be protected, 
so that the lowest applicable VQS would have to be adopted (Xance, 1984, 
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p. 510), and the technical difficulties of ·'accurately· deriving the 
appropriate WQS, and then in turn accurately transposing the VQS into 
variable consent conditions (Renshaw, 1980, p. 235 et seq.).66 
A. He RequireDents and Decision-IRking 
In considering the way in which WQS were developed, it is intended, 
first, to briefly outline the nature of the EC requirements and the 
processes of decision-making underlying these. The main Directive of 
concern was the "Dangerous Substances Directive" (76/464/EC) which 
provided for two MLists" - List I (or the MBlackM List), which included 
the most dangerous substances, and List II (or the "Grey" List) of the 
less dangerous substances. 57 Values for List I substances were to be set 
at EC level, with a view to the eventual elimination of such substances, 
while List II values were to be set nationally List I were to be 
treated as List II until a "Daughter" Directive had been agreed. 59 
In considering the decision process in relation to the Directive, two 
issues need to be taken into account. First, the decision to include a 
SUbstance in List I, and second, the actual standard set for each 
SUbstance. Both processes have been detailed by Mance (1984, p. 509) and 
the Wic (1987), and can be summarised as follows. With regard to the 
first decision, the EC comDdssioned several studies to rank compounds in 
order, based on their "toxicity, persistence and bioaccumulation" and 
also took account of the levels of production to assess their likely 
concentration in the aquatic environment. This resulted in the 
publication, in 1982, of 129 potential List I compounds. In selecting 
which of these would then receive early action as the basis for a 
Directive, three further reports were then commissioned in each case, 
one relating to MecotoxicityM, plus a technical report, and an economic 
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report. The opinion of an expert advisory committee could also be 
sought, although the European COmnUssion was nat bound to do so (WRC, 
1987). 
In the setting of standards, reports were comDdssioned from expert 
consultants, which included proposals as to "safe environmental levels-, 
including a -safety factor" - the extent of which varied significantly. 
The process at this stage relied only on published data, thus excluding 
any that was unpublished and held, for instance, by the (English and 
Welsh) WAs and regulatory agencies in other Member States. Experts from 
the national governments would then meet behind closed-doors with the 
process not becoming public until the proposal for a Directive had been 
published. Following this, national negotiations would begin (for 
instance with the appropriate regulatory agencies), followed by a 
process of political bargaining and compromise (lance, 1984).69 It 
should be noted that the final decision on the agreement of a Directive 
rested with the Council of Kinisters (comprised of the Kinisters for the 
Environment for each Member State) and not with the (unelected) 
Commission. 
Apart from 76/464/EC, a range of other Directives, including some which 
were use-based, were significant in laying down standards which would 
need to be adhered to through British WQSs. These included Directive 
76/160/EC Concerning the Quality of Bathing Water (OJ L31, 5 February 
1976); Directive 78/659/EC on the Quality of Fresh Waters Needing 
Protection or Improvement in Order to Support Fish Life (OJ L222, 14 
August 1978); and Directive 79/923/EC an the Quality Required for 
Shellfish Waters (OJ L281, 10 November 1979).60 
- 235 -
B. Decision-laking Iationally 
In the case of List II substances, and those not covered by Ee 
requirements, the standards were drawn up by the Kember States, and in 
the case of Britain by the WRc under contract for the DoE (lance, 1984, 
p. 510). Xance has indicated that this was a continious process of 
collating, reviewing and assessing existing data - both laboratory and 
"field observations" - regarding the toxic effect of each substance, 
with the aim of identifying the "maximum safe concentration for 
continious exposure". A "safety factor" was then introduced before a 
tentative VQS was produced, which was circulated to the WAs for 
comparison with their own water quality and biological information, 
followed by further stages of revision where there were any obvious 
differences between the data. Finally, the proposed standards were 
reviewed by a series of DoE/VRc/VA committees, before the publication of 
the full report detailing the VQS and the supporting information. 61 
In outlining this process, account can be also be taken of the main 
factors which had to be considered, especially any technical or 
practical limitations which would thus limit the "choiceR available in 
making the decision. The prime criteria was 
standard which would ensure the achievement 
clearly that of devising a 
of any WQOs, but other 
the limits of scientific factors have been identified, including 
knowledge - especially the "limits of detection",62 the need to allow 
for "future capacity",63 and inputs from sources other than discharges, 
especially the effects of accidental spillages. 6A The key problem, 
however, has been in determining the appropriate size of the "mixing 
zone" - the area around each discharge outfall where the pollution will 
be greatest because the natural capacity of the receiving water has not 
had the chance to disperse the effluent (Sayers, 1986). Within this area 
it cannot be expected that the WQS will be achieved, but this should not 
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(be allowed to) prejudice the VQOs for the water in question. This was 
identified by Welsh Water, in evidence to the Environment COmmittee, as 
"the most significant technical problem water authorities 
face in managing estuarine ... water quality at the present 
time. M 
In response to which, the ComDdttee were of the view 
... that the universal application in estuaries of the 
mixing zone must be regarded as seriously flawed, with the 
result that it is not always possible to apply effective 
estuarine [Water] Quality StandardsM (HC 183, 1986/7, para. 
115). 
Sayers has indicated that the characteristics of the individual estuary 
are the main factor, and that the size of the zone will vary as between 
discharges, and even for the same discharge at different times.&& 
C. Public Participation in the Setting of WQS 
To complete the picture, the question must be raised of the scope for 
public participation in the above process at the two levels of 
decision-making. While it cannot be argued that WQSs are as fundamental 
as the actual WQOs, they are clearly important in implementing the WQOs 
in practice to ensure the latter are achieved, and hence, it is 
submitted that the requirements of meaningful participation should be 
adhered to equally at all levels of decision-making. 66 
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1. At Ruropean ComDUn1ty Level 
While a detailed critique of the decision-making processes of the Be 
will not be provided,S? the main criticisms, especially in the context 
of water Directives, can be outlined. Haigh has highlighted the trend 
towards increased Community level decision-making, especially in the 
case of standard setting, and that during the dispute between the 
British Government and the remaining Kember states in the mid 1970s 
(noted earlier), the former claimed that it was defending the right of 
the VAs to set standards, and hence, prevent a shift away from the 
regional level (1986, p. 204). Lawrence and Taylor (1987) have been 
leading critics of the way in which the Be produced Directives, 
especially the absence of Nopen government", citing, in support of this, 
the way that the studies, used as the basis for standard setting, were 
not open to public or NpeerN scrutiny, nor was the advice received from 
consultants available to interested parties. Further, they were critical 
of the way that the advice of the Economic and Social Commdttee and the 
European Parliament was generally ignored without adequate 
explanation. sa 
In the wider context, therefore, it would seem that the practice and 
ethos of the EC may to some extent mirror that of Westminster and 
Whitehall in the preference for secrecy and limited access to decision-
making. This has been seen more recently in the context of calls for 
significant reforms, including the need for greater power for the 
(elected) European Parliament, for openness in the meetings of the 
Council of Ministers, and for greater (and earlier) scrutiny of Be 
proposed legislation for the Westminster Parliament. It is submitted 
that the EC, as much as the British Government, needs to adopt fully the 
principles of meaningful participation in its law-making processes. This 
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is a point which will become all the more important as Europe increases 
its control over the Kember States. 
2. At Iational Level 
In the case of the setting of WQSs nationally. there appears to have 
been very little opportunity for the wider public to participate. and a 
distinct lack of educat10n about the process. A study of the Yorkshire 
Water commdttees supports this view. Equally. there was little or no 
opportunity at the regional level. This is a point which must be taken 
on board in future decision-making. 69 
IV. THE RRVIEYIIG OF VQOs AID VQSs 
It has been argued that. as part of the requirements for the whole 
process of co~n1cat1on. a key stage is the opportunity <and 
willingness) to keep decisions under review. This applies. it is 
submitted. a fort1ori to WQOS and WQSs. One of the central issues. in 
the case of the VQOs especially. was that of financial constraints. and 
it can be noted that. apart from the decision of what target to set. 
there are the equally important questions of the time-scale within which 
any WQO should be achieved <which has been the most affected by 
financial constraints) and the actual target within each MClassM that 
should be sought. Because both groups of objectives and standards for 
inland and tidal waters were set prior to, or at the very beginning of, 
the main period of VA decision-making under study here (1983-89) it is 
intended to briefly review the extent to which any review was 
undertaken. Clearly the type of structures discussed in chapters three 
and four provided mechanisms through which such reviewing could take 
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place at regional level (subject to the requirements of political will 
and education and the reservations expressed therein), but in practice 
these were utilised only to a very limited extent. A number of recent 
developments have also raised the question of such reviews, but again 
very much at the dictates of bodies other than the public or the WAs -
account will be taken of these as appropriate. 
A. The Reviewing of YQOs 
In his preface to the NYC consultation paper (1978) on the review of 
discharge consents, the Xinister, Denis Howell, stressed the importance 
of keeping the objectives under review and of including the public in 
this process. 70 However, there does not seem to have been any process 
akin to the original setting of the WQOS for inland waters71 with 
extensive public participation either offered nationally, or regionally 
in the case of Yorkshire Water. The main concerns, however, relate to 
the question of the time-scales for achieving the targets, and the 
ability to comply with them within the framework of government financial 
controls of the WAs. This is reflected by the main assessment of the 
Yorkshire Water WQOs which was carried out on a systematic basis by the 
VQAG (chapter four).72 This process was commenced by a resolution of the 
Group (in May 1985) that it would review the quality of the rivers in 
the Yorkshire Water area on a 
" ... catchment by catchment basis, in relation to the 
predicted quality based on a strategy for the catchment 
together with a review of the progress achievedM (minutes, 2 
Xay 1985). 
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Reports detailing (inter alia) the action required to achieve the WQOs 
were presented to the Group on the Aire catchment (7 November 1985), the 
Don (20 February 1986),73 the Calder (1 May 1986', the MRorthern 
rivers·, and the tidal Quse, Humb E t d er s uary an the North Sea coast 
(both 31 July 1986). Apart from an update 5 v b 1987 on Bovem er the Group 
did not, however, repeat the exercise. 74 
In chapter four the question of the interaction between the various 
committees was considered, with the importance of equality of access, 
and committees knowing what was on the "agenda" for consideration by 
other committees, being stressed. The approach in the case of the WQOs 
mirrors the main findings in chapter four, to the effect that none of 
the information noted above was offered by the Authority to the 0CCs or 
the RRCC, but a range of the above reports were passed on to the RFAC 
Mfor information". Primarily this included the initial report regarding 
estuarine and coastal WQOs (19 August 1985),76 followed by each of the 
individual catchment reports. Apart from these examples, however, there 
do not appear to have been any occasions on which members of the RFAC 
requested any form of review of the VQOs or related time-scales. 
Finally, an interesting process which needs to be recorded, is the 
practice which Yorkshire Water developed of holding sy~Dsia relating to 
the major rivers in its area. These were apparently well attended by 
local interest groups in particular, and provided an opportunity for a 
variety of matters relating to the management of the rivers to be 
considered. For instance, at the Aire seminar (Vater in the Aire 
catchment, 24 February 1988) a local group, concerned with the quality 
of the Aire, raised the issue of the target dates not being met. 
It can be seen, therefore, that there was no systematic review of the 
actual objectives themselves, only in respect of the action to achieve 
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the objectives, and that there was a clear absence of the presentation 
of this information to the OCCs and RRCC. 
B. The Reviewing of VQSs 
In the case of WQSs, it can be suggested that there has been even less 
reviewing (but again concern about achieving compliance), although this 
issue is complicated by their national (and supra-national) character,76 
However, it can be suggested that the framework of the control system 
itself has come under close scrutiny from 1987 onwards with a number of 
international developments relating to the North Sea, and the British 
Government's proposals to introduce the concept of "Integrated Pollution 
Control" (see DoE, 1988a), ultimately as Part I of the Environmental 
Protection Bill, published in December 1989, Following on from the 
Second Ministerial Conference on the North Sea in 1987, and the 
resolution to cut total inputs to the North Sea by 50~ by 1995, the 
Government published a consultation paper (DoE, 1988b) regarding the 
most dangerous substances, selecting 24 from the Black List (of 
Directive 76/464/EC), which it perceived to be the most dangerous, and 
resolving to work towards their elimination from discharges into rivers 
- this was labelled the "Red List", In other words, that in such cases 
- and under central government dictat - any existing standards would be 
replaced by the target of "zero", Such a process will have a knock-on 
effect for individual discharge consents. While reference will be made 
to this issue in the following chapters, the point can be noted at this 
stage, that the development of the "Red List" was subject to national 
ti regionally by Yorkshire Vater's WQAG,77 consultation, and considera on 
Finally, as will be noted in the final chapter, it can be argued that 
the issue of the review and development of WQSs was more at the 
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forefront of policy-making following the reorganisation of the water 
industry in September 1989, including the request of the SoS for the NRA 
to undertake a full review of the consent system, (and hence implicitly 
WQOs and WQSs) and reviews of the river classification system ready for 
the River Quality Survey to be published in 1991, and statutory WQOs to 
be agreed in 1992. 
V. COICLtJSIOIS 
From the above discussion a number of conclusions can be drawn. For 
instance, it is submitted that very few of the decision processes were 
close to meeting the requirements of a "principled approach- based on 
meaningful participation, either because only limited, or in some cases, 
no public participation, was provided. A particular concern is the 
increasing control by the EC, where the scope for meaningful 
participation also appears limited reforms of the law and policy-
making processes at all levels must therefore remain a priority. A 
fortiori, the perceived "failings" of representative democracy at the 
national level may be intensified at the EC level. The development of a 
"super state- may thus pose the greatest challenge or the greatest 
opportunity for a concept based on a participatory form of democracy. 
Further, it is believed that the overall concept of WQOs is valuable as 
a basis for providing a relatively clear system of management (subject 
to the problems of transition through WQS to consents) which could 
provide a major benefit for public participation. However, in a number 
of ways it is questioned whether the system has ever worked in the way 
in which, it is submitted, it should. First, the concept is only 
beginning to take its first tentative steps towards actually agreeing 
targets in terms of intended uses - those for inland waters still being 
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based only an the NYC river classifications. Second, it will be 
questioned, in the next twa chapters, whether the VQOs and WQSs have 
been "successfullyW translated into individual consents, a problem made 
worse by the extensive rate of nan-compliance, and the absence of 
control over many discharges until the mid 1980s (chapter two). Related 
to this, has been the recent "over-emphasis", it is contended, an 
discharge compliance without regard to whether consents were set 
wcorrectlyW in relation to the WQO/S in the first place. It was argued 
that the IVC was more concerned with the individual consents than the 
WQOs, and a similar impression has been created by the process of 
introducing Wtime limited consentsW for WA discharges and the promise of 
tlbn from central funds to enable all WA sewage works to be brought into 
compliance by 1992. 7 & Such an approach was thus carried aut regardless 
of the need, and later promise, to review the consent/WQO system. 79 
Finally, although there is limited evidence available, it is 
questionable whether sufficient education was ever provided of the whale 
concept of WQOs and WQSs, and thus it is perhaps unsurprising that the 
public should have been so concerned at rates of compliance per se in 
the run-up to privatisation. It can also be suggested that the very 
technical nature of many of the above decisions provides an ideal 
opportunity for the implementation of an managerialist/business 
principles approach which, it has been contended, was the dominant ethos 
of the WAs from start to finish, and hence the danger that the necessary 
political will would be absent either from decisions to grant public 
participation, or in the actual process thereof. 
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IOTES: 
1 Although in the case of Water Quality Objectives and Standards (in 
chapter five) Yorkshire Water will again provide the main focus. 
2 The fundamental importance of this approach in ensuring planned 
investment rather than the setting of consents on an ad hoc basis has 
been noted (Humber Estuary Technical Panel, 1986, p. 1) and clf the 
approach analysed by Richardson et al, 1982. 
3 The point can also be made that because such objectives and standards 
amount to a definition of "pollution", there is need for public 
agreement about that definition, the word itself being emotive. 
Furthermore, the use of a river necessarily involves resolving a 
conflict of potential uses, and hence, it is submitted that there is 
a clear need for public agreement as to how that conflict should be 
resolved. 
4 It should be noted that there have been considerable problems over 
terminology in this context, including different definitions of the 
term "quality objective" and their prefacing with titles such as 
"river", "environmental", and "water". In this work the terms "water 
quality objective" (WQO) and "water quality standard" (VQS) will be 
used in accordance with the terminology adopted in the Vater Act 
1989, and these will be given the definitions indicated above, rather 
than those adopted by other EC Xember States (as illustrated beloW). 
6 Report of the Rivers' Pollution Prevention Sub-Committee of the 
Central Advisory Water ComDdttee, Prevention of River Pollution. 
6 clf France in 1964. For similar critiques see Guruswamy, L D, Papps, 
I, and Storey, D J, "The Development and Impact of an EEC Directive: 
The Control of Discharges of Xercury to the Aquatic Environment", 
(1983) xxii Journal of COmDOn Market Studies; and Gunn, J A L, "The 
UK Approach Environmental Quality Standards", in Environmental 
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Protection: Standards, Compliance and Costs, (Lack, T J, Ed.)(1984). 
For further reading, including 
related concept) see the Royal 
1972, paras. 24 and 86); DoE, 
(1980, p. 233), 
the idea of "pollution budgetsM (a 
COmmission Third Report (Cmnd. 5054, 
Circular 118/72, para. 5 and Renshaw 
7 It is not intended to rehearse the details of the EC legislative 
programme which led ultimately to four "action programmes on the 
environment", but see further Haigh (1984, 1989), Farquhar (1983), 
and Howarth (1988), and Booth, H, and Green A, -The European 
Community Environmental Programme and UK Law", (1976) European Law 
Review 444. 
e The Directive that was finally produced was, what has been termed, a 
"framework" or "parent" directive, leaving the details for individual 
substances or industrial processes to be developed by later 
"daughter" directives - a process described by Farquhar (1983, pp. 
147-8) as "little more than a delaying tactic". See further Booth and 
Green (ibid., p. 53'1), and Guruswamy, L D, "EEC Legislation 
Controlling Dangerous Substances: Legal Odyssey or Unchartered Voyage 
of Discovery?" (1983) Lloyds Maritime and Commercial Law Quarterly, 
464, on the suitability of Directives for the protection of the 
environment. 
9 Stated by the Minister, Denis Howell at the Council Xeeting on 8 
December 19'15 (Okun, 19'17, p. 330) and see further, Hansard, HL, 
cols. 721-65; 13 October 19'15, and the comments of Waldegrave, W, 
"The British Approach", (1985) 15 Environmental Policy and Law 106, 
108. 
10 It should be noted that the Treaty of Rome did not provide for 
legislation on the environment, and so, before the Single European 
Act in 1986, a combination of Articles 100 and 235 were relied on -
see House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, 
- 246 -
Approxi~tion of Laws Under Article 100 of the EEC Treaty, Session 
1977/8, HL 131. 
11 Thus, consistent with the arguments relating to the non-
implementation of COPA II, (chapter two). 
12 See further Dick, T A, EEC Directives and the Aquatic Environment _ 
Setting the Scene, (1978), Institute of Water Pollution Control, 
Scottish Branch Symposium, 15 Karch 1978, at p. 13. It is submitted 
that the claims of Renshaw (1980, p. 234) miss the point. 
13 See Article 6(3), and Guruswamy, ibid., p. 471. It was, however, only 
in the mid 1980s that a more "enlightened" and positive approach was 
agreed, with both "sides" recognising that a combination of the two 
approaches could yield significant environmental benefits. See the 
Ministerial Declarations on the North Sea (1984 and 1987) following 
the Conferences in Bremen and London respectively, the Government's 
response to the Environment Committee, He 543, 1987/8, para. 1.24 et 
seq., and the "Red List" consultation paper (DoE 1988b). 
14 The classifications (for freshwaters) were as follows: Classes 1A and 
1B - "Good Quality", 2 - "Fair Quality", 3 - "Poor Quality", 4 - "Bad 
Qualityw. This does bear some correlation to the uses to which the 
river can be put, however. The classification system is considered in 
more detail, post, including that the first step for the WAs was to 
determine which classification each river already met. 
16 Again note that this all occurred against the back-drop of the severe 
public expenditure cuts, referred to in chapter two. 
16 In the first paper it had been noted that many consents had been set 
at the so-called "Royal Commission 30/20 Standard" relating to the 
1912 Royal ComDdssion, but the latter had intended that the capacity 
of the receiving water also be taken into account (lVe, 1977, paras. 
4-6) . 
17 Including the review of consents in the next chapter. 
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18 And presumably by the other WAs. The following is gleaned from the 
minutes of the meetings of the Board and committees of Yorkshire 
Water, viewed at the Authority library in Bradford. 
19 A special meeting was convened on 7 Karch 1977, where the commdttee 
was given a presentation of the paper. 
20 Ibid., chapters three and four. 
21 The matter was considered primarily by the Water Quality Advisory 
Panel on 10 Karch 1977. 
22 lembers were then informed on 3 August 1977 (PRC) that the Authority 
was expected to complete its development of "RQOs" by larch 19'78, and 
the review of consents by larch 19'79. 
23 It was also indicated to the RFAC ('7 Karch 197'7), that Yorkshire 
Water's priorities were the protection of drinking water quality 
"first and foremost", 
24 The NVC considered this a "broad 
concept of WQOs would conflict 
would also have to be taken of 
duty" which it did not think the 
with (NWC, 1978, para. 25). Account 
additional localised duties arising 
through Sites of Special Scientific Interest, for instance. 
2& Regarding the effect of the "recession" on WA planning, see Reynolds, 
L R, and Williams, B R H, "Trade Effluent Control - An Industrial 
Viewpoint-, (1984) Journal of the Institution of Vater Engineers and 
Scientists, 305, 310, 
26 See, in particular, the Annual Reports of the Authority for 1975-8, 
the report produced by the Yorkshire Water WQAP on the Authority's 
"Inheritance", and the same named report of the IWC. An additional 
problem for Yorkshire Water lay in the long-term commitments entered 
into by its predecessors, which had the effect of constraining 
resource planning for the early years, and that, by 19'78, only two-
thirds of its likely length of sewers had been identified and their 
condition catalogued (Annual Report, 1978, section 3), 
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27 A further factor was the drought of 1976, as a result of which, the 
Authority decided to develop a water supply Mgrid" at considerable 
expense (Policy and Resources Committee, minutes, 7 April 1976). 
28 A more detailed version of this document was actually presented to 
the WQAP on 15 June 1978 details, herein, are from the WQAP 
version. 
29 In contrast to the NYC, Yorkshire Water (temporarily> adopted the 
approach of classifying water supply rivers as Class "0" (PRC, 
minutes, 8 January 1975), 
30 Although the classification based on chemical criteria was considered 
to be in some way linked to potential uses (Lester, 1980, pp. 430-1), 
as suggested earlier. 
31 Although the Royal ComDdssion in 1912 is often considered as the 
founder (IWC, 1977). 
32 See Fish, 1978, p. 237. 
33 It is important to take account of the criticisms that have been made 
of the classification system, on the basis that, potentially, 
fundamental decisions were being made on less than "perfect" 
information. For instance, the point has been made that it was 
possible to have a fishless Class 1 river, but healthy fish in a 
Class 3 river (CSO, Yorkshire Water, pers. comm., and Birch, 1988). 
Further, the system did not take account of the flow and capacity of 
rivers, so that a high quality river could not be used for water 
supply because of inadequate capacity (quantity> but the system would 
not reveal this (Okun, 1977, p. 210), and Royal Commission Fourth 
Report, Cmnd. 5780, 1974, para. 106). Finally, the Environment 
Committee recommended that the DoE should consider further the 
"adequacy and sensitivity to changeR of the system (HG 183, 1986/7, 
para. 42). These problems will be noted further in chapter eight. 
~4 Indeed the liC (1978, para. 23) recognised the link between the two 
suggesting that "the formalisation of ... aims for river quality will 
- 249 -
no doubt influence the plans and programmes proposed under 6. 24M. 
This information, which had also been required from the river 
authorities, was used by central government to produce the 
quinquennial river quality surveys. 
36 The corporate plans were, however, intended primarily as information 
for central government to be used in the setting of financial 
controls (DoE, pers. comm.). 
36 Kinutes, 4 September 1978. The minutes of this meeting were submitted 
to the Board on 15 November 1978. 
37 The list of organisations was as follows: all County and District 
Councils in the Yorkshire Water area, CBI, RFAC (supra.>, division 
FCAs, IFU, Yorkshire and Humberside Economic Planning Council, CLA, 
Chambers of Commerce, and Yorkshire and Humberside Council for Sport 
and Recreation <Yorkshire Water, 1978, Appendix 1). 
38 No evidence is available of the extent to which education was, in 
fact, provided. 
39 From the Authority meeting on 19 September 1979, it would seem that 
comments were also received from various nationalised industries. 
40 See Directive 78/176/EC on Waste from the Titanium Dioxide Industry 
(OJ L54, 25 February 1978), amended by Directive 83/29/EC; and 
Directive 82/883/EC on Procedures for the Surveillance and Xonitoring 
of Environments Concerned by Waste from the Titanium Dioxide Industry 
(OJ L378, 31 December 1982). 
41 Sayers {pers. comm. >, and see Garnett, 1981, p. 175 regarding the 
similar effect of 76/464/EC. 
42 For instance, the Humber Estuary was classified by the 1980 River 
Quality Survey (NYC, 1981, summarised in Edwards, 1985, p. 34, Table 
8.3) as "Class A" ("Good Quality") for 44.8 km, and ·Class B" ("Fair 
Quality"> for the remaining 18.7 km along its north side (for which 
Yorkshire Water was responsible). The inland rivers feeding the 
estuary were, by far, a greater problem. 
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~3 For instance, in the case of the Humber, see Edwards (1985). 
~~ Cmnd. 5054, 1972, para. 23) The COmmission considered this would do 
"for estuaries what the miners' canary did for miners·. Also note 
earlier references to the concept of ·pollution budgets· (para. 24). 
4& Thus the basic ·philosophy" between the two was essentially the same 
(Sayers, 1980, p. 1(9). 
~6 IYC, 1981, pp. 8-9, and see Howarth, 1988, pp. 48-9. 
47 In particular the WRc was involved in the development of a 
"mathematical model" of the estuary, which was considered a 
significant part of the process (Yorkshire Water, Annual Reports 
1978, p. 20, 1980, p. 14). 
~e It should be noted that this was under the "ne~' Authority; it would 
seem likely, therefore, that the objectives would have been finally 
agreed by the Board (meeting in private). For further details see 
Humber Estuary Technical Panel, 1986. 
~9 However, the WQAG later reported that this was impractical within 
Yorkshire Water's (then) existing capital programme (minutes 8 August 
1985) - public expenditure controls again clearly dOminating. 
60 There may have been with particular interest groups, but no evidence 
of this has been found; it can be expected, however, that, at the 
very least, the industries reliant on the Humber would have been 
allowed some input, thus creating the kind of "privileged access" 
argued against here. 
61 Similarly, at the WQAG meeting (20 December 1983) it was noted that 
the three WAs had been under ·direct pressure" from the Kinister (for 
the Environment) to produce the WQOs. 
62 In contrast see the arrangements for participation in the setting of 
WQOs for the Kersey: Harper, E, ·COPA II and the River Kersey - A 
Regional Water Authority View·, (1984) Cbendstry and Industry, 16 
July 1984, 502, 503 et seq. j and Edwards, P R, "COPA II and the River 
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Kersey - An Industry Vie~', (1984) Chendstry and Industry, 16 July 
1984, 506. 
63 A problem indicated by the ongoing action relating to navigation 
rights on the (Yorkshire) Derwent A-G (ex rel Yorkshire Derwent 
Trust Limited and others) v Brotherton and others [1989] 2 ALL ER 
423. 
64 It was however, open to Britain, or any Member State, to develop 
stricter standards. 
66 And published in a series of VRc Technical Reports. 
66 The benefits of UES, in terms of being easily understood, have also 
been noted, as well as the need for them in the case of watercourses 
which cross national boundaries (ibid., pp. 238-9). 
67 This was an approach modelled on the Paris Convention for the 
Prevention Df Marine from Land-Based SOurces, 1974, Cmnd. 8941. 
sa It is not intended to provide full details of the Directives or their 
requirements; these can be found in Haigh, 1989. 
69 See for instance Mance's example of the Cadmium Directive, p. 511. 
60 Reference has already been made to Directive 78/176/EC on Waste from 
the Titanium Dioxide Industry (OJ L54, 25 February 1978). This 
required the eventual elimination of waste into rivers from the 
industry, and as such, did not 
required Kember States to draw up 
(Renshaw, 1980, p. 233). This will 
the following chapter. 
lay down specific standards, but 
"pollution reduction programmes" 
be considered in more detail in 
61 The List II WQSs are found in VRc Technical Reports TR-206-212. 
62 Humber Estuary ComDdttee/Institute of Estuarine and Coastal Studies, 
University of Hull, The Humber Estuary (1988), Conference 
Proceedings, p. 90. In relation to the actual lack of data for tidal 
waters, see Sayers, 1980, p. 146. 
63 Especially for new discharges. 
64 A problem the UES approach cannot deal with directly. 
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65 He also concluded that "mixing zone size should, therefore, reflect 
the ability of the estuary at the point of discharge, to absorb 
pollution without undue detriment." In respect of the two titanium 
dioxide discharges on the south bank of the Humber, a survey 
undertaken by Anglian Water in 1984, was the first time that the 
Authority had attempted to measure the existing mixing zones around 
any discharges under its control (1986, pp. 280-2). 
66 The point must also be made that in talking about the "public·, this 
includes organisations with the existing technical ability, such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, thereby indicating that all 
information does not rest with the government machine (chapter one). 
67 Clinton Davis (1989), a former EC Commissioner, has been a leading 
critic, especially in relation to the powers of the European 
Parliament (which he has described as "hopelessly inadequate"), and 
the "secretive" nature of Council (of Ministers) meetings. 
68 See further Moltke, K V, "Cadmium Discharges", (1982) 9 Environmental 
Policy and Law 94. 
69 See further chapter eight. The point can be made regarding the extent 
of education that would be needed to develop a public able to 
participate in this decision. It should also be noted that an 
important decision, apart from the actual setting of standards, was 
in the application of the Directives, where it was necessary to 
"designate· waters to which particular directives would apply. The 
Directive 76/160/EC Concerning the Quality of Bathing Water (OJ L31, 
5 February 1976) provides the clearest example of this in the initial 
approach of the Government to designate only 27 beaches, less than 
land-locked Luxembourg (see Haigh, 1989, pp. 65-8). 
70 This was also a theme of a one day conference hosted by Derbyshire 
County Council ten years later (Rivers for Life, 9 November 1988). 
71 Bearing in mind there was no consultation at all in the case of the 
Humber WQOs at least. 
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72 Again it is submitted that the detailed reports provided to the Group 
in this context show the value of the Group for education and as a 
catalyst for public participation. 
73 When it was also agreed that the CSO should report annually on any 
problems that were likely to prevent the WA from achieving the WQOs 
- in the case of the Dan, pollution by waters from abandoned mines 
was a particular problem. 
74 A general presentation was also made to the Group regarding the river 
Wharfe (21 February 1981). 
76 The minutes do not reveal the nature of any discussion which ensued. 
76 At a meeting of the WQAG (1 lay 1986) the scientific basis for the 
standards was considered. Mance has, however, argued that the most 
significant part of the WQS process lies in the "gaining of practical 
experience" from applying them to the control of discharges, and 
thus, after a few years, he expected this experience to be 
"harvested" in a review of the standards (1986, p. 511). 
77 It can also be noted that such an approach constitutes the kind of 
positive ·welcoming" of a combined UES/WQO approach noted earlier in 
the chapter. and commended by the Environment Committee (HC 183, 
1986/1. paras. 91, 112-3). 
78 See the statement of the (then) SoS for the Environment to the House 
on 4 November 1988 (Hansard, HC. vol. 139. cols. 1289-90). 
79 Its interrelationship with privatisation cannot, however, be 
overlooked. 
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CBAPTRR S I X 
Imposing Control I I 
- The Discharge Consent Process 
Following on from the process of setting 
in the control regime to consider is 
WQOs and WQSs, the next stage 
the setting of (conditional) 
consents for individual discharges of trade and sewage effluent. Such 
consents were backed up by the force of law, as will be explained in the 
next chapter. This formed one of two main methods through which it was 
sought to prevent or limit "pollution" from occurring, the other being 
(again through the use of the criminal law) in the form of strict 
liability offences relating to "irregular" pollutions, such as spillages 
or deliberate "dumping". 1 and a variety of powers to impose limits on 
activities which might lead to pollution occurring. The emphasis of the 
chapter will, however, be on the consent process because a variety of 
potentially significant rights to public participation were provided for 
in respect of the setting (and also the enforcement) of consents; as 
indicated in the Introduction, this provided the initial spur for the 
research, seeking to analyse whether the potential of the rights was 
realised in practice. It is intended, 
consent setting decision process, 
therefore, to work through the 
outlining and analysing the 
opportunities for public participation at each stage, and effecting a 
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comparison with the requirements of meaningful participation. At the end 
of the chapter the position in relation to the control of "irregular" 
pollutions will be noted. 2 
Reference can be made to initial expectations. that by providing such 
rights. it had been intended that the public should be fully involved in 
pollution control decision-making. However. account must taken of the 
arguments regarding the rationale of the provisions. and their delayed 
and then phased implementation (outlined in chapter two). as well as the 
framework of the WA as a corporate entity within which such rights were 
to operate - thus the domination of the business principles ethos. It 
will be argued that. in the context of the control of both types of 
pollution, the attitudes of the regulatory authority were particularly 
important where the authority was dealing with various types of 
industry. large and small, for whom the discharge of waste was a vital 
part of the production process. and by whom. sometimes significant. 
local employment was provided. The danger is. therefore. that if the 
authority possessed significant discretion in the imposition and 
enforcement of control, that this would be used for the benefit of 
industry, or some industries (and hence "unequally·) thus negating the 
process of public participation, and a fortiori, where such discretion 
was exercised as the result of "hidden" bargaining without reference to 
public scrutiny or comment. Thus the issue of political will. although 
difficult to test. must always be considered an essential part of the 
relationships between the regulatory authority. the regulatees. and the 
public. 3 Again much of the material used in the following chapters has 
been collected with regard to the practice of Yorkshire Vater, but, 
because some of the most important examples of the use of the public 
participation provisions occurred in relation to other VAs, these are 
included also. 
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I. THE COBTROL OF TRADE AID SEWAGE EFFLUKIT DISCH.A.RGES 
A. The Background to the Control Regime 
In the previous chapter the review of discharge consents by the WAs, 
under the auspices of the HWC, was referred to as being part of the 
process of developing WQOs in response to EC requirements. The second 
consequence of EC legislation was the need to have in place controls 
over any discharge which contained EC controlled substances. COPA II was 
the main mechanism to achieve this, and in the late 1970s serious steps 
towards its implementation were taken, for which the review of discharge 
consents was the key.4 Having briefly referred to the review in the 
previous chapter, it is intended here, too consider it more fully, 
taking account of its implications for the control regime, and public 
participation therein. Following this, the decision process under COPA 
II will be analysed. 
The significance of the review lay in the way in which it would provide 
the "baseline" for virtually all VA consents to inland waters, but the 
approach taken suggested a dissonance with the concept of VQOs which the 
VAs had been required to develop in the months prior to the review. The 
problem was that the WAs had specified short and long term targets, but 
were then being required to re-define consents in accordance with the 
standards which the discharges were achieving at the time - apparently 
irrespective of the targets which had been set - or at least, that the 
short term targets would have been set to accord with the intended 
reviewed consent. This, arguably, was a process of planning in reverse. 
This argument is re-inforced by a number of factors. First, (as noted in 
chapter five) the NWC regarded the review as a process of obtaining the 
"best environmental value" from available investment, rather than a 
process of allocating new resources - in other words of achieving what 
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was practicable with existing funds (1977, para. 3).6 Second, the NWC 
recognised at the time, that progress was likely to be delayed, or even 
set back, by further cuts in VA investment (ibid., para. 3). Third, as 
will be noted below, seven years later a further review of consents, 
adopting the same approach, was carried out. It is difficult to see, 
therefore, how repeated amending of consents to the levels they were 
achieving in practice, could do anything but negate the already publicly 
agreed WQ0s6 and, therefore, a true concept of publicly agreed WQOs, 
with consents based thereon, could not have begun to operate, at least 
until after the mid 1980s. 
This further lends support for the contention, set out in the previous 
chapter, that the Government's claim, in the mid 1970s, that it was 
established practice for consents to be derived from VQOs, was 
"rhetoric" only. This is also suggested by the main justification for 
the review which was the "anomalies" (Fish, 1978, p. 239) in the way 
consents had been set until then. In particular, it was claimed that 
there had been an over reliance on the recommendations of the 1912 Royal 
Commission on Sewage Disposal. This had suggested that consent 
conditions of 30 mg/l suspended solids, and 20 mg/l biochemical oxygen 
demand should be appropriate for most works (hence the so-called "30/20 
standard"), but in many cases it was overlooked that the Commission had 
stressed that such conditions should be varied in accordance with the 
available dilution in the receiving water in question - anything less 
than 8 times the volume of the discharge required a stricter standard 
(Fish, 1978, pp. 238-9). The NYC noted that" ... existing consents 
are not always rationally related to [VJQOs" (1977, para. 7). 
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1. The Regional Perspective - Reviews by Yorkshire Water 
To complete the picture of the involvement of Yorkshire Vater in the VQO 
and consent process (following on from the previous chapter), the impact 
of the review, and the extent of participation, can be noted. 7 It was 
stated by the Director of Operations that, with present levels of public 
expenditure, not all consents could be brought into compliance (RFAC, 7 
larch 1977), nor could actual improvements in water quality be achieved 
in the near future (VQAP, 10 larch 1977). The Authority put forward a 
two stage review. First, consents would be reviewed to set them at 
"realistic" levels - in other words the level of quality actually being 
achieved - where compliance could not be achieved at present levelsS 
Second, all consents would be "rationalised" so that they would accord 
with the target WQOs. It is difficult to see how the latter fits into 
the former, unless stage 2 was intended "to be carried out further into 
the future,9 and given the subsequent review exercises (post), it seems 
doubtful that such an exercise was ever "properly" carried out. 
Importantly, the Authority was of the view that no consultation was 
required in the first stage of this process, according to the Director 
of Operations, because the revised consents would merely be "statements 
of fact" and hence, there was nothing that could be negotiated about 
(YQAP, 15 larch 1979). It is submitted, however, that this is an 
unjustifiable approach, given the benefits, it has been argued 
participation can produce in terms of "better" decisions. There was some 
scope for participation through consideration of the review process by 
the Yorkshire Water committees (on the same basis as in chapter five, 
including again the RFAC) , but there appears to have been no wider scale 
participation, unlike for the WQOs. This seems to be equally true for 
the second stage, 10 despite indications that participation might be 
appropriate for the latter (VQAP, 15 March 1979), In terms of the actual 
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decision-making process, a progress report was presented, by the 
Director of Operations, to the WQAP in November 1978, indicating how the 
review was being conducted and its implications (9 November 1978), This 
was followed by a further report, supposedly as the basis for public 
involvement, which was received by the Authority on 17 January 1979, and 
the WQAP on 15 Karch 1979. However, the next consideration of it seems 
to have been at the WQAP on 30 October 1980, with very limited evidence 
of participation on any wider scale in between. 11 
2. The 1985 Review 
With the announcement by the Conservative Government in 1984, that 
implementation of COPA II would finally take place (albeit in phases), 
preparations were made in the form of a further review of consents to 
again ensure that consents reflected the levels they were achieving in 
practice. It would seem that the demand on sewage works since 1979 had 
continued to rise, but because of public expenditure, and hence VA 
investment, constraints, the capacity of the works had not kept pace, 
thus the (new) 1979 levels were no longer being achieved. 12 It is 
difficult to see, therefore, how, even by 1985, the VQO-consent system 
could be working in the way the NYC claimed that it would. In the case 
of Yorkshire Water, proposals for the latest review were considered in 
late 1983, and put to the SoS Environment in early 1984, thus involving 
the new Board (once again in the absence of the CCCs) , Formal 
applications were made in 1985 (YV, Annual Report 1986, p. 24),13 
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B. The Process of Setting Consents for Discharges Commenced After 4 
July 1984 
In the main body of the chapter, the process of setting new consents 
during the period under study, will be explained, including the 
provisions for public involvement under COPA II. The significance of the 
provisions should be noted in the way they differ from the Mtraditional" 
British approach to public involvement in "rule-makingM (c/f the US APA 
1946). Further, the provisions are notable in respect of their potential 
effect on the relationships between the WAs and dischargers who, before 
COP! II, were used to consent setting being a process of private 
bargaining. The public can thus be seen as an extra Mdimension" in this 
relationship, making it all the more important that all parties 
possessed the necessary political will. The danger was that such private 
bargaining would continue, thereby reducing participation to 
legitimation, outcomes having already been determined. 14 
1. Responsibility for Consent Setting 
It should be explained that, while the WAs were responsible for the 
setting of non WA discharge consents, those for WA discharges were set 
by the SoS Environment (with HMIP providing the technical expertise from 
1987).16 Because of this, reference will be made to the role of the 80S 
as appropriate, but the majority of data available relates to the 
process of consent setting by the WAs, especially Yorkshire Vater. 
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2. Technical Constraints 
In accordance with the approach adopted in i h t prev ous c ap ers, it is 
intended to briefly outline the "technical constraints- involved in 
setting consents, prior to consideration of the decision process in 
practice. 
a. Legal Limitations 
The WAs were empowered by s. 34 of COPA to either grant a consent 
unconditionally, subject to "reasonable" conditions, or to refuse 
consent, but not "unreasonably". The idea of reasonableness thus 
provides the route through which a variety of requirements could be 
achieved, including the setting of conditions to meet EC obligations (as 
discussed in the previous chapter),16 complying with the WAs' general 
statutory duties, 17 and (at least according to NYC intentions) the 
implementing of the WQOIWQS approach. Thus, in contrast to the UES 
approach, different conditions could be applied to individual discharge 
consents, provided that the combined effect of all the discharges to 
each stretch of river was not such as to cause the WQS to be exceeded 
(espeCially where this was a "mandatory value" under EC law). Therefore, 
although the WQO/WQS was intended to be the key element in the setting 
of consents, it was not provided for in COPA, being (arguably) a later 
development. 19 
b. Practical Limitations 
A number of these applied in the process of consent setting, including, 
primarily, the available dilution, and in some cases turbidity, of the 
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river (given that this enables the effluent to be dispersed), A 
particular problem was also the need to take into account existing 
discharges 
- the new consent had to be "slotted in" to the existing 
total load on the river, and a fDrtiori capacity had to be left for 
future (new) discharges. lSI 
c. RPolitical· LiDdtations 
A more significant problem in practice, at least prior to COPA, was the 
right of the applicant for consent to appeal to the SoS against the WA's 
decision. This was often used as a "delaying tactic", because the 
discharge was allowed to proceed unconditionally until the appeal had 
been determined, which often took many months. WAs thus sought to 
negotiate to avoid appeals wherever possible. 20 This position was 
reversed by COPA (s. 39) but was still, potentially, a factor in 
practice, and important because of the scope for the WAs to take into 
account the effects of consent conditions on the economic position of 
the discharger. 
3. The Decision-laking Process 
Applications for consent were required to include a range of details 
specified in s. 34(1) of COPA, including (inter alia> the nature and 
composition of the matter proposed to be discharged and hence, the 
individual substances which were to form the discharge. In practice 
submission of the application was rarely the first contact between 
discharger and the VA department responsible for consent setting. A 
process of prior informal negotiation was common place - and encouraged 
by VAs - so that applicants did not go through the process of applying, 
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and the expense of advertising <post). f th I 
, or e app ication to be 
rejected. 21 Because of this approach refusals were rare, but this does 
not mean that the WAs did not consider refusal an option. In terms of 
is important to stress the need for the 
effectively determined at this negotiation 
political will, however, it 
application not to have been 
stage, thus making the participation process no more than tokenistic. 
4. Public Participation in Consent Setting 
Each of the main opportunities for public participation under COPA II 
will be outlined, and a comparison with the principles of meaningful 
participation attempted, in particular, with regard to the different 
stages of communication, and the constraints identifiable from practical 
experience. Information provided by WAs and national and local "amenity" 
groups is used as appropriate. In considering this process of setting 
consents, and public participation therein, it should be noted that the 
latter applied only to new applications after 4 July 1984 <following the 
long-awaited implementation of COP! 11)22 and, therefore, to only a 
small percentage of the total number of discharges subject to control.23 
The provisions can be analysed as a series of progressive stages of the 
decision process. 
8. Obtaining Information About the Application 
The first requirement for communication is the means through which 
information about the proposed decision can be obtained. Under the terms 
of COP! II this could be achieved in three main ways. 
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The RequireJllent to Advertise. Section 36(1) placed the VAs under a duty 
to advertise all applications in local newspapers for two successive 
weeks. and in the London Gazette. in the form prescribed by Regulation 2 
(SI 1984/864), However. there were two important exceptions to this. 
First. under subs. (4) the WA had the discretion to not advertise where 
it 
-" .propose(d] to give consent ... and considere(dl that the 
discharges in question (would] have no appreciable effect on 
the water in which they [were] proposed to be made. "24 
This provided a significant internal constraint because of the 
discretion it presented to the WAs. coupled with the difficulties of 
interpreting "appreciable effect M ,2S Guidance was given by the DoE on 
this phrase. by providing a series of complex criteria which had to be 
met before advertising could be "waived" (DoE. Circular 17/84, Annex 3). 
VAs' reaction to this was mixed. For instance, as previously reported, 
Horth West Water sought to uphold "the spirit" of s, 36 by advertising 
when they were in doubt or the application might cause local concern 
(Burton and Freestone, 1986, pp. 256-7).26 Yorkshire Water published its 
own policy with regard to the use of the "waiver", which favoured 
advertising whenever the proposed discharge had implications for the 
appropriate VQO, for water supply abstraction points, or underground 
waters, and all applications from fish farms were to be advertised 
(Rhoades, 1984. p, 501).27 
The rationale behind the "waiver" was that it was designed to deal with 
" hundreds of small and very insignificant discharges 
made from such places as domestic septic tanksM (Denis 
Howell, Hansard. He, vol. 817, cols. 969-70, 19 July 1974). 
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but despite the DoE's statement that the ·normal presumption" should be 
that the application be advertised because "advertisement is a 
fundamental feature of the publi i 1 t c nvo vemen provisions· (DoE, 
Circular, 11/84, Annex 3, para. 2), the use of the provision was the 
cause of much concern due to the extent of its use. There were apparent 
inconsistencies of approach between the different WAs, and with the DoE, 
in respect of WA applications. 28 The low level of advertising is 
indicated by the analysis of Clayfield and Woodward who have questioned 
whether this was "in the spirit of the Act" (1981, p. 6), and is 
supported by the interviews carried out at a number of WAs. It may, 
therefore, be suggested that the WAs were not confining themselves to 
those situations envisaged during the enactment of COPA.2~ Furthermore, 
there was no requirement in the Act for the WA to give (written) reasons 
as to its refusal to advertise; a willingness to do this would, 
therefore, be a matter of political will. Finally, the complexity of s. 
36(4), and interpretations thereof, can be noted from the point of view 
of education. 
Copies of Applications Displayed an the Public Registers. Given the 
potential for applications not to be advertised, other mechanisms for 
obtaining information need to be considered. One of these was the 
requirement that all applications (with the exception of those subject 
to a s. 42 certificate) had to be recorded on the public registers open 
to inspection at all "reasonable hours· at WA offices. Copies were to be 
available at a "reasonable charge". While the registers are considered 
in more detail in the following chapter, the main differences with 
advertising can be noted, in particular, that having to inspect the 
i i nd "cost" and hence a register would involve more nconven ence a 
greater commitment - for members of the public. The DoE considered that 
where applications were not advertised the registers would provide 
- 266 -
"sufficient publicity" (DoE, Circular 17/84, Annex 3, para. 2) but it is 
submitted that the level of public awareness of the registers, and 
especially the fact that applications were included on them, was very 
low. 30 No evidence was found of the registers having been used for this 
purpose. 31 
COpies to specified Bodies. The Act further specified that local 
(county and district) authorities in the area of the proposed discharge 
were to receive copies,32 but this did not apply where the application 
was not advertised. This clearly raises the question of whether the aim 
was to keep them informed given their historicallongoing interest in 
water services, but clearly it could also provide a further means 
through which the public could obtain the information, albeit that 
reliance was being placed on the Mrepresentative" model. ITo detailed 
research was undertaken in this context, but no evidence has been found, 
from any source, of individuals or groups benefiting from it.33 
b. laking Representations in Response to an Application 
The next requirement for communication is that of channels through which 
the public can give information to the decision-maker, in this case, in 
response to the application for consent, and to have that response taken 
into account (stages II and III). Section 36(1)(c) provided such a 
requirement, but it would appear that this only applied where the 
application had been advertised. This is suggested by the requirement to 
consider representations - taking a literal approach - only applying for 
representations received within six weeks of the date of advertising in 
the London Gazette, and further, subs. (4) (the .. wai ver-) refers to 
"subsection 1" not applying, rather than just the advertising itself 
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being waived. If this interpretation is correct, then subs. (4) created, 
it is submitted, a very serious loop-hole for the process of public 
involvement in consent setting, and indicates that the alternative 
mechanisms for obtaining information (supra.) were of limited value if 
representations could not be made. This raises the question of whether, 
irrespective of the wording of the Act, WAs were prepared to accept, 
what can be termed, infornal representations. This would seem likely, 
but in such a case, there would then have been no statutory duty to take 
the representations into account political will, therefore, being 
essential. 
Subject to the above concern, s. 36 clearly provided an important 
development for public involvement in the consent process compared to 
the position before COPA,3A especially in terms of providing a means 
through which members of the public could seek to influence the 
decision-maker. A number of points can be made about the process, in 
conjunction with the "obtaining" stage, above. First, the clear need for 
education, both in respect of the actual existence of the facilities,36 
and also with regard to the nature of the consent setting decision and 
its dependence on the WQO/S, the complexity of which has already been 
recorded. It would appear that in practice there was limited awareness 
of the existence of the provisions and also, even at a superficial 
level, about the way in which consents were intended to be derived from 
the appropriate WQO/S. For instance, one of the Yorkshire Water 
fisheries consultative associations was experienced in making 
representations under similar provisions relating to applications for 
water abstractions (under Water Resources Act 1963, s. 28) but appeared 
to be unaware of the equivalent COPA provisions for discharges <pers. 
comm., through attendance at one of the meetings), or of the WQO 
system. 3G It is contended, therefore, that a great deal more education 
needed to be provided by the WAs, including through their formal 
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channels such as the GGGs and RFAC. 
regulatory system, the argument was 
With regard to understanding the 
developed in chapter one, that 
individuals can learn through involvement however, a particular 
weakness of COP A II was in not re i i th uA qu r ng e. s to explain to 
individual representors, the effect that representations by the latter 
had on the decision, and thus why such representations were "not valid" 
if this was the case. This seems to mirror the position throughout the 
decision-making process for the WAs. Once again, it would have been 
necessary for this to have been done informally, dependant on the 
political will of the WAs. 
From the research undertaken, it is clear that representations were made 
by a whole range of groups and people regarding different types of 
applications for consent. 37 In particular, North West Vater and Thames 
Vater reported that proposed consents had been altered in the light of 
representations received. 3S Of the "amenity" groups who assisted the 
research, most seemed to have some form of "monitoring system" for 
checking, either the local newspapers, or the London Gazette, and then 
of responding to particular applications. However, interestingly, groups 
such as the Anglers' Co-operative Association, South Yorkshire Salmon 
and Trout Association and the Esk and Derwent Fisheries Consultative 
Association indicated that they generally considered abstractions to be 
more of a threat to rivers {in terms of the river flow which could 
thereby increase the concentration of any 
majority of representations they made were 
for abstraction licences (under the 1963 
{all pers. comm. ).39 
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pollution), and hence, the 
in response to applications 
Act) rather than under GOPA 
c. The Determination of the Application 
The above processes of decision-taking were all subject to an over-
arching requirement that the application be determined within three 
months of receipt by the WA (unless a longer period was agreed in 
writing with the applicant) (s. 34(2». If the process was not completed 
within this time the application was deemed refused. 40 As indicated 
earlier, the WA was required to decide whether to grant consent, either 
conditionally or unconditionally, or to refuse it (but not 
"unreasonably"). 
In terms of communication# stage VI requires notification of the 
decision and the reasons for it. However, COPA merely required the WA to 
"serve notice" on those who had made representations, of the intention 
of the VA to grant consent (s. 36(6){a», thus not where it intended to 
refuse. It was, therefore, a matter of the political will of the VA as 
to the extent of the detail of the reasoning. It was argued (in chapter 
one) that such detail was important with regard in terms of subjecting 
decision-making to scrutiny, and thereby, seeking to ensure that 
decisions were adequately thought out.41 
Deter~natlons by the ~ It has also been argued that it should be 
possible, at least in respect of some decisions, to engage in further 
stages of communication. COPA also provided a mechanism akin to this, by 
providing that representors could request the 808 to take-over the 
application, and determine it himself (s. 35). This mechanism could come 
into play in three ways. First, at the volition of the 80S. This could 
be achieved by the SoS specifying (a priori) particular types or classes 
of application which he would determine, or by him identifying 
individual applications he wished to determine. The third method was for 
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the SoS to exercise the power following representations. Section 35(1) 
merely stated M ••• in consequence of representations made to [the SOS] 
... ", suggesting that they could be made by any person at any time, 
although the SoS was not under a statutory duty to consider those 
representations, Thus representations could be made prior to an 
application even being considered by the WA, or during the course of the 
VA decision process, but the main example, contemplated by the Act, was 
where a person had made representations following the advertising of the 
application, and been informed by the WA of its intention to grant 
consent (as explained above), In other words effectively an -appeal M • An 
important educative feature, in this respect, was the requirement that 
the VA also had to notify the representor (but only him) that, within 21 
days of receiving the notice, he could request the SoS to determine the 
application, and the VA was thus barred from granting consent until the 
SoS had indicated whether he intended to determine the case (s. 
36(6)(b)(c».42 
It was indicated that in deciding whether to consider an application 
M the SoS [would] have particular regard to the extent to 
which the proposed discharge [was] of more than regional 
significance and to which it [would] raise novel or unusual 
issues which ha[d] not been publicly debated in another 
context M (DoE, Circular 17/84, para. 46).43 
In the case of a refusal to determine an application, following any form 
of representation, it is argued that reasons should have been provided 
for this decision. COPA did not require such a step, but it was 
indicated that the SoS would inform "third parties· of his decision 
<ibid., para. 40) - again the degree of detail would have been a matter 
of political will. 
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Mechanisms for DeterBUnation. Where the SoS had decided that he was 
going to decide an application, arising through whichever means, there 
were then three ways in which the application could be determined - the 
SoS could either decide the matter based on the information available to 
him, or he could direct a local inquiry or a hearing of the parties. 
Where either the applicant or the VA requested a hearing then the SOS 
was under a duty to provide this (s. 35(2». Where a hearing was to take 
place, the SoS was under a statutory duty s. 35(3) to give any person 
who originally made representations (at any stage of the decision 
process) the opportunity of being heard. The Act was, however, silent in 
relation to the alternative of an inquiry, but it was made clear by the 
DoE that the same position would apply. Equally, it was stated that for, 
either a hearing or an inquiry, members of the public who had not made 
representations would be heard at the discretion of the Inspector or 
person holding the hearing (DoE, Circular 17/84, para. 49). 
The TitaniuJII Dioxide Public Inquiries. As far as is known there was 
only one case44 where the decision-making was "transmittedW to the SoS 
for his determination. Although this related to Anglian Water, rather 
than Yorkshire Water, the case, being the only one of its kind, will be 
briefly reviewed, and the public inquiry mechanism considered in the 
light of the requirements of meaningful participation. The case 
concerned the two titanium dioxide manufacturers on the south bank of 
the river Humber - SCM Chemicals and Tioxide UK Ltd (TUKL) respectively. 
The background to this case lay in the (already mentioned) EC Directive 
Directive 78/176/EC on Waste from the Titanium Dioxide Industry (OJ L54, 
25 February 1978) which had, as its eventual aim, the reduction and then 
elimination of waste from the industry. The Directive required the 
establishment of "pollution reduction programmes" by 1 July 1980 (Arts. 
1(1) and 15) which were to set targets for reduction to be achieved by 1 
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July 1987 (Art. 9). The UK Programme in response to this, involved three 
phases - the first being a water quality survey of the estuary, 
undertaken by Anglian WaterAS in 1984, which sought to analyse the 
"polluting" effects of the discharges from the two existing outfalls, 
and the consequences of different outfall lengths.~6 Phase 2 was the 
construction of new outfalls implementing the best option, as identified 
by the survey (AW, 1987c). SCM proposed the building of a new 300m 
outfall (to replace the existing 50m) with a 50m "diffuser", whereas 
TUIL proposed a 1300m outfall to replace the existing 800m (ibid.). 
Although, in neither case the effluent volumes were being reduced, 
Anglian Water considered that there would be reductions of some 80% in 
the "environmental effects· of the discharges (AW, 1987b, p. 23). 
In both cases the new outfalls reqUired the consent of Anglian Water. 
Originally this was to be achieved by the variation of the twa 
companies' existing consents, but following discussions with the DoE, 
Anglian Water decided that bath cases were more appropriately treated as 
new applications under s. 34 (AV officer, pers. comm.). This is 
significant because, as will be discussed in the next chapter, where a 
variation of consent was to be carried out, the advertising and 
representations procedure did not apply (s. 37). However, it would apply 
(subject to s. 36(4» for new applications under s. 34. The applications 
were submitted by SCM an 29 August 1986 and TUKL on 22 October 1986. 47 
However, by letters dated 17 and 18 December 1986, the SoS advised 
Anglian Water that he was "calling-inll both applications for his own 
determination exercising his powers under s. 35(1), on the basis that 
Mthe issues raised by the proposed discharge[s] are such 
that it would be appropriate for [the SoS) to deal with the 
application[ s1" (per the letters). ~e 
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The decision of the SoS had a significant impact on the decision process 
by taking the decision out of Anglian Water's hands during its course49 
after the applications had been advertised, but before any 
representations had been received. Representations in respect of the 
TUKL application were later received from Greenpeace (19 December 1986) 
and XAFF (17 February 1987). 
From the point of view of meaningful partiCipation, a number of points 
can be made about the practice of the inquiries, based on impressions 
gained through attendance at the last day of each inquiry. so The 
inquiries were conducted by an independent Inspector assisted by a DoE 
Assessor, and notionally, the role of Anglian Water was intended to be 
neutral in assisting to provide the facts, however, the Authority 
considered itself less able to do this in the case of the SCM 
application because it objected significantly to the proposed increase 
in load. (SCM, in turn, considered Anglian Water had been "disgenerous 
and unhelpful"). The two companies and Anglian Water employed counsel as 
well as sending a number of staff as witnesses and for technical 
support. 51 In terms of representors, Greenpeace gave evidences2 along 
with a retired Anglian Water official (Chief Scientific Officer) who was 
permitted to speak at the discretion of the Inspector. From the point of 
view of those taking part, there is no doubt of the amount of detailed 
research that was required to understand the arguments and to provide 
information at the inquiry.53 
In relation to the general public, the same issue must be raised, 
especially in terms of the ability to follow the arguments and issues 
raised, given their technicality, and that proceedings were conducted 
for the benefit of the parties and not for the watching public,s4 
Clearly, an important point, therefore, was the availability of 
information during the proceedings. From a personal viewpoint (albeit 
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only attending the last days) it was not obvious how, or from whom, 
documents could be obtained - those on display were marked "not to be 
removed" - and there was no "secretariat" present to assist those 
attending in the way that was standard practice at eee meetings (chapter 
four).55 
The inquiries were advertised in local newspapers, although, according 
to Anglian Water staff, and members of the Press in attendance, there 
had been no "genuineM members of the public present, only a small number 
of people who were in some way associated with the parties (pers. 
comms.). Press attendance was, however, apparently consistent including 
local radio stations, IQcal newspapers and a BBe regional television 
news programme. 56 
In conclusion, the extent to which the inquiries were beneficial, both 
for deciding the issues and for providing any form of meaningful 
participation in the deciSion-making process, can be questioned. 
Clearly, a high level of technical expertise was required to participate 
with a view to seeking to influence the outcome. For those actually 
attending, or following proceedings through the Press, while this could, 
potentially, have an educative effect, it is suggested that this would 
have been very limited for those not already familiar with the subject 
matter. It is contended that far more attention needs to be paid to 
these issues before the inquiry process is again utilised. 
Final DetermanatloD by the sase Where the matter was placed in the 
hands of the SoS, he was required to direct the VA to grant consent, 
conditionally or not, or to refuse it (s. 35(4». The final decision to 
gra~t the above consents, subject to conditions, was taken in June 1988. 
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d. Participation in the Appeal System 
The final stage in the decision-making for new consents was the right of 
an applicant to appeal against either the refusal of a consent, or 
against the conditions imposed on a consent - in both cases on the basis 
that the decision was "unreasonable" (s. 39(1».57 Limited public 
participation was provided for in this case, the extent of which will be 
outlined. First, it should be noted that the appeal was as of "right" 
whereas, as explained above, the public could only request that the SOS 
determine the application. Second, the introduction of the public into 
the decision process raises the question of whether appeals would have 
been more likely, assuming that the decision to grant consent was no 
longer a matter of (solely) private bargaining between the applicant and 
the VA.s8 
The opportunities for participation in the case of appeals, were 
essentially the same as the procedure for the SoS to determine 
applications ab initio (supra.). Thus, the VA was required to inform 
anyone who made representations in relation to the original application 
of the appeal within 14 days of the VA being informed of the appeal by 
the SoS. This had to include informing the representor that he had the 
right to make further representations within 21 days (Sl 1984/865, 
Regulation 7). The SoS was then under the vaguely worded duty" ... to 
take account of ... " such representations (s. 39(5». Again, therefore, 
the importance of having made representations at the initial stage of 
the decision process is clear. 59 The DoE recognised the importance of 
this procedure for education, given that there was no requirement in 
COPA for appeals to be advertised. The procedure had the aim of seeking 
"to ensure that the SoS may be aware of matters raised with a ~A in 
t " (D E Cl'rcular 17/84, para, 45).60 response to an earlier advertisemen 0 , 
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The procedure for hearing the appeal was also very similar to SoS 
determinations under s. 35. Thus the SoS could either determine the 
matter on the evidence available 
announcing his intention to do so 
the VA or the appellant 
to him, but not before 14 days from 
had elapsed, during which time either 
request that there be further could 
investigation. In such a case it was for the discretion of the SoS to 
decide whether to adopt the local inquiry or hearing approach. 
Presumably it would have been open to third party representors to make a 
similar request, although the regulations did not provide for this. 
Although the regulations were silent, the DoE indicated that those who 
made representations, either originally, 
would be heard at either the hearing or 
other members of the public would be 
or in respect of the appeal, 
the inquiry, and at an inquiry 
heard at the discretion of the 
Inspector (DoE, 1983a, para. 48). No evidence is available of the extent 
of any public participation in the appeals process, but as far as is 
known. no inquiries were held. Finally, the 80S was empowered to direct 
the VA "as he [thought] fit" with regard to any aspect of the original 
decision which he deemed to be unreasonable (subs. (6». 
With regard to the process of appeals, the 
involved through making representations in 
application can be noted, and hence, the 
importance of having been 
respect of the original 
essential nature of the 
original application actually being advertised, rather than s. 36(4) 
being too readily used by the WAs. Again, as seemed to be a common 
feature of the COPA provisions, there was no formal requirement for 
communication by the decision-maker following the making of the 
decision, either as to the reasons for the decision, or in terms of the 
effect of individual representations. This may have occurred informally, 
but should be encouraged at all times, it is submitted. 
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e. other Iecbanisms for Participation in Consent Setting 
The structures outlined in chapters three d f an our could be expected to 
provide an important means through which the process of consent setting 
could be monitored and communication undertaken i 11 
- espec a y with regard 
to wider issues of policy, including the use of s. 36(4), However, an 
analysis of the minutes of the CCCs, RRCC, and RFAC for Yorkshire Water, 
reveals that this was barely the case. S1 Whether this was the result of 
a lack of education or interest, can only be the basis for 
speculation. s2 
c. Decision-Iaking Procedures in Respect of other Discharges 
The above presents the decision-making process, and the opportunities 
for public participation in respect thereof, as it was intended to 
operate for applications for new consents. However, in practice this 
provided only a proportion of the pollution control regime, because 
there were a range of other categories of discharges which were 
controlled in different ways. These will be briefly outlined because of 
the implications for achieving meaningful participation based on a 
principled approach - clearly if the above system did not operate in all 
cases, this provided for an important external constraint on meaningful 
participation. 
Dischar,ges KristiDH but UncDnsented before 1974. The most significant 
problem related to the "troubled" history of the introduction of 
extensive controls through COPA II - first, the delayed implementation, 
and then the system of phasing through exemptions and deemed consents. 
As the nature of this process, and its implications for the above 
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procedures, has already been analysed (Burton 1987a), it is intended 
here only to place this analysis in the framework of the requirements of 
meaningful participation. To summarise the position, the combined effect 
of the Rivers (Prevention of Pollution) Acts 1951-61 (supra, chapter 
two) was that discharges to estuarine and coastal waters commenced 
before 1960 did not require consent unless, since that date, they had 
been "substantially altered",63 This created two problems. First, it 
meant that there was no comprehenSive control of water pollution in 
England and Wales (as identified for instance by the Jeger report [MHLG, 
1970]), so that a true system of WQO/Ss could not be put into effect. 
Second, EC obligations in relation to such waters could not be fulfilled 
because a number of Directives required that affected discharges be 
"authorised" in advance. COPA offered the solution to both,64 however, 
as argued in chapter two, successive Administrations put the concerns of 
industry, including the WAs, and public expenditure requirements, first. 
This was reflected in the manner in which COPA II was finally 
implemented. First, all discharges unconsented before 1974,65 other than 
those needing consent to meet EC requirements, were exempted from 
control (SI 1983/1182). Second, those discharges which did need a 
consent for EC purposes66 were granted "deemed consents" - in other 
words an unconditional consent allowing the discharge to continue as 
before, lawfully, until such time as the VA chose, or was able or 
required, to set conditions. Finally, when the above exemptions were 
withdrawn (for the majority of discharges), in October 1987, those 
discharges losing their exemption were eligible for deemed consents 
also,67 The effect of this whole approach was that, even after 1987, 
many discharges, especially to estuarine and coastal waters, were 
subject only to notional control - with no conditions imposed and hence, 
no monitoring,6B Furthermore, it was not expected that the setting of 
conditions termed "posi ti ve determination" could be achieved 
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immediately; the DoE merely required that it be achieved by 1992 - 18 
years after the enactment of COPA.69 
Of greater significance for the requirements of meaningful participation 
based on a principled approach, was the way that the COP! requirements 
for public involvement were blatantly side-stepped in respect of the 
above, further suggesting. if not a lack of co~tment by all parties to 
the concept of meaningful participation, at least an indication of the 
dominance of the business principles ethos. It would seem doubtful that 
there was any significant "public M participation in the decisions as to 
how and when to introduce control in the manner described above. 
Regarding the 1983 exemptions mechanisms such as the GGGs, for 
instance, were not operational, and the 1987 changes were not put to the 
committees according to the minutes for Yorkshire Water. 
In terms of the introduction of control, two stages can be considered. 
First, when a deemed consent was applied for (either for EG affected 
discharges or those in 1987) the DoE M advised"70 that such applications 
would not require advertising (and hence attract the procedures 
appropriate for new consents), on the basis that the deemed consent 
would be granted under s. 40(4) (which provided for transitional 
arrangements). They were not applications for consent under s. 34 -
because they were merely the continuation of existing discharges - and 
s. 36(1) clearly applied only to such applications under s. 34 (DoE, 
1982b). Second, even at the stage when consent conditions were to be 
imposed in respect of the discharge, the WAs were to be entitled to 
utilise s. 36(4) and waive the requirement to advertise, because the 
discharge would have already demonstrated its effect on the receiving 
water and, therefore, in most cases, indicated that the discharge would 
have "no appreciable effect" (DoE, 1983a, para. 14). While the latter 
may be justifiable on the wording of the Act, it is submitted that both 
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approaches fly in the face of the requirements for a principled 
approach. It is difficult to see why public participation was warranted, 
and accepted as such, for entirely new discharges, but not for existing 
discharges for which control was finally being introduced. The aim of 
COPA was, and should have been, to enable (meaningful) participation in 
the whole regime of water pollution regulation. 71 
Finally, in respect of the process of introducing control, when 
conditions were being set for deemed consents, the discharger had the 
right of appeal,72 but because there had been no advertising in the 
first place, there was no right for the public to be involved in the 
determination of the appeal through representations or attendance at any 
hearing or inquiry. 73 Arguably members of the public could have sought 
infor~lly to persuade the SoS to exercise his general discretionary 
powers to hold a public inquiry under s. 96, but this would not have 
been an ideal means for involving the public, in terms of an opportunity 
to influence the outcome of the decision. 7. 
I I. THE CONTROL OF "IRREGULAR- POLLUTIONS 
Having considered the decision-making process for discharges of trade 
and sewage effluent, and the opportunities for public participation 
therein, to complete the picture it is necessary to take account of the 
way in which other forms of pollution were sought to be controlled. This 
relates to the "irregular" pollutions which arose through accidents and 
deliberate acts, which were not discharged systematically as part of the 
production process. 76 Control of such forms of pollution will be 
considered in two respects. First, in the remainder of this chapter, the 
powers for seeking to prevent such pollution will be outlined - this 
will, however, be brief, because, despite the importance of the powers, 
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few were actually implemented during the life of COP!, and the range of 
opportunities for public participation were distinctly limited. Second, 
in the next chapter, the controls available ex post facto will be 
explained. Under COPA it was an offence for any person to Mcause or 
knowingly permit- any Npoisonous, noxious 
waters controlled by the Act (s. 31). 
or polluting matter- to enter 
The main sanction against this 
was, therefore, in the form of criminal prosecution. 
A. Voluntary Control 
By way of introduction, it can be noted that a great deal of emphasis 
was placed, by the WAs, on the use of voluntary control through 
persuasion, rather than resort to formal legal powers. 76 For instance, 
the use of intensive campaigns by Yorkshire Water in relation to 
farmers, can be noted. Inevitably, therefore, there was limited scope 
for public involvement and scrutiny of this process,77 and all attempts 
to persuade the WA to act, or explain its actions or inactions, would 
have had to have been directed informally or via the committee system. 
B. The Imposition of Legal Controls 
A range of formal legal powers to prevent pollution were specified in 
COPA but their impact in practice was limited. However, as will be seen 
in the final chapter, in respect of the NRA, the importance of powers 
for pollution prevention, and their practical value, is being 
increasingly recognised. 
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1. Regulations to Control Activities Likely to Cause Pollution 
The first controls which can be noted are those which would have enabled 
the WAs to limit pollution in relation to specific activities, including 
in specified areas. Section 31(4) provided for the SoS to make 
regulations 
" ... as to the precautions to be taken, by any person having 
the custody or control of any poisonous, noxious or 
polluting matter, for the purpose of preventing the matter 
from entering any relevant waters ... " 
and the subsection further provided that contravention of such 
regulations could be a criminal offence. The main context in which such 
regulations were envisaged was with regard to the storage of potentially 
polluting substances, and in particular, given the concerns of the 
Environment Committee (HC 183, 1986/7, para. 65 et seq.), slurry and 
silage liquors. This would have enabled requirements as to the 
construction and location of storage facilities to be specified. Section 
31(5) also provided for regulations to be made where the SoS deemed it 
fitting "to prohibit or restrict" activities in specified areas where 
those activities were likely to cause pollution. This could have 
included specifying that such activities could only be carried on in the 
specified areas with the conditional consent of the WA, again with the 
threat of criminal sanction for non-compliance. In this context it was 
envisaged that regulations would be designed to protect particular 
areas, such as around water supply boreholes, and those areas badly 
affected by nitrate pollution. 78 
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2. "Anti-Pollution Operations" 
The powers of the WAs to carry out, 
following pollution incidents, will be 
or require, clean-up operations 
explained in the next chapter. 
Under s. 46(4) the WAs also had powers to carry out "operations as ... 
consider[ed] appropriate" where they believed that any "poisonous, 
noxious or polluting matter, or any solid waste matter [wa]s likely to 
enter ... any relevant waters" for the purpose of preventing the 
entry.79 This provision was implemented (unlike s. 46(1)-(3» and also 
included, by subs. (5), the power to recover costs from persons who 
caused the matter to be in any place from which the above perceived 
entry was possible. eo 
3. Iotices to Abstain from "Good Agricultural Practice" 
As will be noted in the next chapter, it was a defence to a charge of 
"causing or knowingly permitting" "pollution" (under s. 31(1», if the 
incident had arisen in the course of farming practices recommended by a 
code of practice developed by XAFF (subs. (2)(c». COPA provided a means 
by which this defence could be withdrawn in individual cases, where the 
VA believed that pollution had, or could arise, through such practices 
(s. 51). Section 51, however, provided for a complex procedure, whereby 
the VA was required to request the SoS to serve a notice on "the 
occupier" "requesti~·el him to cease potentially polluting practices, 
thereby withdrawing the defence. Copies were to be served on MAFF, and 
the occupier, who was given a 21 day period within which to make 
representations to the SoS; the latter 
(subs. (2)(3». Despite the widespread 
procedure under s. 51 was never used. B2 
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being required to consider them 
criticisms of the code, the 
4. Opportunities for Meaningful Participation in Relation to Pollution 
Prevention 
In each of the above cases COPA did not lay down any for~l mechanisms 
for public involvement, in stark contrast to the position for the 
setting of discharge consents. From the point of view of a principled 
approach this is unfortunate. Further, it is disconcerting that the full 
process of pollution control, envisaged by the Legislative, was not 
given effect to, in this case in the form of the SoS not making 
regulations, where there was a demonstrable need. In relation to such 
(non) decision-making, the point can again be made of the need for 
public participation, but the example considered here, is no more than a 
reflection of the absence of adequate mechanisms in relation to central 
government. 
Because of the absence of opportunities at the VA level, participation 
would have been dependant on political will on the part of the WAs in 
being prepared to accept informal communication, and it can be suggested 
that, more than ever, the Yorkshire Water committee system would have 
had an important role to play. Surprisingly this potential was, once 
more, not realised.B3 Few examples can be traced from the minutes of the 
respective commdttees,e4 although the benefit of the committees for the 
provision of information can clearly be seen, for instance, in the way 
that standing reports were provided of pollution incidents and actions 
taken in relation thereto, especially to the WQAG.es 
III. CONCLUSIOIS 
In conclusion, it can be argued that, although COPA II appeared to offer 
a developed concept of public participation at the a priori stage of 
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imposing control over pollution, practice reveals the emptiness of the 
promise. First, because of the lack of commitment on the part of 
government and industry, including the WAs. Higher priority was attached 
to the consequences of costs and public expenditure, so that 
implementation was delayed, and then phased-in in such a manner that the 
public participation requirements were by-passed, or rendered almost 
otiose. By the end of the period of service of the WAs in 1989, the 
public involvement procedures still accounted for only a proportion of 
the total regulatory decision-making process. Second, a principled 
approach was not achieved with regard to "irregular- pollutions, with 
heavy reliance being placed on informal methods and the (already 
analysed) VA committee system, which, it is submitted, failed to achieve 
its full potential in this context, either as a means for educatioD, or 
communicatioD. 
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IOTES: 
1 It should be noted that the discharge of any substance not falling 
within the terms "trade" or Nsewage effluentN (s. 105 COP!) would be 
treated as an irregular pollution. 
2 While discharges of effluent to sewers (commonly known as -trade 
effluent"), and the control of abstractions, are also important in 
overall pollution control terms, limited reference will be made to 
them in the next twa chapters given the limitations of space and the 
desire to provide a more detailed account of the position for 
"direct" discharges. The emphasis of the chapter will also be on 
consents issued after 1984, as this illustrates how COP! had been 
• intended to operate, although it will be seen that this position was 
not as common in practice as it should have been. 
3 This is even more crucial in the case of the WAs because, as already 
noted, they were not just "regulators", but also major dischargers of 
effluent. 
4 See NWC, 1977, para. 9. As argued in chapter two, the "fear" of 
private prosecutions was a key factor in the perceived need for the 
review - according to the NVC to avoid prosecutions "at random" 
(ibid.). A useful account of the NVC document is provided by Bates, 
1979, and see further, Purdue, 1979, Lester (1979, p. 432), Hawkins 
(1984, pp. 34-5), and Robinson, R, "The Control of Pollution Act 
1974: Implications for River Quality Management", (1980) 34 Journal 
of the Institution of Vater Engineers and Scientists 129, p. 132 et 
seq.). Hammerton (1983, p. 345) has indicated that a similar review 
was undertaken in Scotland in 1965, but not in 1978 - notably private 
prosecutions were not to be introduced by COP! for Scotland. It 
should be noted that the review only applied to WA discharges (to 
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inland waters), although the HVC stre~sed th 
- e need for "parityW with 
non VA discharges (1977, para. 16). 
6 See further Fish and Wood (1977, pp. 28 9) h 
- w 0 argued that it was 
"illogical" to impose a consent that a works could not meet. 
6 The IVC claimed that the process would not have an "unacceptable 
adverse" effect on river quality (ibid., para. 3), but it is 
submitted that this misses the point. 
7 Details are again found in the Annual Reports and Authority and 
Committee minutes. 
e Some 431 disCharges were identified as failing. This was to include 
non VA discharges it would seem. (ibid,). 
9 It is not clear at what point it was carried out, however. 
10 Assuming it was ever undertaken. 
11 The possible consequences of the change of Government, May 1979, must 
also be noted (chapter two). This had the immediate effect of the 
plans to implement COPA II being abandoned in the short term. Any 
original urgency, in the process of reviewing consents, was thus 
dissipated. 
12 This was particularly through increased agricultural loads and loads 
from new housing estates (CSO, Yorkshire Water, pers. comm.). 
13 In accordance with new DoE policy, "descriptive consents· (ie those 
not including numerical conditions) were applied for in respect of 
240 of Yorkshire Water's 550 works - being "small· works serving less 
than 250 people (Annual Report 1985, p. 18, and see Matthews, 1985, 
pp. 81-2). Doughty (1988) has argued that there was, effectively, a 
further "review', in the form of the formal introduction of the 95%-
ile as a condition of VA (but not non-VA) consents, achieved through 
a "national notice of variation" (Matthews, 1985, p. 81) in January 
1985. This replaced the, previously informal, agreement (that 100 per 
cent compliance would not be required) with a clear provision open to 
bli ti ( B t 1989a P 201,' Matthews, 1987, p. 143 et pu c scru ny see ur on ,. 
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seq., and DoE, 1985). The implications of the 95t-ile will be 
considered further in the next chapter. Finally, the effects of the 
way in which COPA II was implemented (as discussed below) must be 
noted, as this also limited the achievement of a true VQO-consent 
regime. 
14 The importance of the practice of the VAs is indicated by their role 
in defining the "boundaries of regulatory deviance ... pollution, in 
other words, is an administrative creation ... agencies ... actually 
determine the reach of the law they exercise a real legislative 
authority· (Hawkins, 1984, p. 23). For the theoretical perspective to 
consent setting see Hawkins (ibid.), Richardson et Bl (1982), and 
Brittan (1984), especially as to the kind of factors that VA staff 
and dischargers considered important in the process of bargaining. 
All of these works, however, pre-date public involvement in the 
process. It is not intended to duplicate their analysis here. 
15 See COPA s. 55, the Control of Pollution (Discharges by Authorities) 
Regulations 1984, 81 1984/1200, explained by DoE, Consultation Letter 
VS/920/40, 16 March 1983. 
16 Further see DoE, Circular 7/89. It should be noted that under Article 
5(3) of Council Directive 76/464/EC, the "competent authority" was 
required to refuse consent where it was "evident" that the discharger 
would not be able to comply with the appropriate standards. 
17 Such as to further conservation, discussed in chapter three. 
19 Section 34 actually specified a number of conditions which could be 
included, but this was stated not to be inclusive; nor did it provide 
any of the actual standards for individual substances - thus the 
labelling of COPA II as a "framework" Act, as noted in chapter two. 
h id the kind of "objective" approach to consent The VQO approac proves 
For a setting that Brittan (1984, p. 7) identified as absent. 
detailed (technical) account of the process of deriving consent 
conditions from WQSs, see Fish and Wood (1977), Warn, A E, 
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"Calculating Consent Conditions to Achieve River Quality Objectives., 
(1982) 22 Effluent and Water Treatment Journal 152, Warn, A E, and 
Matthews, P J, "Calculation of the Compliance of Discharges With 
Emission Standards", (1984) 16 Water Science Technology 183. 
19 See NWC, 1978, para. 22. The problem of the size of the "mixing zone" 
was referred to in the previous chapter. A further problem related to 
those cases where the WA did not have the legal powers to deal with a 
source of pollution - the example of waters from abandoned mines 
having already been noted. The issue of farming practices will be 
considered post. 
20 Hawkins has spoken of their "fear", and note his explanations of 
appeals limiting the WAs "whip hand" (1984, pp. 27-8). See further 
Greenpeace, Aspects of River Quality Management - Submssion to the 
Royal COnmUssion on Environmental Pollution, (1987), p. 4. Richardson 
et a1 (1982) have suggested that appeals were a means to control VA 
discretion <pp. 47-8). 
21 Thames Vater officers indicated that they only provided forms via 
field officers so that the latter could discuss the application with 
the would-be discharger (pers. comm.). Note further the Guidance 
Leaflet (VAA/NFU/CLA, COPA 2 - Guidance on the Application of the Act 
to Agriculture in England and Vales, 1985), at para. 3.4, Trice and 
Godwin, 1974, p. 324, and James, 1984, p. 582. 
22 Commencement Order No. 17, SI 1984/853. 
23 See Kacrory, 1984, p. 3. 
24 The second exception was the provision under s. 42 allowing 
applications to be exempted from publicity, by the SoS, where "trade 
secrets" were involved. As far as is known no such certificates were 
ever granted. 
26 The point can be made that the decision to grant consent would in 
most cases have been made prior to submission of the application as 
noted above, but the sub-section does require that this be settled 
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without public involvement 
conditions to be included in the 
negotiation. 
only the decision as to actual 
consent would therefore be open to 
26 And see Matthews, 1987, p. 141, Howarth, 1989, pp. 34-5. 
27 This policy was discussed at the VQAG on 20 December 1983 and was, 
therefore, open to, at least limited, scrutiny. Again it can be 
argued that it was important that the public could seek to influence 
such a policy. 
28 It should be noted that the VA was entitled to recover the cost of 
advertising from the applicant (subs. (3» so the cost factor should 
not have dissuaded the WAs from requiring advertising. 
29 Interestingly, in the case of the "time limited consents" ("revised" 
consents designed to prevent VA discharges falling foul of the law, 
and hence being liable to prosecution, until all improvement work 
could be carried out, by 1992, when the original consents will be 
re-instated) issued for WA discharges in 1989, the Government stated 
that all 1800 of these would be advertised despite apparently falling 
within subs. (4) (according to the Earl of Caithness [ Vater Bulletin, 
2 June 1989, p. 17]). 
30 Kacrory (1984, pp. 3-4) has suggested that the registers provided a 
potential means through which the public could seek to influence the 
WAs' decision to advertise, but clearly this would have required 
continious monitoring of the register, and for the application to 
have been entered before the decision not to advertise had been 
taken. Entries were required within 28 days of receipt of the 
application (SI 1985/813, Regulation 4(2), subject to exceptions). 
31 The applicant was also required 
locality of the proposed point of 
to specify a place "within the 
discharge" at which copies of the 
1984/864, Schedule), which in the application could be inspected (SI 
case of non-VA discharges could have been the offices of the 
discharger. This offered a further opportunity, but again involving 
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commitment on the part of the public. Also note the idea of automatic 
notification of particular (amenities) bodies, put forward by Macrory 
(1984, p. 3). 
32 MAFF was also specified (where the discharge was to be made to 
estuarine and coastal waters) i it t t t g ven s s a u ory interest in 
relation to fisheries. This would appear to have no informational 
value for the public. 
33 Note that when this provision was enacted, it had been envisaged that 
local authority members would form the majority on each VA. 
34 As to which see Bates, 1979. 
3S Importantly. the advertisements were required to state that 
representations could be made by a specified date, in writing, and 
giving the appropriate address (S1 1984/864). 
36 Informal discussions with GGG members gave a similar impression. 
37 Initial findings are presented in Burton and Freestone, 1986. 
38 And of one application actually being withdrawn (Thames). 
39 In relation to the "time limited consents" [supra.], the advertising 
of them led to concerted representation campaigns by Friends of the 
Earth and the AGA/National Federation of Anglers (Angling Times, 28 
June 1989). However, it can be strongly argued that such advertising 
was no more than legitimation, with the DoE clearly intending that 
such consents would be granted. For instance, a DoE spokesman is 
quoted as saying that objections would be taken into account, but 
those who " ... object[ed] for the sake of it [would] be objecting to 
realityM <Angling Times, 7 June 1989). 
40 This "three months" rule was the cause of some concern for VA staff, 
especially as it did not apply to DoE determinations of WA 
applications, and if advertising was completed, it was a tight 
timetable after six weeks had been allowed for representations. Again 
the process of "prior negotiation" was deemed important and, 
comparisons were made with the abstraction licence process, where the 
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applicant was responsible for fulfilling the advertising requirement 
(pers. comm.). 
A1 It is also contended that the WAs should have been prepared to give 
reasons to anyone requesting them, not just to those who made 
representations. 
A2 Where this applied, the three month time limit was suspended <ibid., 
subs. (6». Disconcertingly, Mservice of the noticeM was to be in 
accordance with s. 95 which did not appear to require the use of 
registered post, thus indicating the possibility that, if the letter 
never arrived, the representor would lose his notification. For 
further details of the procedures involved see SI 1984/865, and DoE, 
1983a. 
43 It should be noted that where the SoS took over an application which 
had not by then been advertised, advertising would continue to be 
carried out in accordance with the modified procedures specified in 
Regulation 4 of SI 1984/865, and, Mas a matter of policyM, the SoS 
intended that all applications under his consideration would be 
advertised even where the WA had not intended to advertise (DoE, 
1983a, para. 32). 
44 In fact two applications, but they were treated together. 
4& The VA with jurisdiction over the section of the south bank in 
question. 
46 See AW, 1987a and AW, 1987c. The documents referred to are those 
prepared by the two companies and Anglian Water specifically for the 
inquiry. I am grateful to all three parties for supplying copies of 
the documents. 
47 In both applications the companies proposed to increase the loads of 
the discharges to enable them to increase production; a point which 
was of concern to Anglian Water at the ensuing inquiries. 
49 Two contrasting views have been offered of the rationale for the 
call-in. First, the desire for the Government to be seen to be acting 
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A9 
60 
in respect of the Directive, given the "threat" of future Directives 
in relation to the industry, and second, that the SoS wished the 
matter to be settled "in front of the people" (both pers. comm. ). 
With the effect that the proposed new consents were never put to the 
Authority Board. 
These were held, successively for one week each in October 1981, at 
Grimsby Town Hall. References are to notes taken from the 
Proceedings, unless otherwise stated. Through 96 f COPA h s. 0 suc 
inquiries were to be conducted in accordance with s. 250 Local 
Government Act 1972. 
61 It was noticeable that, generally, each of the days' proceedings were 
conducted "congenially", although they became far more adversarial 
during the closing speeches. The Inspector, however, commented that 
the inquiry had been carried out in a "helpful" manner. 
62 Although, apparently, the person who wrote their formal evidence was 
not available having been arrested in international waters a few days 
earlier (pers. comm.). 
63 In particular, a familiarity with the titanium dioxide industry, and 
production processes and problems, was required, as well as knowledge 
of water quality management. An Anglian Water officer has suggested 
that one possible benefit of the inquiries would have been in 
demonstrating the complexity of setting consents for estuarine 
discharges <pers. comm.). 
54 This point can be emphasised by the way in which a notable amount of 
"bargaining" was undertaken outside of the inquiry room - at the TUKL 
inquiry the parties were given an extra 25 minutes after lunch for 
this purpose. Importantly, such negotiations did not include the 
representors. Further, there was also the issue of a DoE document 
which was apparently "restricted". It had been made available to TUKL 
d t b made available to SCM during the and Anglian Vater, an was 0 e 
i that the company could respond to its course of the inqu ry so 
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contents in their closing speech. Naturally the document, or its 
implications, were not made available to the public. 
66 It was indicated, by Anglian Vater, that they were responsible for 
local administration and that documentation was available (pers. 
comm. ). 
66 The role of the Press as a mechanism for meaningful participation 
must again be considered in the light of the analysis in chapter 
three. 
67 The procedures for appeals were provided in SI 1984/865, regulation 
7. 
68 As noted earlier, under COP A , the right of appeal could no longer be 
used as a "delaying tactic" by the applicant, the decision of the VA 
being deemed "reasonable" unless the SoS determined otherwise (subs. 
(7». 
69 This was a matter of some concern to Viscount Dilhorne during the 
enactment of the Bill - for instance, Hansard, HL, vol. 348, col. 
1691; 24 January 1974. 
60 Note that the SoS was required to send copies of further 
representations to both the VA and the appellant. 
61 It should be noted that consideration of the consent process was part 
of the terms of reference for the WQAG, but again consideration 
seemed to be far less than might be expected. 
62 Two examples can be given. At two meetings of the North and East 
Division CCC, inquiries were made by members as to the procedures for 
issuing and reviewing consents, and sampling, and the methods of 
advertising (minutes, 20 January and 2 June 1986). Second, at a 
meeting of the RRCC, the Nature Conservancy Council sought an 
assurance, which was received, that the conservation of wildlife was 
one of the criteria taken into account when considering consents for 
agricultural discharges (RRCC Annual Report 1984/5, para. 14). 
63 For example the TUKL discharge (supra.). 
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64 Although it should be noted that COPA was not enacted with EC 
requirements in mind. 
66 With the special exception of those to the Kersey. 
66 See further DoE, 1982b. 
67 SI 1986/1623 and SI 1987/1782. As to "deemed consentsw and their 
effect on river quality - Birch, 1988, and the Environment COmmittee, 
He 183, 1986/7, para. 107. 
68 The implications of which are considered in the next chapter. 
69 And, as it turned out, 3 years after its repeal and re-enactment! See 
DoE, 1986a, para. 6, and Burton 1987a, pp. 12-17. 
70 Government by "administration" once more? 
71 Further, note the incongruities with the DoE's views regarding 
applications "pending", already pointed out, 1987a, p. 18. The WAs 
were required to enter all deemed consents on the public registers, 
thus providing a very limited opportunity for the public to seek to 
solicit, infor~lly, the WAs to impose conditions - the timing of the 
decision to set conditions being equally important, it is submitted. 
72 Section 39. Again the decision of the VA was to be deemed 
"unreasonable" until the SoS decided otherwise (SI 1986/1623, 
Regulation 3(c»j clf the position for new discharges (supra.). 
73 Except as a member of the public per se, at a local inquiry. 
74 Other categories of discharge which can be referred to, include those 
applications which were pending on the day on which s. 34 came into 
force - in other words, having been originally submitted under pre-
COPA legislation. The DoE considered that to fulfil the spirit of 
COPA, especially with regard to advertising, these were best treated 
as new applications under s. 34 and hence, subject to s. 36 (DoE, 
1983a, paras. 17-18). Those consents which had been issued under 
pre-COPA legislation were to be translated (by s. 40) as if granted 
under COPA, and hence, valid as a defence to offences under s. 32. 
Thus participation in respect of such discharges could only arise in 
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respect of the enforcement and review of the discharge as indicated 
in the next chapter. Finally, those discharges commenced after COPA 
had received Royal Assent, but before it was implemented, posed 
something of a legal problem, having not been contemplated by the Act 
(Sayers, pers. comm.). Xost of these had been exempted until 1987 
under S1 1983/1162. 
76 It is worth noting that the Environment Committee were of the view 
that regular discharges under COP A had been generally well 
controlled, (c/f, Birch, T, Poison in the System - A Critical Review 
of the Role of Industry, Vater Authorities, the Public and the 
Control of Pollution Act 1974 in Water Pollution, (1988), p. 44), but 
they were far more concerned over the control of irregular pollutions 
especially in relation to farming practices (HC 183, 1986/7, para. 96 
and chapter 6). 
76 See for instance the work of Hawkins already cited. 
77 The value of the Yorkshire Vater committees, especially the WQAG, can 
again be noted, including the way in which they were provided with 
detailed reports on pollution incidents, including any action that 
had been taken in respect of such incidents (chapter four). 
7e See for instance, the references to "water protection zones" in the 
Green Paper (DoE, 198Gb, sections 5 and 7), and HC 183, 1986/7, para. 
83. Eastwood and Ord. (1986, p. 242) have suggested that farming and 
forestry were the most likely to be affected. 
79 However, the WAs were specifically barred from impeding a discharge 
consented by them under s. 34. 
eo Concern has been expressed, however, about the type of work which 
could constitute "operations" and hence, be eligible for cost 
recovery; notably it has been suggested that the provision of 
"advice" would fall outside this criteria (Howarth, 1989, pp. 36-7), 
WAs also expressed concern about how they would make use of the s. 46 
powers <reported in Burton and Freestone, 1986, pp. 253-4). 
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81 As to which see Howarth, 1989, p. 31. Generally see McLoughlin, J, 
"The Control of Pollution Act 1974 M , (1975) Journal of Environment 
and Planning Law 77. 
82 Note that the Government were, apparently, of the view that because 
of the code, no regulations under s. 31(4) were needed (DoE, 1986b, 
para. 5.4); the Environment Committee, however, gave this a frosty 
reception (HC 183, 1986/7, para. 75). As to WA bye-law making powers, 
see s. 31(6). 
83 Although quaere the potential workload, especially given the 
irregularity of CCC/RRCC meetings. 
84 One incident which was considered was a pollution of the river Don in 
1984, raised by a member of the RRCC, who urged action to be taken to 
prevent future oil spillages of this kind (RRCC Annual Report 1984/5, 
para. 15). 
as Given its specialised role in relation to pollution. 
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CHAPTER SEVE. 
Retaining Control 
- The Enforce~nt Process 
In chapter six the process of seeking to prevent pollution by imposing 
control over systematic and irregular discharges, and the opportunities 
for public participation in relation to that process was explained. Once 
such control was imposed, the next stage in the regulation of water 
pollution was the monitoring of both systematic discharges and the 
waters being protected. Where non-compliance with the legal requirements 
was identified, various forms of enforcement action would ensue-
prosecution in a criminal court being the ultimate sanction. It is 
intended to outline these two remaining stages of the control process, 
identifying the scope for public participation, and effecting a 
comparison with the principles of meaningful participation. 
Consideration of these aspects is important given public concern that 
consent compliance, especially by the WAs, attracted towards the end of 
the 1980s. COPA was also significant in, for the first time, providing 
the public with the right to prosecute any "polluter-, including for 
exceeding the conditions of a consent; during the period under study 
four WAs were prosecuted by members of the public. It will be suggested 
that undertaking a private prosecution was exceedingly complex and 
subject to a range of external constraints. It will be noted that the 
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impact of the public on the relationship between the -polluter- and the 
regulator, a relationship which was barely scrutinised in practice, was 
potentially significant - developing far more transparency, and arguably 
a more objective approach to determinations of compliance and 
enforcement. 
The importance of the process of achieving compliance as part of the 
whole regulatory regime, must be noted with regard to meaningful 
participation in practice. Having (theoretically> agreed the targets for 
each stretch of river in the form of WQOs, and then translated these 
through WQS to discharge consents, it is essential that consent 
compliance was achieved, otherwise the whole concept of publicly agreed 
WQOs would be negated. In this chapter, account will be taken of the 
formal mechanisms in relation to Yorkshire Water, although reference 
will be made to the practice and experience of other WAs, especially 
where important examples are available. 1 
I. IOIITORIIG OOIPLIAICH 
A. Discharges of Trade and SelRlge Effl uent 
1. The Process of ](oni tori ng 
The main concern here is the way in which monitoring of compliance, both 
with WQO/Ss and individual discharge consents, was carried out - the 
d the invol vement of the public in that deCision-making process an 
th xt t to which the public could find out process, and hence, e e en 
whether compliance was being achieved. The latter could be attempted in 
two ways - either through the public taking their own samples, or 
seeking to obtain the results of monitoring by the VA (or by 
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dischargers). It can, therefore, be seen that the extent, and way in 
which, such monitoring was carried out would have significant 
consequences for the nature, and amount, of information available to the 
public through which to judge if the agreed consents and VQOs were being 
achieved. 2 It is submitted that the decision process relating to 
monitoring should have been subject to the prinCiples of meaningful 
participation, given that monitoring provided the -gateway· to later 
stages of enforcement, as discussed below. 
It will be suggested that in practice the decisions regarding monitoring 
were largely a matter of discretion for the VAs, and there was 
significantly limited scope for public involvement through fDr~l 
mechanisms, other than the process of VA comDdttees. However, in terms 
of actually obtaining the results of such monitoring, there was a key 
facility in the form of the public registers. For this reason emphasis 
will be placed on the latter, but with the former outlined by way of 
comparison. 
a. Icnitoring by the WAs 
It would appear that the VAs possessed significant discretion in 
practice as to the extent of the monitoring undertaken, although the 
limitations on this, and the factors taken into account can, be noted. 
First, various EC Directives laid down minimum requirements as regards 
regularity the regularity of sampling, and the locations of sampling 
points. 3 Second, practical considerations were important, especially 
with regard to the resources that monitoring involved in terms of the 
actual equipment,4 man-hours of the field officers taking the samples, 
and of the laboratory staff in analysing the samples. Vith regard to non 
VA discharges, there was no formal or Htransparent M regime for the 
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actual regularity of sampling, but VAs took into account factors such as 
the potentially polluting effect of the discharge (including the type of 
substances involved), the volume, and the nature of the receiving water 
in question (pers. comm. WA officers). legotiations with the discharger 
would also take place. Finally, the record of the discharger would be 
significant - a discharger with a history of non-compliance being likely 
to be sampled more often than one with a MgoodN record.S 
With regard to their own discharges, the WAs were subject to close 
scrutiny by the DoE (and more so with regard to rates of compliance).6 
In particular, the WAs were required to specify, in what were termed 
Msampling guidelinesM , the regularity with which their discharges would 
be sampled, and these guidelines were to be subject to the approval of 
the SoS, and included in each discharge consent. In theory, therefore, 
public involvement in the development of these guidelines, and in 
checking that they were fulfilled in practice, could have occurred. 
However, from the research undertaken, this would seem to have been 
unlikely in reality - in particular because it proved impossible to 
obtain copies of the guidelines either from WA staff or other sources. 
Figures for WA compliance with the overall sampling programme were 
provided at Yorkshire Water WQAG meetings, including the reasons why 
sampling fell short of the target,7 but no details of individual 
requirements were ever given. It was also possible to test how often an 
individual discharge had been sampled from the results contained on the 
public registers - explained below 
facto involvement. e 
but this provided only ex post 
In summary, it can be suggested that there was very limited scope for 
public involvement in decisions relating to the nature and extent of ~A 
sampling, and clearly an absence of education about these decisions. 9 
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b. IOnitoring by the Public 
An alternative method. therefore. f th 
' , was or e public to seek to 
undertake their own monitoring of the receiving water around the 
discharger's outfall. This presented a range of practical problems, 
including the actual ability to take the sample - given that this could 
involve trespassing on the discharger's land the alternative being 
access via the river itself. Second, the actual problems of getting the 
sample analysed, especially in terms of cost, and the need, in most 
cases, for more than one sample to 
must be noted. 10 Sampling on the 
therefore, be regarded as a practical 
the public. 11 
ensure a MrepresentativeM result, 
part of the public could not, 
possibility for the majority of 
2. Obtaining the Results of SaDpling - The Public Registers 
In contrast to the absence of facilities for public participation above, 
in terms of being able to obtain the results of sampling COPA provided a 
significant mechanism in the form of registers maintained by the WAs and 
open to the public at all Nreasonable hours" (s. 41).12 However, it will 
be shown that there were significant limitations to the Meffectiveness" 
of the registers in practice, again supporting the contention that legal 
rights do not guarantee their fulfilment in reality. A range of key 
limitations, based on research at a number of WAs, including Yorkshire 
Vater, have already been reported (Burton, 1989a). The main points will 
be noted and the research placed in the context of the principles of 
meaningful participation. 
Apart from applications for consent (discussed in the previous chapter) 
the VAs were required to record all consents granted {including any 
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conditions attached thereto). the results of analysis of samples taken 
by the WA, any certificates of exclusion issued under s. 42, and any 
notices requiring abstention from Mgood agricultural practice- under s. 
51.13 The registers were first opened to public inspection on 1 August 
1985, and were required by that date to show all extant consents, but 
only the results of samples taken 
view of the public, the registers 
mechanism in respect of sample 
monitored through a comparison of 
specified in each consent. In 
after that date. From the point of 
were likely to be most significant 
data, by enabling compliance to be 
sample results with the conditions 
terms of providing a channel for 
communication. the registers. therefore, enabled information to be 
obtained on request (supported by a legal right) in accordance with 
stage VI. but this could equally act as the basis for further 
communication, and hence. a further series of decisions, where a 
discharge was found to be non-compliant. However, the registers provided 
no information about the reasons behind much of the information recorded 
- this had to be obtained through other means. 
The practicalities of using the public 
terms of the nature of the constraints 
registers can be considered in 
two) . 
imposed either externally or 
These will be noted in turn. internally (or a combination of the 
It will then be suggested that in practice the registers were little 
used, and a number of possible explanations for this propounded. Thus, 
it will be argued that the principles of meaningful participation were 
not fully realised in the case of the registers. 
a. Hzternal Constraints on Obtaining the Data 
t be t d that the registers were concerned only with First, it mus no e 
discharges of trade and sewage effluent, thereby excluding information 
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about the quality of drinking water~ and discharges to sewers <where 
secrecy was maintained even following COPA). 14 Abstraction licences were 
provided through another register set up under the Water Resources Act 
1963~ s. 53. In the context of 
to restrict the data available. 
trade secrets~ two further bars operated 
Section 42 Mcertificates· have already 
been noted in the previous chapter, (including that none were issued), 16 
but s. 94 also created a general offence (applying to more than just 
register-data) 
secretM unless 
of MdisclosingM information relating 
specified conditions were met. The 
to any Mtrade 
impact of this 
provision is not known, however~ it operated subject to s. 41 and~ 
therefore, could not limit the availability of information required to 
be maintained on the register. 16 Again account must be taken of the 
manner in which COPA II was implemented, in that any discharge which had 
been exempted until 1987, and subject to a deemed consent from then 
onwards, would not have been subject to monitoring and hence~ there was 
no sample data available to be recorded. 
There were also two further external constraints which were potentially 
significant, but it can be suggested~ because of the political will on 
the part of the WAs (as far as is demonstrated by the research), they 
did not prove to be a major problem. First, a number of authors were of 
the view that there was an important Mloop-holeM in the data required to 
be recorded, in that, where the WAs required dischargers to undertake 
the sampling on behalf of the VA (as a condition of the consent)~ the 
regulations which supplemented s. 41 (SI 1983/813) did not specify that 
the results of this sampling had to be recorded. For instance, Tinker 
(1972, p. 531) noted that such data would in fact be the property of the 
discharger, and according to Bates (1979, p. 211) it was likely that it 
would be more detailed than monitoring by the WAs. Furthermore, it was 
suggested that, given the cost of monitoring in the context of public 
expenditure constraints, WAs might be more keen to use such an approach 
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(Byers, 1978, p. 452). Three points can be made, however. First, it 
would have been open to the WAs to require, also as a condition of the 
consent, that the discharger permit the VA to include the data on the 
registers. Second, given the Mfear" of private prosecutions, it would 
seem unlikely that the WAs would have sought to offer indirect 
Mprotection" to a discharger where this 
themselves. Thus while an external 
was not available to the WAs 
regulations, it was open to the 
constraint according 
discretion of the WAs, 
to the 
given the 
necessary political will - which appeared to exist - to overcome it. 
Third, and more importantly, for what ever reason, it would seem that in 
practice the omission was not a real problem, WA staff interviewed 
variously reported that they either rarely required dischargers to carry 
out such monitoring, or the WA monitored simultaneously. There were no 
suggestions that WAs were seeking to save money by widely adopting such 
a practice. 
The regulations specified three types of sample to be recorded: (inter 
alia) samples of effluent taken by the VA either (1) in accordance with 
s. 113 Water Resources Act 1963, 17 (2) of their own discharges, and (3) 
samples of water taken by the WAs in relation to pollution control. The 
effect of this was to exclude samples taken by the WAs of other 
dischargers' effluent which were not "statutory samples", In practice, 
it was likely that most sampling would have been "routineM - designed to 
measure compliance - not with legal action in mind - and hence, a strict 
reading of the regulations indicates that this would not have been 
available to the public. This would have been a serious omission, but 
the DoE made it clear that they expected all samples taken to monitor 
discharge consent (therefore including any samples taken in accordance 
with the sampling guidelines for WA discharges) to be recorded (Circular 
13/85, para. 26). It would seem that in practice this was fulfilled by 
the WAs. 18 
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b. Internal Constraints on Obtaining the Data 
One important factor within the purview of the WAs, already referred to, 
was the question of the regularity with which discharges were monitored. 
In the context of the registers, this would clearly have a direct 
bearing on the volume and representative nature of the results available 
to the public. However, concerns can be expressed about the whole system 
of monitoring, as indicated supra. 19 It is submitted that any future 
approach requires a more developed concept of deCiSion-making which can 
involve the public and be comprehended easily. 20 
c. Practical Utilisation of the Registers 
There is no doubt that the registers were little used during the four 
years from 1 August 1985 until the IRA took-over responsibility for 
them. Two surveys have demonstrated the low number of inquiries made, 
and personal research has indicated that a limited range of people have 
benefited from this potentially significant mechanism for obtaining 
information (Burton 1989a, p. 193 et seq.). Generally, it has been a 
small number of groups with an organised approach to using the 
registers, and the knowledge of how to use the data, who have 
benefited. 21 
It can be suggested that there were a number of practical difficulties 
which could explain why the registers were rarely used (bearing in mind 
the apprehension of the water industry at their implementation, supra. 
chapter two). 22 First, it is contended that there was a lack of 
awareness on the part of the public, which was symptomatic of a general 
lack of understanding of the role and functions of the VA - hence the 
"public awareness campaign" in 1989 (supra. chapter three). It is argued 
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that this provides the clearest example of 
the approach of the WAs was very low 
the need for education, but 
key neither providing an 
extensive advertising campaign when the registers were first opened, nor 
producing leaflets about the registers and how to use them. This was in 
contrast to the amount spent on privatisation (Burden, 1988), and to the 
information provided about the COCS. Such an approach seems illogical 
given the extensive capital investment involved in actually setting up 
the registers. 23 Second, the extent of the comDdtment required on the 
part of the public was considerable, both to actually access the 
registers themselves, and then to obtain any useful data. This includes 
the location of the registers even where copies were provided at 
divisional offices this often involved travelling considerable 
distances, and access was only possible during the "working hours" of 
the WAs, suggesting the requirement for time-off work for many would-be 
inquirers. 24 Problems were also identified in terms of some computer 
systems (which were used to store and enable access to the data) being 
"dated", and not "user-friendly", as well as in terms of the costs of 
actually obtaining copies, with some WAs interpreting "reasonable 
charge" disgenerously, it is suggested. 
Further problems were in terms of whether members of the public could 
understand the data, and hence, the danger that they would be too 
apprehensive to make an initial inquiry, and whether an "adequate" 
volume of data was available. The main factors in relation to this have 
already been noted (supra.), including the effect of a number of 
outstanding deemed consents, the regularity with which discharges were 
monitored, and the potential, although it seemed not actual, "loop-
holes" regarding monitoring by dischargers and "routine" samples. 
It can be seen from the above, brief assessment, that to transpose 
"paper" legal rights into meaningful participation both education about 
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the rights, and the political will of the WAs, were crucial. While 
criticism has been levelled in respect of the former, VA staff were 
consistently keen to assist members of the public as much as possible, 
including providing on the spot guidance as to how to use the registers 
and the data which they contained. It can be argued that the VAs needed 
to take a more dynamic and positive approach towards promoting the 
registers,26 and thus, the views of the DoE that the registers 
provided Mfree and unimpeded accessM (HC 543, 1987/8, para. 5.27) - are 
disconcerting. It is encouraging, however, that the Government also 
accepted the need to keep the arrangements under regular review (ibid., 
para. 5.28). 
In terms of a holistic approach, consideration of the registers should 
be placed in the context of other mechanisms already considered. First, 
the extent to which members of the COGs were aware of the registers is 
interesting, as it might have been expected that members would have made 
consistent use of the registers. However, this seemed not to have been 
the case for the Yorkshire Water committees. A presentation was made to 
the committees (Horth and East Division Commdttee, minutes, 19 January 
1987) but this was not updated, and thus, members spoken to informally 
in 1988/9 were completely unaware of the registers. Questions relating 
to register-data appear to have been asked on only a couple of 
occasions, one of which included a promise that information about the 
number of inquiries of the registers would be provided at CCC meetings, 
but this was not followed up (North and East Division Committee, 
minutes, October 1985). It should also be pointed out that the 
Committees provided a means through which the issues raised above could 
be considered, but the opportunity was not taken except with regard to 
the provision of a copy of the register in Hull (ibid., 2 June 1986), an 
idea rejected by Yorkshire Yater. 
- 309 -
B. Irregular Discharges 
In the case of irregular discharges, the system of monitoring was 
largely dependant on the role of individual field officers keeping a 
close eye on their particular stretches of water (as explained fully by 
Hawkins (1984) and Brittan (1984», but the public, and dischargers 
themselves, also had a particularly important role in identifying 
pollution incidents. 2& Hawkins (1984) has also indicated how this put 
more pressure on the WAs to take action in respect of such cases, 
because of the "visible" nature of the decision-process. However, there 
was no formal mechanism for the public to obtain details of pollution 
incidents similar to the public registers, but it may be suggested that 
here the ComDdttee system again played a particularly important role. As 
indicated in chapter four, standing reports were provided to the WQAG 
and RFAC on pollution incidents and prosecutions. Thus information could 
be communicated through this method, subject to the limitations 
considered with regard to the comDdttees. 
II. SECURIIG COIPLIAICE 
Having identified that a discharge was not compliant with the conditions 
of its consent, or that a pollution incident had occurred, the next 
stage in the decision process was concerned with the way in which each 
of those states of affairs was dealt with. It will be seen that, 
although they potentially posed different issues, they were generally 
dealt with in similar ways. The WAs were seen to be concerned with 
remedying the effects of the breach and ensuring future compliance, 
rather than with the individual incident or breach for its own sake. 
Prosecutions were seen as a means to achieve compliance, but not as a 
means to punish • offenders· , Thus, although prosecution was the course 
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envisaged by the legislation. it was not an automatic consequence. and 
was often used only as a "last resort M27 where other methods were deemed 
to have "failed". The implications of this preference for -negotiated" 
compliance through "persuasion". is of great significance for an 
assessment of public participation. because much of the decision-making 
was "hidden". involving only the field officer and the "polluter" and. 
therefore. open to limited scrutiny by the public; indeed as Hawkins 
(1984) has indicated. even from the senior WA officers at times. The use 
of "persuasion" will be outlined. followed by consideration of more 
formal approaches, including the legal process. 
The significance of the enforcement process needs to be noted with 
regard to the level of non-compliance with discharge consents - as 
indicated by the debate over WA sewage works in particular - and the 
number of "irregular" pollution incidents occurring each year. 28 The 
point must again be made that both forms of non-compliance posed a 
threat to the publicly agreed WQO for each receiving water. and hence 
the process of public participation leading to that. In accordance with 
the principled approach, meaningful participation is equally important 
at the enforcement stage. 
A. Discharges of Trade and Sewage Effluent 
1. VA Enforcement strategy 
Two key points need to be recorded at the outset. in relation to the 
nature of organisational decision-making regarding enforcement. First. 
th Ii Y decisions t he VAs were given possibly unlike many a er po c , 
significant freedom from government interference as to the kind of 
enforcement approaches taken. 29 Second, individual field officers within 
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the VA organisations, also possessed significant discretion, and it was 
often difficult for VA policy agreed at Board level to be effectively 
transmitted to the level of individual discharges (Hawkins 1984, chapter 
4). Thus, VA pOlicy itself provided a "gloss" on the bare words of the 
strict liability offences created by the legislation (COP! II) and 
often, the field officers added their own criteria as well. 
Two features of VA enforcement policy have already been noted (Burton, 
1989b) viz. the disjuncture between the legislation and WA policy in 
practice, and the actual choice of that policy in the form of the 
positive adoption of the "compliance- or "accommodative" strategy-
bargaining and negotiation - rather than the "sanctioning" strategy 
the use of prosecutions (virtually) whenever an "offence" is comndtted. 
Essentially, this positive choice was based on twa key criteria. First, 
the belief that negotiation was a more "effective" approach in seeking 
to achieve compliance, and second (especially on the part of field 
officers), that many cases of non-compliance did not "deserve- criminal 
prosecution. Thus, same element of mens rea or "moral blameworthiness" 
(of at least negligence) was sought before field officers considered 
legal action to be "appropriate" (e.g. Hawkins, 1984, p. 11 and p. 191 
et seq.). A range of factors were taken in to account in varying degrees 
of importance. These included whether the nan-compliance threatened to 
cause "harm" to the receiving water, whether the discharger had been 
warned before and failed to take preventative action (such as installing 
treatment processes), and the general intention and attitudes displayed 
by the discharger30 Thus, it has been indicated that the formal 
definition of unlawfulness was not the de facto definition (Richardson 
et al, 1982, p. 194), and that pollution is an "organisational and moral 
1 t t " (Hawkins, 1984, p. 74).31 rather than a lega cons rue 
The above assessments of VA enforcement policy were mirrored by the 
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interviews at different WAs although far less detailed and more 
impressionistic - where WA officers indicated a similar overall approach 
and verified the kind of factors involved in the decision process. 32 In 
the case of Yorkshire Water specifically, the main factors included 
whether the breach was a first offence, and the likelihood of - or 
actual - damage to the river (especially to fish).33 It was also 
indicated, especially at Yorkshire Water and North West Water, that 
prosecution was more likely in the case of an unconsented discharge, 
than one where the consent was held but had been exceeded. 
a. IBplications for Keaningful Participation 
The above policies of the WAs have notable implications for any concept 
of meaningful participation, given that the role of the public, as 
already suggested, provides the extra Mdimension" in the "polluterM-WA 
relationship, a relationship which was not only well established but 
influential in the kind of response given by the WA to any Mtechnical" 
offence.3~ Clearly, in the decision regarding WA enforcement action, 
there were no facilities for public involvement. 36 Equally, in this 
respect, COPA II had a very limited effect. The public register was 
required to include information as to the "steps takenM in consequence 
of a discharge exceeding its consent (regulation 7(2)(d», but the 
research undertaken suggested that this was near to useless as an 
information tool, being limited in the range of information included by 
many WAs and rarely being sufficiently up to date. However, arguably, if 
the registers were to be valuable in themselves, this was the sort of 
information, provided in more detail, which could have helped achieve 
such a goal. 
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It is submitted that public involvement should have been possible, not 
only in relation to overall policy, but also in respect of individual 
cases, a view which is supported by the right of the public to prosecute 
(post), and hence the need, at the very least, for those considering 
prosecution to know - and quickly whether the VA intended to take 
action. Equally, it should have been possible for the public to 
influence the decision of the VA as to whether to prosecute; thus 
demonstrating the way public involvement would cut-across the existing 
relationship of the WA and discharger. Such influence could in practice 
only be achieved infDrmally with VA staff or Board members, and hence, 
the vital need for pDlitical will on the part of the VA, and the need 
for basic information about any cases of non-compliance. 36 WA staff 
interviewed, indicated that they would be open to the views of the 
public regarding possible prosecutions. The implications of the public, 
and other "external actors", was noted by Hawkins, in particular, who 
explained the way in which this also affected WA decisions in individual 
cases - especially in the form of creating a "defensive" response - the 
desire to protect the image of the Authority (1984, chapter 10). 
However, two factors actually worked to further dissuade the use of 
prosecutions. First, a perceived public ambivalence towards the use of 
the la~7 and the "fear" that the public would be more critical of the 
VA losing a case than of failing to take a prosecution. Hawkins reports 
that it was the certainty of conviction which determined legal action 
rather than a prima facie case (p. 185). The key theme of this aspect of 
his findings was, however, the extent to which VA deciSion-making was 
"visibleM and hence open to (public) scrutiny. 
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b. Possible Solutions 
It is submitted that the crux of the enforcement decision for the WAs 
should have been in the form of the WQO system, whereby, because a 
consent was (intended to be) tailored to the appropriate WQO/S, any 
non-compliance, or at least significant non-compliance, would have put 
the WQO in jeopardy and, therefore, required remedial action. This in 
turn would have overcome the problem of public ambivalence in that there 
would be a natural desire on the part of the public to see the WQOs, 
which they had been involved in agreeing, protected. The issue then 
becomes the question of the appropriateness of the criminal law, and of 
a prosecution followed by a fine. It may be argued that more 
"imaginative- remedies than fines provide the solution, and it is 
disappointing that this was not considered in the Water Act 1989. 38 The 
proposal of Hutter (1988) (albeit in the context of environmental health 
officers, but applying mutatis mutandis to water pollution) of the 
introduction of a negligence requirement has already been supported 
(Burton, 1989b, p. 10). In the case of water pollution and breaches of 
consent, this could be achieved by a form of enforcement notice, non-
compliance with which could lead to prosecution. 39 In practice the WAs 
were hindered by a further external constraint in terms of, both the 
level of fines actually imposed arguably this did not pose a 
sufficient deterrent - and the failure of magistrates to appreciate the 
actual costs of prosecuting, with the effect that the public, through 
water charges, have had to subsidise polluters. 4o 
The above argument relating to the WQO was, however, negated in practice 
by the way in which the regulatory system was not achieved in practice 
in the way envisaged by the nc. Kany consents did not tie-in with their 
WQOs, discharges were not controlled, and in the case of the many 
Humber, for instance, there had been no public participation in the 
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setting of the WQOs (chapter five). It is submitted that under the 
auspices of the IRA. this is the direction in which water pollution 
control should proceed in the 1990s.41 
A further underlying problem for the WAs in the use of formal 
enforcement powers was in the need for "even-handedness· in their 
treatment of other dischargers. given that the WAs themselves were 
achieving compliance rates no higher than 80 per cent in many cases. 42 
This problem. at least. should be solved by the creation of the IRA. The 
problem was further emphasised by the inclusion of the 95~-ile condition 
in all WA discharges (supra.). The effect of this condition was that 5% 
of samples in any 12 month period could exceed the permitted level. but 
the discharge would still be deemed compliant. and, therefore, lawful. 
ion-WA discharges did not include a comparable condition, which again 
raised the question of parity. especially where the non-compliance (of 
the non-WA discharge) was "marginal-. As a consequence, informally, a 
level of non-compliance was tolerated by the WAs. It is submitted that 
the question of discharges which only marginally exceed their consent 
conditions (including the issue of whether. for instance, only 95 per 
cent compliance is appropriate) must be addressed. It may be argued that 
a 95~-ile should be included for all discharges, subject to an ·upper 
tierN • 43 with the guarantee of the service of an enforcement notice 
(supra,) and then prosecution where either the upper tier is exceeded, 
or the lower tier for more than 5 per cent of samples taken, on the 
basis that such non-compliance would present a threat to the publicly 
agreed WQO. 
The research identified a number of attempts which had been made to 
persuade the WAs to take legal action against dischargers. 44 Two notable 
examples were first, by Friends of the Earth, who claimed that a 
campaign by their Avon and Vale of Evesham Groups was successful in 
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persuading Wessex Water to prosecute Tenneco (F i r ends of the Earth, 
1988), and second, the case brought by Derbyshire County Council against 
Jorth West Water was undertaken f 11 .. ~ o ow~ng a long running attempt to 
Persuade the Authority to ensure. through th i ' e necessary nvestment and 
remedial works, that the discharge from the Whaley Bridge works 
complied. This process continued for some ten years before the Council 
concluded that legal action was "required" (pe d D ht rs. comm., an oug y, 
1987). It would appear, however, that HKIP (see below) was not 
approached. 46 
2. Prosecution by the VA for Breach of Consent46 
The crucial step, prior to the actual commencement of legal proceedings, 
was the taking of what was known as the "statutory" sample (·stat" for 
short, but also known as the "tri-partite" sample), which, according to 
Hawkins (1984), was sometimes used as a threat in itself. Section 113 of 
the Water Resources Act 1963 (unaffected by COPA) specified that 
proceedings against a non-WA discharger could not be brought other than 
based on data resulting from a sample which had been taken in the 
correct manner. Essentially this involved the taking of the sample in 
the presence of a representative of the discharger, and then splitting 
of the sample into three parts, one part for WA analysis, one for the 
discharger, and one to be retained as a "control·. This enabled the 
discharger to obtain his own independent analysis of the sample as a 
basis to test the accuracy of the WA results and interpretation. A7 Thus, 
for the public in seeking to persuade the VA to take action it was vital 
that the VA was persuaded to take a "stat·. 
Exceeding, or failing to hold, a consent amounted to an offence under s. 
32 of COPA, which was written in the well used formula of COPAls 
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predecessors, of Mcaus[ingl or kno i 1 mi w ng y per t[tinglM~a the entry of 
trade or sewage effluent into co t 11 d n ro e waters. As noted earlier, it 
can be seen that the WQO had to be transposed through the WQS into the 
conditions of the consent because 1 
, on y non-compliance with those 
conditions was an offence; the VQO not being referred to in COPA.~9 
The main defences to such an action, and the problems in bringing a 
successful prosecution, are discussed more fully below, because they 
were more acute for the private prosecutor than for the VA. The point 
must be made, however, that if the process was over-complex for the WAs, 
this may have dissuaded them from taking action, thus leaving the onus 
on the public to prosecute, whereas it can be argued that prosecution 
was the responsibility of the WA, as the regulatory authority. 
3. Enforcement of VA Discharges - the Role of BIIP 
In considering the use of the law, while the above is concerned with 
enforcement by the WAs, the point has already been made that in practice 
WA sewage treatment works were achieving on average about 80 per cent 
compliance. so The issue of WA compliance, therefore, raises the question 
of whether the public were able to persuade the WAs to improve this 
position in relation to specific, or all, works. Clearly attempts could 
be made through the VA committee system or informally - following the 
obtaining of information through the public registers - but the question 
must also be addressed of the oversight of the WAs and the possibility 
of the WAs being prosecuted for non-compliance. Prosecution by the 
public will be considered below, but formal oversight was the 
responsibility of the SoS for the Environment and his Department. From 1 
April 198? Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Pollution was created as a unit 
within that Department, which brought together the staff previously 
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responsible for water and air in particular, 51 and from them on it was 
HKIP which provided the technical WexpertiseM for the SoS in setting WA 
consents and monitoring subsequent performance. 
While it seems established that the WAs could not prosecute themselves, 
it was clearly open to the SoS to do so, but this would seem not to have 
been seriously contemplated in practice, and it was the attitude of the 
DoE, in relation to such prosecutions, which drew some of the heaviest 
criticism from the Environment ComDdttee. The ComDdttee considered that 
it was not Mrealistic· for the DoE to leave it to the public to 
prosecute VAs, and were surprised at the DoE "absolving themselves of 
the responsibilityM. 
"Arguably, prosecution of a WA has become anybody's right 
but nobody's job. We recommend that the DoE, or the water 
inspectorate of HKIP, should be given a duty to prosecute 
those VAs which pollute watercourses" (HC 183, 198611, para. 
The fact that such prosecution was a possibility was, however, indicated 
by Colin Koniyhan in 1988, to the effect that: 
"HXIP, in examining detailed reasons for non-compliance, 
will continue to consider whether prosecution is justified 
in individual cases" (Written Answer, Hansard, HC, vol. 132, 
col. 562; 5 May 1988).63 
Id that since the setting up of H~IP, the In practice it wou seem , 
Inspectorate began to take a closer interest in the compliance levels of 
WA discharges.~4 Yorkshire Yater staff indicated that annual reports on 
compliance, including reasons for non-compliance, were required, coupled 
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with regular visits to every works by the area Inspector. Xatthews has 
pointed out that visits by Inspectors to all the WAs included checks of 
the public registers, and HXIP began to introduce new conditions into WA 
discharge consents empowering the Inspectorate to take samples of VA 
discharges (1987, p. 144). 
In considering the, arguably slim, possibility of prosecutions by HKIP 
of WA discharges, the issue of whether HMIP was genuinely open to public 
influence must be addressed, including through which channels this could 
be attempted. Again there were no formal means - and it may be suggested 
an absence of education about the existence and work of the 
Inspectorate. No evidence has been discovered of attempts to persuade 
HKIP to act, but it is submitted that in the run-up to privatisation, 
such prosecutions would not have been countenanced by the Government. 
4. Enforcement by the Public 
The final stage in the process for the public was the commencement of 
legal proceedings against either a VA or a non-WA discharger, assuming 
that attempts to persuade the WA/HXIP to act had either failed, or the 
action (short of prosecution) was not to the satisfaction of the party 
in question. COPA was significant, not only in making information about 
discharge performance available to the public, but in also providing a 
right to bring a prosecution, repealing the requirement to first obtain 
the consent of the Attorney-General (formerly s. 11, Rivers (Prevention 
of Pollution) Act 1961). However, COPA did not resolve, or even address, 
a range of complications which in practice made prosecuting an uncertain 
process. Thus, in contrast to the fears expressed by many in the 
industry, prior to the implementation of COPA II (supra. chapter two), 
that every breach of consent, however minor, would be prosecuted, only a 
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handful of cases were brought and none of th 
ese were against non WA 
dischargers. It is intended to review the main constraints which have 
been identified, and outline the key features of the cases that were 
brought during the period under study. It is important to note that, 
although the final decision in a prosecution rests with the court, it 
does amount to a mechanism of Mcontrol- rather than merely -influence" 
(Arnstein, 1969) over the policy-maker (discharger) with regard to 
compliance, although the "value" of a prosecution against the WAs has 
been questioned, and the possible implications for resources 
considered. 55 
a. External Constraints 
The Absence of Legal Control. The first problem for the public was in 
relation to those causes of pollution over which there was no legal 
control. Detailed reference has already been made to the range of 
discharges which were not subject to conditional consents and hence 
sampling. A further range of "discharges" not subject to detailed 
monitoring was the storm sewage overflows which operated during periods 
of heavy rain to cope with any potential over-loading of sewers. It has 
been estimated that there were some 5000 such overflows but, as a matter 
of practicality, these were not subject to the same kind of control as 
the discharges already discussed. 56 A second significant category, which 
became a centre of public concern towards the end of the period under 
study, was in relation to substances present in discharges which had not 
been included in the original application for consent. There has been 
intense debate as to whether the discharge of such substances was 
illegal as being without consent, or whether a consent issued under s. 
34 was all-embracing in other words that anything not strictly 
prohibited or limited by individual conditions was thereby permitted. 57 
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The Government, in response to the concern of the Environment Committee 
(HC 183, 1986/7, para. 102), stated that it considered such sUbstances 
would be illegally discharged, and hence open to prosecution, although 
it did accept that it would be possible for a "broadly worded" consent 
to lead to "doubt" (HC 543, 198717, para. 4.4). 
Cost. The second constraint, which provides the real reason why fears 
about prosecutions were exaggerated, was the cost which faced a private 
prosecutor (a problem also experienced by the WAs). For instance, in the 
first action, by David Wales against Thames Water, costs were estimated 
at t2000 but only t800 was awarded by the court.sa This action was 
brought with the financial and administrative support of the !CA, who 
have supported many civil actions in relation to water pollution in the 
past. Clearly financial reqUirements mean that such a prosecution was 
only a realistic possibility for those with the resources. S9 
b. Legal Uncertainties in Relation to Prosecutions 
Apart from the absence of control limiting the pollutions in respect of 
which prosecution could be brought, there were a number of uncertainties 
in relation to the legal process of prosecuting, which can be seen as 
additional to the above constraints. 
Tbe AdBdssjbjl1ty of Evjdence. The first key issue was the evidence on 
which a private prosecutor could rely. The possibility of the public 
taking their own samples has already been considered, but in practice it 
was more likely that the data from WA samples recorded on the public 
registers would have been relied on. Logically, it has to be assumed 
that this was the intention in creating the registers coupled with the 
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right of private prosecution, although the issue does not appear to have 
been addressed during the enactment of COPA.60 The issue is whether such 
data was admissible in court being Mhearsay" evidence,61 and with the 
added complications that the person who made the "record- (entered the 
data on the register> was not the same person who produced the results 
through analysing the sample in question. This issue will not be 
considered in detail here,62 as in practice, a more significant issue 
related to the question of whether data from samples not taken in 
accordance with s. 113 
admissible. 53 
Water Resources Act 1963 (supra.) was 
It will be remembered that, for the VAs to prosecute non VA dischargers, 
they had to comply with the requirements of s. 113 by taking a 
Mstatutory· sample. It would seem that as a consequence, actions by the 
public against non VA dischargers could only be brought in reliance on 
the analysis of such samples (as recorded in the public registers), but 
any other samples would not qualify. However, even at the end of the 
period of study this position had not been determined conclusively, 
primarily because there had been no private actions against non-VA 
discharges in which the matter could be tested. VA discharges were 
sampled in accordance with s. 34 COPA, and thus s. 113 did not apply 
(latthews, 1987, p. 143) with the effect that even Mroutine- (non 
Mstatutory.) samples could be used as the basis for prosecution. SA The 
question of the admissibility of such registered data has also not been 
conclusively determined, this time because it was not raised in any of 
the actions brought against the VAs. It was unlikely that the VAs would 
have sought to challenge the data they had provided as part of their own 
pollution control work; such a challenge would have threatened their own 
credibility, and potentially, would have led to challenges by non VA 
dischargers when being prosecuted by the WAs. It is submitted, however, 
that had there been any possibility of such data not being admissible it 
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would haye been challenged by the VAs.66 This raises the question of 
whether such challenges would have been mounted had (private) actions 
been brought against non WA dischargers, and leaves open the possibility 
of challenges against actions by the IRA (including by any of the newly 
privatised sewerage undertakers> following the 1989 restructuring of the 
industry. As explained in chapter eight, the IRA took over 
responsibility for maintaining the public registers. 
Interpretat10n of the -95J-11e- COndit1on. A further uncertainty in 
relation to VA discharges was the 95~-ile consent condition, which 
required data to be collected over a 12 month period to compare 
performance with the consent to determine whether more than 5 per cent 
of samples taken had been exceeded. 66 One of the key issues regarding 
the 95~-ile, was the correct way to calculate it. In particular, whether 
the permitted degree of non-compliance related to actual samples (ie the 
number of bottles of effluent) or to each individual determinand for 
which a specific limit had been set in the consent. Thus, on the former 
it would have been easier to find non-compliance above the 5 per cent 
permitted, on the basis that one failure in relation to say BOD, and one 
for DO would amount to two failures, whereas on the latter 
interpretation, the permitted number would have to be exceeded for each 
determinand separately.67 This is clearly central to the question of 
compliance, and hence the ability to prosecute. It appears to first have 
become an issue in the Derbyshire CC case. The VA (IVY) argued that the 
"determinand" approach was correct, and, therefore, the number of 
samples which had exceeded were insufficient to cause a breach of the 
consent according to the 95~-ile. This view was based on the notice of 
variation of WA consents issued by the DoE in January 1985 (supra.), 
which also relied on WRc technical report TR 230, and a further report 
by the author of TR 230 which justified this approach on the basis that 
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consents were issued on an "individual d t m1 d e er nan basis-, which the 
author considered to be a "clear-cut principle" (para. 7.3.1, extracted 
in a letter from the NWV Solicitor to Derbyshire CC, 17 June 1988, 
kindly provided by the Council), This was fatal to two of the counts on 
which the action against NWW was brought, The magistrates (apparently) 
decided that the position was unclear and, therefore, the case had not 
been proven beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution. 
c. Actions Concluded 
Despite the fears that led to COP A II being dubbed the "busybody's 
charter" <quoted by Pearce, 1984, p. 11), from 1 August 1985 to the end 
of the period under study there were, as far is known, six actions by 
private bodies/individuals all of which were against VAs (and all heard 
in magistrates' courts) ,68 These were as follows: David Vales v Thames 
Vater (1987), Derbyshire County Council v North West Water (1988>, ACA v 
Anglian Vater (1988),69 ACA v Thames Water (1989),70 Palumbo v Thames 
Vater (1989),71 and Derbyshire County Council v Severn Trent (1989).72 
In conclusion, it can be argued that there were a number of legal and 
practical constraints in seeking to utilise the right of private 
prosecution, thus limiting its potential value as a mechanism for 
meaningful participation. Equally, it is clear that it was a facility 
that was not well -advertised" (unsurprisingly), but was closely linked 
to use of the public registers those using them would be likely to 
know that prosecutions could be brought. As a mechanism for 
communication, clearly such actions were limited to a very narrow focus 
in seeking to affect priorities, especially investment, regarding the 
compliance of individual discharges. However, prosecutions could be seen 
as potentially more ·powerful" in influencing such (future) priorities, 
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bearing in mind the legal nature of the penalty, but the argument put 
forward earlier, of the need for M f an en orcement notice- type system, 
would strengthen this even further, 
action, non-compliance with which would 
in terms of political will, it can be 
by requiring specific remedial 
again be actionable. 73 Finally, 
noted that the political will of 
the WAs was less important at this stage of the process, but the 
political will of other actors was important most notably that of 
magistrates in being willing to accord MappropriateM penalties, and full 
award of costs to the prosecutor. 7 • 
B. Irregular Discharges 
In the case of Mirregular" or ·sporadicR emissions, similar issues arise 
in terms of the potential for the public to seek to persuade the VA or 
the SoS to take enforcement action, but again there were no specific 
mechanisms under COPA through which this could be channelled. A number 
of points can be noted, however. First, potentially, such incidents 
would be more MvisibleM by their nature (discolouring water or causing 
fish kills> and hence, be open to reporting by the public (indeed the 
WAs relied on the public, and sought to encourage them to report such 
incidents). As a consequence, the manner in which such an incident was 
handled would have been of a higher profile, especially where (for 
instance) a local angling club was directly affected. Second, such 
incidents were not recorded on the public registers (supra.) - even 
where samples were taken to prove the polluting nature of the emission. 
Thus, members of the public were reliant on information from the VA, or 
on taking samples themselves. In practice it appeared that, although the 
VAs adopted similar criteria as for s. 32 offences (above), adding a 
RglossN to the legal definition of non-compliance, they were more 
willing to take action, in part because of the increased visibility of 
- 326 -
the decision process, and also because of the more "discreet- (Hawkins, 
1984, p. 6) nature of the incident it w t" ti i as no a con nu ng state of 
affairs· suited to "incremental M enforcement t measures, 0 use Hawkins' 
terminology. In particular, it was possible that, in many cases, there 
would be no ongOing relationship with the polluter - for instance a road 
tanker accident causing a spillage into a river but this was not 
always true, especially in relation to agricultural incidents from 
defective silage stores, or where incidents occurred at plants where 
consented discharges took place, but where the incident was not the 
result of that discharge. 
Assuming, however, that the VA had not acted to the "satisfactionM of a 
member of the public or group, again a private action was pOSSible, 
although only one definite (attempted) case is known about (post). 
Section 31 used a similar formula to s. 32, in relation to ·causing or 
knowingly permitting", but instead of being concerned with the breach of 
consent conditions, the criteria of "poisonous, noxious or polluting 
matter- was utilised to define what amounted to pollution. There were a 
number of defences to s. 31, the most contraversial of which was that 
the action leading to the emission was in accordance with good farming 
practice as specified in the (non-statutory) code drawn up by XAFF (s. 
31(2)(c».7S The practical significance of the Code is, therefore, 
difficult to judge, either for VA prosecutors or potential private 
prosecutors, but it can be noted as a further external constraint. 
The main case that can be noted is the attempted private prosecution 
under s. 31 by the ACA against South West Water in relation to the 
pollution of the river at Camel ford by aluminium sulphate (chapter 
three).76 The action was apparently taken based on the view that the 
Crown Prosecution Service were proceeding "too slowly" (ibid,), however, 
b th DPP (The Independent, 7 November it was ultimately taken over y e 
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1989, and Observer, 19 November 1989). The case was expected to be heard 
in a Crown Court in Summer 1990. 77 
I 11. IDDIFYIIG THE COBTROLS 
Where a pollution from a systematic discharge did occur, there were two 
further types of action that the YA could take (but only one in relation 
to irregular pollutions), These related, first, to remedying the effects 
of the pollution in terms of any actual damage to the receiving 
watercourse, and second, to action in relation to the consent where its 
terms had been exceeded, either by varying the consent (up or down) or, 
ultimately, revoking it.7s The powers in each case will be outlined and 
the opportunities for meaningful participation analysed. 
A. Remedying ·Damage" to the River 
A further important feature of COP!, in relation to the powers it 
provided to deal with pollution, was in giving the WAs new and more 
comprehensive powers to remedy and "forestallM79 pollution, and charge 
the cost of the work to any party who caused, or was likely to cause, 
such pollution. However, while the WAs were granted discretionary powers 
in relation to virtually all waters, including inland and tidal rivers 
and underground waters, a range of duties in relation to inland waters 
only were not implemented. eo It will also be seen that, again, there was 
no scope in the legislation for formal public involvement in this 
decision process. 
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Under s. 46(4) the WAs were empowered in the following terms: 
"where it appears to a water 
noxious or polluting matter or 
authority that any poisonous, 
any solid waste matter is 
likely to enter, or is or was present in, any relevant 
waters in its area, the authority may ... carry out in its 
area or elsewhere 
appropriate -
(a) ••• 
such operations as it considers 
(b) ... for the purpose of removing or disposing of the 
matter or of remedying or mitigating any pollution caused by 
its presence or of restoring the waters (including the flora 
and fauna in them), so far as is reasonably practicable to 
do so, to the state in which they were immediately before 
the matter became present in the waters". 
Initial impressions of the likely practical benefits of this section 
have already been presented (Burton and Freestone, 1986, pp. 253-4), but 
Howarth has noted that, although the section appears to give practical 
meaning to the concept of the "polluter pays", the power of cost 
recovery (subs. (5)-(7» was severely limited because of the use of the 
word "operations". Thus anything, including the provision of advice, 
however costly, falling short of "operations" was not recoverable. He 
has, therefore, argued for a wider definition. s1 It was foreseen that 
one of the main uses of the provision would be in relation to the re-
stocking of rivers with fish where the pollution had resulted in a fish 
kill, and that this would not, therefore, need action on the part of the 
affected angling club. Consequently, such clubs were likely to seek to 
influence the VAs in their use of this power, being discretionary 
<Eastwood and Ord, 1986, p. 244). 
- 329 -
It can be seen that there was an absence of any procedures laid down 
through which such influence could be channelled and hence, individuals 
and groups would have had to rely on infor~l means, such as direct 
contact with WA officers, or through the WA committee system. In this 
respect fisheries interests would have been at a clear advantage in 
having representation on the RRCC as well as the RFAC (chapter four), 
but again the importance of the effective link between the members of 
the comDdttees and those outside them must be stressed. 82 A further key 
factor was clearly the need for political will on the part of the WA in 
being prepared to use the above powers. Presumably, it was equally 
important that the WA, or angling clubs, possessed a detailed knowledge 
of the state of the river prior to any incident, given the use of the 
term "immediately before" in the subsection. 
B. Re-Determ.ning the Consent 
In relation to consented discharges, the WAs were also given powers to 
modify the conditions imposed in the consent, or ultimately to revoke 
it. This was, potentially, an important provision, the former in terms 
of ensuring that consents were McorrectlyM tied-in with VQOs and kept 
pace with changes in the composition of discharges, and the latter in 
terms of ensuring that a discharge, unable to comply, was not permitted. 
Despite the detailed mechanisms for the involvement of the public 
described in the previous chapter, it will be seen that, in the case of 
reviews of consents especially, there were no formal mechanisms through 
which communication could take place. 
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1. Revocations of Consent 
Having granted a consent under s. 34, the WAs were then under a duty to 
-review from time to time" that consent and any conditions attached to 
it, and were further empowered to either revoke the consent if 
-reasonable to do so" or to make -reasonable modifications- to the 
conditions (s. 37(1». While no clear definition of -time to timeN was 
provided by COPA, or available from VAs, this review was subject to the 
minimum requirement that, except in special circumstances, it could not 
take place less than two years from the date of granting the consent. 
This was because, in each notice granting consent, the WA was required 
to specify a Nreasonable" period of Nnot less than two years" (s. 
38(1». This was provided, apparently, to give a degree of certainty to 
dischargers, given the investment likely to be required to achieve the 
initial consent. The "special circumstances" allowed this minimum period 
to be dispensed with; however, this latter power (s. 38(3)-(5» was not 
implemented,e~ and hence, as recognised by the Environment Committee (He 
183, 1986/7, para. 98) the WAs did not have the de facto power to stop a 
discharge in any kind of emergency.8£ 
In practice, therefore, it was very difficult for either WAs, or members 
of the public, to argue that the power of revocation should be used as a 
means for bringing to an end a discharge which was repeatedly non-
compliant. In particular, apart from the time limitations, because the 
action was required to be "reasonable-, it might have been difficult to 
argue that revocation was reasonable, given the potential effects on 
(for instance) a large company, although it could potentially have been 
used as a means for requiring the company to dispose of its waste by an 
alternative method such as via discharge to sewer. 
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Again there were no formal mechanisms for public i 1 nvo vement (ather than 
those already described in relation to the L7 wA as a whale) in such a 
decision. but it should be noted that s. 37(2) provided the option for 
the SoS to direct the VA. not only to use its powers under subs. (1) _ 
subject again to s. 38 - but as to how to use its powers. This adopted a 
similar formula to s. 35 (chapter six) in indicating that the 80S could 
act. either on his own initiative. or "i n consequence of 
representations". It is to be presumed. therefore, that the 80S would 
have been open to receiving such representations at any time. and would 
have been prepared to fully consider them. Finally, it must be noted 
that where the VA did decide to revoke a consent under s. 37. the 
discharger had the right of appeal under s. 39 (1) . 
2. Variations of Consent 
The alternative to revocation, envisaged by s. 37, was the variation of 
consent, which in practice was a far more important provision. This was 
because of the likelihood that some consents would be shown. through 
practical experience, not to be set at the "necessary" level to ensure 
that the appropriate WQO was achieved, or that consent conditions would 
have to be tightened to meet new EC obligations. ss Recent developments 
have also shown the importance of the successor provision in the Water 
Act 1989 (sch. 12, para. 6) in relation to the commitment at the Second 
Ministerial Conference on the North Sea to achieve a total reduction in 
inputs to the North Sea of 50 per cent by 1995, a requirement which in 
part will have to be achieved through reduced pollution loads from 
individual discharges. 
As was explained in the previous chapter. where an application for a new 
consent to discharge was made under s. 34, extensive opportunities for 
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public involvement went into operation (subject to s. 36(4»). However, 
where the WA proposed to undertake a review (under s. 37) these 
provisions did not apply86 and, therefore, the whole process of public 
involvement was to be by-passed. It is submitted that this position 
cannot be justified, and again demonstrates 
approach to public participation. It was 
the absence of a principled 
suggested by VA officers 
contemplate the relaxation of a interviewed, that they would never 
consent under this provision and hence, public participation was not 
required,s7 but it is submitted that public participation is required as 
much in the decision to determine to what extent a consent should be 
tightened, as in the decision to relax it.as It would seem possible that 
participation could take place again through informal means, or the WA 
committees, but this would be subject to the public knowing about the 
proposed review and the willingness of the WA to be open to influence. s9 
The nature of the problem is highlighted, and a partial (but inadequate) 
solution suggested, by the example of the two titanium dioxide 
discharges discussed in the previous 
inquiries following the calling-in of 
chapter. Both went to public 
the applications by the SoS, but 
they would not have been subject to publicity, and the opportunity to 
make representations, had the VA not decided to treat both cases as new 
applications under s. 34, having originally decided they would be 
treated as variations (which they strictly were) under s. 37. 90 This 
indicates that WAs possessing the necessary political will and wishing 
for public involvement, could have sought to require the discharger to 
submit a new application, but it may be argued that they would have had 
no jurisdiction to require this, and equally, if it was being proposed 
to tighten the consent, then the s. 36(4) "waiver" would seem likely to 
have applied. 91 Either way, it is submitted that this is a highly 
unsatisfactory position, which was not, however, remedied in the Water 
- 333 -
Act 1989, despite the continually increasing importance of the need to 
review consents. 
IV. COICLUSI OIS 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis. Apart from 
the apparent continued low level of education made available, and the 
importance of political will, the limited range of formal facilities 
provided under COPA in relation to the decision process following the 
granting of consent can be noted, in contrast to the arrangements for 
granting consents (chapter six) . This would seem to increase the 
emphasis on the VA committee systems and the need for informal contacts. 
It might be argued that not all the decision processes above would be 
amenable to formal mechanisms for participation, but it is clear that 
improvements could be made especially in relation to the reviewing of 
consents and the action to be taken in relation to individual discharges 
which did not comply with their consents. Further, while the right of 
the public to prosecute was an important development, there were a range 
of constraints and uncertainties which threatened to make the process 
far more difficult than, it is argued, should have been the case. 
Related to this is the second main theme, of the "e ffective M operation 
of the regulatory system. If the public are to participate in the 
process of pollution control, it is vital that the system operates as 
intended, from the agreement of WQOs to their implementation in 
individual discharge consents and the enforcement of those consents. 
Thus the question of the policies of the VAs in relation to enforcement 
need to be addressed, and the problems that the WAs, along with the 
public, faced in utilising the law. A number of suggestions have been 
put forward relating to changes in the substantive law that could 
improve this position. In relation to compliance by the WAs themselves, 
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this was clearly connected to investment, and hence, the finances 
permitted by central government, which the present Government in turn 
have strongly argued will be remedied through pr1vatisation and the 
additional expenditure permitted to achieve compliance by 1992. 
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IOTES: 
1 Similarly no reference will be made to discharges to sewers, and 
again the main emphasis of the chapter will be on discharges of trade 
and sewage effluent, with brief reference to irregular pollutions. 
:2 It will be shown that the "regulari tyee of sampling was essential in 
terms of the amount of information actually available, and the 
"accuracy" of any picture of compliance presented by the data. The 
importance of monitoring was stressed by the Environment Committee 
(HC 183, 198617, paras. 108-110), and see the Government response (HC 
543, 1987/8, paras. 5.19 et seq.). 
3 The clearest examples of this are Directive 76/160/EC Concerning the 
Quality of Bathing Water (OJ L31, 5 February 1976) and Directive 
80/778/EC Related to the Quality of Water Intended for Human 
Consumption (OJ L229, 30 August 1980). See further DoE, Circular 
18/85, super-seded more recently by Circular 7/89, paras. 30-6, 51. 
And note the information that the WAs were required to provide to the 
DoE. 
4 By comparison (in relation to trade effluent sampling) see the 
concerns expressed to Richardson et al (1982), and the problems of 
obtaining a "representative" sample. Importantly this also had an 
effect on the level of compliance sought by individual officers (pp. 
120-2); further below. 
S The DoE indicated the principles that should apply to monitoring, and 
the differences in relation to VA and non-WA discharges (Circular 
13/85, paras. 34 et seq.). The process and implications of sampling 
in the context of pollution control "in the field·, are described 
fully by Hawkins (1984, p. 80 et seq, and p. 155 et seq.). The views 
of the dischargers are presented by Brittan (1984). 
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6 Indicated by Clayfield and Woodward, 1987, p. 8 and Clayfield pers. 
comm. 
7 Especially staff shortages (for instance, notes of meeting, 25 
February 1988). 
S The WAs also undertook a programme of monitoring of overall river 
quality, enabling assessments of compliance of total riverine inputs 
and the VQO/S. For instance, Yorkshire Water updated, on an annual 
basis, the five yearly river quality survey for their region. 
Sampling was also undertaken by dischargers themselves, which some 
dischargers have claimed to be more Mrepresentative N than WA results 
(in Brittan, 1984, p. 33). The discretion for the WAs to require 
dischargers to monitor their own effluents also had potential 
implications in relation to the public registers. The implications of 
both points, in relation to enforcement, will be considered post. 
9 Criticisms of VA sampling have also been made with regard to its 
inconsistency - in particular by Birch, 1988, and Jackson, 1988, p. 
10. 
10 Especially with regard to the M95~-ile·, below. 
11 As opposed to actually identifying river pollutions (below) or of 
monitoring overall water quality, as undertaken by Greenpeace, in 
particular. 
12 Section 41 was notable in reversing the pre COPA position whereby 
registers had been required under the Rivers <Prevention of 
Pollution) Act 1951, but s. 7 had severely limited access - see 
Tinker, 1972. 
13 The details for each category were provided by regulations - S1 
1983/813, explained by DoE, Circular 13/85, and DoE, 1984b. 
1~ See chapter eight in relation to the Water Act 1989. 
1& Had any been issued this would have had the effect, inter alia, of 
preventing the recording of the details of discharge consents and the 
results of sampling. 
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16 But see further Waite. 1985. p. 118. and as to the actual publication 
of register-data. Howarth 1989. pp. 35-6. Regarding the "more 
draconianM (Waite. ibid.) s. 12 of the 1961 Act see Tinker, 1972. and 
Trice and Godwin. 1974, p. 326. 
17 The so-called Mstatutory" samples. explained post. 
le Indeed the DoE indicated that the regulations were deliberately 
framed so that more than the above three categories of data could be 
included. thus apparently including samples (of water) taken in 
relation to overall water quality (ibid. paras. 26-7). In relation to 
[WJQOs see further. para. 35. 
19 And see Burton, 1989a, pp. 202-4, where it was argued that regularity 
of monitoring appears not to have been "subject to clear 
understanding or logical criteriaM • 
20 One exceptional case which caused a great deal of concern, and 
ultimately a change in the law, was in relation to the time within 
which sample results had to be recorded on the register. According to 
the regulations, recording had to take place within 28 days of the 
results being received by the person in charge of the register, 
rather than of the sample actually being taken. In preparing a legal 
action against North West Water, (further below) I>erbyshire County 
Council had obtained a print-out of the NVY register (on 29 April 
1988) showing sample results from 1 January to 22 Karch 1988, which 
indicated that the discharge consent limits had been breached on five 
occasions. The day after the action commenced. the Council received, 
via a third party. a further print-out for the above period which 
revealed a sixth breach the sample result (for 1 Karch) had, 
however, only been recorded on 14 June. It was thus not possible to 
include it in the ongoing action. The Authority claimed that the 
sample had been subject to more detailed analysis, although the 
Council were not wholly satisfied with this, and wrote a number of 
letters to the SoS requesting a tightening of the rules to prevent 
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such delay. The delay was also crucial because a prosecution in a 
Magistrates Court could only be commenced within six months of the 
date of the sample <pers. comm. Council officers, including documents 
supplied by them, and see further Doughty, X, UA Case to Answer R , 
(1988), Surveyor, 27 October 1988, 16). Friends of the Earth have 
also alleged that four WAs failed to maintain their registers fully 
in accordance with the regulations regarding the details of the 
"composition" of discharges (Observer, 2 April 1989, p. 2). 
21 For instance, Friends of the Earth have carried out regular MauditsR 
of different VAs' registers, especially with regard to the way that 
the registers were maintained (supra.), and also as to sewage works 
compliance. From the feed-back they received from their network of 
local groups, it was suggested that members required a great deal of 
assistance in using the registers (pers. comm.). Possibly the most 
interesting example witnessed was in the case of the South Yorkshire 
Salmon and Trout Association, where data relating to all discharges 
to the River Don was being collected, and a system of maps and graphs 
denoting all the discharges and their performances, was being 
developed. Yorkshire Water were sufficiently impressed to wish to 
purchase a copy! The member leading this work had also written a 
leaflet on how to use the register, for the benefit of other members 
(pers. comm., attendance at the AGM) • Data has also been 
systematically collected as part of the preparation for legal actions 
by groups such as the ACA and Derbyshire County Council, as indicated 
below, and the National Federation of Anglers has indicated that it 
intended to systematically monitor sewage works in the south east, 
with a view to making it countrywide <Angling Times, 1~ December 
1988, p. 8). 
22 Again only a brief resume of the earlier report of the research is 
provided here - see Burton (1989a) for a fuller account. 
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23 In terms of advertising, in the case of Yorkshire Water, there was 
one exception, where advertisements were placed in local newspapers 
giving details of the registers and the new charges for copies that 
had been introduced <Yorkshire Evening Post, 7 October 1987). It has 
been suggested that the Yorkshire Water register cost t40 000 to 
provide <pers. comm., Yorkshire Water officer). 
24 During enactment of the Bill, a number of alternatives were 
suggested, such as providing access at local authority offices (see 
for instance, Hansard, HC, Standing Committee F, col. 90; 27 June 
1974) . 
26 For instance, by including explanatory leaflets with every customers' 
water bill. 
26 Many incidents, such as foam or dead fish, being highly visible. A 
number of groups have indicated that they regularly monitored rivers 
systematically in this way <pers. comm.) and see WATCH, sponsored by 
the Sunday Times. Friends of the Earth also set up a national Mwater 
pollution incidents reporting scheme". The contributions of anglers 
were also clearly significant. 
27 Hawkins (1984, p. 190) - law as the Nshadowy entity·; and see further 
the report by Lidstone, K W, Hogg, R and Sutcliffe, F, Prosecutions 
by Private Individuals and Non-Police Agencies, 1980, Royal 
Commission on Criminal Procedure Research Study 10. 10. 
28 In 1985/6 there were 20 000 pollution incidents (Angling Times, 20 
May 1987), and an average 22~ failure rate by WA sewage works 
discharges (HC 183, 1986/7, para. 25). Further details are provided 
in the DoE publication Annual Digest of Environmental Protection and 
Vater Statistics. 
29 Arguably they were actually assisted in the form of the consent 
reviews (chapters five and six) and the granting of Mtime limited 
consents". However, as the Environment Comndttee noted (He 183, 
1986/7, para. 26) the inability of VA sewage works to comply, acted 
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as a constraint on WA enforcement policy in relation to non-VA 
discharges, because of the need for an "even-handed" approach. 
30 Hawkins, 1984, chapters 5-10. Richardson et al (1982, p. 171) report 
similar findings in relation to trade effluent discharges, and they 
have also indicated that field officer perceptions of the consent 
standards were important. Where officers considered the consent 
standards "inappropriate" or "incorrect" they were willing to 
tolerate higher non-compliance; concern was also expressed in respect 
of the reliability of sampling, noted earlier (p. 121 et seq.). 
31 An interesting comparison with the findings of Hawkins et al, is 
provided by Hutter (1988) in her study of the work of environmental 
health officers; she found officers were generally reluctant to class 
technical breaches of the law as ·crimes", and even more reluctant to 
class the offenders as "criminals" (pp. 62-3). Similar criteria as 
for water were employed in the decision to prosecute - "gaining 
compliance is regarded as an open-ended and long term process" (p. 
132), a process which was not geared towards punishment (p. 191). 
Regarding law enforcement for air pollution offences, see Gunningham, 
1974, chapter 6, and especially note his contrast with law 
enforcement for crimes against property <p. 69). Brittan (1984) also 
analysed the reasons why, given the low level of prosecutions for 
non-compliance, dischargers did actually comply (p. 69 et seq.); but 
also note the general conclusions that dischargers wanted more advice 
and education, which was seen as the best way of securing compliance 
(p. 104). She also found that dischargers perceived field officers 
were most concerned with the prevention of damage to the watercourse, 
and hence, dischargers were quick to provide "first aid" to remedy 
any damage and limit its extent (p. 49). 
32 It should also be noted that discussions were with senior, rather 
than field, officers, clf Hawkins et al. 
- 341 -
33 Further, Burton and Freestone (1986, pp. 259-61) and Yorkshire Water, 
Vater Xanagement in the Aire Catchment - Proceedings of a Technical 
Seminar, (Ed. A M C Edwards), 24 February 1988, p. 51. 
34 Hawkins (1984, p. 16) has stressed this in terming the relationship 
"symbioticM , indicating its interrelated and long-term nature, 
thereby creating the perception that prosecution is precluded unless 
other more informal methods are "unsuccessful". 
36 The committee system might be considered of potential value in terms 
of VA pOlicy for offences in general, but they met too infrequently 
to be an effective mechanism for individual cases. It has already 
been noted, however, that at least two of the committees did begin to 
receive standing reports on pollution incidents. 
36 The point must be made that, unlike for pollution incidents (as noted 
above), it would have been impossible, before the introduction of 
public registers, for the public to detect that a discharge was non-
compliant. 
37 Also found by Hutter (1988) for environmental health officers. 
38 It should be noted that all the research referred to here, revealed 
that VAs and dischargers alike wanted the retention of the criminal 
law for "serious·' cases. 
39 An alternative, but similar approach - but not within the control of 
the WAs - was the imposition of conditional discharges where the 
defendant promised to remedy the problem (WQAG minutes, 25 February 
1988) . 
40 Yorkshire Water were always very keen that every effort should be 
made to ensure that full costs were recovered, and standing reports 
at the VQAG were closely scrutinised for this information. The low 
level of fines, as a factor dissuading prosecution, was a strong 
theme at IVY, as well as the costs and staff-time involved. Velsh 
Water, however, considered themselves to have been historically one 
of the "harder-line" authorities (pers. comm.). The problem of low 
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fines, and the question of costs, was recognised by the Environment 
Committee (HC 183, 1986/7, para. 45), the maximum being t2000. The 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Agriculture has been quoted as 
saying that the real problem lay in the level of fines imposed rather 
than the level of the statutory maximum (The Independent, 6 May 
1989). 
£1 A strong argument can also be made for the involvement of other 
dischargers (as members of the public) in decisions about others' 
breaches of consent, on the basis that discretion can lead to unequal 
treatment of individual cases (Davis, K C, Discretionary Justice: A 
Prelindnary Inquiry, (1969». Brittan (1984) found that dischargers 
wanted such equality - their concept of "justice" - both in consent 
setting <p. 26) and in enforcement (p. 67). 
£2 Noted by the Environment Committee, supra. 
43 A limit, possibly two or three times the consent limit, for which 
100~ compliance is required. This is designed to ensure that the 
95~-ile is not "abused", and was introduced for WA discharges as part 
of their "time limited consents", and is expected to become common 
practice in the future. 
44 It is assumed that there were many more which have not been 
discovered. 
46 The problems of informal contact with the WAs was suggested by the 
South Yorkshire Salmon and Trout Association, who indicated that they 
dealt regularly with Yorkshire Water in relation to discharges to the 
Don, but the continious flow of letters was a "slow process". 
However, it was stated that they would seek to increase the formality 
of the process as appropriate, including, ultimately, using their 
representative on the RRCC, and interestingly, making use of their MP 
(pers. comm.). 
4G Alternative formal action by the WAs is considered at the end of the 
chapter. 
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~7 As explained below, this rule did not apply to the prosecution of YA 
discharges, but did suggest potential problems for private 
prosecutions. 
~e See Bates, G X, "'Causing or Knowingly Permitting' in Pollution 
Legislation", (1977) Journal of Environment and Planning Law 629. 
49 The issue has been raised, however, of whether the summons should 
specify "causing" or "knowingly permitting" where the action was in 
relation to a breach of consent conditions; a point raised by Thames 
Vater in the action against them by David Vales - see Turner (1988, 
p. 2), clf Jackson (1988, p. 3). 
60 Note the comments of the Environment ComDdttee that "poor VA 
performance in meeting their own effluent consents cannot be 
excused", but the ComDdttee went on to recognise that an historical 
lack of investment was a key factor in this (He 183, 1986/7, paras. 
26-30) . 
51 For details see Howarth 1988, pp. 58-61, and the annual reports of 
the Inspectorate. 
62 In response to the ComDdttee, the Government stated that it "fully 
accept(edl M the criticism in relation to compliance rates and that 
this required "urgent improvement" (He 543, 1987/8, paras. 2.6-7). It 
should also be noted that as part of the process leading up to 
privatisation, the Government announced that t1bn would be made 
available to the WAs for the improvement of sewage works compliance, 
with a view to achieving almost total compliance by 1992 (see the 
statement of Nicholas Ridley [noted in chapter sixl during the Debate 
on the Government's response, 4 November 1988). 
63 And further the Government response (He 543, 1987/8) paras. 2.10 et 
seq. 
64 Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the public nature of the issue. 
65 See Turner, 1988, and Jackson, 1988. The ACA also considered that the 
right was important as a threat, which should not be over-used, but 
- 344 -
needed to be used occasionally to prove its real value ( pers. comm.). 
In the case of the WAs, the question of available finance, given 
central government control, must also be considered. 
56 It has been reported that it would cost £637m to adequately replace 
them (Sunday Times, 12 Karch 1989, p. A15), and see HC 183, 1986/7, 
para. 23. A further problem in pollution terms, already mentioned, 
was waters from abandoned mines. These were not subject to control 
primarily because of the likely costs and the problems of determining 
who should be responSible. 
57 The Yorkshire Post was a leading campaigner in this respect (for 
instance, 21 November 1988, pp. 1 and 7), supported by Friends of the 
Earth. (I am grateful to Andrew Lees, of Friends of the Earth, for 
bringing this issue to my notice). 
sa Further Burton, 1987b, pp. 293-4. This clearly raises wider issues 
about access to law and the administration of justice, which are 
outside the scope of this work. 
59 And see the references cited in Burton 1989a, pp. 204-6. The main 
difference for the ACA with such prosecutions was that the mainstream 
of their actions were civil suits aimed purely at obtaining damages 
where, for instance, a pollution had caused a fish kill and the 
affected fishing club required finances to re-stock. The power of the 
courts, following conviction of the defendant, to award compensation 
under the Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973, can, however, be 
noted - see Hawke, N, "Private Prosecutions for Water Pollution 
Offences in the UK", (1988) 3 International Journal of Estuarine and 
Coastal Law 266. 
60 The statement of the DoE in Circular 13/85 (para. 40) is, however, 
interesting. This states that the registers were designed for "public 
information", and nat as the "basis for legal proceedings·, but it is 
presumed that this was directed solely to the WAs in their 
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enforcement role, and was not speaking generally about the role of 
the public. 
61 An out of court "statement" tendered to prove the truth of its 
contents. 
62 Although it has been addressed by Jackson, 1988. A further 
uncertainty which can be noted, but which will not be considered in 
detail because it did not arise in practice, is the question of on 
whom the burden of proof lay in a prosecution for breach of consent 
conditions. This raises the issue of whether the rule relating to 
reliance on "exceptions", "exemptions", "provisos" etcetera under 
Edwards [1975] QB 27, and Hunt [1987] 1 ALL ER 1 (for trials on 
indictment), and s. 101 Xagistrates' Courts Act 1980 (for summary 
trials) applied, with the effect of placing a legal burden of proof 
on the defendant. Conflicting views have been expressed by Jackson 
(1988, p. 4) and Turner (1988, p. 2). It is contended that, as a 
matter of administrative convenience (the rationale for the rule) it 
would have been easier for the WA (as the regulatory agency, with the 
data to hand) to prove the breach of consent, than for the defendant 
to prove there was no breach. The question of the correct charge -
"causing", or "knowingly permitting", has also been referred to, 
supra. Again this has not been conclusively determined. 
63 For the reasoning indicated below, it is suggested that, as a general 
principle, registered data was admissible. 
64 This was the cause of great concern for the WAs who considered that 
they were being treated unequally, by being given less Mprotection"; 
see for instance Clayfield (in Lester, 1980, p. 174). The fact that 
it was the WAs who were providing the data, also raised the issue of 
the "privilege against self-incri~nation" see for instance the 
views of David Walker of the NWe, quoted in (1982) 94 New SCientist, 
1 April 1982, 6. 
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66 It was argued by the solicitors for Thames Water (pers. comm.) that 
the first case did not settle the point on the basis that the 
Authority pleaded guilty. Horth West Water defended their action 
against Derbyshire CC but did not dispute admissibility. Similarly 
Jackson (1988, p. 9) has suggested that, for the same reasoning, the 
VAs would not challenge the accuracy of the data, and hence SSt 68-9 
Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (as amended by SSt 23-4 
Criminal Justice Act 1988) would not have needed to be resorted to. 
66 Thus if members of the public were to take, and seek to rely on, 
their own samples, a number of samples, rather than just one, would 
have been required (Jackson, 1988, p. 9). 
67 Further, see Rees, J, Vater Privatisation and the Environment: An 
Overview of the Issues (1989), pp. 31-2. 
68 An action was also reportedly commenced against British Tissues, in 
relation to a discharge to the river Llynfi, but no further details 
have been obtainable (Angling Times, 9 March 1988). 
69 An action brought on behalf of a Federation of eight angling clubs in 
relation to a breach of consent to the river Lark in Cambridgeshire, 
heard at Xildenhall Magistrates' Court. The Authority was fined t750 
on each of two counts <Angling Times, 13 July 1988, p. 6, and 15 
Karch 1989, p. 11). 
70 Five counts of breaches of consent were charged in relation to the 
discharge from the Wargrave works to the river Loddon in Berkshire, 
the action being on behalf of the Wargrave Residents Association and 
the City of London Piscatorial Society. The Authority pleaded guilty 
to three counts, with fines totalling t4500 including, for one count, 
the maximum of t2000, plus £1000 costs <Angling Times, 18 January 
1989 and 8 March 1989). 
71 The Authority was fined £3000 with t1000 costs for a discharge to a 
stream at Winterbourne in Berkshire, in an action by the Chairman of 
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the Arts Council and local residents (The Independent, 3 October 
1989) . 
72 The Council issued summonses in relation to the Ashbourne, Pye 
Bridge, Pinxton and Bakewell works on a total of 16 counts, in 
respect of all of which the Authority pleaded guilty and was fined a 
total of £6800 with £220 costs (pers. comm., Council officers). 
73 The question of the appropriateness of more severe penalties, such as 
the imprisonment of company directors, instead of MjustM fines can 
also be addressed. 
74 The importance of political will on the part of the WAs at the 
earlier stages of the enforcement process can be re-iterated, in 
their willingness to prosecute, rather than leaving it to members of 
the public (supra.). 
7& Supra. (chapter six) in relation to withdrawal of the defence. The 
Code received sharp criticism from the Environment Committee 
especially the idea that causing pollution could never be excused (HC 
183, 198617, para. 64). The Committee thus called for the withdrawal 
of the defence. Note that the VRc submitted to the Committee that had 
the Code been properly followed, there would have been virtually no 
agricultural pollution incidents (1987, p. 19). The Government 
suggested that the Code had only been successfully used a couple of 
times by way of defence, and agreed to its repeal (HC 543, 1987/8, 
para. 3.6). For a critique see Howarth, 1989, p. 30. 
76 Summonses were also issued for offences under the Salmon and 
Freshwater Fisheries Act 1915 (Angling Times, 26 July 1989). 
77 Actions at Civil La~ It should also be noted that in respect of 
pollution occurring, which contravened either s. 31 or s. 32, it was 
open to those who had suffered "damageM to bring an action at civil 
law, primarily for damages. This was the main approach of the ACA, 
and had been since its formation in 1948. In 1987 the Association won 
"recordM damages of £350 000 in relation to a 1983 pollution of the 
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River Tees (Angling Times, 30 December 1987, and 24 February 1988). 
The details of the law will not be considered here on the basis that 
such actions raise similar issues to prosecutions under COPA, as a 
mechanism for meaningful participation. Detailed accounts are, 
however, provided by Bennett, G, ~Pollution Control in England and 
Wales: A ReviewM, (1979) 5 Environmental Policy and Law 93, and 
Howarth (1988, chapter 3). The most crucial limitation, in relation 
to the civil law, which thus highlights the importance of the right 
of private (criminal) prosecution, is the locus standi requirement, 
generally in the form of a proprietary interest, such as riparian 
ownership. Bentil has provided a detailed account of the common law 
as a mechanism for environmental protection for pressure groups, but 
found it Mlamentably ... wanting and unsuited to modern needs" 
(1981, pp. 324-5). He, therefore, analyses the model of ·citizen 
suits· being developed in the USA, an approach he finds "desirable" 
despite its many limitations (p. 342). 
79 Variation and revocation were also possible, irrespective of whether 
there had been an breach of consent, and importantly, this included 
the situation where practical experience revealed that the consent 
did not "accurately" tie-in with the appropriate WQO, and hence, even 
though compliant, the discharge was deemed to be having a deleterious 
effect on the receiving water. Yorkshire Vater recognised that this 
was the case with a number of their sewage works' consents. 
79 As discussed in the previous chapter. 
eo S. 46(1)-(3), as to which see HC 183, 1986/7, para. 15; HC 543, 
1986/7, para. 1.12 et seq. 
e1 1989, pp. 36-7. He further noted that on conviction for a pollution 
offence the defendant could be required to pay compensation (ibid. n. 
77) under s. 35(1) Powers of the Criminal Courts Act 1973 (as 
amended) (also mentioned supra.). 
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82 For instance, it was noted that not all angling clubs were members of 
the fisheries consultative system. 
-.. 
83 Partly, it is believed, because - of the complications of the 
requirements for compensation to be paid to dischargers. 
84 In relation to inland waters the WAs would have been under a duty to 
revoke or vary the consent where the discharge had caused damage to 
flora and fauna, but this provision was also never implemented. Under 
s. 46(4) (above), while the WAs could undertake their "anti-pollution 
operationsM, they could not interfere with a consented discharge. 
8S This was the case initially with the titanium dioxide discharges to 
the River Humber (chapter six and post). 
86 As s. 36(1) specifically refers to an application under s. 34. 
87 Similarly Matthews, 1987, p. 142. 
88 From the point of view of equity, the discharger had a right of 
appeal against such decisions - in relation to s. 34, s. 36 was seen 
as the equivalent to that for the public (supra.) - but apparently 
not here. 
8S Information would only be provided on the public registers once the 
new consent had been issued. 
90 Alternatively, it could have been sought to persuade the SoS to use 
his general discretion to hold a public inquiry under s. 96, but 
reservations were expressed about this mechanism in the previous 
chapter. 
91 The DoE indicated that a variation requested by a discharger was 
always to be treated as a s. 34 application (DoE, 1983a, para. 36), 
but that where the WA initiated the variation, and considered 
advertisement " desirable it would appear to be free to invite the 
discharger to make a fresh application under s. 34" (ibid. para. 38). 
As noted earlier, in the case of the "time limited consents", 
although advertising was not required, 
all the variations would be advertised. 
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the Government announced that 
PART IV 
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CHAPTER E I G H T 
Conclusions and the Future: 
The Yater Act 1989 
In this thesis it has been contended that while public participation has 
been accepted as a principle by successive administrations it has not 
been successfully translated into practice through a "principled 
approach"; and that such an approach is needed. In particular. it has 
been argued that the decision of when and how to provide participation 
has never been subjected to adequate analysis. This has had the effect 
that participation has not been provided comprehensively - it has not 
been offered in respect of all decisions and decision-makers. and when 
it has been provided it has often amounted to no more than 
"legitimation". offering no real opportunity to influence the outcomes 
of decisions. or providing access only for particular "favoured" groups 
rather than the public per se. The concept of ":meaningful participation" 
was. therefore. put forward as a means through which a "principled 
approach" could be developed. involving the ideas that participation 
should be provided on a comprehensive basis. directed at the actual 
locus of decision-making. and provided in a manner which would enable 
its actual utilisation in practice. Three elements to this concept of 
meaningful participation were, therefore, suggested. viz. (1) the 
ability to participate; (2) the opportunity. in the form of "channels 
for communicationU ; and (3) the willingness of the decision-maker (and 
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the participants) to treat the process as a "genuineM exercise designed 
to yield benefits for all involved. 
Meaningful participation was also put forward as a standard through 
which it can be sought to test whether any given decision process does 
enable such -genuine- public participation to take place, and it 
includes a number of principles which can be taken into account in the 
design of such processes. The legal regulation of water pollution was 
put forward as a significant example of policy-making because the 
opportunities for public participation, primarily through COPA II, were 
more extensive than in most areas of public administration. This 
provided an ideal case study through which to illustrate the way that 
the concept of meaningful participation could be applied to practical 
examples of decision-making to analyse the nature of any opportunities 
for public participation, as well as a means through which the concept 
- embryionic as it is - could be evaluated. The main body of the thesis 
presented the application of the principles of meaningful participation 
to the work of the WAs in relation to water pollution control, but set 
in the context of one VA Yorkshire Water which was studied as a 
"corporate entity", including its relationships with bodies such as 
central government and the EC. In this chapter it is intended to draw 
together the conclusions from the application of meaningful 
participation to the case study, including noting to what extent it can 
be argued practice did, or did not, accord with the concept, following 
which the concept will be re-evaluated. Finally, the Water Act 1989 
introduced significant changes to the structure of the water industry, 
including the abolition of the water authorities and the creation of a 
new, national public regulatory authority with responsibility for 
pollution control. This provided an opportunity for improvements to be 
made to the range, and nature, of the opportunities for public 
participation. This new structure will be outlined, and, as far as can 
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be judged at this early stage. its i Ii ti 
P mp ca ons for meaningful 
participation, in the light of the conclusions reached about the pre-
1989 position, will be assessed. 
I. COICLUSIOIS: IIHAIIIGFUL PARTICIPATIOI II THE PRACTICE OF YATER 
POLLUTIOI COnROL 1983-1989 
Water pollution control, primarily under the influence of COPA II, was 
put forward as an example of decision-making which was, potentially, one 
of the most "advanced" in terms of offering an extensive range of 
opportunities for the public to participate in the policy-making of the 
WAs. However, it is contended that the empirical research presented in 
the main body of this thesis provides clear support for the central 
argument of the thesis that participation is rarely provided on a 
comprehensive basis, and when it is provided, this is often without the 
necessary commdtment to a genuine process enabling equal chances for the 
public to influence the outcome of deCision-making. First, it was shown 
that there was an absence of the necessary political will on the part of 
the Executive towards providing comprehensive opportunities. Despite the 
enactment of important new (legal) rights in 1974, successive 
Administrations were willing to frustrate the will of Parliament by 
postponing the implementation of these rights for over ten years, partly 
at the behest of the WAs themselves, because of a mixture of the 
consequences of the rights for the WAs,l and the pervading economic 
problems requiring extensive cuts in public, including WA, expenditure. 
COPA II, incorrectly, it is submitted, was seen as likely to increase 
significantly such expenditure. Finally, in the mid 1980s, serious steps 
were taken towards the implementation of the provisions, but the manner 
in which this was achieved further illustrated the absence of comndtment 
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on the part of the Executive. Thus the legislation was phased-in, 
coupled with directions by the DoE that, in respect of virtually all 
discharges then coming under control, the main provisions for 
participation <advertising and representations) could be disregarded. 
The effect of this was to apply the, apparently extensive, opportunities 
to only a limited proportion of the control regime, rather than to all 
discharges of trade or sewage effluent to rivers. The more detailed 
analysis of COPA II, provided in Part III, further serves to illustrate 
the limited scope of the opportunities. In the case of -irregular. 
pollutions, actions designed to prevent pollution, and the review of 
discharge consents, there were, in reality, few opportunities for public 
involvement. 
Second, prior to the final implementation of COPA II, the Thatcher 
Government made significant changes to the internal constitutions of the 
WAs through the Water Act 1983. This included the removal of the right 
for local authorities to appoint Board members, the power for the Boards 
to meet in private, and clear directions to the new Boards that their 
first criteria was "economy and efficiency". Saunders has argued that 
this amounted to a sharpening of the "managerial ethos·, instilled in 
the WAs from the start <under the Water Act 1913), into what he termed 
the ethos of the "balance sheet- (1984, p. 1), or what has been termed 
in the thesis, that of "business principles". Furthermore, all 
activities of the WAs - including public participation - would have to 
take place within the framework of this governing ethos, itself 
described as "antithetical to participation" (Saunders, 1983, pp. 34-5). 
It is contended that there is enough evidence in this thesis, despite 
the already recorded difficulties of testing, to suggest that Saunders' 
assessment is valid witness, for instance, the extensive control 
exercised by Yorkshire Water over the 
central government controls over the 
eees, coupled with the effects of 
WAs finances, thus limiting the 
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potential impact that 
charges. 
t~ CCCs could have on the setting of water 
Third, it was suggested that one of the key problems with the practice 
of participation has been that when it has occurred it has not been on 
an Mequal M basis - "privileged" access has been the theme. Concern was 
expressed at the way in which the new arrangements, including those for 
consumer representation, would fit within the existing established 
relationships which a number of groups/organisations had with the WAs 
prior to 1983 (as described by Saunders [1983 and 1984] in particular). 
The need was stressed for political will on the part of such groups, as 
well as the WAs, to accept a positive role for the public per se, and to 
treat the various comDdttees as the main fora for policy consideration. 
However, doubts were expressed, as a result of the analysis in Part II, 
whether equal access was being achieved. 2 First, because of a perceived 
failing of the COGs in particular, to act as communicators between the 
Wi and the public per se, 
interaction between all 
and second, because of the apparent lack of 
the open comndttees. It is suggested that 
privileged access was achieved (at the very least) by default for two 
reasons. For instance, certain interests were catered for with 
membership on more than one committee, while the public per se were only 
given places on the COGs, but not the RROC or the RFAC. Because of the 
very limited interaction, the effect appeared to be the de facto 
exclusion of the wider public from many of the issues put before the 
RRCC and RFAC. The limited availability of education about the existence 
of the channels for communication and how to use them, also contributed 
to this situation of "privileged" access by default. 
Finally. the thesis also lends support to the argument that significant 
constraints are often put in the way of those seeking to participate. As 
part of the analytical framework (set out in chapter one) both external 
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(relating to bodies above the WAs in the "hierarchy·) and internal 
(relating to the WAs themselves) constraints were identified. In 
relation to most of the opportunities analysed there were a range of 
constraints evident. For instance, in the case of the CCCS, the extent 
of governement financial control was seen as an important constraint and 
doubts were expressed about the willingness of Yorkshire Water to grant 
the commdtteessignificant independence; in the case of the requirement 
to advertise applications for consent to discharge; the discretion to 
"waive" the requirement appeared to present an unnecessary internal 
constraint. 
Apart from demonstrating the way that participation is rarely provided 
on a comprehensive basis in practice, a second major theme of the work 
was that if the regime for water pollution control did not operate in 
the way intended, this would provide a further constraint to public 
participation by negating much of what was publicly agreed, thereby 
limiting the impact of that participation. In other words, if targets -
such as the Water Quality Objectives - having been determined following 
processes of public involvement, were not successfully put into practice 
through derivation into Water Quality Standards and then individual 
discharge consents, this diminishes the value of that partiCipation, 
making it appear futile. It is suggested that the research shows that, 
by the end of the period of study, the control regime was barely 
operating in the way that had been intended; this is unfortunate, as it 
is suggested, that the system of Water Quality Objectives was an 
important development which, if it can be made to operate, will yield 
significant benefits both for the aquatiC environment and for those who 
wish to partiCipate in policy-making about that environment. However, as 
described in Part III, the system was hastily created in response to 
external pressures, and applied to a structure where not all discharges 
were subject to control, and many of those which were, actually failed 
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to comply. Xore attention seems to have been paid, thereafter, to the 
discharge consents, without adequate regard to the governing WQOs. This 
can be coupled with the delay in the introduction of extensive controls 
(as noted above> such that some discharges were only being brought into 
control from 1987, and the problem of non-compliant discharges from VA 
sewage works was only beginning to be seriously tackled as a prelude to 
the privatisation of the utility functions of the VAs.a 
A. Overall CmlparisoDS with the Requ i relEnts of Jfeaningful 
Participation 
Apart from prOViding support for the central argument regarding the 
realities of public participation, a number of general conclusions can 
be drawn from the comparison of the case study with the three elements 
of meaningful participation put forward in chapter one. These general 
conclusions will be outlined, followed by a summary of the main 
conclusions from the case study. 
First, in terms of the provision of channels for-communication, these 
were not always made available -in the shape of formal facilities in 
relation to every decision, or stage of the decision process. It is 
suggested, however, that from the point of view of making participation 
available to the public this was necessary; the public cannot (at least 
without extensive education) be expected to know how to deal informally 
with a decision-making body, especially one as complex, and responSible 
for as many functions over a large geographical area, as the VAs were. A 
further danger, where informal means have to be relied upon, is that 
this provides significant discretion to the decision-maker as to who to 
deal with and how, in the knowledge that such dealings will largely 
remain hidden from wider scrutiny. Thus, without the necessary political 
- 358 -
will, this perpetuates the danger of privileged access. This is 
especially the case where, as was suggested for the YAs, the decision-
maker is subject to an overriding ethos which, by definition, does not 
encourage "genuine" participation. 
A number of different stages of the decision process, for which channels 
for communication were required, were 
argued that to achieve the kind 
identified 
of fluid 
(chapter one). It was 
two-way process of 
communication which accords with a "principled approach" to 
participation, there is a need for all of these stages to be provided in 
relation to every decision to a degree consistent with the nature of the 
decision in question. While the latter point will lead to a number of 
conflicting views in respect of the 
there were a number of examples in 
same deCision, it is suggested that 
the study where particular stages 
were not complied with. The setting of (new) discharge consents is 
perhaps of greatest interest in coming close to the kind of standard 
argued for, but a number of gaps were still identified (irrespective of 
the constraints also noted), including the apparent inequalities in the 
rights to have the decision taken over by the SoS in place of the WA, 
and further stages of communication (stage ~ undertaken as a result. 
Similarly, it was suggested that the committees offered an important 
development in (apparently) making 
but the main concern lay in the 
met, and hence, the very long 
considered and reviewed, including 
all the stages pOSSible, formally, 
irregularity with which the committees 
time-scale if matters were to be 
involving the nominating bodies and 
wider public. Despite such weaknesses, however, it is contended, that 
both mechanisms are significant in illustrating the way that the 
channels for communication can be put into practice if their full 
potential is recognised, and major constraints removed. 
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Two common features of the results of the analysis were also that stage 
IV was apparently never complied with (as far as can be detected). and 
stage VI only sporadically, and to different degrees. In the case of the 
former, it is argued that this is a vital feature of the concept of 
meaningful participation if the benefits of meaningful participation 
(propounded in chapter one) are to be realised. One of the problems 
identified was that of people not knowing how to participate. or 
providing "irrelevant" information. and it was argued that by 
participating, with the significance of the contribution made being 
explained. this would assist the participant in a Nself learning-
processW • It is hoped that decision-makers will pay greater attention to 
this point in the future. Equally. it is believed that stage VI (akin to 
what is more commonly termed Naccountability" or Nreason giving") is 
fundamental to any decision process, both in seeking to ensure that 
decisions are adequately considered (the "Franks" reasoning [Cmnd. 218. 
1957]) and that participants can know the decision and the reasons 
behind it. In practice, it is suggested that the amount of detail given 
varied significantly. especially as to why particular options had been 
rejected. In the case of the discharge consent regime there were few 
such requirements, however, again the comDdttees were of great potential 
(sometimes realised) in providing a means through which VA Board members 
and officers could be questioned as to the reasons behind decisions 
(including, in some cases [chapter four] why decisions had been taken 
without the prior involvement of the COGs). 
Second, in terms of the requirement of education. a particular concern 
must be expressed here, that insufficient education was provided to the 
k f the ~lAs ongoing decisions. and the public about the wor 0 • • ' 
opportunities for participation and how to use them. It is. therefore. 
unsurprising that the need for the "public awareness campaign" (chapter 
three) was identified. and that public concern over the performance of 
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sewage works reached a peak, coinciding with the move towards 
privatisation. Equally, it is unsurprising that facilities such as the 
comDdttees and the public (discharge consent) registers were 
"underused". It is unfortunate that there was such inconsistency in the 
approach of the WAs, including Yorkshire Water, to the different 
facilities - for instance advertising the COGs but not the registers or 
the Water Quality Advisory Group. Education is an issue which must be 
addressed in relation to any decision process, a point which will be 
continued below, in the context of the post 1989 water industry. 
As suggested at the beginning of the thesis, the presence or absence of 
political will was the hardest factor to take account of, and hence, 
this was only attempted to a limited degree, primarily in the form of 
seeking to identify external or internal constraints (as noted above). 
Apart from such constraints, it can be suggested that Board members and 
staff of Yorkshire Water, in particular, sought to be helpful and 
welcoming to participation (at least from those who knew how to 
participate). This was evident in particular from the range of 
comDdttees, where requests for (more detailed) information were met, 
members were assisted through seminars, visits to works, and detailed 
presentations on particular matters. The question of the extent to which 
the Authority was always Mopen to influenceM, however, must remain 
unanswered, although, given the business principles ethos, there must be 
doubts in relation to some decisions (witness "access to Board meetingsM 
[Part II]). 
A final point which needs to be 
Although the Community, and its 
made at this stage, relates to the EC. 
considered to the extent that t~y 
decision processes, have only been 
inter-linked with the regulation of 
water pollution, it can be questioned whether a principled approach 
based on meaningful participation has been achieved at Community level. 
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It has been suggested that the BC has been a major influence on the 
English regime for water pollution control through a series of 
Directives (Part III>, and it is likely that this influence will 
continue.£ It can be argued, therefore, that the application of 
meaningful participation is as appropriate at the supra-national level 
as the national or regional, but a number of steps will need to be taken 
for the decision-making processes of the EC to accord to the principles 
set out in chapter one a number of criticisms of the present EC 
structure were noted (chapter five). There will always be a need for 
extensive education of the public, about the decision-making structures 
of the EC, and how they interrelate with the British structure, as well 
as in relation to individual decisions. Equally, there are clear 
difficulties in providing channels for communication given that the 
adoption of EC legislation rests with the Council of Ministers, and not 
the elected Parliament. Such an approach is therefore dependant on 
effective communication through the appropriate (British) Xinister. but 
this rests on the kind of representative democratic structure already 
argued to be ineffective (chapter one). The question of whether 
mechanisms can be developed to achieve such co~nication with the 
public per se, therefore, needs to be addressed. 
B. A SuDlllllI"y of Individual Chapter Conclusions 
The thesis was divided into four parts. Part I was concerned with 
setting out the contentions of the thesis. their justification, and 
explaining the concept of meaningful participation and how this would be 
applied to the case study. Account 
the Executive in the development of 
the period under study. Part II was 
was also taken of the intentions of 
the water industry to the start of 
then concerned with an analysis of 
Yorkshire Water as an example authority. Part III with the workings of 
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the pollution control regime, and Part IV with concluding the work and 
considering the implications of the post 1989 structure. In this section 
it is intended to review the main chapter conclusions. 
In chapter two it was sought to establish whether the Executive 
intended, in initially creating. re-constituting. and then arming with 
extended pollution control powers, the WAs to operate in accordance with 
an approach similar to meaningful participation. The reasons for the 
development of the WAs, and. in particular. the issues behind their 
constitution and t~ proviSion of opportunities for public 
participation. were considered. and it was contended that they were to 
be subject to a dominant ethos, and that most opportunities for 
participation had actually been granted as concessions to powerful 
groups such as the local authorities and industry. Furthermore, as noted 
above, further concessions were granted in the form of actually delaying 
the implementation of the provisions in relation to pollution control. 
Chapter two, therefore, provided an indication of the framework within 
which the WAs were required to operate. These Mexpectations" were 
analysed more fully in Part II where one WA - Yorkshire Water - was 
studied in detail as, what was termed, a "corporate entity·. In chapter 
three, the structure of the Authority was outlined, including its 
relationships with central government the extensive nature of the 
financial controls to which it was subject - and its Board and comDdttee 
structure. The aim of this was to illustrate the kind of environment 
within which the regulation of water pollution. being only one of the 
range of WA functions, would have to take place, and also to show the 
extent to which meaningful participation could take place with the 
Board, given that many important decisions about pollution control would 
actually be taken at Board level, and, therefore, there had to be a real 
opportunity to influence the Board. In terms of opportunities for public 
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participation, the mechanism of holding Press conferences after Board 
meetings was analysed, compared with the previous practice of allowing 
both the Press and the public access to the Board meetings. Account was 
also taken of the Authority Annual R t d epor s an Accounts and the 
extensive range of information provided by the Public Relations 
Department. To provide an holistic approach to the study of the 
Authority, chapter four presented a study of the range of committees 
through which some form of public participation was possible, with the 
main emphasis on the eccs. The totality of mechanisms for cDmDUnication 
with the Board could then be analysed as a whole. 
It was suggested that the Government had successfully instilled in the 
WAs the ethos of "business prinCiples", but that within that framework 
Yorkshire Water had shown considerable comDdtment towards partiCipation, 
both through fDrmal and informal means. Specifically, it was suggested 
that the eees were a significant development in allowing for the 
involvement of the public per se, both through actual membership, and by 
communicating through the committees. Concern was, however, expressed at 
whether the potential of the committees had been fulfilled, because of a 
confusion over the roles of the comDdttee members, and a lack of 
education of the public. It was difficult to see how members could 
generally play other than an "interpretativeM role, and little evidence 
was found of them acting on behalf of the public in relation to policy-
making. Further, it was clear that the comDdttees were subject to tight 
control from Yorkshire Water, especially as to the regularity of 
meetings - a matter of some concern. In the case of access to meetings, 
it was argued that the choice should not have been seen solely as an 
either/or situation that improved communication might have been 
achieved through a combination of access to meetings and the eocs. The 
arguments for closure of meetings, presented by the Government during 
the enactment of the 1983 Bill, were not accepted as convincing. From 
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the point of view of the Press, it was suggested that there was little 
that could be gained through Press conferences that would not have been 
available through obtaining agenda and attending meetings. and indeed 
the latter would have allowed the Press to decide for themselves what 
they considered "newsworthy". However, it was argued that the governing 
criteria had to be what would best enable meaningful public 
partiCipation, and in relation to all the mechanisms in Part II, the 
analysis re-inforced the importance of political will on the part of all 
parties involved, including central government, the Press and the 
public. 
Part III was concerned specifically with the pollution control regime, 
which was outlined, with reference to its historical background, and an 
analysis of the opportunities for public participation in relation to 
the setting of Water Quality Objectives and Standards, both nationally 
and regionally (again using Yorkshire Water as an example), and the 
control of pollution from both "systematic" {trade and sewage effluent 
discharges> and "irregular" sources. s It was suggested in chapter five, 
that the system of WQOs and WQSs provided the baseline against which 
individual discharges would be controlled, but that their development 
was an urgent response to EC pressures, and occurred outside the 
statutory framework. It was argued that this was, in fact, a potentially 
beneficial development in providing a relatively clear method of 
management amenable to public participation, but it was questioned 
whether, in practice, it had ever worked in the way intended, and that 
there appeared to have been a clear absence of the desired "principled 
approach". Both points were heightened in the following two chapters. In 
chapter six the process of setting discharge consents was explained, but 
it was found that only a limited proportion of consents were being set 
in the manner intended. The opportunities for public participation were 
being by-passed, either through the exercise of VA discretion, or under 
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DoE guidance, coupled with the absence of control for many discharges. 
In the case of irregular pollutions there were no actual facilities for 
public involvement, and a number of potential controls, requiring 
secondary legislation, had not been introduced. In chapter seven, the 
process of retaining control through monitoring and enforcement was 
analysed. Many of the initial stages, including the regularity of 
monitoring, remained at the discretion of the WAs, although the public 
registers offered an important development as a means to obtain 
information about discharge performance. These were, however, under 
utilised due to a lack of education about them, and a range of 
constraints. Again informal means had to be relied on to seek to 
persuade the WAs to use the law to enforce discharge consents, and the 
process of the public themselves undertaking a prosecution was seen to 
be complex and was, therefore, unlikely to be common, and possibly only 
available to organisations with extensive financial backing. Finally, 
concern was expressed at the absence of similar opportunities for 
participation in the reviewing of discharge consents, and the remedying 
of damage to rivers, in contrast (theoretically at least) to the setting 
of consents. 
II. Rfi-KVALUATIIG THE co.eRPT 
At the beginning of the thesis it was indicated that the concept of a 
"principled approach", based on meaningful participation, was 
embryionic, having been developed inductively during the course of the 
research. An initial evaluation was undertaken in chapter one, and here 
a re-evaluation will be attempted in the light of the case study and 
conclusions thereof. 
It is submitted that the work has validated the essential concept and 
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especially the three elements on which it is based. Two clear themes of 
the empirical work have been. first, the need for the education of the 
public about the functions of the decision-making body in question, the 
facilities for participation and how to use them. Such education can be 
seen as a precondition to participation based on equal access which can 
thereby yield the benefits argued for in chapter one. as well as 
legitimating governmental activity. Second, no system of participation. 
which seeks to offer a genuine opportunity to influence the outcome of 
decisions, and hence lead to responsive decision-making. can operate 
unless there is the necesary political will on the part of all the 
parties involved in the decision process <whether national or regional 
government, the Press or public) to make 
thesis also emphasises the 
presence of political will 
difficultly 
the process beneficial. The 
in seeking to identify the 
at the different levels of administration, 
especially where those levels interrelate and such interrelation is 
often hidden. This difficulty of identification arises even where 
"obvious" indicators such as "constraints" are utilised. KcAuslan's 
definition of "ideology" <1980, p. xii) indicates the problem of really 
knowing what a person intends. 
One of the difficult issues relates to the different stages of the 
decision process at which a channel for communication is appropriate. 
The seven stages which have been included in the concept, are designed 
to demonstrate the need to develop a fluid process of two-way 
communication. It has also been sought to demonstrate that such 
communication needs to be analysed based on the interaction between the 
different processes amounting to participation. Thus participation is 
not just concerned with activity prior to the making of a decision. For 
th existing terms such as "access to information" or this reason e 
"accountability" were rejected. The 
decision as to the appropriate 
view 
degree 
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remains, however, that the 
of communication must be 
determined in the context of the decision in question. As noted earlier, 
the thesis has reinforced the view that. f ibl 
r as ar as poss e, actual 
facilities should be provided for each of the stages, the wider public 
cannot be expected to rely on informal means, especially in the case of 
large and complex administrative organisations. 
The thesis also demonstrates the need to 
studying any decision process, including 
the decision-maker operates, and all 
participation. 
take an holistic approach in 
the environment within which 
opportunities for public 
Finally, the issue again needs to be addressed of the likelihood of such 
a concept being put into practice. Doubts were expressed at the outset, 
with works such as KcAuslan (1980) and Gunningham (1974) being cited 
(chapter one). It is suggested that the thesis has further indicated the 
limited scope for optimism under present conditions, given the extent of 
central government control, and the imposition of an overriding ethos 
(of business principles), in relation to the WAs; all set against the 
back-drop of the present system of representative government serving to 
buttress the status quo. 6 Clearly, for the principles of meaningful 
participation to be put into practice in the manner argued for in this 
thesis there must be significant changes in attitude, primarily in 
Westminster and Whitehall, but equally at all levels of public 
administration. However, it is hoped that this work demonstrates the 
need for a principled approach being put into practice, and provides 
guidance as to the problems which must be solved for it to be achieved. 
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III. THE FUTURH: JlHAIIIGFUL PUTICIPATIOI AFTER THE VATER ACT 1989 
It was indicated in the Introduction to the thesis that between 1 
October 1983 and 31 August 1989 provided an ideal time period within 
which to base the case study, as the practice of the VAs could then be 
studied and compared with arrangements before that period. The end of 
the time period is marked by the major changes which took place in the 
water industry, primarily inspired by the privatisation proposals of the 
present Government, leading to the National Rivers Authority and the 
Water Services plcs commencing operations on 1 September 1989. The 
conclusion to the thesis, therefore, provides an ideal opportunity to 
outline these changes and to analyse their implications for the concept 
of meaningful participation presented here. In particular, it offers the 
possibility of assessing how the main issues raised in the thesis are 
dealt with post 1 September 1989, and hence, whether, as far as can be 
assessed at this early stage, the new structure moves any closer to 
achieving a principled approach based on meaningful participation. 
By way of introduction, it is apposite to identify the background to the 
changes, and the main reasons for them. This will be followed by a brief 
outline of the new structure of the industry. The emphasis will again be 
on the arrangements for water pollution control, and opportunities for 
participation therein, but a similar kind of holistic approach will be 
taken, as it was in the main body of the thesis. 
A. Background to the Changes 
It the water authorities were never planned for 
privatisation .... The government and the water authorities 
stumbled into it without any clear or coherent view of its 
i Ii ti II (Kinnersley, 1988, pp. 118, 12'1). mp ca ons 
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It has been contended that the proposals for water privatisation were 
born of "naked political di expe ency· (Herrington, P, [letter to] ~ater 
Bulletin, 3 February 1989 p 4) i th 
,. n at they originated during a debate 
over a proposed Statutory Order (required to set Thames Water's 
financial target) during which intense backbench concern was expressed 
over the likely increase in water charges for Thames . 
.. 
... to overcome backbencher unrest, Ian Gow [Environment 
Xinisterl spoke of 'examining the possibility of a measure 
of privatisation in the industry' - vague and cautious words 
but enough to gain the votes he needed" (Kinnersley, 1988, 
p. 12'7), 
This came - in February 1985 just two months after the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Neil MacFarlane, had announced that the 
Government had "absolutely no intention of privatising the water 
industry" (Hansard, HG, vol. '70, col. 45'7; 19 December 1984). The next 
stage in the process was the issuing, by the DoE, of a discussion paper, 
which was heavily criticised at the time7 and it has been suggested by 
Kinnersley that this provided the "clearest evidence" of the 
privatisation having been "unplanned, or not even thought through" 
(ibid.). This was followed by a White Paper in February 19869 and then a 
Green Paper in April that year (DoE, 1986b). The main points of these 
proposals were that the WAs would be privatised as complete entities 
(including, therefore, their pollution control functions),9 as Water 
Services Public Limited Companies (WSPLCs) to be regulated by a 
Director-General of Water Services. 
The change in SoS at the DoE, however, brought a significant change in 
outlook towards the proposals. One of the first actions of Nicholas 
Ridley was to suspend the proposals which had been set out in the White 
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Paper. The matter was then apparently left in abeyance until just before 
the 1987 General Election, when new proposals for a separation of the 
industry were included in the Conservative Xanifesto. The regulatory 
functions relating to the environment (including pollution control) were 
to come under the jurisdiction of a new (public) body, the National 
Rivers Authority, and only the "utility" functions were to be privatised 
under the guise of the YSPLCs. 
Following re-election, the details of these new proposals were 
published, in July 1987 (DoE, 1987a), however, there appear to be two 
views as to their rationale. The "official" version (stated in the 
consultation paper) was that none of the protections that had been 
devised to prevent "abuse" by the WSPLCs in the operation of their 
regulatory functions were adequate, or could overcome the "objection 
that regulation must not only be impartial, but also be seen to be 
impartial" (para. 1.5). The alternative view was that EC law would not 
allow a "competent authority" to be a private body. This resulted from a 
legal opinion obtained by CPRE.10 
After the publication of the July 1987 paper (DoE, 1987a) the proposals 
gathered momentum with a further consultation paper on the NRA in 
December 1987 (DoE, 1987b), and the enactment of the Public Utility and 
Water Transfer Charges Act on 10 May 1988. The latter (inter alia) 
empowered the WAs to begin the process towards the 1989 changes, 
including the setting up of shadow unitsll and transferring property to 
these units. 12 The culmination of the process was the publication of the 
Water Bill in November 1989, receiving Royal Assent on 6 July 1989, As 
already noted, the new structure became operational on 1 September 1989, 
with the privatisation of the ~SPLCs taking place in November 1989, 
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B. The Iew Structure of the Industry 
Given the above proposals it is appropriate to outline the structure of 
the industry after the latest re-organisation. Essentially the Water Act 
198913 created a split between the regulatory functions and the 
provision of the utility services. Thus the IRA was charged with 
responsibility for pollution control, fisheries, flood defence, 1£ 
abstraction licensing and limited navigation and harbour authority 
functions. The functions of water supply and sewerage disposal were 
transferred to the ten water and sewerage undertakers (who were to be 
licensed as such by the Director-General) joining the existing 28 
"statutory" water supply companies who were already in the private 
sector. 16 These ten water and sewerage undertakers are each subsidiaries 
of the ten "nominated holding companies" (the bodies actually 
privatised), the former being the successors to the WAs. 16. Under the 
terms of the Water Act, the water and sewerage undertakers are regulated 
by the Director-General of Water Services [DGWS] (head of a non-
ministerial government department the Office of Water Services 
[OFWS]). The main task of the DGWS is to balance the needs of the 
undertakers to carry out their functions, while at the same time 
protecting the consumer from the consequences of monopoly power. A major 
task will, therefore, be the operation of the price control formula (RPl 
+ K) in respect of the plcs. 
The IRA is thus the key player for present purposes, in being 
responsible for most of the powers and duties described in Part III of 
the thesis, with COPA II having been largely re-enacted in the Water 
Act.17 This was seen as a significant move in terms of ending the 
"poacher-gamekeeper" conflict of the former WAs and it was hoped that 
this would lead to stronger regulation, and consequent improvements in 
river water quality. However, the Act also places a role of oversight on 
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the SoS in relation to all three actors noted above. This includes the 
power of enforcement of many of the duties under the Act (s. 20), and 
the power to issue directions of a general or specific nature to the IRA 
(s. 146). As will be explained further, below, the SoS also has an 
important role to play in the pollution control regime. 
Part of the sheer complexity of the legislation (apart from its length) 
is the result of the way in which the functions and duties of the main 
actors overlap. For instance, s. 8 (supplemented by ss. 9 and 10) places 
each actor under a duty to take account of nature conservation and 
matters relating to recreation (modelled on duties formerly contained in 
the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981). The first point, in relation to 
meaningful participation under the new regime, to note, therefore, is 
the greatly increased importance of education, first, about the new 
structure and the key actors, and second, about their respective 
functions and duties, and the opportunities for public participation. 
Given the perceived failings of the WAs, in this respect throughout 
their 15 years, this is an issue which must be addressed early in the 
lifetime of the new structure. The first few months, however, have shown 
no indications of such education being provided. 
C. Prospects for Meaningful Participation 
The final stage of the chapter is to seek to assess to what extent the 
regime for pollution control under the Water Act 1989 accords with the 
requirements of meaningful participation set out in chapter one. A 
number of issues can be raised, adopting a similar approach to the main 
body of the thesis. 18 
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1. The structure of the IRA 
The first point of which account must be taken is the structure of the 
IRA, and hence, its arrangements for 
environment and the opportunities 
Authority is constituted of a Board of 
decision-making. its operational 
for public participation. The 
15 members, 13 appointed by the 
SoS, and 2 by the Minister of AFF (s. 1(2»,19 at national level, and 
ten regions (each based on the boundaries of the former VAs) each of 
which is overseen by a regional Board accountable to the national 
Board. 20 The DoE has made clear that in practice it will be the national 
Board which will be reponsible for policy-making. and the main forum for 
negotiation with government (DoE, 1988c, para. 27). Apart from the 
question of appointments to the respective Boards - for which it can be 
suggested that little has changed compared with the VAs - a key issue is 
the question of communication between the public and the RRA. It would 
appear, as will be illustrated further below, that most of the public 
input is designed to occur at the regional level, and hence this creates 
another indirect relationship, which means that effective cO~DicatioD 
between the regional Boards and the national Board <and vice versa) will 
be critical. In terms of those seeking to co~nicate via the regional 
committees <post) this effectively imposes an extra tier, potentially 
leaving the public more remote from the actual decision-maker. It is 
submitted that this is a matter which must always be borne in mind when 
significant (national) policy decisions are being made. In part the 
structure of the two-tier Boards is designed to alleviate this, in that 
ten of the members of the national Board each chair one of the regional 
Boards (NRA Advisory ComDdttee, 1989b) and will co-ordinate the work of 
the advisory comndttees <DoE, 1987b, para. 29). 
- 374 -
2. Relations with Central Government 
The question of relations with central government raises a number of 
related issues, which logically fallow from the problems which the WAs 
faced in relation to central government control. First, the NRA is far 
more dependant on central funds than the WAs were (because of their 
ability to raise revenue through water charges), and the Act specifies 
that grants may be paid to the Authority, and that it may raise revenue 
through loans (sch. 1). However, it was the clear intention of the 
Government that the IRA would work towards reducing its financial 
dependency as far possible through 
Principle" (DoE, 1986b, para. 6.1). 
would be levied on dischargers 
involved in setting and monitoring 
implementation of the "Polluter Pays 
Thus, it was intended that charges 
to cover the administrative costs 
discharges, and that, ultimately, a 
scheme of charges for the right to 
to increase revenue significantly. 
diSCharge per se would be introduced 
The power to do this had been 
included in COPA (s. 52) but was not implemented, in contrast with the 
scheme of charges for discharges to sewers. Second, as indicated 
earlier, the SoS is provided with powers of direction over the NRA (s. 
146), a provision likely to be of great significance in governing the 
relationship between the two, especially given the breadth of the power 
in s. 14621 which includes the work of the NRA in relation to pollution 
control. Only a limited safeguard is provided regarding the use of this 
power, viz. the requirement that Annual Reports of the IRA must detail 
any directions received during the year in question (s. 150), but there 
appears to be no requirement for directions to be otherwise publicised, 
especially at their making. 
A key issue with regard to the operation of the WAs, was the dOminating 
ethos (of business principles) instilled in them by central government, 
especially under the Water Act 1983. The extent to which any similar 
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ethos, which may be detrimental to public participation, may apply to 
the IRA, must also be considered, although at this stage, there is only 
limited information on which an assessment can be based. Despite the 
large degree of dependency on central finance, and the likely close 
relationship with government, it can be suggested that the IRA will not 
be subject to a requirement which places as precise an emphasis on 
"economy and efficiency" as the business principles ethos did for the 
WAs. This is primarily because the present Administration has proclaimed 
itself as truly "green" (in the environmental sense), and put forward 
the IRA as the key body to achieve a major improvement in the quality of 
the aquatic environment. It is unlikely, therefore, that the NRA will be 
too readily required to pay close attention to finance to the detriment 
of the performance of its functions. For instance, to quote the SoS for 
the Environment, that the Act 
... is a major environmental [ Act] in that it establishes " 
proper arm's length state control of the entire water 
environment" (in Lucas, 1989), 
It is submitted, however, that the above view must be tempered by the 
belief that the pervading attitudes of British government did not change 
with the implementation of the new structure, and, therefore, it is 
unlikely that the creation of the NRA has brought with it a sweeping 
commdtment towards meaningful participation, as suggested by the 
analysis regarding access to meetings et al (post), It can be argued 
that this is also demonstrated by the following comment of the Chairman 
of the IRA (a former SoS for Wales), the emphasised section of which 
suggests that regard may be paid to the stages of c011J111unicatioD 
following the making of policies <stage VI), but not the earlier stages; 
therefore, raising the question of whether the public will be able to 
influence NRA policy-making. To quote the Chairman: 
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"We have both the resources and the expertise to be 
effective, and to strike a balance between all the competing 
interests that use our rivers, while at the same time 
providing the strongest protection for their plant and 
wildlife ... Ye will operate openly by publicising our 
policies and publishing available information. The existence 
of a powerful, impartial and independent organisation with a 
clear statutory responsibility to carry out its duties 
transforms the way in which our water environment is 
guarded. It is an immense improvement on the arrangements 
that have existed before" (IRA - Yorkshire Region, 1989, p. 
4i emphasis added).22 
3. The -Open- CoDmdttee structure 
CoDlJlittees 
The Regional Rivers Advisory 
In terms of other opportunities for co~njcatjon, no provision for 
access to the meetings of either the national or regional Boards has 
been made. 23 Indeed it may be suggested that it was taken for granted 
that the Boards would meet privately, the issue appearing not to have 
been raised extensively. Similarly, no details are available as to any 
for~l arrangements for Press conferences following meetings in a manner 
similar to that for the WAs under the guise of the Code of Practice 
(supra. chapter three), It would appear that the mainstay of public 
involvement is intended to be through the system of ( .. open" ) 
cammdttees,24 primarily the Regional Rivers Advisory Comm1ttee (RRAC), 
supported by the Regional Fisheries Advisory ComDdttee which continues 
essentially unchanged from the arrangements described in chapter four. 
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Given their potential impo t i r ance n relation to meaningful public 
participation, the emphasis here will be placed on analysing the 
implications of the RRACs. 
a. Terms of Reference 
These were defined by the IRA as follows: 
"To advise the iRA on all regional aspects of the broad 
framework for river basin management, including: 
- the setting and monitoring of river, estuary, coastal and 
underground water quality objectives; 
- enforcement procedures for securing compliance with NRA 
requirements; 
- the promotion of conservation through IRA regulation, 
operations and works; 
- all aspects of recreational uses including policy 
initiatives and use of byelaws; 
- the reconciliation of any conflicts between different 
river uses; 
- charging policy for the provision of all services except 
in the areas of flood defence and fisheries; 
- water resources management plans. including policy 
gUidelines for licensing; 
- any relevant codes of practice/guidelines 
and to report annually to the NRA on its activities· <quoted 
from the Yorkshire RRAC Agenda, 13 December 1989, item 7). 
It can be seen from the above, that the intention appears to be that the 
committees will be significantly involved in the development of policy 
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and its implementation at the regional level. This is re-inforced by the 
terms of s. 2, which places the IRA under a specific duty to "consult" 
the committees in relation to the carrying out of its functions, and to 
consider any "representations· made by the committees. 26 For the RRAC 
system to accord with the requirements of meaningful participation it 
must be possible for the wider public to communicate with the NRA (both 
regionally and nationally) through the comndttees. A number of concerns 
in this respect, can be expressed. 26 
b. Interests -Reflected- on the ComDdttee 
The first point to consider is the interests which are now "reflected" 
through membership on the committee. 27 The Government made clear that 
decisions as to the terms of reference, the size of the committees, the 
interests involved, and the actual appointment of the members, were 
matters for the NRA to determine. According to the December 1987 
consultation paper <DoE, 1987b) the RRCCs (chapter four) were to form 
the basis of the comndttees, but the NRAAC, in its consultation paper on 
the committees, 2 May 1989 (HRAAe, 1989a> ,29 expressed the view that the 
composition of the RRACs should be "considered from first principles· 
because the committees would have wider responsibilities than the RRCCs 
<para. 15). It was also stated that the committees would be kept to a 
"manageable" size, of 15-20 members <ibid.>.23 Organisations were not to 
be given the right to appoint members, but they would be invited to make 
nominations, from whom the IRA would make the appointments (para. 16).30 
The interests, from whom members were actually appointed (in the case of 
the Yorkshire region committee) are indicated in Figure 8.1. (Appendix 
B). From this it can be noted that the extent of local government 
involvement is further reduced, and it can be questioned whether any of 
the members are specifically members of the public per se. 31 
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c. The Role of the )(embers 
In contrast to the cces, this issue was 
creating the new comDdttees, but not for 
meaningful participation, it is suggested. In 
expressed about the ability of the COCs 
clearly addressed before 
the better, in terms of 
chapter four concern was 
to act 
communicators for the wider public in pollcy-:.aklng, 
successfully as 
and it can be 
argued that the emphasis of the RRACs is to move even further from this 
role. While the consultation paper states that the IRA would be looking 
to members to "reflect a broad area of interest- and to "make 
arrangements for liaison with the interested bodies and organisations· 
(WRAAC, 1989a, para. 15)32 members 
" ... would not be regarded as representatives or delegates 
of the bodies in question; they would be individually 
selected for the contribution they would make to the overall 
work of the committee· (ibid. para. 16; emphasis added), 
This view was re-inforced at the first meeting of the Yorkshire region 
committee that members were appointed for their Mindividual 
expertiseR.3~ It is submitted that this is a backwards step which brings 
into question how the public can be 
NRA.34 Again it would seem that the 
expected to communicate with the 
main responsibility will fallon 
local authority members, but the nature of the membership (not all local 
authorities are covered)3S makes clear that even they are not intended 
to take this role, 
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d. Access to CoDDdttee Ieetings 
The above raises the concern that the committees may in effect become an 
extension of the (regional) IRA, thus with even less independence than 
the CCCS.36 This is buttressed by a new power given to the RRACs to 
exclude the Press and public by resolution under the Public Bodies 
<Admission to Meetings) Act 1960, the same power available to local 
authorities. 37 It is contended that this is a wholly unjustified power, 
and it is hoped that it will never be used. 
e. Regularity of Meetings 
There are two positive pOints which can be noted from the structure of 
the commdttees and indications from the first meeting of the Yorkshire 
RRAC. First, although indications were that four meetings per year would 
be held,3e (according to the Chairman) there might be the need for more 
because of the likely workload of the committee. 
f. Interaction of the ComDdttees 
Second, provision was made specifically to ensure some form of 
interaction between the various committees (including the RFAC and the 
Flood Defence Commdttee), in the form of the chairman of each committee 
being a member of the other two. Further, a combination of the three 
chairmen, the Regional General Xanager (the head of the operational side 
of the regional unit) and the IRA (national) Board member, would 
together form the MRegional Advisory Board", the purpose of which (inter 
alia) would be M ••• to enhance ... links between the IRA centrally and 
its regions~ (IRAAC, 1989a, para. 8),39 An interesting feature of the 
- 381 -
consultation paper is the statement that the RRAC would not "normally. 
advise on matters within the jurisdiction of the RFAC (NRAAC, 1989a, 
para. 16). This suggests clarity in terms of who should be contacted on 
particular matters. but it further means that r , if there is to be any 
successful communication through the commdttees, there must be adequate 
education as to which committee is responsible for which matters.40 
4. The Pollution Control Regime 
Apart from the major changes in structure already noted, the Water Act 
1989 also provided an extensive (although not totally comprehensive) 
revision of water law. This was the result of work carried out by the 
"Law Review Group" of the DoE, which was unconnected with the 
privatisation proposals (Howarth, 1988, p. 403), and which resulted in 
the publication of the consultation paper Vater and Sewerage LaW' in 
Karch 1986. The Water Act, therefore, provided a suitable vehicle for 
any changes deemed appropriate. In the case of pollution control, 
specifically, the Act actually introduces few significant changes,4t 
COPA II being largely re-enacted. 42 
a. Yater Quality Objectives 
Arguably one of the most significant developments 
Water Quality Objectives on a statutory footing 
is 
for 
the placing of 
the first time. 
Section 105 empowers the SoS for the Environment to serve notice of any 
WQOs on the iRA "for the purpose of maintaining and improving the 
quality of controlled waters", which is to include a date for their 
achievement. 43 Equally significant is that, in contrast to the practice 
reported in chapter five, provision is also made for the involvement of 
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the public - through a system of notice and "representations" - in the 
setting and reviewing of objectives (s. 105(4». Clearly, the success of 
this approach will be dependant on adequate education and political 
will, and it must be hoped that as many communication stages as possible 
will be incorporated, including the notification of individual 
representors regarding the effects of their contributions, and the 
giving of detailed reasons following decisions being made. 
At this stage the whole regime is, 
of the need for the reform 
however, 
of the 
in a state of flux because 
existing system of river 
classifications and WQOs, and the need to rationalise the, at times, 
distinct approaches of the ten WAs. Thus the WQOs of the former WAs have 
been adopted by the IRA, a review of the classification system is in 
progress, and the DoE have made it clear that new statutory objectives 
will not be set until 1992, by when the classification system should 
have been revised. 44 
b. The Consent System - Imposing and Retaining Control 
Similarly, it may be suggested that the consent system, for controlling 
systematic discharges, is also in flux, and for which 1992 will also be 
an important year. By then virtually all WA works should be in 
compliance <and hence their Mtime limited consents· will expire), all 
remaining deemed consents should have had 
NRA committee reviewing the consent system 
Kinnersley)A5 will have completed its work, 
conditions imposed, and the 
(under the auspices of David 
and had an opportunity to 
provide extensive public involvement in 
is hoped that, thereafter, the pollution 
relation to its findlngs. AG It 
control regime will begin to 
operate more coherently than, it is suggested, it has to date. This in 
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turn will yield benefits for the public wishing to be involved in 
policy-making in this context. 
Essentially the system of setting (and reviewing) consents remains as it 
was in COP! II, (although with responsibility having passed from the WAs 
to the SoS, advised by the IRA),47 It can be argued, therefore, that in 
practice there are likely to be few improvements in relation to 
achieving meaningful participation compared to the findings of this 
thesis.·e 
Tbe Vater Registers. The system of water registers (open to the public) 
has been maintained, although with few signs of greater education being 
provided about them. However, the information which is to be contained 
in them has been extended to include all statutory WQOs and all samples 
of water or effluent whomsoever taken by (thus removing the -loop-hole N 
identified in chapter seven) (s. 117), Inevitably, there has needed to 
be a process of rationalisation following the succession of the IRA, and 
in the case of the Yorkshire region, this has included the reduction in 
the number of copies of the register to three (to coincide with the 
number of operating divisions), However, prior to the take-over of the 
NRA, staff were engaged in a process of seeking to improve the way that 
information is recorded and retrieved, taking account of the views of 
people who had used the registers in the past (pers. comm,),49 
Enforcement. A number of changes can be noted in this context, In terms 
of the legislation, the two separate provisions creating offences for 
systematic and irregular pollutions have been merged (s. 107), with the 
six month time limit for prosecutions in magistrates' courts extended to 
twelve. 50 However, an important limitation (which caused a great deal of 
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controversy during the enactment of the Bill) is the so-called 
"amnestyM, whereby only samples of effluent taken after 1 September 1989 
(the start of the IRA) can be used as the basis for a legal action 
against a discharger (sch. 26, para. 25('7» . Because of the 95~-ile 
condition applying to the plcs' discharges, and hence the need to 
collect data over a 12 month period, this means that the plcs cannot be 
prosecuted for breaches of consent before 1 September 1990. 61 In terms 
of prosecutions by the public and the admissibility of samples, the Act 
has provided important clarification, although arguably achieved by a 
restrictive interpretation. Section 148 makes clear that only those 
samples which were taken in accordance with the Mtri-partiteM method 
(formerly under s. 113 Water Resources Act 1963) will be admissible in 
legal proceedings. However, this applies only to samples taken Mon 
behalf ofM the NRA, and, therefore, if sampling by the public is 
practicable, such samples will not have to comply with this section, and 
hence, presumably will be admissible. It can thus be questioned whether 
any significant constraints have been removed, in terms of the public 
seeking to bring actions, but early signs from the IRA are that the 
Authority is going to take a much stricter line with polluters, and 
hence, it may be more amenable to persuasion with the public less 
reliant on private actions as a consequence. 52 
Pollution Prevention. Finally, it can be noted that the Act places a 
greater emphasis on the prevention of pollution, following criticism of 
the Government's failure to use its powers under s. 31 of COPA. Thus, 
the SoS is empowered to make regulations to control the way in which 
"poisonous, noxious or polluting matterM is stored (s. 110) , and (at 1 
t d that regulations would soon be submitted January 1990) it was expec e 
to Parliament aimed at laying down construction standards for Silage and 
slurry stores, and oil facilities. Section 111 empowers the creation of 
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"water prote ti M ith c on zones w in which certain activites can be 
restricted or prohibited (most likely to be used to protect areas around 
boreholes), and under s. 112 the Minister of AFF (on this occasion) is 
empowered to designate Mlitrate Sensitive AreasM designed to prevent the 
entry of nitrate into controlled waters. Concern was expressed in Part 
III of the thesis, at the absence of formal opportunities for public 
involvement in decisions about pollution prevention. Little has changed 
under the Water Act 1989, although a small step forward is provided in 
the case of water protection zones and nitrate sensitive areas, where a 
process of public notice (through local newspapers and the London 
Gazette) and response, is laid down (schs. 7 and 11 respectively). 
5. Conclusions 
The above has presented an outline of the complex regime after 1 
September 1989, and indicated some of the major issues in relation to 
the requirements of meaningful participation. Overall, it can be 
suggested that little has changed, and the need for education and the 
necessary political will on the part of those involved will be at least 
as great. Emphasis has been placed on the "openM commdttees of the NRA 
because of the likely importance of them for achieving public 
involvement with a number of very significant policy decisions to be 
made in the next few years. However, it is submitted that the committees 
are even less likely to achieve meaningful public participation than 
were the CCCs, a point to be regretted. 
In the next few years the need for education about the institutions for 
pollution control, and their functions will continue to grow, it is 
suggested. This is because the structure outlined above will not remain 
static - as was made clear by the publication of the Environmental 
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Protection Bill on 20 December 1989. This proposes the introduction of 
"Integrated Pollution Control-, which aims to ensure that all waste is 
discharged to the environmental medium - air, land or water - to which 
it will cause the least damage. Each discharge, including those to 
water, will require an "authorisation" from Her Majesty's Inspectorate 
of Pollution. It has been indicated that aquatic discharges containing 
any of the 24 "most dangerous substances" (DoE, 1988b - the so-called 
"Red List-) will be subject to IPC, and hence responsibility for them 
will pass from the IRA to HXIP.63 Procedures, including those for public 
involvement, will, therefore, be governed by the new legislation which 
will include requirements for advertising, representations and a public 
register. It can be suggested, therefore, that the move towards IPC will 
lead to further public confusion about the responsibilities of the 
different regulatory agencies, thus increasing 
for educatiDD. Likewise, while the proposals 
significantly, the need 
in the Environmental 
Protection Bill for public involvement are to be welcomed, one 
consequence, in conjunction with the Water Act 1989, will be a complex 
structure of opportunities for public involvement, including different 
public registers, probably at different locations. It is therefore, open 
to question whether the new structure will lead to water pollution 
control being carried out in accordance with the principles of 
meaningful participation any more than was the case before 1 September 
1989. 
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KOTES: 
1 In particular the right of the public to prosecute WAs for exceeding 
their discharge consent limits. 
2 And coupled with this, the danger that the committees could actually 
legitimise such privileged access by appearing to be mechanisms 
designed to overcome it. 
a It is unfortunate that public attention also came to be focused 
almost solely on the question of consent compliance, rather than with 
the importance of the relationship between consents and their 
appropriate WQOs. 
~ It can also be suggested that developments within the EC may assist 
with the development of meaningful participation at the domestic 
level - witness the proposed Directive on access to environmental 
information. 
6 But with the emphasis on the former. 
6 Again see the comment of XcAuslan, quoted in chapter one. 
7 See the House of Lords debate on 22 April 1985 cited by Kinnersley 
(1988) p. 127 et seq. Details of those who responded to the paper are 
provided in a Written Answer, Hansard, HC, vol. 89, cols. 679-80; 16 
January 1986. 
e Cmnd. 9734; of which Kinnersley is equally damning (ibid., p. 132 et 
seq.). The following account is based on Kinnersley, unless otherwise 
indicated. 
9 The exception was to be land drainage which was to pass to separate, 
public bodies (Cmnd. 9734, 1986, paras. 46-48), and see further 
Financing and Administration of Land Drainage, Flood Prevention, and 
Coast Protection in England and Wales, Cmnd. 9449, Karch 1985. 
10 CPRE, Annual Report 1987, p. 4. As to the raising of the matter in 
the European Parliament <Haigh, 1989, p. 29). Interestingly, even at 
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the initial stages of the process, there had been those who had 
recognised that the privatisation of the whole of the VAs was not 
practicable - see for instance the comments of Lord lugent, cited by 
Kinnersley (1988, p. 128) 
11 For the NRA and the plcs. 
12 For the reasons behind the Act, see DoE, Vater: Preparations for 
Privatisation and Creation of the National Rivers Authority, News 
Release No. 255, 11 Kay 1988; but note the strong criticisms of 
members of the Lords (Hansard, HL, vol. 495, cols. 1637-1651; 21 
April 1988). 
13 As to the "philosophy" behind the Act, see Carney, K, WThe Philosophy 
of the 1989 Water Act", (1989) Vater Bulletin, 6 October 1989, 8. 
14 The "new" term for land drainage, reflecting that this is now the 
main problem to be faced in that context. 
16 This role includes the duty to provide the necessary sewage disposal 
works, to receive effluent from other traders into those works, and 
to then dispose of the trade and domestic effluent to suitable 
environmental media, including rivers. In relation to trade effluent, 
therefore, the plcs are designated as the consenting authority for 
discharges via sewers to their works, applying the provisions of the 
Public Health (Drainage of Trade Premises) Act 1937, as amended by 
Schedule 8 of the 1989 Act. Discharges containing any of the most 
dangerous substances <noted further below) will, however, be 
controlled by the SoS for the Environment under SI 1989/1156. 
16 The "nominated holding companies are listed in S1 1989/1531, and the 
successor companies in S1 1989/1465; see further Hall, P, "Water 
Transfer Scheme", (1989) Vater Bulletin, 28 July 1989, 9. 
17 See further below. 
19 Here the emphasis will be on arrangements nationally, but with 
appropriate reference to the position in the area formerly served by 
Yorkshire Vater. Equally, most of the following concentrates on the 
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IRA as the main body responsible for pollution control, but with 
account taken of other actors, especially the SoS, as appropriate. 
'9 References are to the Vater Act 1989 unless otherwise stated. 
20 See further below. The rationale for one national body, rather than 
ten, is explained in DoE, 1987a, para. 2.3. 
21 In particular, note the catch-all nature of subs. (l)(c)j further see 
Xacrory (1989, p. 213), who has also suggested that in practice the 
DGVS is likely to be allowed far greater independence than the NRA 
(ibid. p. 16), 
22 Similar views have been expressed by the DGWS in relation to his role 
23 
of regulating the plcs OFWS, The Operation of the Regulatory 
Regime, News Release, 8 August 1989; and see Paynting, T, "Ian Byatt 
- The Customers' Watchdog", (1989) Water Bulletin, 7 July 1989, 10. 
Note that the Authority is empowered to regulate its own proceedings 
<sch. 1, para. 4). 
24 At this stage nothing is known of any "closed" comDdttee structure 
which may be operating either regionally or nationally. 
25 It will be remembered that the Government refused to place such a 
duty on the WAs in respect of the coes (chapter four). 
26 This includes that again there was a delay in the creation of the 
committees, with the Yorkshire Region comndttee meeting for the first 
time on 13 December 1989. 
27 The reasons for avoiding the term "represented" are made clear below. 
29 Submitted to the Yorkshire Water CCGs at their June 1989 round of 
meetings. 
29 It can be noted, therefore, that in considering committee membership 
itself as a form of participation, this was being significantly 
reduced, including that the former position of four divisional CCCs, 
plus one RRCC, was being replaced by just one (smaller) comndttee. 
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30 An NRA news release (IRA, 1989) indicates that a range of 
organisations had been written to, inviting them to make nominations 
by 4 August 1989. 
31 late that according to the July 1987 Paper (DoE, 1987a, para. 9.4): 
-Kembersh1p should clearly reflect functions. While it is desirable 
that the comDdttees include some members of the general public, the 
bulk should clearly be drawn from those with special standing and 
experience in the subject covered by the committee, as well as 
including representatives of interested organisations-. Kembership 
also includes a member from the two water supply undertakers in the 
region (the successor to Yorkshire Water, and the York company), on 
the basis that the comDdttees would also provide the companies with 
advice on recreation matters relating to reservoirs and land in their 
ownership (ibid. para 9.3). 
32 No mention of the public. 
33 It was also stated that, for this reason, provision was not being 
made for members to send deputies in their absence. 
34 Further see Burton, T P, "The Role of the Regional Rivers Advisory 
Committees·, Environmental La~ forthcoming (1990). 
36 One of them is the former chairman of the RRCC. 
36 One of the purposes of meaningful participation is the ability to 
provide a "check" on the administration. 
37 The above also raises the question of the importance of the public 
attending meetings, again in contrast with 
is clearly going to be important, albeit 
communication. 
38 One more than the CGGs. 
the GGGs. Press coverage 
as a limited means of 
39 The Chairman of the RRAG is, therefore, given a much more important 
role than in the past, and for this reason was appointed specifically 
by the IRA to this post, rather than being elected by the committee. 
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He is, however, ·independent" of the IRA. At the RRAC meeting, it was 
indicated that the RAB meets monthly, but does not keep minutes. 
40 It might also be questioned whether a distinction can always be 
easily drawn. In the case of the RFAC, it was also indicated that 
members would be appointed to serve as individuals and not 
representatives (ibid. para. 14). See further s. 141, Vater Act 1989. 
The comDdttee to advise the SOS for Wales (s. 3) had not been 
appointed by 1 January 1990. It can be noted that in relation to the 
work of the DGWS, the Director was required to establish ten 
·Customer Service Gommdttees· (s. 6), which would be independent of 
the plcs, based broadly on the format of the CGGs (again with reduced 
"representation"). Concern can be expressed that one of the main 
functions of the committees is to deal with consumer complaints (s. 
27). They will also be subject to the 1960 Act in relation to public 
and Press access, but by 1 January 1990 they were still be in the 
process of being appOinted. See further DoE, Vater Privatisation: New 
steps for Promoting the Interests of Consumers, News Release, 19 Kay 
1989. 
41 See Part III, Chapter 1 of the Act. 
42 The clearest guidance as to the Government's intentions and 
objectives in this respect are to be found in the Green Paper (DoE, 
1986b) and the Government response to the Environment Committee (HG 
543, 1987/8). 
43 The SoS is no longer under the vague duty to "maintain and improve" 
river water quality, but by s. 106, he is under a duty (along with 
the IRA) to ensure that WQOs, notified under s. 105, are achieved. 
44 DoE 1988d, para. 8.3. Initial objectives have been notified to the 
IRA in relation to mandatory values under EC Directives 75/440/EC 
(see SI 1989/1148>, and 76/464/EC (SI 1989/2286). In both cases, 
because of the need for immediate compliance with EC law, the 
provisions for public involvement were by-passed (Regulation 5). 
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Interestingly, it was indicated at the first meeting of the Yorkshire 
RRAC, that the committee would be given a full role in assisting the 
IRA to advise the SoS on WQOs and that this process would be 
commenced by presenting a series of ·position statements· to the 
co~ttee in relation to the major river catchments in the region 
(notes of meeting). 
45 See Vater Bulletin, 8 September 1989, p. 3. 
46 It is believed that the review will include a number of issues raised 
in Part III of the thesis, as to the substantive working of pollution 
control. For instance, the need for consents to accurately tie-in 
with the respective WQOs, the problem of 95%-iles only appyling to 
sewage works discharges and so on. 
47 With the exception noted post. 
48 For instance, the power to waive the requirement to advertise 
applications for consent is retained, apparently because otherwise 
this would have involved advertising a large number of applications 
relating to domestic septic tanks <per a VA officer). Equally, there 
is again no requirement that variations for consent must be 
advertised, despite an attempt by Lord Aldington, during the House of 
Lords Co~ttee stage, to introduce one. It is also disappointing 
that all the provisions relating to public involvement have been 
-relegated- from the main body of the Act to the Schedules <sch. 12). 
However, a wider power to hold public inquiries is included <s. 120), 
which may, in particular, be used in relation to the setting of WQOs 
<1986d, para. 2.7.c), and inquiries could also be held in relation to 
any matter concerned with river water quality. 
49 And see the minutes of the WQAG, 2 March 1989. The Act also provides 
for two new registers; one providing information concerning the 
regulation of the plcs by the DGWS <so 31), and, for the first time, 
details of discharges to sewer are to be made public <sch. 8, para. 
3) . 
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60 No changes have been made to the kind of remedies available following 
conviction, such as the Mimprovement noticesM argued for in chapter 
seven, however. 
61 It does not mean, however, that the plcs are immune from prosecution 
for breaches of consent occurring during the first year. 
&2 For instance, the IRA sought to prosecute Shell in the Crown Court 
<where fines are unlimited>. 
63 The issue of increasing centralisation must, therefore, be addressed. 
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A P PHI D I X A 
The following provides the details of the research undertaken (October 
1986 - 1 January 1990). 
A. Informal Interviews 
Interviews were arranged fallowing a request by letter (indicating the 
general areas of interest, and the nature of the research), or at the 
invitation of the interviewee following correspondence. They were 
conducted "informally", structured only to the extent of using an 
outline list of points for discussion. During the interviews, written 
notes were made with the agreement of the interviewees. In all cases 
interviewees were given the opportunity to comment on the information 
used, prior either to publication of aspects of the work, or submission 
of the final thesis. (The interviews conducted during the ·pilot study", 
referred to in Burton and Freestone (1986) are nat included below), 
1. Yater Authorities: 
18 Karch 1987: Mr C Chubb, Velsh Vater (Bridgend), 
19 Karch 1987: Mr J D Foster, Severn Trent Water (Nottingham), 
23 March 1987: Mr R G Stead, Northumbrian Water (Newcastle). 
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11 Kay 1987: Mr P R Chatfield, and Kr C Haggart, Thames Vater (Reading). 
23 February 1989: (Sir) Gordon Jones, Chairman, Yorkshire Vater (Leeds). 
25 April 1989: Dr A J Shuttleworth, Chief Scientific Officer, Yorkshire 
Vater (Leeds). 
2. "Amenity· Organisations: 
29 June 1987: Mr A Edwards, Director, Anglers' Co-operative Association, 
Grantham. 
1 October 1987: East Riding Fisheries Consultative Association, 
Beverley, North Humberside (including attendance at Association 
meeting). 
16 Karch 1988: CONSYDER (Conservation of the Yorkshire Derwent), York 
(including attendance at committee meeting). 
14 February 1989: Salmon and Trout Association, South Yorkshire Branch, 
Barnsley (including attendance at Association AGK). 
20 Karch 1989: Friends of the Earth, London. 
3. Industry: 
15 February 1988: Mr P J Lynskey, Hazard and Environment Xanager, SCM 
Chemicals, Stallingborough, Lincolnshire. 
4. Local Authorities: 
24 October 1988: Mr R Higgs and Councillor M Doughty, Derbyshire County 
Council, Xatlock. 
- 396 -
B. Attendance at Yorkshire Water Comndttee Xeetings 
Xeetings were attended whenever practicable to observe proceedings, 
coupled with agenda and minutes of all meetings being obtained. At each 
meeting the opportunity was also taken to discuss issues informally with 
VA officers and members of the committees and Press. Gratitude is due to 
all those involved for their willingness to discuss matters, at times at 
length. 
1. Iorth and East Division Consumer Consultative ComDdttee: 
1 June 198'7. 
5 October 198'7. 
18 January 1988. 
6 June 1988. 
3 October 1988. 
6 February 1989. 
5 June 1989 (Scarborough, including a visit to the Scalby Mills Visitor 
Centre with the ComDdttee, courtesy of Yorkshire Vater). 
(at York, unless stated). 
2. Regional Recreation and Conservation CoDmdttee: 
2 October 198'7. 
3 June 1988 (York) . 
'7 October 1988. 
3 February 1989. 
2 June 1989 (Hull). 
(at Leeds, unless stated) . 
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3. Regional Fisheries Advisory Commdttee: 
22 February 1988. 
9 Kay 1988. 
21 November 1988. 
20 February 1989. 
(at Leeds>. 
4. Yater Quality Advisory Group: 
5 November 1987. 
25 February 1988. 
7 July 1988. 
3 November 1988. 
2 Karch 1989. 
(at Leeds>. 
C. Attendance at IRA - Yorkshire Region ComDdttee Ieetings 
1. Regional Rivers Advisory CoDmdttee: 
13 December 1989 (Leeds), 
D. Inquiries of the Control of Pollution Act Public Register: 
5 October 1987: Yorkshire Water, York. 
5 November 1987: Yorkshire Yater, Leeds. 
23 November 1987: Anglain Water, Huntingdon. 
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6 June 1988: Yorkshire Water, York. 
20 February 1989: Yorkshire Vater, Leeds. 
E. Attendance at COPA Public Local Inquiries 
22 and 29 October 1987 (Grimsby). 
F. Letters Received: 
Letters were written to an extensive range of national and local amenity 
groups, as well as governmental organisations and organisations involved 
in the water industry, either requesting documents or information on 
specific issues. Only those responses which included details in their 
text are noted below. 
J A Wakefield, Chairman, Coastal Anti-Pollution League, 5 Xarch 1987 and 
22 June 1987. 
J Stevens, Secretary, Humber Pollution Action Group, 19 larch 1987. 
S Jackson, Solicitor, Jansons, 8 July 1987. 
P T S Jackson, Litigation Solicitor, Thames Water, 17 July 1987. 
P Lester, Secretary, East Riding FeA, 23 September 1987. 
Dr A J Bates, Divisional Scientist, Anglian Water, 19 November 1987 and 
17 December 1987. 
R G Stead, Principal Water Quality Officer, Northumbrian Water, 19 
November 1987. 
R W T Turner, Company Secretary and Legal Adviser, Tioxide UK Limited, 2 
December 1987. 
I C Sinclair, Authority Secretary and Solicitor, Severn Trent Water, 4 
December 1987. 
- 399 -
D J Lea. Senior Administrative Officer, Control and Regulation/Technical 
Support, North West Water, 19 January 1988. 
S Harry. Scientific Liaison Officer, Welsh Water, 26 January 1988. 
Dr A E Varn. Regional Scientist (Regulation), Anglian Water, 4 February 
1988. 
P R VeIlings, Clerk to the North Eastern Sea Fisheries Committee, 8 
February 1988. 
V Jackson, Secretary, Esk and Derwent FCA. 27 May 1988. 
B Thorpe. Toxics Division. Greenpeace, 19 June 1988. 
X Carney, Secretary, Water Authorities Association, 31 January 1989 and 
23 lIay 1989. 
D J Pearson, Water Environment (A) Division, DoE, 26 April 1989 and 24 
July 1989. 
Dr G V Clayfield. Industrial Wastes and Effluent Standards Manager, 
Severn Trent Water 17 May 1989. 
Rt. Han. X Howard, Minister for Water and Planning, 22 lay 1989 and 27 
July 1989. 
J Le Patourel, Secretary, Thames Water, 4 July 1989. 
J Raine. County Director, Derbyshire County Council, 9 August 1989. 
N G Vooller. Assistant Secretary, Wessex Water, 10 August 1989. 
G. Publications and Papers Produced During the Course of the Research: 
1. Publications: 
"The Control of Pollution Act 1974, Part II: The Extension of Control to 
All Discharges to UK Tidal Waters·, (1987) 2 International Journal of 
Est uari ne and Coastal Law 10. 
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"The Control of Pollution Act 1974, Part II: The First Private 
Prosecution", (1987) 2 International Journal of Estuarine and Coastal 
Law 293. 
"House of Commons Third Report of the Environment Committee - Session 
1986-7" (review of), (1987) 2 International Journal of Estuarine and 
Coastal Law 294. 
"UK Environmental Law Association: Review of the Association and the 
First 'Garner' Law Lecture", (1988) 3 International Journal of 
Est uari ne and Coastal La w 91. 
"The Control of Pollution Act 1974, Part II Registers - Promoting the 
Public Interest?" (abridged), (1989) 3 Journal of the Institution of 
Yater and Environmental Xanagement, 260. 
"Enforcing the Law of Water Pollution 
Environmental Law 9. 
"Access to Environmental Information 
A Conflict", (1989) 3 
The UK Experience of Water 
RegistersN , (1989) 1 Journal of Environmental Law 192. 
Forthcoming (at 1 January 1990): 
"The Role of the Regional Rivers Advisory Committees·, Environmental Law 
(1990) . 
2. Unpublished Papers: 
Submission to DoE in response to "The National Rivers Authority. The 
Government's Proposals for a Public Regulatory Body in a Privatised 
Vater Industry", (DoE/MAFF/Velsh Office, July 1987), October 1987. 
"The COPA II Registers' Explained", 
October 1987. 
Leaflet for Friends of the Earth, 
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3. Papers Presented at SeDdnars and Conferences: 
26 June 1987: "Water Pollution: The COPA II Registers - Promoting the 
Public Interest?" Law School, University of Hull. 
18 Xay 1988: "The COPA II Registers Promoting the Public Interest?" 
(up-dated and extended) - for which awarded the "Otter Trophy" by the 
Tyne and Humber Branch of the Institution of Water and Environmental 
Management. following presentation of the Paper at the Branch AGM. 
20 January 1989: "The Exchange of Information: Definition and the Ideal 
- Its Application to the Legal Regulation of Water Pollution". Law 
School, University of Hull. 
11 April 1989: "The Exchange of Information: Definition and the Ideal -
Its Application to the Legal Regulation of Water Pollution" 
(extended), Socia-Legal Group Annual 
Edinburgh. 
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Conference, University of 
A P P E I D I X B FIG U R H S 
Figure 1.1 - Elements of the Concept of wXeaningful Participation-
1. wEducationw - about: 
the functions/responsibilities of the decision-making body 
the channels for communication and how to use them 
proposed decisions, and those already made 
2. The wChannels for ComDunicatiou- - Channels through which: 
stage IA 
stage IB 
stage II 
PRIOR TO THE MAKING OF A DECISION -
information can be made available by the decision-maker 
information can be requested, and received from the 
decision-maker 
information can be given to the decision-maker, whether 
following I, or not 
stage III - information given under II will be taken into account 
by the decision-maker 
stage IV 
stage V 
an explanation of the effects of the information given 
under II can be provided in relation to the decision 
stages I to IV can be repeated as appropriate 
FOLLOWING THE XAKIIG OF A DECISION -
stage VI details of the decision and the reasons for it can be 
provided by the decision-maker 
stage VII - the decision can be kept under review by repeating 
stages I to VI as appropriate 
3. ·Political ViII- - the need for the decision-maker: 
to be "open to influence" at all stages of the process 
to treat all participants equally, at all stages of the process 
to consider all information on its merits, irrespective of its 
source 
(For clarity, the terms used 
participation", and the analytical 
the text). 
within the concept of Mmeaningful 
framework are italicised throughout 
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Figure 4.1 Iembership of the cees in 1984 
Centra.! Division CCC 
West Yorkshire County Council 
North Yorkshire County Council 
Boothferry Borough Council 
Leeds City Council 
Selby District Council 
City of Wakefield Metropolitan District Council 
Confederation of British Industry 
(Yorkshire and Humberside Region) 
Association of Yorkshire and Humberside 
Chambers of Commerce 
National Chamber of Trade 
(Vest Yorkshire Council) 
West Yorkshire Association of Trades Councils 
National Farmers' Union 
Country Landowners' Association 
(Yorkshire Branch) 
Members selected by the Authority from amongst persons 
duly nominated in response to public ad~ertisement 
Yorkshire Water 
Horth and East Division CCC 
North Yorkshire County Council 
Humberside County Council 
East Yorkshire Borough of Beverley 
East Yorkshire Borough Council 
Hambleton District Council 
Harrogate Borough Council 
Kingston Upon Hull City Council 
Holderness Borough Council 
Richmondshire District Council 
Ryedale District Council 
Scarborough Borough Council 
York City Council 
Boothferry Borough Council 
Selby District Council 
Confederation of British Industry 
(Yorkshire and Humberside Region) 
Association of Yorkshire and Humberside 
Chambers of Commerce 
National Chamber of Trade (North Yorkshire 
and Humberside Councils) 
North Yorkshire Association of Trades Councils 
National Farmers' Union 
Country Landowners' Association 
> 
> 
<Yorkshire Branch) 
Members selected by the Authority from amongst persons 
duly nominated in response to public advertisement 
Yorkshire Water 
York Waterworks Company 
(* including one from the York Waterworks Company area) 
- 404 -
1 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
22 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
between 
them 
7 * 
1 
1 
30 
Southern Division CCC 
South Yorkshire County Council 
Derbyshire County Council 
Barnsley Borough Council 
Bolsover District Council 
Chesterfield Borough Council 
North East Derbyshire District Council 
Doncaster Hetropolitan District Council 
Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council 
Sheffield City Council 
Confederation of British Industry 
<Yorkshire and Humberside Region) 
Association of Yorkshire and Humberside 
Chambers of Commerce 
National Chamber of Trade <South Yorkshire Council) 
South Yorkshire Association of Trades Councils 
National Farmers' Union 
Country Landowners' Association 
<Yorkshire Branch) 
> 
> 
> 
Members selected by the Authority from amongst persons 
duly nominated in response to public advertisement 
Yorkshire Water 
Western Division CCC 
Vest Yorkshire County Council 
North Yorkshire County Council 
Bradford City Council 
Calderdale Borough Council 
Craven District Council 
Kirklees Borough Council 
Leeds City Council 
Confederation of British Industry 
(Yorkshire and Humberside Region) 
Association of Yorkshire and Humberside 
Chambers of Commerce 
National Chamber of Trade (West Yorkshire Council) 
Vest Yorkshire Association of Trades Councils 
National Farmers' Union 
Country Landowners' Association 
<Yorkshire Branch) 
Members selected by the Authority from amongst persons 
duly nominated in response to public advertisement 
Yorkshire Water 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
21 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
between 
them 
2 * 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
6 
1 
22 
(* Kirklees Council did not accept the invitation to nominate members to 
the committee), 
1 (S Annual Reports of the Divisional Committees, Figure 4. ouree: 
1984/5). 
- 405 -
Figure 4.2 - Iembership of the RRCC in 1984 
North Yorkshire County and District Councils 
Yorkshire and Humberside Council for the 
Environment 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds 
South Yorkshire County and District Councils 
British Trust for Conservation Volunteers 
Countryside Commission 
West Yorkshire County and District Councils 
Yorkshire Vildlife Trust 
Royal Society for Nature Conservation 
Yorkshire Naturalists' Trust 
British Canoe Union 
North Yorkshire Koors and Yorkshire Dales 
National Parks Committees 
Council for the Protection of Rural England and 
Youth Hostels Association 
National Anglers' Council 
National Federation of Anglers 
Hull and District Anglers Association 
British Field Sports Society 
Kilton Angling Club 
Inland Waterways Association 
Humberside County and District Councils 
Yorkshire and Humberside Orienteering Association 
Ramblers Association 
Peak Park Joint Planning Board 
National Anglers' Council and 
Salmon and Trout Association 
Yorkshire and Humberside Council for Sport and 
Recreation and the Sports Council 
Nature Conservancy Council 
Yorkshire Vater 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
) 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
21 
Figure 4.2 (Source: Annual Report of the Committee, 1984/5), 
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between 
them 
between 
them 
Figure 4.3 - Xembership of the RFAC in 1984 
Fisheries Consultative Associations 
Wational Federation of Anglers 
Salmon and Trout Association 
Netting Fisheries interests 
Institute of Fisheries Management 
British Vaterways Board 
National Farmers' Union 
Country Landowners' Association 
Universities of Leeds and Hull jointly (person 
with expert knowledge of river or lake ecology) 
Yorkshire Vater 
Figure 4.3 (Source: Yorkshire Vater, 1984a), 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
17 
Figure 8.1 - Xembership of the IRA <Yorkshire Region) RRAC in 1989 
(Independent) Chairman 1 
IRA Yorkshire Region Appointee 1 
Country Landowners' Association 1 
National Farmers' Union 1 
Royal Society for the Protection of Birds and Royal 
Society for Nature Conservation 1 
Eye on the Aire 1 
Countryside Commission 1 
Nature Conservancy Council 1 
Confederation of British Industry 1 
Central Electricity Generating Board 1 
North Yorkshire County Council/Craven District Council 1 
British Waterways Board 1 
Association of Metropolitan Authorities 1 
Sport~; Council/Yorkshire and Humberside Sports Councill 
Central Council for Physical Recreation 1 
York Waterworks Company 1 
Yorkshire Vater pIc 1 
CPRE (Southern Area) - representing general interests 1 
Peak District National Park 1 
18 
Figure 8.1 (Source: RRAC Agenda, 13 December 1989), 
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